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Abstract
This thesis identifies and examines a conjunction between white postcolonial cultural 
and species concerns within recent novels from South Africa, Canada, New Zealand and 
Australia.  The argument takes as a starting point a suggestion by Philip Armstrong that 
postcolonial and animal studies discourses might form an alliance based on a common 
antagonist: humanism.  Here, this idea is applied in the context of literature by white 
postcolonial writers.  I explore the extent and nature of the alliance and the degree to 
which it can be called successful within the selected novels.
 Each of the five chapters concerns a different text, and the thesis is also divided 
into two sections.  The first addresses the contrasting approaches to humanism and to 
animals offered by J.M. Coetzee’s Disgrace (1999) and Yann Martel’s Life of Pi (2001).
The second addresses the representation of these themes in Fiona Farrell’s Mr Allbones' 
Ferrets (2007), Julia Leigh’s The Hunter (1999), and Margaret Atwood’s Oryx and 
Crake (2003), set in the past, present and future respectively, to illustrate the temporal 
dimension of the white postcolonial-animal alliance in question.  
 Overall, the thesis emphasises the relevance of species concerns within white 
postcolonial culture, and posits the existence of a thread running through contemporary 
white postcolonial novels in which animals are a priority.  All of the novels examined 
here, I argue, represent animals as more than victims in relation to humanist discourse: 
they emphasise animals’ potential to disrupt that discourse by affecting the attitudes of 
individual humans or by resisting humanist endeavours by their own actions.  The result 
of this, I suggest, is that animals appear as allies in white postcolonial cultures’ attempts 
at self-definition against historical colonialism and contemporary globalisation, while 
white postcolonial literature portrays animals in ways that promote positive human 
perceptions of them.    
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1Introduction: writing others 
In an article entitled ‘Bats in the Gardens’, Helen Tiffin investigates the response to the 
presence of native Australian fruit bats in the Melbourne Botanical Gardens (an urban space 
of largely imported European vegetation).  Though the bats are protected, Tiffin notes that 
‘Their consumption of orchard fruits and fruit in urban gardens … has often made them 
unpopular’, and she explains that in the campaign to evict them from the Botanical Gardens, 
they ‘were ironically depicted as outsiders; invaders, newcomers, vandals destroying 
“centuries” of European culture’.
1
The case that Tiffin describes is revealing of human 
attitudes to animals on several levels.  One important point underscored by the response to the 
fruit bats is that anthropocentric and imperialistic perspectives often overlap.  The idea that 
nonhuman animals should not be allowed to share spaces that humans want to inhabit or to 
access resources that humans want for themselves is an example of humans’ common desire 
to set themselves apart, physically but also conceptually, from other species.  At the same 
time, the opposition to the bats’ presence also has a cultural dimension in that, as Tiffin 
emphasises, those campaigning for the bats’ removal were largely the descendants of 
European settlers, wanting to protect their heritage from specifically native species.  On the 
other hand, Tiffin’s own approach shows a clear awareness of the fact that the Australian 
descendents of settlers are the relative outsiders or newcomers who have invaded, 
appropriated and vandalised the spaces and resources first used by the bats.  It also suggests a 
certain appreciation of the bats’ own unwitting resistance to those peoples’ interests.  In this 
thesis, I explore how similar sorts of awareness and appreciation are demonstrated in various 
ways within contemporary ‘white’ postcolonial novels emerging from South Africa, Canada, 
New Zealand and Australia, in what can be regarded as a literary alliance between animal 
studies and postcolonial discourses. 
 Cary Wolfe attributes the emergence of the field of animal studies during the past few 
decades to an intersection between the ‘crisis of humanism’ in critical theory, and the 
changing place of animals outside the humanities.
2
  Deriving impetus from animal rights and 
1 Helen Tiffin, ‘Bats in the Gardens’, Mosaic: a Journal for the Interdisciplinary Study of Literature 38, 4 
(2005): 8, 8-9. 
2 Cary Wolfe, ed., introduction to Zoontologies: The Question of the Animal (London and Minneapolis: 
University of Minnesota Press, 2003), x-xi. 
2environmentalist movements, human-animal relations have become the subject of attention 
within discourses as wide-ranging as history, anthropology, geography, gender studies, art 
history and literary criticism.
3
  The academic field of animal studies encompasses all of these 
perspectives and more.  Meanwhile, in the 2005 edition of The Empire Writes Back, Bill 
Ashcroft, Gareth Griffiths and Helen Tiffin observe that ‘Interrogation and exploration of the 
relationships between powerful human groups and what they have traditionally designated as 
“animal” is increasingly important in postcolonial studies’.
4
  The issue of species is a sensitive 
one in this context because, as Etienne Balibar writes, ‘every theoretical racism draws upon 
anthropological universals’, in all of which ‘we can see the persistent presence of the same 
“question”: that of the difference between humanity and animality’.
5
  This is of course an 
important reason to interrogate human-animal relations, but it is also a reason for caution, 
especially when making comparisons between racism and speciesism and their objects.  In his 
article ‘The Postcolonial Animal’, Philip Armstrong proposes discursive collaboration as a 
response to such problems.  Because ‘equations between the treatment of animals and humans 
fail to advance either postcolonial or animal studies very far’, he considers that ‘an alliance 
between the two fields must build upon other kinds of affinity’, and suggests that a ‘common 
antagonist’ for both discourses is ‘the continued supremacy of that notion of the human that 
centres on a rational individual self or ego’.
6
  In this thesis, I examine the relevance of this 
idea within recent fiction by the descendants of European settlers, and suggest that 
representations of animals are related to a serious interrogation of humanist discourse. 
 In The Empire Writes Back, Ashcroft et al. set out three basic types of comparison as 
constituting postcolonial discourse: ‘comparisons between countries of the white diaspora – 
the USA, Canada, Australia and New Zealand – comparisons between areas of the Black 
diaspora, and, thirdly, those which bridge these groupings’.
7
  This thesis belongs in the first
3 For instance, respectively, in the work of Erica Fudge, Garry Marvin, Chris Wilbert, Carol Adams, Steve Baker 
and Nigel Rothfels. 
4 Bill Ashcroft, Gareth Griffiths and Helen Tiffin, The Empire Writes Back: Theory and Practice in Post-
Colonial Literatures, 2nd ed. (London and New York: Routledge, 2002), 214. 
5 Etienne Balibar, ed., ‘Racism and Nationalism,’ in Race, Nation, Class: Ambiguous Identities (London and 
New York: Verso, 1991), 56, 57 (Balibar’s emphases) 
6 Philip Armstrong, ‘The Postcolonial Animal,’ Society and Animals 10, 4 (2002): 413-19, 
http://psyeta.org/sa/sa10.4/armstrong.shtml 
7 Ashcroft et al., The Empire Writes Back, 18. 
3category.  It centres on five key contemporary novels, covering a period ranging from 1999 to 
2007: J. M. Coetzee’s Disgrace (1999); Yann Martel’s Life of Pi (2001); Fiona Farrell’s Mr
Allbones' Ferrets (2007); Julia Leigh’s The Hunter (1999) and Margaret Atwood’s Oryx and 
Crake (2003).
8
  These novels originate from South Africa, Canada, New Zealand, Australia 
and again Canada respectively.  I have chosen this cultural focus not because human-animal 
relations are any more significant or popular within the literature of these societies than 
elsewhere (although Atwood has argued that this is true of Canada
9
), but in order to examine 
how the cultural specificities of white postcolonial societies inform an engagement with 
species issues when it does occur.  I employ the expression ‘white postcolonial’ to designate 
this focus; despite its unhelpful and sometimes inaccurate emphasis on colour, I have not 
found an unproblematic alternative.  Terms involving the word ‘settler’ fail to acknowledge 
‘first peoples’’ own histories of settlement.  Others like ‘English-’ or ‘French-Canadian’ make 
some sense linguistically, but are no more culturally accurate than ‘European’.
10
  Meanwhile, 
the Spanish derived ‘Creole’, which Elleke Boehmer applies broadly to any people of 
European descent born in a non-European country,
11
 is not normally used in relation to the 
countries with which I am concerned.  Therefore, I reluctantly retain ‘white postcolonial’ not 
as the most accurate but as the clearest of the possibilities.  Within this subset of 
postcolonialism, I am also limiting myself to those societies whose ties to Europe were 
primarily to Britain.  There is of course no singular ‘white postcolonial culture’ or ‘British
8 J.M. Coetzee, Disgrace (London: Random House, 1999); Yann Martel, Life of Pi (2001; repr., Edinburgh: 
Canongate Books Ltd, 2003); Fiona Farrell, Mr Allbones’ Ferret (Auckland: Vintage, 2007); Julia Leigh, The 
Hunter (1999; repr., London: Faber and Faber, 2000); Margaret Atwood, Oryx and Crake (London: Bloomsbury, 
2003). 
9 Margaret Atwood, Survival: A Thematic Guide to Canadian Literature (Toronto: House of Anansi Press, 1972). 
10 The increasing irrelevance of the term European in postcolonial contexts is illustrated by a 2006 campaign to 
change the New Zealand census forms to include ‘New Zealander’ as an ethnicity option.  The only category 
available to those of white settler ancestry is ‘New Zealand European’, resulting in widespread use of the 
category ‘other’ by those belonging to the dominant culture.  Where asked to specify, some leave the form blank, 
others write ‘New Zealander’, or, more intriguingly in the context of this thesis, ‘Kiwi’. A trial of the Maori term 
Pakeha also met with resistance because some believe it is derogatory in origin (although historian Michael King 
finds no early evidence for this.  See Michael King, The Penguin History of New Zealand, (Auckland: Penguin 
Books, 2003), 168-69.  It is likely that the forms for 2011 will retain ‘New Zealand European’ as the best means 
of documenting ethnicity, and so will probably meet with further resistance.  Kelly Burns, ‘Still no tick-box for 
“New Zealander,”’ The Dominion Post April 28, 2009. http://www.stuff.co.nz/national/2367738/Still-no-tick-
box-for-New-Zealander. 
11 Elleke Boehmer, Colonial and Postcolonial Literature: Migrant Metaphors (Oxford and New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2005). 
4colonial culture’; whatever they may have in common, white South African, Canadian, New 
Zealand and Australian cultures are certainly not identical or seamlessly overlapping. 
However, the concentration on Britain’s former colonies helps to narrow the scope of my 
inquiry, and makes for more similarity of cultural inheritance. I have not attempted to address 
fiction from the United States.  This is partly because, as Boehmer writes in her own exclusion 
of it, ‘The United States … won independence long before other colonial places, and its 
literature has therefore followed a very different trajectory’.
12
  Additionally, as Fredric 
Jameson explains, the United States is uniquely powerful within the context of globalisation,
13
which places it in a very different position from the other postcolonial societies with which 
this thesis is concerned.  As a final delimitation, I concentrate on relatively recent literature, 
the earliest of the key novels being Coetzee’s Disgrace and Leigh’s The Hunter, both 
published in 1999.  The advantage of this is that it allows me to examine how the 
contemporary awareness of species relations is manifesting itself within white postcolonial 
literature.
 In the remainder of this introduction, I want to give some philosophical and cultural 
background to the species and postcolonial themes and the relationships between them that are 
central to this thesis.  First, I offer a brief history of the role of animals and analogies between 
humans and animals within humanist and imperialist constructions of humanity, together with 
some literary responses to the key ideas. I then make some suggestions about what culturally 
specific reasons white postcolonial writers might have for wanting to engage with that history.
Finally, I introduce the discourses of anti-humanism and posthumanism which, as I argue over 
the following chapters, can be seen in various ways to inform the representation of human-
animal relations within the selected novels. 
12 Boehmer, Colonial and Postcolonial Literature, 4. 
13 Fredric Jameson, ‘Notes on Globalization as a Philosophical Issue,’ in The Cultures of Globalization: The 
World-System and the Limits of Modernity, ed. Fredric Jameson and Masao Miyoshi (Durham, NC and London: 
Duke University Press, 1998), 59. 
5Animals in humanism and imperialism
Humanism has had various different meanings at different times and in different contexts.  My 
use of it here accords with the definition offered by Kate Soper: 
 Humanism: appeals (positively) to the notion of a core humanity or common essential 
 features in terms of which human beings can be defined and understood, thus 
 (negatively) to concepts (‘alienation’, ‘inauthenticity’, ‘reification’, etc.) designating, 
 and intended to explain, the perversion or ‘loss’ of this common being.  Humanism takes 
 history to be a product of human thought and action, and thus claims that the categories 
 of ‘consciousness’, ‘agency’, ‘choice’, ‘responsibility’, ‘moral value’, etc. are 
 indispensable to its understanding.
14
I am most concerned here with humanism’s privileging and marginalisation of certain 
concepts.  Val Plumwood writes that among the key dualisms for western thought: ‘In 
particular the dualisms of male/female, mental/manual (mind/body), civilized/primitive, 
human/nature correspond directly to and naturalise gender, class, race and nature respectively, 
although a number of others are indirectly involved’.
15
  In exploring the history of 
postcolonial treatments of animals, the most important of these points are the distinctions 
between humans and animals and European and non-European, and the relationship between 
those categories.  I therefore want to begin by offering a handful of the most influential and 
explicit examples of such discourse. 
 At once essential to and often invisible within humanist subjectivity is the constitutive 
role of species difference; that is, humans’ ‘common essential features’ are defined against 
other species.  As Wolfe puts it:  
 this pervasiveness of the discourse of species … has made the institution of speciesism 
 fundamental … to the formation of Western subjectivity … an institution that relies on 
 the tacit agreement that the full transcendence of the ‘human’ requires the sacrifice of 
 the ‘animal’ and the animalistic.
16
14 Kate Soper, Humanism and Anti-Humanism: Problems of Modern European Thought (London: Hutchinson, 
1986), 11-12. 
15 Val Plumwood, Feminism and the Mastery of Nature (London: Routledge, 1993), 43. 
16 Cary Wolfe, Animal Rites: American Culture, the Discourse of Species, and Posthumanist Theory (Chicago 
and London: University of Chicago Press, 2003), 6. 
6Distinctions between humans and other species have often been made to hinge on the capacity 
for reason and language, which are, according to these arguments, inherent in humans but 
lacking in animals.  This tradition can be traced back to classical thought.  Aristotle concluded 
that ‘plants are created for the sake of animals, and animals for the sake of men…  As nature 
therefore makes nothing either imperfect or in vain, it necessarily follows that she has made 
all these things for men’.
17
  Not dissimilarly, ‘man’ was accorded dominion or mastery over 
other creatures in Genesis.
18
  Although the description of diet that follows includes no 
reference to eating animals, St Augustine argued that the commandment ‘thou shalt not kill’ 
could not reasonably be applied to animals any more than to plants,
19
 and St Thomas Aquinas 
asserted that animals are not rational creatures but means to human ends.
20
  In the seventeenth 
century, René Descartes contended that animals are little better than machines, and that 
language and reasoned action set humans apart from other species.  He argued that the ability 
of even mute humans to communicate ‘proves not only that the brutes have less reason than 
man, but that they have none at all’.
21
  In the following century Immanuel Kant interpreted the 
distinction between humans and animals as having moral implications.  He advocated a view 
of humans as ends in themselves, and suggested that humans have duties to animals only to 
the extent that kindness to animals fosters kindness towards other humans.
22
  Common to all 
of these examples, then, is the characterisation of humans in terms of their superiority to other 
species, and of other species in terms of their lack of human qualities.   
 However, other thinkers repeatedly questioned such assumptions.  In ‘An Apology for 
Raymond Sebond’ (1569), Michel de Montaigne wrote that in terms of communication 
between species, humans seem to be the ones at a disadvantage, while animals ‘manifestly  
17 Aristotle, Politics, trans. William Ellis (London: Dent, 1912), extracts in Political Theory and Animal Rights,
ed. Andrew Linzey and Paul Barry Clarke (London and Winchester: Pluto Press, 1990), 58. 
18 Genesis 7:2-3; 9:1-2. 
19 Augustine, The City of God, trans. Marcus Dods (Edinburgh: T.T. Clark 1887), extracts in Political Theory 
and Animal Rights, ed. Andrew Linzey and Paul Barry Clarke (London and Winchester: Pluto Press, 1990), 59. 
20 Aquinas, Thomas, ‘That the Souls of Brute Animals Are Not Immortal,’ in Summa Contra Gentiles, trans. 
Anton C. Pegis (Notre Dame and London: University of Notre Dame Press, 1975), vol. II, chap. 82. 
21 René Descartes, ‘Discourse V’, 1637, in René Descartes: A Discourse on Method, trans. John Veitch (London: 
Dent, 1912), extracts in Political Theory and Animal Rights, ed. Andrew Linzey and Paul Barry Clarke (London 
and Winchester: Pluto Press, 1990), 16. 
22Immanuel Kant, Lectures on Ethics– Duties Towards Animals and other Spirits, 1780-1,trans. Louis Infield 
(New York: Harper and Row, 1963), extracts in Political Theory and Animal Rights, ed. Andrew Linzey and 
Paul Barry Clarke (London and Winchester: Pluto Press, 1990), 126-27. 
7have converse between themselves … not only within one species but across different 
species’.  He also asserted that there is ‘no rational likelihood that beasts are forced to do by 
natural inclination the selfsame things which we do by choice and ingenuity’, and that though 
humans have power over animals, we have much the same powers over each other in certain 
circumstances.
23
  In the eighteenth century, Alexander Pope reasoned that human power over 
animals entails a responsibility towards them rather than a license to exploit them,
24
  and 
Jeremy Bentham offered the well known reformulation: ‘The question is not, Can they 
reason? nor, Can they talk? but, Can they suffer?’.
25
Yet despite these and many similar 
arguments, animal otherness remained significantly constitutive of the notion of humanity, 
and this point manifested itself within the imperialist discourses of European colonialism. 
In Barbaric Others, Merryl Wyn Davis, Ashis Nandy and Zia Sardar see negative 
Western attitudes to other humans and animals as stemming from the same cause, suggesting 
that Europe has a long history of ‘an anxiety-ridden perception about Other People, those 
beyond its actual touch and reach, and about the natural world’.
26
  Both have been subject to 
‘exoticisation’.
27
  The term ‘exotic’ refers to that which is geographically or culturally foreign 
from the perspective of a certain ‘self’.  Exoticising discourse, then, concentrates on and 
emphasises perceived contrasts between subject and object.  Such details might be regarded in 
a positive or negative light, yet the centrality of notions of difference and distance to this 
perspective is often inimical to sympathy.  This effect is frequently reinforced by the mapping 
of different kinds of difference onto each other.  Animalisation was a particularly powerful 
tool for asserting the difference of other peoples.  As Keith Thomas writes in his study of 
early modern English human-nonhuman relations, ‘if the essence of humanity was defined as 
23 Michel de Montaigne, ‘An Apology for Raymond Sebond,’ 1569, in Michel de Montaigne: The Complete 
Essays, trans. M. A. Screech (London: Penguin, 1991), 506, 514, 515. 
24 Alexander Pope, ‘Of Cruelty to Animals’, 1713, in A Hundred English Essays, ed. by Rosalind Vallance 
(London: Thomas Nelson, 1950), extracts in Political Theory and Animal Rights, ed. Andrew Linzey and Paul 
Barry Clarke (London and Winchester: Pluto Press, 1990), 72. 
25 Jeremy Bentham, ‘An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation,’ 1789, in A Fragment on 
Government and an Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation, ed. Wilfred Harrison (Oxford: 
Blackwell 1948), extracts in Political Theory and Animal Rights, ed. Andrew Linzey and Paul Barry Clarke.  
(London and Winchester: Pluto Press, 1990), 136. 
26 Merryl Wyn Davies, Ashis Nandy and Zia Sardar, Barbaric Others: A Manifesto on Western Racism (London 
and Boulder: Pluto Press, 1993), 1, 25. 
27 For the sake of clarity, I use the terms ‘exoticisation’ and later ‘primitivisation’ to refer to ‘othering’ 
perspectives, rather than exoticism and primitivism, which more commonly denote influences within art.  
8consisting in some specific quality, then it followed that any man who did not display that 
quality was subhuman, semi-animal’.
28
  Thus, as Plumwood writes:  
 With the rise of colonial conquest and expansion and the ideology of progress as 
 technological conquest, nature as the primitive and as the past from which certain 
 ‘advanced’ human cultures have supposedly risen is also represented as the dualised 
 underside of the concept of civilisation.
29
Human proximity to nature, therefore, was automatically assumed to mean primitiveness, and 
as Mary Louise Pratt writes, other peoples were portrayed as ‘reductive, incomplete beings 
suffering from the inability to have become what Europeans already are, or to have made 
themselves into what Europeans intend them to be’.
30
  A belief in their cultural and spiritual 
‘need’ for the influence of Europe was used to justify imperial intervention as a ‘civilising 
mission’, when any justification was thought necessary. Very often, asserting peoples’ 
similarities to animals served to reinforce this.  Indeed, Thomas suggests that it may have 
been essential to the institution of slavery: ‘it is hard to believe that the system would ever 
have been tolerated if negroes had been credited with fully human attributes.  Their 
dehumanization was a necessary precondition of their maltreatment’. He writes, ‘Some men 
were seen as useful beasts, to be curbed, domesticated and kept docile; others were vermin 
and predators, to be eliminated’.
31
  Meanwhile, Davies et al. observe that some were even 
presented as ‘natural slaves’, ‘able to apprehend the reason of others and follow 
commands’.
32
  Daniel Defoe’s Robinson Crusoe provides a good example of such 
imperialistic attitudes in Crusoe’s relation to the native people living near his island. 
Armstrong observes that ‘rather than envisaging “savage” humans as animals, Crusoe 
typically refers to them as “inhuman”’, but that he also regards cannibals as worse than wi
beasts.
ld
33
  Crusoe’s relationship with ‘Friday’
34
 demonstrates the ‘civilising’ benefit of 
28 Keith Thomas, Man and the Natural World: Changing Attitudes in England 1500-1800 (1983; repr., London: 
Penguin, 1987), 41. 
29 Plumwood, Feminism and the Mastery of Nature, 107. 
30Mary Louise Pratt, Imperial Eyes: Travel Writing and Transculturation (London: Routledge, 1992), 152. 
31 Thomas, Man and the Natural World, 45, 47. 
32 Davies et al, Barbaric Others, 62. 
33Philip Armstrong, What Animals Mean in the Fiction of Modernity (London and New York: Routledge, 2008), 
23. 
34 Crusoe never asks his real name and simply labels him with the day of the week.  As Crusoe admits to losing 
two days from his reckoning, it cannot even have been a Friday. 
9European influence. First, on being rescued from a cannibal feast, Friday becomes a ‘natura
slave’: he ‘laid his head upon the ground, and taking me by the foot, set my foot upon his 
head; this it seems was in token of swearing to be my slave for ever’. Over the course of their 
relationship, Crusoe rescues Friday from being a cannibal as well as from being cannibalis
He trains Friday out of his ‘inhuman’ and pagan ways until he is a protestant,
l
ed.
d to 
upposedly worse-than-animal savages. 
35
 and finally 
takes him into European civilisation. Crusoe thus achieves all that Europeans claime
attempt in their cultural colonisation of s
 The alternative construction of primitiveness was as a condition which could only be 
tainted by contact with Europeans.  One influential example of this came from Montaigne.  He 
argued that savages were ‘barbarous only in that they have been hardly fashioned by the mind 
of man, still remaining close neighbours to their original state of nature’, which he regarded as 
‘simple and pure’.
36
  Such views tended to be applied to a select few; for instance, Native 
Americans were generally regarded in a more positive light than Africans, leading Chinua 
Achebe to suggest that there was a particular need or desire ‘to set Africa up as a foil to 
Europe, as a place of negations at once remote and vaguely familiar, in comparison with 
which Europe's own state of spiritual grace will be manifest’.
37
  Aphra Behn’s seventeenth-
century representation of Surinamese and Nigerian people, in Oroonoko, provides a literary 
example of this sort of contrast.  The nobility of Oroonoko, an enslaved Nigerian prince, is 
presented as an exception to rather than an example of the norms of his people.  Moreover, it 
is not innate but the result of European civilising influence: 
Some part of it we may attribute to the care of a Frenchman … who … perceiving him very 
ready, apt, and quick of apprehension, took a great pleasure to teach him morals, language 
and science…  Another reason was, he lov’d … to see all the English gentlemen that traded 
thither, and did not only learn their language, but that of the Spaniard also, with whom he 
traded afterwards for slaves.
Thus, as in Robinson Crusoe, enlightenment is of European origin.  In Oroonoko, however, 
this is emphatically not the case for the Surinamese, who are characterised entirely differently.  
35 Daniel Defoe, Robinson Crusoe (1719; repr., London: Everyman, 1966), 148, 175. 
36 Michel de Montaigne, ‘On the Cannibals,’ 1580, in Michel de Montaigne: The Complete Essays, trans. M. A. 
Screech (London: Penguin, 1991), 232. 
37 Chinua Achebe, ‘An Image of Africa: Racism in Conrad's Heart of Darkness’, in Hopes and Impediments: 
Selected Essays (New York: Anchor Books / Doubleday, 1990), 3. 
10
Though unclothed, they are presented as having an innocent freedom from desire, ‘so like our 
first parents before the fall’. Yet significantly, it is not God that the narrator credits with their 
state: ‘simple nature is the most harmless, inoffensive and vertuous mistress.  Tis she alone, if 
she were permitted, that better instructs the world, than all the inventions of man: religion 
wou’d here but destroy that tranquility they possess by ignorance’.
38
  Thus, the Surinamese 
live in an innocent harmony with nature which European influence could only corrupt.  
 This idea became central to the later myth of the ‘noble savage’ which often contrasted 
European life with a Utopian alternative.  The concept is commonly associated with Jean-
Jacques Rousseau. Although, as translator Franklin Philip points out, Rousseau’s 
representation of the state of nature is ‘devoid of moral attributes’, his view of Europe was 
certainly critical.  He argued that European medicine was dangerous, that its technology 
weakened Western humans by comparison with those in a state of nature, and that 
enlightenment serves only to instil fears.  Additionally, his idea of this state of nature is not 
noticeably distinguished from what he calls ‘the animal condition’:   
we can desire or fear things only if we can form some idea of them in our mind or 
through a simple impulse of nature.  The savage… experiences passions only of the 
latter kind; his desires never go beyond his physical needs… and the only evils he fears 
are pain and hunger.  I say pain and not death, for an animal will never know what it is 
to die, and a knowledge of death and its terrors is one of man’s first acquisitions upon 
leaving the animal condition.
39
Here, then, for a human to be in an ‘animal condition’ is seen not as deplorable but as 
preferable to European civilisation. 
 Rousseau’s Irish contemporary Jonathan Swift had offered an alternative interrogation 
of European corruption a few years before, in Gulliver’s Travels.  At its culmination, this 
satire extends to species relations.  The Houyhnhnms (whose name means ‘perfections of 
nature’) are horses, while the wild, brutish Yahoos, as Gulliver eventually recognises, are 
human, and the more Gulliver tries to distinguish between them, the more both he and the 
38Aphra Behn. Oroonoko and Other Stories (1688; repr., London: Methuen, 1986), 29, 33, 32. 
39 Jean Jacques Rousseau, Discourse on Inequality, 1755, trans. Franklin Philip (Oxford and New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1994), viii, 31, 34-35. 
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Houyhnhnms become convinced that Europeans and Yahoos are the same.
40
  The Yahoos’ 
wildness implies that humans have the potential to degenerate, although Gulliver himself 
strives to emulate the Houyhnhnms and to be accepted as one of them.  However, although 
species values again are inverted here, species difference is still a significant proof of 
otherness, while, even if Europeans struggle to achieve them, the values of rationality and 
‘civilisation’ remain central, and remain set against human animality.   
 The distinction between human and nonhuman in humanist discourse, then, significantly 
informed the imperialist portrayal of non-European cultures as primitive.  This primitiveness 
was sometimes seen as negative and sometimes positive in comparison with European 
civilisation, but either version assumed that Europeans were more complex and therefore more 
advanced than cultures that appeared to live in greater proximity to nature.  Such values 
persisted in later colonial thought.  In particular, developments in evolutionary theory were 
interpreted to support notions of cultural hierarchy: the idea that some people were more 
primitive than others was now explained by the idea that they were literally closer to animals.  
Nevertheless, evolution also meant kinship, between cultures and between species, and this 
began to unsettle other assumptions.  
 As Pratt emphasises in her examination of travel writing, natural history and 
imperialism were closely related. She explains that students of Linnaeus, using his model for 
the systematization of nature, simultaneously recorded potential resources and imposed 
European order upon them: 
 Analyses of natural history … do not always underscore the transformative, 
 appropriative dimensions of its conception. One by one the planet’s life forms were to 
 be drawn out of the tangled threads of their life surroundings and rewoven into 
 European-based patterns of global unity and order.
41
Indeed, as Harriet Ritvo comments, natural historians ‘embodied a sweeping human claim to 
intellectual mastery of the natural world’.  Their work also contributed to European countries’ 
sense of political mastery over the world; as specimens arrived back in Europe, they became  
40 Jonathan Swift, Gulliver's Travels (1726; repr., London: Everyman, 1977), 244, 205. 
41 Pratt, Imperial Eyes, 31 
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part of colonial collections which often functioned as symbols of national power.  For 
instance, Ritvo writes: 
 Beginning in the late seventeenth century, citizens who wished to admire symbols 
 of triumphant individual enterprise as well as those of national prestige could visit 
 the numerous exotic animal displays that mirrored the spread of British commercial 
 influence throughout the globe.
42
Humans were also included within both classificatory and spectacular systems. Linnaeus had 
at first distinguished between homo sapiens and homo monstrosus, and eventually offered six 
categories – wild man, American, European, Asiatic, African, and monster (including dwarfs, 
giants and artificial monsters like eunuchs).  Although this meant classifying humans 
alongside other species, Pratt comments, ‘One could hardly ask for a more explicit attempt to 
“naturalize” the myth of European superiority’.
43
  Certainly, European society was not so 
disturbed by the idea as to prevent the display of non-Europeans; Eric Baratay and Elisabeth 
Hardouin-Fugier demonstrate that ‘ethnographical’ spectacles of exoticised people were 
popular throughout the nineteenth century and into the twentieth, and ranged in type from 
fairground stalls to zoos to the Crystal Palace exhibition.
44
 Charles Darwin’s contribution to natural historical knowledge was often interpreted as 
offering further support to the European/non-European/nonhuman hierarchy.  Monogenism, 
the view that all humans were descended from a common ancestor, had been the orthodox 
one, and according to this theory, Thomas writes, ‘it was common to explain the different 
varieties of men in the world by saying that the blacks had degenerated from their common 
ancestor, Adam, while the whites had stayed constant or even improved.’ However, ‘as the 
difference between men and animals ceased to appear an absolute one, polygenism [the 
concept of descent from different ancestors] became increasingly attractive’.
45
  Michael 
Banton writes that Darwin’s achievement ‘was to subsume these two theories within a new 
synthesis which explained both change and continuity’.
46
  His theory suggested that variations 
42 Harriet Ritvo, The Animal Estate: The English and Other Creatures in the Victorian Age, (Cambridge and 
London: Harvard University Press, 1987), 12, 206. 
43 Pratt, Imperial Eyes, 32. 
44 Eric Baratay and Elisabeth Hardouin-Fugier, Zoo: A History of Zoological Gardens in the West, trans. Oliver 
Welsh (London: Reaktion Books, 2002), 38, 126. 
45 Thomas, Man and the Natural World, 135, 136. 
46Michael Banton, Racial Theories (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 81. 
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between humans might result from membership in subspecies.  As a result, the concepts of the 
noble or ignoble savage began to give way to an uneasy sense of kinship with non-Europeans 
as ancestor figures.  Darwin himself represents both non-European humans and other animals 
as inferior in his characterisation of the Fuegians as resembling ‘our’ (presumably 
Europeans’) ancestors: 
 These men were absolutely naked and bedaubed with paint, their long hair was tangled, 
 their mouths frothed with excitement, and their expression was wild, startled, and 
 distrustful.  They possessed hardly any arts, and like wild animals lived on what they 
 could catch; they had no government, and were merciless to every one not of their own 
 small tribe.   
Moreover, Darwin sometimes praises animals over savage humanity:  
 I would as soon be descended from that heroic little monkey, who braved his dreaded 
 enemy in order to save the life of his keeper, or from that old baboon, who descending 
 from the mountains, carried away in triumph his young comrade from a crowd of 
 astonished dogs – as from a savage who delights to torture his enemies, offers up bloody 
 sacrifices, practises infanticide without remorse, treats his wives like slaves, knows no 
 decency, and is haunted by the grossest superstitions.
47
A literary echo of Darwin’s attitudes appears within Joseph Conrad’s Heart of Darkness,
published ten years after The Descent of Man.
48
  Achebe argues, Conrad ‘almost always 
managed to sidestep the ultimate question of equality between white people and black 
people… the farthest he would go was kinship’.
49
  Travelling up the Congo, Conrad’s narrator 
Marlow declares that ‘Going up that river was like travelling back to the earliest beginnings of 
the world’.  Seeing Africans on the banks, he comments, ‘The prehistoric man was cursing us, 
praying to us, welcoming us – who could tell?’  Marlow watches them across the water as 
across an evolutionary gap, and, in a passage very like Darwin’s description of the Fuegians, 
Marlow animalises them even as he expresses a sense of connection.  ‘No, they were not 
inhuman…  They howled and leaped, and spun, and made horrid faces; but what thrilled you  
47 Charles Darwin, The Descent of Man, and Selection in Relation to Sex (1871; repr., Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press, 1981), 404, 404-05. 
48 Joseph Conrad, Youth, Heart of Darkness, The End of the Tether (1889; repr., London: Dent, 1974). 
49 Achebe, ‘An Image of Africa’, 10-11 
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was just the thought of their humanity – like yours – the thought of your remote kinship with 
this wild and passionate uproar’.  Thus, kinship does not result in understanding, only ‘the 
faintest trace of a response … a suspicion of there being a meaning in it which you – you so 
remote from the night of first ages – could comprehend’.
50
  Thus, speciesism, in the form of 
animalisation, remains central to post-Darwinian imperialism, despite the growing belief that 
even European humans were descended from animals. However, because of the centrality of 
animal otherness to humanist constructions of the human, the evolutionary notion of kinship 
with animals was, at least to some, much more disturbing than kinship with other humans.   
 In terms of human-animal relationships, Darwin’s theory of evolution by natural 
selection was again potentially radically disruptive, and Ritvo writes, ‘Certainly, for those 
who were persuaded by it, [it] … eliminated the unbridgeable gulf that divided reasoning 
human being from irrational brute.’
51
 For instance, in The Descent of Man, Darwin writes,
 If it be maintained that certain powers, such as self-consciousness, abstraction, &c., are 
 peculiar to man, it may well be that these are the incidental results of other highly-
 advanced intellectual faculties; and these again mainly the result of the continued use of 
 a highly developed language.   
He then describes language itself as a ‘half-art, half-instinct’ which ‘still bears the stamp of its 
gradual evolution’.
52
  However, Darwin’s work was still often interpreted as supporting the 
view of human superiority over other animals by presenting it as the natural result of 
evolutionary processes.  Thus, as Armstrong writes, ‘Its potentially revolutionary undermining 
of beliefs about human supremacy were mostly inhibited (or ignored) due to the widespread 
interpretation of evolutionism as another of modernity’s narratives about progress towards an 
ever-more advanced human state’.
53
  A novel that demonstrates both an acknowledgment of 
the disturbing implications of evolutionary theory and an enduring commitment to the values 
of anthropocentrism, rationalism and progress is H.G. Wells’ The Island of Doctor Moreau
(1896).  Wells’ novel accepts the notion that humans are animals, but it is informed by 
anxieties about human animality and retrogression as threats to progress. It is Doctor  
50 Conrad, Heart of Darkness, 97, 98, 92, 96. 
51 Ritvo, The Animal Estate, 39. 
52 Darwin, The Descent of Man, 105, 106.  
53Armstrong, What Animals Mean, 142. 
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Moreau’s belief that human perfection is possible, and his aim is to accelerate evolution 
artificially to transform animals, physically, mentally, and emotionally, into humans.  
Prendick, the narrator, respects Moreau’s aims but feels pity for the resulting ‘Beast People’, 
failed experiments who ‘stumbled in the shackles of humanity’.  Moreau has been unable to 
eliminate what he describes as “Cravings, instincts, desires that … burst suddenly and 
inundate the whole being of the creature with anger, hate, or fear”.  Worse still, the Beast 
People show increasing signs of reversion.  Moreau complains, “As soon as my hand is taken 
from them the beast begins to creep back”. This process is later accelerated when the Beast 
People succumb to the temptation of meat (after Moreau’s assistant brings rabbits to the 
island), and again when a puma escapes the vivisection room and kills Moreau.  Prendick lives 
on the island for some time in constant fear of the Beast People, and on his return to England 
he finds himself constantly nervous about humans.   
 I could not persuade myself that the men and women I met were not also another, still 
 passably human, Beast People, animals half-wrought into the outward image of human souls, 
 and that they would presently begin to revert … I feel as though the animal was surging up 
 through them; that presently the degradation of the Islanders will be played over again on a 
 larger scale.
54
Like Heart of Darkness, The Island of Doctor Moreau demonstrates an increasing 
acknowledgement of kinship with human and nonhuman ‘others’.  Marlow and Prendick respond 
by asserting and clinging to the ideology of rationality, but their certainties are obviously 
threatened.
 Within the histories of humanist and imperialist discourse, then, the concept of animal 
otherness repeatedly serves to define and to bolster the Western European sense of self.  Classical 
and early modern philosophers defined humans by their possession of reason and language, and 
animals by their apparent lack of these qualities.  Within imperialism, animalisation and 
primitivisation were used to portray other peoples as inferior to civilised Europeans. Developments 
in natural history were not necessarily interpreted as unsettling the European worldview, and 
where they were perceived to constitute a threat, there remained a strong belief in rationalism, 
54 H. G. Wells, The Island of Doctor Moreau, 1896, ed. Leon Stover (Jefferson: McFarland, 1996), 141, 132, 
167-68, 146, 147, 204-05. 
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progress and the exceptionality of the human species.  Thus, anthropocentrism, humanism and 
imperialism are more than parallels or similes for one another; their histories are interwoven
narratives of self and other.  It is out of these histories of European species and cultural relations 
that white postcolonial cultures emerge, necessarily inheriting from them but also challenging their 
principles.
White postcolonialism and species 
While the literature addressed in the following chapters is in part participating in an 
increasingly international engagement with the ethics of species relations, I want, bearing in 
mind the history just discussed, to explore some culturally specific concerns that might also 
inform the white postcolonial representations of animals that are under consideration.  In 
discussing white South African, Canadian, New Zealand and Australian cultures alongside 
one another in this way, I do not mean to imply that they are identical.  A more helpful way of 
understanding the relationship between these societies is as evolving out of a diaspora, a term 
which is most strongly associated with the displacement of the Jewish people, but which can 
be applied to many cultural dispersals, including those of Africans and Europeans.
55
  This 
history means that white postcolonial cultures are at once distinct from and related to one 
another: they have all developed in distinct ways, but because of their overlapping origins, 
they also display, to varying degrees, some common characteristics and cultural concerns.  In 
relation to literature, Ashcroft et al. write: ‘The critical questions raised in … settler colonies 
cluster around a peculiar set of problems which highlight some of the basic tensions which 
exist in all post-colonial literatures’.  The three major issues they identify are ‘the relationship 
between social and literary practices in the old world and the new; the relationship between 
the indigenous populations in settled areas and the invading settlers; and the relationship 
between the imported language of the new place’.
56
  Elaborating on the first two of these 
points, I want to outline six concerns that could be interpreted as factors – though I think not 
equally significant ones – in the white postcolonial attention to animals that is the focus of this  
55 See Stuart Hall, ‘Cultural Identity and Diaspora,’ in Identity: Community, Culture, Difference, ed. Jonathan 
Rutherford (London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1990); Michael King, The Penguin History of New Zealand, 169-
70.
56 Ashcroft et al. The Empire Writes Back, 133. 
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thesis.  These include: guilt over historical colonisations of people; awareness of the historical 
relationship between speciesism and racism; white postcolonial identification with animals as 
victims; guilt about past human-animal relations; desire for local belonging; and desire for 
cultural independence. 
 One possible explanation for a specifically white postcolonial writing about species 
themes is that it constitutes a displacement of cultural guilt and an expiation of that guilt via 
animals.  In other words, animals may, at some unacknowledged level, function as substitute 
objects of compensation in place of colonised people. Obviously, this could have problematic 
implications in terms of cultural relations, if the substitution is understood as an avoidance of 
historical responsibility or indeed as perpetuating the equation of first peoples with animals 
on some level.  Alternatively, it could be interpreted as reflecting a desire to achieve, without 
approaching or indeed patronising the indigenous subject, a break with the perceived 
imperialism of settler ancestors.  In any case, however, because an expiation of cultural guilt 
might well be a dynamic invisible to both writer and reader, it is perhaps impossible to assess 
the extent of its relevance as an explanation of white postcolonial representations of animals. 
 Another explanation that is much more commonly put forward for the attention to 
animals in postcolonial discourse is that there is awareness that analogies between humans and 
animals have been used, as I have just described, as a means of constructing one human group 
as inferior to another.  Where this takes the form of animalisation, a common response to 
animalising rhetoric is, understandably, straightforward refutation: the effects of the 
comparison of oppressed groups to animals have been such that it can seem quite illogical for 
them to perpetuate such connections themselves.  Comparisons of animals to human groups 
can also seem insulting.  Peter Singer observes that recent animal rights theorists ‘reject the 
assumption of the priority of human interests as “speciesism”’, and that ‘By using that term, 
they make an analogy between our attitudes towards other species and the earlier, now 
discredited, attitudes of European racists towards members of other races’.
57
  The aim here is 
to show that cruelty based on species difference is also unjust.  However, such analogies risk 
being perceived as equations, and therefore as offensive to the humans referenced.  A Jewish
57 Peter Singer, preface to Animal Philosophy: Ethics and Identity, ed. Matthew Calarco and Peter Atterton 
(London and New York: Continuum, 2004), xi, xi-xii. 
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character in Coetzee’s The Lives of Animals makes this point when he objects to Elizabeth 
Costello’s analogy between animal exploitation and the Holocaust: ‘The Jews died like cattle, 
therefore cattle die like Jews, you say’.
58
  This character’s objection is that Costello appears to 
be suggesting that the deaths of cattle are as significant as those of persecuted Jews.  This sort 
of interpretation of analogies and equations between humans and other species as offensive 
leads Wolfe to suggest: 
 [A]s long as this humanist and speciesist structure of subjectivization remains intact, 
 and as long as it is institutionally taken for granted that it is all right to systematically 
 exploit and kill nonhuman animals simply because of their species, then the humanist 
 discourse of species will always be available for use by some humans against other 
 humans as well.
59
This is one reason why it may be productive for postcolonial discourse to interrogate 
speciesist discourse.  People who are descended from European colonisers and not from 
colonised people, however, may not have the same need to dismantle speciesism on their own 
behalf.  This does not mean that they disregard the problem, but among the novels discussed 
in this thesis, only Disgrace is overtly concerned with race as well as with species relations, 
and it offers little in the way of challenge to equations between Africans and animals.  The 
other novels in question avoid the question of such equations almost entirely, so awareness of 
them does not seem to be a significant explanation of the attention to animals in white 
postcolonial literature.  Indeed, Margaret Atwood suggests in Survival that white Canadians 
may identify with animals as mirroring their own victimhood.  This is the third explanation for 
white postcolonial treatments of species themes that I want to explore here. 
 Ashcroft et al. write that ‘Diaspora does not simply refer to geographical dispersal but 
also to the vexed questions of identity, memory and home which such displacement 
produces’.
60
  White postcolonial populations in South Africa, Canada, New Zealand and 
Australia share these three concerns, although they do not always manifest themselves in the 
same ways.  To begin with the first of the problems Ashcroft et al. list, white settler ‘identity 
crises’ have emerged in each context.  These are caused partly by the experience of inhabiting 
58 J. M. Coetzee, The Lives of Animals, ed. Amy Gutmann (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1999), 49. 
59 Wolfe, Animal Rites, 7-8. 
60 Ashcroft et al., The Empire Writes Back, 217-18. 
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countries which were once the colonies of other nations, and which are still vulnerable to the 
influence of other cultures, especially Anglophone ones.  For example, W.H. New, exploring 
connections between Canada and New Zealand, writes,
 To a significant degree the societies see themselves in terms that derive from elsewhere. 
 Celebrating their own roots, they simultaneously have felt ‘marginalized’ by the 
 culturally powerful presence of their British heritage and their nearest neighbour (the 
 United States, Australia).  These neighbours and forebears, moreover – at least to 
 anglophone Canada and pakeha New Zealand – even appear to speak the same language, 
 framing or containing their own manner of expression.
61
It is this situation that leads Atwood, in Survival, to attribute white Canadian identification 
with animals to a sense of victimisation.  She writes that in general, ‘English animal stories 
are about “social relations,” American ones are about people killing animals; Canadian ones 
are about animals being killed, as felt emotionally from inside the fur and feathers’.  She 
suggests that the reason for this is:
 that Canadians themselves feel threatened and nearly extinct as a nation, and suffer also 
 from life-denying experience as individuals – the culture threatens the ‘animal’ within 
 them – and that their identification with animals is the expression of a deep-seated 
 cultural fear.
62
This idea could also apply in other postcolonial contexts, provided, of course, the focus is on 
animals as victims.  However, in Atwood’s own Oryx and Crake as well as the other texts, 
animals seem to be important as much more than this, and human-animal relations are often 
questioned more directly. 
 In this respect especially, perhaps, the concern with species relations addressed here 
reflects wider trends, including environmentalist and animal rights discourses and the growth 
of animal studies as an academic field.  However, these concepts are also pertinent in relation 
to what Ashcroft et al. call the question of ‘memory’, in the sense that settlement included the 
colonisation of animals and the environment.  Examining the impact of Europeans in New 
Zealand, historian Michael King asks,
61 W.H. New, Dreams of Speech and Violence: The Art of the Short Story in Canada and New Zealand (Toronto: 
University of Toronto Press, 1987), ix. 
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 Are human beings to be viewed as part of nature, and therefore as a legitimate element 
 of any ecosystem to which they choose to attach themselves?  Or are they, because of 
 their inherent selfishness, hubristic sense of superiority and unrivalled capacity for 
 manipulation, an inevitably alien and malevolent ingredient in ecosystems that have 
 evolved in their absence?  Or is it simply that humankind has failed thus far to exercise 
 its intelligence and technologies to ensure that natural resources are used sustainably and 
 other species are not sacrificed unnecessarily to human greed? 
63
To answer the first of these questions in the affirmative is obviously to evade either of the 
others, but all three questions persist, and in Survival, Atwood mentions guilt as a possible 
reason for Canadian literary attention to animals: ‘Canada after all was founded on the fur 
trade, and an animal cannot painlessly be separated from its skin.’  Making her own analogy 
between human and animal exploitations and persecutions, Atwood writes, ‘From the animal 
point of view Canadians are as bad as the slave trade or the Inquisition; which casts a new 
light on those beavers on the nickels and caribou on the quarters’.
64
  Although Atwood rejects 
this explanation in favour of her idea of the victim complex, it does seem an important one.  
An awareness of this colonial exploitation of animals clearly informs Tiffin’s ironic 
discussion of negative reactions to the bats in the Melbourne Botanical Gardens, and a more 
widespread acknowledgement of this kind of responsibility might translate into more efforts 
to protect rare species and to avoid further colonisations of them.
 Another possible factor in the white postcolonial interest in native animals is related to 
the third side effect of diaspora that Ashcroft et al. call the problem of ‘home’ or belonging.  
In Ecocriticism, Greg Garrard writes that during colonisation, ‘settler cultures crossed the 
oceans with their preconceptions intact, so the “nature” they have encountered is inevitably 
shaped by the histories they often sought to leave behind’.
65
  These imported perspectives 
meant that to newly arrived European settlers, South Africa, Canada, New Zealand and 
Australia constituted unfamiliar environments that often seemed resistant to their efforts.  The 
trope of alienation from the land surfaces in each context. Coetzee writes that while the South 
African pastoral genre evokes a kind of ‘dream topography’, there is a rival one of ‘South 
63 King, The Penguin History of New Zealand, 25. 
64 Atwood, Survival, 79.  
65 Greg Garrard, Ecocriticism (London: Routledge, 2004), 60. 
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Africa as a vast, empty, silent space… a land of rock and sun, not of soil and water… This 
landscape remains alien, impenetrable, until a language is found in which to win it, speak it, 
represent it’.  His expression ‘unsettled settlers’,
66
 used to describe this white South Africans 
unease, seems equally applicable to European settlers elsewhere.  Northrop Frye writes that 
‘To feel “Canadian” was to feel part of a no-man’s-land with huge rivers, lakes, and islands 
that very few Canadians had ever seen’ and suggests that (white) ‘Canadian sensibility … is 
less perplexed by the question “Who am I?” than by some such riddle as “Where is here?”’.
67
In his introduction to the Penguin Book of New Zealand Verse, the poet Allen Curnow writes, 
‘The best of our verse is marked or moulded everywhere by peculiar pressures – pressures 
arising from the isolation of the country, its physical character, and its history’.  Without 
using the term, he emphasises that this results from diaspora: ‘The nineteenth-century 
colonists achieved their migration bodily, but not in spirit…  The shock of so distant a 
migration, and the recoil of imagination from realities, were to be transmitted through two, 
three, even four NZ generations’.
68
  The Australian environment, according to writer Thomas 
Keneally, exudes an ‘unwillingness to come to terms with what Europeans expect the earth to 
be.’  ‘The hardwoods were so hard that they split axes.  The seasons were inverted.  European 
seed, planted in the earth, withered… Even the animals seemed to assert this otherness. They 
were absurd and from before the Ark’.
69
  Thus, as Ashcroft et al. write, ‘White European 
settlers … faced the problem of establishing their “indigeneity” and distinguishing it from 
their continuing sense of their European heritage’.
70
  Here, then, indigeneity is understood as 
a concept of belonging which native or first peoples are automatically assumed to possess, bu
not (usually
t
71
) as something that settlers could achieve by trying to integrate themselves into 
those cultures.  What is significant about this negotiation for my purposes is that one means 
66 J. M. Coetzee, White Writing: On the Culture of Letters in South Africa (New Haven and London: Yale 
University Press, 1988), 7, 4. 
67 Northrop Frye, ‘Conclusion to A Literary History of Canada,’ in The Bush Garden: Essays on the Canadian 
Imagination (Toronto: Anansi Press, 1971), 220. 
68 Allen Curnow, ed., introduction to The Penguin Book of New Zealand Verse (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1960), 
17, 20. 
69 Thomas Keneally, ‘Here Nature Is Reversed,’ in Australia: Beyond the Dreamtime, ed. Thomas Keneally, 
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71 Atwood does discuss a phenomenon in which some white Canadians did desire to ‘go native’ and take on 
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by which white postcolonial people try to construct a sense of belonging is via the nonhuman 
environment. Boehmer explains that in the negotiation of displacement, ‘The first and most 
obvious strategy was to ground ill-fitting cultural equipment in the ‘new’ geography by 
incorporating indigenous referents, local plant and animal imagery, and details of local habits 
and customs’.
72
  However, this does not fully account for the attention to animals in white 
postcolonial literature, because that attention is not limited to native animals.   
 The last point that I want to raise as a possible explanation for literature about native and 
non-native species is the white postcolonial desire to break away from external forms of 
authority.  In Post-colonial Transformation, Bill Ashcroft underscores that colonised people 
are not passive victims and resist via various ‘strategies in the transformation of colonial 
power’.
73
  Arguably, the same is true of white postcolonial cultures, as they seek to maintain 
and assert their distinctiveness and independence from international influences.  Here, animals 
are valuable for their disruptive potential, both conceptually and because real animals, 
deliberately or accidentally, resist manipulation too.  In The Postmodern Animal, Steve Baker 
suggests that animals feature within contemporary art as part of a postmodern desire for 
distance from what he calls ‘expert thinking’.  He writes that the postmodern valuation of ‘the 
unknown over the known, the difficult over the easy, the inventive over the rulebound, and 
creative living over compliance’ invites engagement with nonhuman animals, in various ways, 
as a means of unsettling human experience and certainty.
74
  Marian Scholtmeijer suggests that 
animals can have a similar effect in the context of fiction. She writes that although ‘culture 
knows animals best in their role as victims’, the animal victim in modern fiction ‘refuses to be 
assimilated’. She finds that  
 In response, fiction elevates the issue of acts of aggression against animals to the level 
 of a genuine problem.  The power of the animal victim to splinter human certainties 
 reveals the extent to which animals even in this role defy human authority.
75
Within postcolonial fiction too, animals can be represented as contributing to or as allies in a 
challenge to perceived colonising or globalising threats.  This can also encourage attention to 
72 Boehmer, Colonial and Postcolonial Literature, 207. 
73 Bill Ashcroft, Post-colonial Transformation, 207. 
74 Steve Baker, The Postmodern Animal (London: Reaktion Books, 2000), 41, 48-49. 
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real animals as the agents of practical resistance (whether or not they seem to be acting 
deliberately).  Armstrong observes in ‘The Postcolonial Animal’ that although ‘several of the 
most potent and durable intellectual paradigms produced by European cultures at the height of 
their imperialist arrogance owe simultaneous debts to the colonial and animal worlds’ (for  
instance, evolutionary theory), animals have in other ways ‘tended to disrupt the smooth 
unfolding of Enlightenment ideology’, resisting ‘the imperialist desire to represent the natural 
(and especially the colonial terrain) as a passive object or blank slate ready for mapping by 
Western experts’.
76
  In What Animals Mean, he elaborates on this point, using the term ‘ferity’ 
– in relation to humans as well as other species – ‘to indicate those forms of wilderness that 
represent a reaction against modernity’s attempts at civilization, domestication, captivation or 
manipulation’.
77
  Such ideas have a ready application to white postcolonial cultural concerns 
with independence.  Ferity as a reaction against control might have a positive connotation for 
white postcolonial cultures as evidence of distance from imperialism.  Particularly given the 
historical relationship between imperialism and anthropocentrism, it is perhaps unsurprising 
that animals’ own powers of resistance should be regarded as admirable or even allied with 
this project, as they are in each of the novels to be addressed here. 
 The white postcolonial attention to animals that interests me in this thesis, then, can in 
part be attributed to certain overlapping concerns within white South African, Canadian, New 
Zealand and Australian cultures.  In their resistance to both imperialism and anthropocentrism, 
all of these concerns can be seen as challenging the humanist assumptions that underlie both 
of those discourses.  I therefore conclude this introduction by outlining concepts of anti-
humanism and post-humanism and showing how they can be applied to postcolonial concerns 
and particularly those of the white postcolonial cultures that are my focus.
Anti-humanism and posthumanism 
Kate Soper explains that within French philosophical usage, anti-humanism ‘constitutes itself 
a new enlightenment from whose purview every form of humanist thinking is revealed as a  
76 Armstrong, ‘The Postcolonial Animal’, http://psyeta.org/sa/sa10.4/armstrong.shtml 
77 Armstrong. What Animals Mean, 227n9. 
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superstition which the “humanist” movement has traditionally congratulated itself upon 
rejecting’.  She writes,  
 while traditionally ‘humanism’  is employed approvingly to designate an 
 anthropocentric and secular approach to the study and evaluation of humanity, such 
 anthropocentrism has now itself come under attack … on the grounds that it 
 mythologizes the object – humankind – of which it aspires to provide a rational or 
 scientific understanding.
Soper summarises anti-humanism as follows: 
Anti-humanism: claims that humanism … is pre-scientific ‘philosophical anthropology’.
All humanism is ‘ideological’; the ideological status of humanism is to be explained in 
terms of the systems of thought or ‘consciousness’ produced in response to particular 
historical periods.  Anthropology, if it is possible at all, is possible only on condition 
that it rejects the concept of the human subject; ‘men’ do not make history, nor find their 
‘truth’ or ‘purpose’ in it; history is a process without a subject.
78
Thus, anti-humanism rejects the theoretical assumptions on which humanism is based, and can 
therefore open space for alternative approaches to both cultural and species relations.  To 
show how anti-humanism might function in relation to postcolonial concerns, and what 
problems this might raise, I want to explore the examples of Louis Althusser’s For Marx
(1965) and Michel Foucault’s The Order of Things (1966).
 Althusser’s work demonstrates that there need not be an absolute break between 
humanism and anti-humanism.  Distinguishing between science (theory) and ideology, he 
suggests that Karl Marx’s work be regarded as adopting a concept of ‘theoretical anti-
humanism’.  On the one hand, ‘By rejecting the essence of man as his theoretical basis, Marx 
… drove the philosophical categories of the subject, of empiricism, of the ideal essence, etc., 
from all the domains in which they had been supreme’.  Yet on the other hand, Althusser 
argues, ‘it is possible to define humanism’s status, and reject its theoretical pretensions while 
recognising its practical function as an ideology’.
79
  To apply the concept of theoretical anti- 
78 Soper, Humanism and Anti-Humanism, 11, 12. 
79 Louis Althusser, For Marx, trans. Ben Brewster (London: Allen Lane, 1969), 229.
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humanism within postcolonialism obviously changes its context, and indeed, Tony Davies 
warns:
 the tidy distinction [Althusser] draws between the clinical procedures of Marxist 
 ‘science’ (‘theoretical practice’) and the fumbling misconceptions of ideology … invites 
 misreading, and can too easily entail an insulting condescension towards all those 
 movements for… emancipation that continue to draw their energy and define their 
 ends from humanist ideas of liberty and self-realisation.
80
Decolonising postcolonial theory is one such movement.  The retention of humanist notions of 
autonomous subjectivity remains valuable in this context because, as Wolfe explains, ‘while 
the category of the subject was formally empty in the liberal tradition, it remained materially
full of asymmetries and inequalities in the social sphere’.
81
  Therefore, as Linda Hutcheon 
puts it, ‘challenges to the coherent, autonomous self or subject have to be put on hold in 
feminist and post-colonial discourses, for these must work first to assert and affirm a denied or 
alienated subjectivity’.
82
  However, decolonising cultures simultaneously seek (as indeed 
white postcolonial cultures do) to define themselves against and undermine the influence of 
other theories that are associated with imperialistic or globalising forms of power, such as the 
belief in the superiority of European culture and civilisation.  Thus, however Althusser’s own 
attitude is perceived, theoretical anti-humanism can still be a useful concept for postcolonial 
discourse in that it shows how one might challenge or reject theories that are perceived as 
dominating or oppressive while retaining the ideological value of human selfhood or 
subjectivity.
 An alternative anti-humanism is offered by Althusser’s student Michel Foucault in The 
Order of Things.  He begins by suggesting that between the fundamental ‘codes’ of culture 
which establish empirical orders for people, and the theories or interpretations explaining 
those orders, is a third ‘region’.  Here, ‘deviating from the empirical orders prescribed for it by 
its primary codes … [a culture] … frees itself sufficiently to discover that these orders are not 
80 Tony Davies, Humanism (London and New York: Routledge, 1997), 59. 
81 Wolfe, Animal Rites, 8. 
82 Linda Hutcheon, Splitting Images: Contemporary Canadian Ironies (Toronto and New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1991), 70-71. 
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the only possible ones or the best ones’.
83
  Throughout, Foucault emphasises the constructed 
nature of knowledge and the instability of any one set of truths.  He concludes that ‘man is 
neither the oldest nor the most constant problem that has been posed for human knowledge’.  
‘As the archaeology of our thought easily shows, man is an invention of recent date.  And one 
perhaps nearing its end’.
84
  Thus, Foucault goes further than Althusser not only because he 
seems ready to dispense with the subject altogether, but also because he expects the centrality 
of ‘man’ to give way to alternative forms of knowledge.  What is perhaps most relevant for 
postcolonial concerns within his ideas is the suggestion that a culture may come to recognise 
alternatives to the dominant ‘empirical orders’ that it has taken for essential truths, and that 
Western culture is capable of doing so.  This could mean that it comes to acknowledge the 
value of cultures it has previously marginalised, even if those cultures cannot themselves 
afford to dispense with the concept of the subject (until, perhaps such a revaluation occurs).
Meanwhile, white postcolonial cultures may be better able to afford to dispense with the 
subject, and in their development away from the influence of their European heritage, might 
themselves be seen as cultures deviating from what Foucault calls empirical orders prescribed 
by primary codes.  In these ways, Foucault’s anti-humanism opens space for more 
fundamental reconsiderations of the human in postcolonial contexts. 
 In terms of postcolonial approaches to species relations, then, an engagement with anti-
humanism might mean one of two things.  If the practical retention of humanist ideology is 
interpreted to necessitate the ongoing superiority of the human within a theoretical anti-
humanism, then the notion of animals as subordinate might go unchallenged.  As Wolfe puts 
it, identity politics here risks making ‘its own “sacrifice,” to use the characterization of both 
Derrida and Bataille – of the question of the animal’.
85
  Alternatively, an engagement with 
anti-humanism could undermine the notion of human superiority to other animals, if the 
decentring of ‘man’ is regarded as desirable and if it is understood in species terms, as 
challenging anthropocentrism.  Among the novels to be addressed here, the former ‘theoretical 
anti-humanist’ possibility, in which animals are ‘sacrificed’ to humanist notions of the human,  
83 Michel Foucault, preface to The Order of Things: An Archaeology of the Human Sciences, trans. Alan 
Sheridan (London: Tavistock Publications, 1970), xx. 
84 Foucault, The Order of Things, 386, 387. 
85 Wolfe, Animal Rites, 9. 
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is exemplified in Yann Martel’s Life of Pi, which I examine in chapter two.  The other novels 
adopt the second position, and they can also be seen to move in the direction of what I am 
calling ‘species posthumanism’. 
 According to N. Katherine Hayles’ description, posthumanism  
 signals … the end of a certain conception of the human, a conception that may have 
 applied at best, to that fraction of humanity who had the wealth, power, and leisure to 
 conceptualize themselves as autonomous beings exercising their will through individual 
 agency and choice.
86
The term is sometimes understood as ‘post-human-ism’ and sometimes ‘beyond humanism’,
meanings that are certainly not mutually exclusive.  Put simply, the difference between anti-
humanism and posthumanism is that while anti-humanism seeks to undermine the supremacy 
of the humanist subject, posthumanism presents this supremacy as already contradicted, 
specifically by relativising the human alongside the nonhuman.  Jonathan Burt describes 
posthumanism as most optimistic where it offers ‘the possibility of transcending categories 
like essentialism, the subject/object boundary, a human-centred world, history, speciesism, 
and possibly death itself’.
87
  Neil Badmington suggests that ‘posthumanism inherits 
something of its ‘post-’ from poststructuralism’, and this point is exemplified in relation t
Jacques Derrida’s argument that humanism cannot simply leap outside itself, and that instead, 
systems deconstruct from within.  Badmington writes, ‘An approach informed by 
poststructuralism testifies to an endless opposition from within the traditional account of wh
it means to be human’.
o
at
d
 or elevated above it.
88
  One example of such internal contradiction can be found in
humanism’s paradoxical reliance on distinctions from the conceptual otherness of ‘the 
nonhuman’ to define the essence and boundaries of the human.  By emphasising 
interrelationships instead, posthumanist discourse re-envisages humans as inextricably boun
up with the nonhuman, rather than isolated from
86 N. Katherine Hayles, How We Became Posthuman: Virtual Bodies in Cybernetics, Literature and Informatics
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1999), 286. 
87 Jonathan Burt, ‘Invisible Histories: Primate Bodies and the Rise of Posthumanism in the Twentieth Century,’ 
in Animal Encounters, ed. Tom Tyler and Manuela Rossini (Leiden: Brill, 2009), 160.
88 Neil Badmington, Posthumanism (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2000), 9; see Jacques Derrida, Of Grammatology,
1967, trans. Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak (Baltimore and London, 1976). 
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 However, different interpretations of posthumanism emphasise different facets of this 
rather amorphous category of the nonhuman.  Although Donna Haraway has since distanced 
herself from posthumanism,
89
 her ‘Manifesto for Cyborgs’ provides a useful starting point for 
examining these emphases.  Her argument is that ‘By the late twentieth century, our time, a 
mythic time, we are all chimeras, theorized and fabricated hybrids of machine and organism; 
in short, we are cyborgs’.  She writes that ‘in United States scientific culture, the boundary 
between human and animal is thoroughly breached… nothing really convincingly settles the 
separation of human and animal’.  She also questions the distinction between ‘animal-human 
(organism) and machine’: ‘Late twentieth-century machines have made thoroughly ambiguous 
the difference between natural and artificial, mind and body, self-developing and externally 
designed, and many other distinctions that used to apply to organisms and machines’.
90
  The 
‘Manifesto for Cyborgs’ therefore demonstrates how the boundaries blur both between human 
and animal and human and machine.  Much of what has been written about posthumanism, 
however, has concentrated on one or the other, and until recently, the focus has often been on 
the latter. 
 In How We Became Posthuman, Hayles argues that ‘grounded in embodied actuality 
rather than disembodied information, the posthuman offers resources for rethinking the 
articulation of humans with intelligent machines’.  She expresses some wariness about 
technophilia, describing ‘the grafting of the posthuman onto a liberal humanist view of the 
self’ as ‘lethal’. She writes,
 When [Hans] Moravec imagines ‘you’ choosing to download yourself into a computer, 
 thereby obtaining through technological mastery the ultimate privilege of immortality, 
 he is not abandoning the autonomous liberal subject but is expanding its prerogatives 
 into the realm of the posthuman.
91
Similarly, Burt observes that ‘despite its effort to avoid “masterdiscourses”, one cannot help 
but sense a counter tendency that might tempt other kinds of enslavement’.  He warns, ‘we 
have to take seriously the possibility that posthuman propositions about transcending 
89 She writes, ‘I am not posthumanist; I am who I become with companion species’.  Donna J. Haraway, When 
Species Meet (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2008), 19. 
90 Donna J. Haraway, ‘A Manifesto for Cyborgs: Science, Technology, and Socialist Feminism in the 1980s,’ in 
The Haraway Reader, (New York and London: Routledge 2003), 8,10, 11. 
91 Hayles, How We Became Posthuman, 287, 286-87, 287. 
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difference will realise themselves in just that: the posthuman as übermensch’.
92
  Although 
Hayles emphasises that this is not an inevitable result of technological posthumanism, such 
risks arguably diminish within the alternative connection explored in Haraway’s cyborg – that 
between humans and other animals – because animals are not human artefacts, or at least, not 
inherently and never exclusively in the way that machines are.  
 Wolfe suggests that ‘the question of the animal is embedded within the larger context of 
posthumanist theory generally’ but that ‘the animal possesses a specificity as the object of 
both discursive and institutional practices, one that gives it particular power and durability’.
93
Certainly, because the concept of the animal has been so significant within humanism, animals 
constitute a potentially powerful example of that exterior otherness which Derrida sees as 
essential to philosophical change.  Even though it remains impossible to step outside the 
human perspective, animals can facilitate a step outside of humanism.  Indeed, in ‘The Animal 
That Therefore I Am’, Derrida suggests that the ‘industrial, mechanical, chemical, hormonal 
and genetic violence to which man has been submitting animal life for the past two centuries’ 
does evoke a potentially disruptive compassion:  
 In response to the irresistible but unacknowledged unleashing and the organized 
 disavowal of this torture, voices are raised … in order to awaken us to … this 
 fundamental compassion that, were we to take it seriously, would have to change even 
 the very basis … of the philosophical problem of the animal.
94
This compassion, then, is one example of how animals can cause a move away from 
humanism. Otherness or difference does not disappear, but its implications change: as with 
machines, posthumanism regards the boundary between humans and animals as blurry, and 
does not see difference as constituting human isolation or justifying supremacy.  Additionally, 
as Derrida also emphasises, difference is not between the human and the animal but between 
humans and a multitude of other species.
95
  For posthumanism, this relativises the human 
92 Burt, ‘Invisible Histories’, 160, 161. 
93 Wolfe, Animal Rites, 6. 
94 Jacques Derrida, ‘The Animal That Therefore I Am (More to Follow),’ trans. David Wills. Critical Inquiry 28, 
2 (2002): 395. 
95 ‘Whenever “one” says, “the Animal” … in the singular and without further ado, claiming thus to designate 
every living thing that is held not to be man … he utters an asinanity.’  Derrida, ‘The Animal That Therefore I 
Am’, 399-400.  
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species, positioning it not within a single division or a hierarchy but within a network of 
interrelationships.
96
 New asks whether power in a marginalized society comes from ‘borrowing, emulating 
and so appearing to join the power structure of the dominant society…  Or from fidelity to the 
things that matter locally and personally’.
97
  Both are possibilities, and they are not 
incompatible.  Within postcolonial discourse, as I observed in relation to anti-humanism, there 
are different possible approaches to the notion of subjectivity.  Both decolonising and white 
postcolonial cultures might seek self-affirmation in the wake of alienation.  However, white 
postcolonial groups are in an ambiguous position, with their sense of this alienation set against 
their colonial inheritance.  In this case, cultural assertion can also take the form of a more 
postmodern self-reflexivity.  In Splitting Images, for instance, Hutcheon writes ‘irony, with its 
potential political application, is an important element in Canadian literature (and art), because 
it is a way of ‘saying two things at once’.
98
  An engagement with posthumanism on the part of 
white postcolonial cultures can be read as another instance of willingness to interrogate their 
own subjectivity, with or without irony, in relation to the nonhuman.  In this thesis, I use the 
term ‘species posthumanism’ to refer to interrogations of humanism that work by relativising 
the human in relation to other animals.  The possible reasons for white postcolonial attention 
to species that I put forward earlier can all, potentially, take this form.  I want to emphasise, 
however, that I do not necessarily see the novels addressed in the following chapters as 
embodying this.  Rather, I want to suggest that the exploration of their engagements with 
humanist ideas often reveals implicit or explicit experimentation with this concept and, to 
varying degrees, many of the novels move in the direction of a postcolonial species 
posthumanism.  
 The chapters which follow each centre on a different text, and are arranged thematically. 
The first section of the thesis is used to demonstrate the widely differing possible approaches 
to humanist discourse and species relations within white postcolonial literature, as exemplified 
96 There clearly is some overlap here between posthumanist and ecological perspectives.  However, the priorities 
are not always the same; ecology is concerned with the ‘relativisation’ of the human specifically in relation to 
nature and the environment, whereas posthumanism is concerned primarily with the disruption of the humanist 
subject via interrelationships with the nonhuman in whatever form it takes. The two discourses are thus 
theoretically but not necessarily compatible. 
97 New, Dreams of Speech and Violence, x. 
98 Hutcheon, Splitting Images, vii. 
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by J.M. Coetzee’s Disgrace and Yann Martel’s Life of Pi.  I begin with Disgrace as 
articulating the complex relationship between questions of postcolonial culture, species, and 
white postcolonial writing itself.  I suggest that this novel explores the productive potential of 
species posthumanism in terms of negotiating both human-animal relations and post-apartheid 
politics, even though it does not offer any clear solution to either problem.  In the second 
chapter, I turn to Life of Pi, where animals appear as a means of undermining excessive 
rationalism, but not the human subject, which remains coherent and the master of other 
species.  I argue that Life of Pi can therefore be read as offering a version of theoretical anti-
humanism.  
 The second section of the thesis is historically structured around novels set in the past, 
present and future.  In a fictionalisation of a shipment of mustelids to New Zealand in the 
1880s, Fiona Farrell’s Mr Allbones' Ferrets emphasises that humans are not superior animals 
or exempt from the laws of nature.  Julia Leigh’s The Hunter is also concerned with colonial 
human-animal relations, in this case with the extinction of the thylacine or Tasmanian tiger, 
but here that history is not retold but replayed in a contemporary context where, I suggest, 
species and technological posthumanisms are set against one another.  Finally, Margaret 
Atwood’s Oryx and Crake pushes similar concerns into the future, presenting a scenario in 
which both technological and species posthumanisms exploit nonhuman animals and 
exacerbate the supremacy of the human in a post-natural and post-postcolonial world, yet still 
fail to eliminate the power of nature. 
 The historical theme of this section permits the examination of representations of 
human-animal relations through a temporal lens, showing how each novel uses ideas about the 
past or future to comment on contemporary attitudes.  All three novels convey awareness, 
arguably informed by sensitivity about colonial history, that the past involves events and 
attitudes which it is important to avoid repeating. They connect this to concerns about species 
by emphasising the relationship between imperialism and the exploitation of animals.  
Addressing these three novels chronologically (in terms of their settings) I suggest that they 
share fears of that relationship having increasingly detrimental results.  In these ways, my 
second section builds on the contrasting connections between species and cultural issues 
explored in the first, by drawing out the temporal dimension to the alliance against humanism.
32
 This thesis, then, is an attempt, firstly, to show how contemporary white postcolonial 
writers are engaging with the theme of human-animal relations, and what patterns appear 
within the resulting literature that might point to reasons for this.  My argument is that to a 
significant degree, the sort of alliance that Philip Armstrong recommends in the context of 
postcolonial and animal studies discourse, in response to the ‘common antagonist’ of 
humanism, is being made within white postcolonial literature, and I attempt to show how this 
occurs.  Whether through theoretical anti-humanism, a decentring of ‘man’ as the master of 
nature, or the repositioning of humans in relation to other animals that I call species 
posthumanism, all five of the novels addressed here can be seen to engage with animals as 
part of an opposition to some aspect of humanist discourse.  Within this dynamic, animals are 
represented as being more than the victims of anthropocentric humanism: they have power to 
resist it by unknowingly influencing the attitudes of individual human characters and 
disrupting humanist endeavours by their own actions.  Thus, animals are in each novel seen as 
participating in a challenge to humanism. 
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SECTION ONE 
1. Like a Dog: Animals and humility in Disgrace 
J.M. Coetzee: cultural and species relations in literature 
The work of South African writer J. M. Coetzee provides a useful starting point for exploring 
white postcolonial anti-humanist and posthumanist approaches to animals.  His novels often 
address postcolonial issues, literature itself, and the relationship between humans and other 
species.  He frequently takes on controversial aspects of these themes, negotiating them 
through the use of careful characterisation.  His novels tend to follow one protagonist very 
closely, either employing a first person viewpoint, or his own brand of the third person 
limited; in the latter case, the narrative follows the actions and thoughts of the protagonist 
with more immediacy than third person, but less than first person.  For this reason, I refer to it 
as ‘third person intimate.’  Those of his novels to use this technique are narrated, if not always 
through the protagonist’s eyes, then primarily according to his or her views.  As a result, 
authorial distance from the protagonist is sometimes obscured.  Alternative viewpoints are 
instead indicated by other characters who interact with the protagonists, so that the novels can 
become a stage for debates.  In The Master of Petersburg, for instance, the fictionalised 
Dostoyevsky (the protagonist) argues extensively with the anarchist Sergei Nechayev about 
pre-revolutionary Russia.
1
  Of course, the medium of fiction allows Coetzee to engage with 
such debates without offering any explicit opinion of his own.  Peter Singer observes this 
technique at work in The Lives of Animals, in which Coetzee’s protagonist Elizabeth Costello 
gives two lectures about animals.  Singer writes of the lectures, ‘They are Costello’s 
arguments.  Coetzee’s fictional device enables him to distance himself from them … without 
… committing himself to these claims’.2  This technique enables him to explore multiple sides 
of politically charged issues, including the themes of postcolonialism, literature and species 
which are of interest here. 
 Many of Coetzee’s novels explore problematic race relations, past and present, and often 
from the point of view of white colonisers or their postcolonial descendents.  Waiting for the 
Barbarians, for instance, centres on the experiences of an unnamed colonial magistrate.  He is 
                                                 
1 J.M. Coetzee, The Master of Petersburg (London: Secker and Warburg, 1994). 
2 Peter Singer, Reflections on The Lives of Animals, by J.M. Coetzee, ed. Amy Gutmann (Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press, 1999), 91. 
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at first deliberately blind to the sufferings of the ‘barbarians,’ but, in part because one of them 
becomes his mistress, he becomes unable to countenance the injustices perpetrated in the 
name of ‘the Empire,’ and eventually rebels.  The novel’s undefined physical setting 
highlights the relevance of the text to multiple instances of colonialism.
3
  In Foe, Coetzee 
offers a retelling of Robinson Crusoe through the eyes of a character named Susan Barton.
One striking feature of the novel is Coetzee’s decision to make the colonised Friday mute; 
Cruso tells Susan that Friday’s previous captors cut out his tongue, but the possibility remains 
that Cruso did it.
4
  Friday’s speechlessness foregrounds his subordinated position, as his 
physical inability to tell his own story literalises his mediation by Crusoe in Defoe’s novel.  
Some critics consider that by silencing characters like Friday, Coetzee defeats his purpose and 
perpetuates colonialism.  Benita Parry argues that despite Coetzee’s apparent intention, 
Friday’s silence nevertheless repeats the occlusion of the voice of the colonised, and locates 
Foe among the same voices of Europe which Coetzee means to subvert.  She makes similar 
comments about Michael K in Life & Times of Michael K,
5
 and the magistrate’s barbarian 
mistress (who is reluctant to narrate her story) and her people in Waiting for the Barbarians. It 
is difficult to see, however, how Coetzee could unproblematically ‘speak for’ the colonised, 
and indeed Parry also criticises the use of ‘ventriloquism’ in Age of Iron.6  By using silence, 
then, Coetzee is able to illustrate oppression without such presumption. 
 Indeed, Coetzee’s own position is sometimes so ambiguous that Marjorie Garber 
questions whether the The Lives of Animals might really be meant as a question about 
analogy: ‘In these two elegant lectures we thought John Coetzee was talking about animals.  
Could it be, however, that all along he was really asking, “What is the value of literature?”’.
7
  
It is true that a significant feature of Coetzee’s work is his interest in the politics and processes 
involved in writing.  Such ideas appear in his own non-fictional work, White Writing,8 while 
several of his novels include elements of meta-literature.  In Foe, Susan Barton, once cast 
                                                 
3 J.M. Coetzee, Waiting for the Barbarians (London: Secker and Warburg, 1980). 
4 J.M. Coetzee, Foe (New York: Viking Press, 1986). 
5 J.M. Coetzee. Life & Times of Michael K  (Johannesburg: Ravan Press, 1983). 
6 Benita Parry. ‘Speech and Silence in the Fictions of J. M. Coetzee.’ New Formations 21 (1993): 3-4.  J.M. 
Coetzee, Age of Iron (New York: Random House, 1990).  
7 Marjorie Garber, Reflections on The Lives of Animals, by J.M. Coetzee, ed. Amy Gutmann (Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press, 1999), 84.  
8 J.M. Coetzee, White Writing: On the Culture of Letters in South Africa (New Haven, CT and London: Yale 
University Press, 1988). 
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away with Cruso and Friday, struggles to retain control of her story as she tells it to the writer, 
Foe, back in England.  In The Master of Petersburg, Dostoyevsky tries to come to terms with 
the (fictional) death of his stepson, Pavel Alexandrovich, an event which eventually comes to 
feed his own writing.
9
   
 Of course, the fact that Coetzee’s novels often contain meta-literary material of this kind 
does not mean that their other content is only a vehicle for this.  There can be no question that 
in The Lives of Animals, animals are a focus, whatever other ideas they may convey, and it is 
of course this theme which ties Coetzee’s work to the concept of species posthumanism 
addressed here.  In The Lives of Animals, the question of species is, as Garber puts it, ‘clearly 
staged as a debate between poetry and philosophy’.
10
  Costello, a novelist, considers that 
reason reduces animals to their least interesting characteristics, arguing for instance that 
Wolfgang Köhler’s reason tests, in which a chimpanzee had to use crates to reach food, 
reduced the chimpanzee ‘From the purity of speculation (Why do men behave like this?) … 
toward lower, practical, instrumental reason (How does one use this to get to that?)’. Her 
recommended approach to animals is to ‘open your heart and listen to what your heart says’.
11
  
An interest in animals is also present in the background of several of Coetzee’s other novels.  
They are frequently shown to be caught up in and indeed inseparable from the human world, 
and sometimes from the human.  For instance, in The Master of Petersburg, Dostoyevsky is 
woken by the cries of a dog and is unable to ignore them, so goes out to free her paw from her 
chain.  He imagines that the dog is a possible ‘thief in the night,’ a reference to the return of 
Christ which he uses to express his longing for his dead stepson.  ‘He … must get dressed and 
answer the call.  If he expects his son to come as a thief in the night, and listens only for the 
call of the thief, he will never see him’.
12
  Details of this kind bring animal concerns into 
Coetzee’s work even where they are not a focal point.   
 Thus, Coetzee’s fiction as a whole covers much of the territory to be explored in this 
thesis, addressing the themes of animals, postcolonialism and white postcolonial literature, 
and exploring their interrelationships.  Of Coetzee’s novels, the one which most clearly 
combines postcolonial, literary and species concerns is Disgrace.  These concerns are related 
                                                 
9 This is also self-referential in that it connects to the death of Coetzee’s own son, similarly through a fall. 
10 Garber, Reflections, 79.
11 Coetzee, The Lives of Animals, 29, 37. 
12 Coetzee, The Master of Petersburg, 80.
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in the novel in that both cultural and species relations are shown to require an adjustment of 
mindset, away from humanism.  While the novel does not actually offer solutions in either 
case, I suggest that it does begin to explore what I am calling species posthumanism alongside 
and in conjunction with post-apartheid cultural relations. 
 
Disgrace
Among the novels to be addressed here, Disgrace is the most concerned with race relations. 
Whereas in Canada, New Zealand and Australia, the white postcolonial populations are by far 
the largest and current changes in race relations tend to be gradual, the population of African 
cultures greatly outnumbers other groups in South Africa, so that the end of apartheid has 
meant radical cultural and political changes that are still being negotiated.  Published in 1999, 
Disgrace appeared five years after the African National Congress came to power in South 
Africa’s first post-apartheid election.  The effects of this political change, particularly the 
abolition of apartheid, are presented on a personal level in the novel through their impact on 
individual characters and especially the white protagonist, David Lurie.
13
  Lurie initially 
seems to regard himself as privileged in terms of race, gender and species relations; thus, he 
can be said to subscribe to the humanist notion of the white male human subject as superior.  
Although Lurie is presented using the ‘third person intimate’ perspective mentioned above, 
with the narrative always following his thoughts, the novel simultaneously achieves distance 
from him through satire, irony, and by presenting contrasting characters.  It is through these 
techniques that the issues of post-apartheid race relations and species relations are first raised.  
 Derek Attridge, in his discussion of Disgrace, notes that ‘Much of [the] early section of 
the novel reads, unusually for Coetzee, as satire’.
14
 Attridge’s example of this is Lurie’s 
sarcastic refusal, for the sake of a principle, to cooperate with the university’s inquiry into his 
affair with a student (47-58).  This tone contributes to the creation of authorial distance from 
Lurie in the earlier part of the novel. During the remainder, this effect is intensified by the 
juxtaposition of Lurie with characters who think very differently from him, particularly his 
daughter, Lucy. Using the term ‘focalization’ over ‘point of view’ or ‘perspective’, ‘because it  
                                                 
13 Lurie’s ancestral origins are not defined, but he is obviously of European descent, and Anglophone. 
14 Derek Attridge, J. M. Coetzee and the Ethics of Reading: Literature in the Event (Chicago and London: 
University of Chicago Press, 2004), 169. 
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emphasizes the fluidity of narrative’, Gayatri Spivak argues that the relentless ‘focalization’ 
on Lurie provokes one to ‘counterfocalize’, because the reader, as reader, ‘does not want to 
share in Lurie-the-chief-focalizer’s inability to “read” Lucy’.
15
  Spivak’s idea gains 
considerable support from an instance of meta-fiction in which Lucy says to her father,  
 You behave as if everything I do is part of the story of your life.  You are the main 
 character, I am a minor character who doesn’t make an appearance until halfway 
 through.  Well, contrary to what you think, people are not divided into major and minor.  
 I am not minor.  I have a life of my own, just as important to me as yours is to you, and 
 in my life, I am the one who makes the decisions.  (198) 
This passage effectively advises the reader to pay attention to Lucy’s opinions as well as 
Lurie’s.  These devices work against the narrative concentration on Lurie’s individual 
subjectivity, and complicate the issues of culture and species, on which Lurie and Lucy 
frequently disagree.  
 In this chapter, I explore the novel’s opposition between theory and practice, showing 
how Lurie’s experiences and the use of irony and counterfocalization work against his initial 
assumptions, which I read as humanist, and towards what Mike Kissack and Michael 
Titlestad, in their discussion of the novel, describe as a ‘secular humility’.
16
  I suggest that this 
kind of ‘non-arrogance’ assists Lurie in the negotiation of post-apartheid cultural relations, 
and facilitates something approaching what I am calling species posthumanism in relation to 
animals. 
Theory
Disgrace first approaches animals through the opposite viewpoint to The Lives of Animals, 
since, unlike Elizabeth Costello, Lurie is initially indifferent to other species (143). Indeed, 
because of Lurie’s own priorities, the importance of animals in the novel is not immediately 
apparent.  Kissack and Titlestad suggest that an ‘intellectual and rational hubris … 
characterizes his life as an academic’.
17
  Lurie lives in Cape Town where, ‘Once a professor 
of modern languages, he has been, since Classics and Modern Languages were closed down as 
                                                 
15 Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, ‘Ethics and Politics in Tagore, Coetzee, and Certain Scenes of Teaching,’ 
Diacritics 32, 3-4 (2002):22. 
16 Mike Kissack and Michael Titlestad, ‘Humility in a Godless World: Shame, Defiance and Dignity in Coetzee's 
Disgrace,’ The Journal of Commonwealth Literature 38, 3 (2003): 137. 
17 Kissack and Titlestad, ‘Humility in a Godless World’, 137. 
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part of the great rationalization, adjunct professor of communications’ (3).  Thus, he has been 
an adherent and proponent of European culture, and although the university’s restructuring 
shows him that it considers his expertise less relevant now, he does not experiment with 
alternatives.  Instead, as his sexual relationships show, he continues to thinks in arguably 
humanist terms, using animals as conceptual tools and engaging in Eurocentric exoticisation 
and classicism.
18
   
 At this point, animals only feature in figurative terms for Lurie; his representations of 
his relationships with two women, Soraya (an escort) and Melanie Isaacs (his student), contain 
the only references to other species in this part of the novel.  The first example occurs when 
Lurie reflects that, because he is not passionate, ‘Intercourse between Soraya and himself must 
be … rather like the copulation of snakes: lengthy, absorbed, but rather abstract, rather dry, 
even at its hottest’ (2-3).  When he tries to follow Soraya and telephone her at home, he also 
sees her defensive response in metaphorical animal terms: ‘what should a predator expect 
when he intrudes into the vixen’s nest, into the home of her cubs?’ (10). With Melanie, Lurie 
gives in to passion from the first, and again sees his behaviour in terms of predation. After 
getting her address from the university, he intrudes and imposes himself on her: 
 Not rape, not quite that, but undesired nevertheless, undesired to the core.  As though 
 she had decided to go slack, die within herself for the duration, like a rabbit when the 
 jaws of the fox close on its neck.  So that everything done to her might be done, as it 
 were, far away.  (25) 
These references to animals, then, are only ideas about animals used to describe human 
situations.  In The Sexual Politics of Meat, Carol J. Adams suggests that figurative language 
makes animals and women into ‘absent referents’ for one another.  She writes that 
descriptions of violence towards animals reference violence towards women, and vice versa, 
‘without acknowledging the originating oppression … that generates the power of the 
metaphor’.
19
  For instance, the expression ‘the rape of nature’ obscures the victims of literal  
                                                 
18 That these tendencies appear in his response to gender relations is probably not coincidental.  Robert Morrell 
explains that gender as well as race relations underwent rapid changes in contemporary South Africa with the 
election of the ANC: ‘Twenty-five per cent of the new parliament were women…  This was in stark contrast to 
the male-dominated parliaments of previous years.  Once in power, the ANC used its parliamentary strength to 
promote a vigorous gender campaign.’  Robert Morrell, ed., ‘The Times of Change: Men and Masculinity in 
South Africa,’ in Changing Men in Southern Africa (London and New York: Zed Books Ltd, 2000), 19. 
19 Carol J. Adams, The Sexual Politics of Meat (New York: Continuum, 2000), 4. 
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rape, while expressions like ‘the butchering of women’ obscure the slaughter of animals.  In 
Lurie’s construction of his relationships, animals are mentioned by name, but they are 
absented in that he is not concerned with real animals at all. It is not clear why Lurie does use 
images of predation, but their effect is to distance him from his own actions, making it hard to 
gauge his view of himself.  One possibility is that he might see predation as romanticising the 
associated behaviour, like European hunting imagery.  Matt Cartmill explains that ‘As hunting 
came to dominate the leisure and imagination of the medieval aristocracy’, participants in 
many different sorts of pursuit, including romance, became ‘figurative deer, hounds or 
huntsmen in medieval and Renaissance literature’.  Alternatively, Lurie’s chosen images 
might imply guilt.  Cartmill writes that in some cases, ‘Deer and rabbits, the traditionally 
favored objects of the hunt, symbolize harmlessness, vitality, and innocent sexuality’.
20
  It 
seems likely that this idea informs Melanie’s characterisation as a rabbit.   
 As well as obscuring real animals and distancing Lurie from his real actions, the 
problem with these metaphors is that if they indeed stem from the sort of literature Cartmill 
describes, then Lurie is perceiving through a lens that is ill-suited to the South African 
context.  This inappropriateness is underscored by the fact that Soraya and Melanie are not 
only South African, they are of non-European extraction.  Lurie is choosing women with 
whom, Attridge notes, a sexual relationship ‘would have been a prosecutable offence for most 
of his life’.
21
  Although his tastes might suggest a degree of relief at the passing of the old 
regime, his choices can also be seen as evidence of Eurocentric thinking because he is 
attracted by what he finds exotic.  Soraya is the obvious instance of this.  She is Muslim, with 
‘honey-brown’ skin, ‘long black hair and dark, liquid eyes’ (1), and Lurie has presumably 
chosen her from her profile at the agency, which is listed under ‘Exotic’(7). By contrast, when 
he begins a relationship with Melanie, he notes her ‘black hair, wide, almost Chinese 
cheekbones, large, dark eyes’ (11), but her non-European ancestry is obscured.
22
  However, 
Attridge finds convincing evidence to suggest that ‘the Isaacs family are, according to 
apartheid race classifications, “coloured”’.  This includes Melanie’s boyfriend’s advice to  
                                                 
20 Matt Cartmill, A View to Death in the Morning: Hunting and Nature through History (Cambridge and London: 
Harvard University Press, 1993), 69, 159. 
21 Attridge, J. M. Coetzee and the Ethics of Reading, 173n. 
22 This comes across as Lurie’s doing; because of the ‘third person intimate’ narrative viewpoint, such an elision 
implies that he is trying to ignore this aspect of Melanie’s identity, to avoid acknowledging the racist dimension 
of his exploitation of her. 
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 ‘Stay with your own kind’ (194), Lurie’s idea of her as ‘the dark one’ (18), and, when he is 
reprimanded for the relationship, his colleague’s references to ‘a case with overtones like this 
one’(50) and ‘the long history of exploitation of which this is part’ (53).  Thus, as Attridge 
writes, ‘We are … allowed to surmise that her appeal derives in part from a certain 
exoticism’.
23
  Lurie’s desire for the exotic, of course, is potentially laden with meaning.  
Meyda Ye÷eno÷lu argues that in Orientalism, ‘the discourses of cultural and sexual difference 
are powerfully mapped onto each other’.  She writes that ‘discourses of colonialism have … 
constructed the world as natural territory ready for the conquest of the “rational” and 
“civilized” European man’, and suggests that the figure of the veiled Oriental female is 
constitutive of the figure of the Western male.
24
  Lurie’s sexual preferences might therefore 
suggest a problematically selective acceptance of the changes brought about in 1994: far from 
regarding Soraya and Melanie as his equals now that apartheid has ended, his attraction to 
them may derive from an imperialistic fascination with or desire to appropriate the exoticised 
‘other’.   
 Finally, both Eurocentrism and animal similes inform Lurie’s attempt to explain his 
relationship with Melanie, both to himself and to others after she makes an official complaint.  
Watching her rehearse a play (ironically, a modern comedy set in South Africa), Lurie muses, 
‘Strange love!  Yet from the quiver of Aphrodite, goddess of the foaming waves, no doubt 
about that’ (25).
25
  Later, when a university committee asks for Lurie’s view of their 
relationship, he says, ‘Suffice it to say that Eros entered … I became a servant of Eros’ (52).  
However, when asked if he is offering a defence of ungovernable impulse, he says that it was 
not ungovernable (52), so the reference is just his way of describing desire.  He does not seem 
to recognise that this allusion undermines him by emphasising that he is out of touch with his 
South African context.
26
  However, when he goes to stay with his daughter Lucy after 
resigning from the university, he avoids this kind of classicism, perhaps because he is now 
                                                 
23 Attridge, J. M. Coetzee and the Ethics of Reading, 173n. 
24 Meyda Ye÷eno÷lu, Colonial Fantasies: Towards a Feminist Reading of Orientalism (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1998), 10, 11. 
25 This may be read as another instance of satire.  Aphrodite is born from sea foam as the result of the castration 
of Uranos.  Lurie’s loss of position over his relationship with Melanie, and the novel’s castration references, turn 
the appearance of this epithet into a subversion of Lurie and his Eurocentric thinking. 
26 This is more problematic coming from Lurie than it might be from someone who is not of European descent. 
The European genres which feature in Derek Walcott’s work, for instance, are not likely to be read as nostalgia 
for colonialism, because of his ‘colonised’ heritage and because he is celebrating West Indian cultural hybridity, 
whereas Lurie’s Europeanising looks like a preference for the foreign over the local. 
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removed from the academic context, or perhaps because he feels a greater sense of shame 
before his own daughter.  ‘I was the servant of Eros: that is what he wants to say, but does he 
have the effrontery?  It was a god who acted through me.  What vanity!  Yet not a lie, not 
entirely’ (89).  Instead, Lurie uses an analogy with a previous neighbour’s dog to suggest that 
his actions were the result of instinct:   
 Whenever there was a bitch in the vicinity it would get excited and unmanageable, and 
 with Pavlovian regularity the owners would beat it.  This went on until the poor dog 
 didn’t know what to do.  At the smell of a bitch it would chase around the garden with 
 its ears flat and its tail between its legs, whining, trying to hide.  (90)   
Here, Lurie is no longer connecting himself with animals via metaphor. Instead, his point is 
that he is an animal and that being punished for acting on his instincts is unfair.  It is not clear 
whether he actually believes this, or whether he thinks this excuse is more likely to appeal to 
Lucy (who might sympathise with the dog he describes).  However, in abandoning his 
explanation that a god acted through him for one in which he is like a dog punished for his 
instincts, Lurie is taking his first step away from Eurocentrism and towards awareness of 
commonality with animals and of how humans treat animals. 
 In the initial section of the novel, then, the narrative remains close to Lurie’s 
perspective, but his character is, as Attridge suggests, conveyed with a degree of irony.  His 
exoticising relationships with Soraya and Melanie and his use of Greek mythology and animal 
metaphors to think about them suggest a failure to come to terms with the new South Africa 
and a tendency to approach life from a Eurocentric and anthropocentric point of view.  As the 
novel progresses, however, Lurie is forced to face practical realities in terms of both race and 
species relations, and counterfocalization now comes into play too, so that the reader is 
continually offered counterpoints to Lurie’s attitudes. 
Encounters
This begins when, to escape the aftermath of his relationship with Melanie, Lurie goes to stay 
with Lucy on her farm.  In doing so, he can be understood to be settling, in a contemporary 
sense: he is moving from the Eurocentric life he has been leading in Cape Town into rural 
Africa, where he has to negotiate an entirely new set of challenges. The representation of this 
transition accords with Parry’s observation that Coetzee frequently offers ‘subversive 
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rewritings of the genres traditional to colonial fiction, especially those favoured by the 
traditional white South African novel’.
27
  Lurie’s attitudes on his arrival recall those of the 
South African pastoral genre, which Coetzee describes in White Writing as ‘essentially 
conservative … it looks back, usually in a spirit of nostalgia, to the calm and stability of the 
farm, a still point mediate between the wilderness of lawless nature and the wilderness of the 
new cities’.
28
  Seeing the kind of life that Lucy leads her on her farm, Lurie thinks of her as a 
‘sturdy young settler’ (61), on ‘A frontier farm of the new breed.  In the old days, cattle and 
maize. Today, dogs and daffodils.  The more things change, the more they remain the same. 
History repeating itself, though in a more modest vein’ (62).  These colonial and very naïve 
attitudes are immediately undermined by Lurie’s experiences at the farm, in terms of both 
cultural and species relations.  Thus, Disgrace has the same effect that Parry finds at work in 
Coetzee’s other generic subversions, of ‘opening conventions to scrutiny and confronting the 
traditional and unproblematized notion of the canon’.
29
   
 In her response to The Lives of Animals, Barbara Smuts points out that ‘none of the 
characters ever mentions a personal encounter with an animal’, and comments that ‘the lack 
of reference to real-life relations with animals is a striking gap in the discourse on animal 
rights contained in Coetzee’s text’.
30
  In Disgrace, by contrast, the question of animals arises 
through real-life relations with them (or at least, real life in the terms of the novel’s reality).  
Animals do retain their earlier function as representatives of human concerns, but real animals 
become far more significant than those which appear in metaphors.  In Lucy’s world, animals 
are certainly not absent or obscured; on the contrary, they are sometimes too close for Lurie’s 
comfort.  The dogs housed in Lucy’s kennels have a separate space, but when Lurie first visits 
Lucy’s friends Bev and Bill Shaw, he is disconcerted by the extent to which they share their 
home with other species.  As he enters, ‘he is repelled by the odours of cat urine and dog 
mange and Jeyes Fluid that greet them’ (72).  Inside, there is ‘the cheeping of birds in cages, 
cats everywhere underfoot’.  Outside, ‘chickens scratch around and what looks uncommonly 
like a duiker snoozes in a corner’ (73).  Lurie is obviously unaccustomed to this degree of  
                                                 
27 Parry, ‘Speech and Silence in the Fictions of J. M. Coetzee’, 2. 
28 Coetzee, White Writing, 4. 
29 Parry, ‘Speech and Silence in the Fictions of J. M. Coetzee’, 2. 
30 Barbara Smuts, Reflections on The Lives of Animals, by J.M. Coetzee, ed. Amy Gutmann (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1999), 107, 108.
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interspecies intimacy.  The brief glimpse of the duiker, a native antelope, is also revealing of 
his detachment from his own South African context.  The word ‘uncommonly’ used to convey 
Lurie’s impression betrays both surprise and uncertainty about his ability to identify it at all, 
again pointing to his Eurocentric and anthropocentric habits of mind.   
 After Lurie and Lucy leave the Shaws’ house, the two of them enter into an ongoing 
debate about human-animal relations, in which Lucy’s counterfocalizing role is very 
important.  When Lurie expresses his sense of alienation, Lucy accuses him of elitism and 
anthropocentrism, and instead advocates what I would call a species posthumanist view of life 
as shared with other animals: 
 You don’t approve of friends like Bev and Bill Shaw because they are not going to lead 
 me to a higher life…   it is true.  They are not going lead me to a higher life, and the 
 reason is, there is no higher life.  This is the only life there is.  Which we share with 
 animals… I don’t want to come back in another existence as a dog or a pig and have to 
 live as dogs and pigs live under us. (74)
31
 
Lurie responds with a counterargument for human exceptionality, and rejects the spiritual 
element of Lucy’s point.  He says:  
 We are of a different order of creation from the animals.  Not higher, necessarily, but 
 different.  So if we are going to be kind, let it be out of simple generosity, not because 
 we feel guilty or fear retribution.  (74) 
The fact that Lurie is the protagonist does not mean that the reader is necessarily expected to 
agree with him; on the contrary, his lecturing tone is alienating and might encourage the 
reader to examine Lucy’s point of view.   
 The same dynamic comes into play when they continue this conversation in the kennels.  
Lucy comments that dogs ‘are part of the furniture, part of the alarm system.  They do us the 
honour of treating us like gods and we respond by treating them like things’ (78). Lurie replies 
by telling her that ‘The Church Fathers … decided they [animals] don’t have proper souls…  
Their souls are tied to their bodies and die with them’ (78).  He does not specify which Church 
Fathers, but his point echoes the ideas of Thomas Aquinas: in Summa Contra Gentiles, 
                                                 
31Lurie has not criticized the Shaws, but there is some justification in Lucy’s accusation, because he has been 
thinking: ‘Curious that he and her mother, cityfolk, intellectuals, should have produced this throwback’ (61).  
This suggests that he is making a distinction between city intellectuals and farmers, and a judgement in favour of 
the former.  
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Aquinas argues that ‘brute animals’ do not have immortal souls, and claims that this argument 
is in line with the teachings of the Catholic Church.
32
  Lurie’s reasons for making this 
observation are ambiguous; he could just be offering an example of the attitudes that Lucy has 
just described.  However, he seems to be offering theoretical support for them. Lucy, who is 
guided by practical experience and not European philosophy, questions whether humans have 
souls: ‘I’m not sure that I have a soul.  I wouldn’t know a soul if I saw one.’  Rather than 
acknowledging Lucy’s implicit questions, Lurie overrides them, asserting, ‘That’s not true.  
You are a soul.  We are all souls.  We are souls before we are born’ (79).  He is not agreeing 
with Lucy, then, but he appears to be falling back on a default position drawn from received 
ideas, rather than presenting arguments which he believes or has even considered before.  
Lucy does not reply but ‘regards him oddly’ (79), her distrust again inviting the reader to 
counterfocalize and to question Lurie’s position.   
 Perhaps because she sees practical experience as more likely to affect Lurie than 
arguing, Lucy suggests that Lurie could help Bev in her animal shelter in order to alleviate his 
boredom.  Lurie is reluctant at first.  He says, ‘It sounds suspiciously like community service.  
It sounds like someone trying to make reparation for past misdeeds’ (77).  This suggests that 
because he thinks of animals as signifiers of human meanings, Lurie is afraid that helping 
them will be read as an act of contrition about Melanie, when he has already refused to accept 
the university’s recommendation to show remorse (66).  But Lucy is more interested in how 
he can offer practical help.  ‘As to your motives, David, I can assure you, the animals at the 
clinic won’t query them.  They won’t ask and they won’t care’ (77).  He does agree to help 
Bev, and she is the one who unknowingly argues with Lurie’s distinctions between humans 
and other animals.  He implicitly rejects her suggestion that he likes animals, saying, ‘I eat 
them, so I suppose I must like them, some parts of them’ (81).  However, Bev ignores his 
hostility and replies, ‘Yes, we eat up a lot of animals in this country…  It doesn’t seem to do 
us much good.  I’m not sure how we will justify it to them’.  Lurie is left thinking, with 
apparent sarcasm: ‘Justify it?  When?  At the Great Reckoning?’ (82). Then, when Bev is 
moved at seeing a goat which must be killed, Lurie tries to invoke his distinction as a source 
of comfort by suggesting that goats might be instinctively prepared for death, but Bev 
                                                 
32 Thomas Aquinas, ‘That the Souls of Brute Animals are not Immortal,’ in Summa Contra Gentiles, trans. Anton 
C. Pegis. (Notre Dame and London: University of Notre Dame Press, 1975), 2:267-272. 
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responds by including animals in the first person plural: ‘I don’t think we are ready to die, any 
of us, not without being escorted’ (84).  Lurie concludes that Bev is ‘not a veterinarian but a 
priestess, full of New Age mumbo jumbo’ (84).
33
   However, his high-minded criticisms do 
not foster sympathy with him, whether or not the reader agrees with Bev.  Again, then, the 
novel encourages the reader to examine the alternative views of human-animal relations which 
Lucy endorses, without ever departing from its close concentration on Lurie.  Lucy has a 
similar effect in relation to Lurie’s view of race relations.  
 As I suggested above, Lurie’s exoticisation of Soraya and Melanie aligns him with 
imperial attitudes, and this is also true of his view of Lucy’s African neighbour, Petrus, when 
he first arrives at the farm, regarding him in the same outdated, colonial terms in which he 
first regards Lucy’s life.  Lucy herself introduces Petrus as ‘my new assistant.  In fact, since 
March, co-proprietor’ (62).  As Timothy Strode writes, Petrus and Lurie’s historical positions 
have in fact reversed, as emphasised by ‘Petrus’s ascension to property-holding status – on 
land, moreover, formerly belonging to whites’.  Strode notes, ‘Petrus’s ambitious upward 
mobility…, two wives, several children, and staunch virility stand in stark contrast to Lurie’s 
economic decline…, two divorces, single child, and steady movement toward sexual 
asceticism’.
34
  However, Lurie immediately reduces him to his most minor role, flatly stating, 
in place of a greeting, ‘You look after the dogs’ (64).  Lucy seems to understand that Lurie 
underestimates Petrus, and she attempts the same remedy here that she does with his 
anthropocentrism: she suggests that he help Petrus with the tasks of ‘establishing his own 
lands’ (76).  Lurie is much more receptive to this idea than to helping animals, saying, ‘Give 
Petrus a hand.  I like that.  I like the historical piquancy’ (77).  He is obviously not threatened 
by the suggestion, but then, he does not understand the new power relations, for he seems to 
be joking when he asks, ‘Will he pay me a wage for my labour, do you think?’  Lucy replies 
quite seriously: ‘Ask him to pay you.  He can afford it.  I’m not sure I can afford him any 
more’ (77).  Here, then, Lucy acknowledges and accepts, where Lurie does not, the full extent 
of the ‘historical piquancy’.  With race relations as with species relations, then, Lurie and 
                                                 
33 The expression ‘mumbo jumbo’ derives from some colonists’ belief that certain African tribes worshipped a 
deity by the name of Mumbo Jumbo, although there is little evidence to this effect.  Over time, the term acquired 
its present meaning (OED).  Lurie’s use of it could be interpreted as a symbol of his failure to understand Africa, 
as well as demonstrating his failure to understand Bev. 
34 Timothy Francis Strode, The Ethics of Exile: Colonialism in the Fictions of Charles Brockden Brown and J. M. 
Coetzee (Routledge: New York and London, 2005), 222. 
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Lucy have very different ideas, and she tries to undermine his assumptions through practical 
experiences.   
 Indeed, the parallels between these two issues are considerable.  The contrast between 
Lucy and Lurie’s perspectives is such that, if with problematic implications, their previous 
discussion about animals could be read as a metaphor for race relations.  Lurie could be 
arguing for cultural instead of species segregation: ‘We are … not higher, necessarily, but 
different,’ while Lucy argues against it: ‘this is the only life there is.  Which we share’ (74).  
Of course, this reading is a dangerous one in terms of both culture and species.  As discussed 
in my introduction, animalisation has often been used as an othering device to legitimise 
oppression.  In The Lives of Animals, Elizabeth Costello’s comparison of the destruction of 
animals with the Holocaust (recalling those made by Derrida
35
) offends a Jew in her 
audience.
36
  The problem with this kind of analogy is that, like the metaphors discussed by 
Carol Adams, it can easily mean subordinating humans to animals or animals to humans.  
Such analogies may be seen as derogatory to the human referents even if they are only 
intended to show that animals are also victims of injustice.  Meanwhile, if the animals are only 
symbols for race relations, then species relations are not important after all.  What might 
redeem the implied analogy in Disgrace is the fact that in Adams’s terms, neither ‘referent’ – 
animal or racial ‘other’ – is absent from the novel as a whole, so that the overlap is 
incomplete: one cannot simply be mapped onto the other.  Although Coetzee continues to 
point to parallels, cultural and species questions appear independently as well as in relation to 
one another.  Indeed, if the novel is seen to criticise Lurie’s theorizing and to favour Lucy’s 
practical view, this implies that it is important to read the novel itself on literal as well as other 
levels; this perspective encourages an interpretation of both race and species relations as 
serious concerns rather than a reading of one in terms of the other. 
 In the disagreements between Lurie and Lucy, then, the idea of counterfocalization put 
forward by Spivak repeatedly comes into play.  The reader is privy to all Lurie’s thoughts, and 
only those of Lucy’s which she speaks aloud, but when Lurie is dismissive of her ideas, this 
                                                 
35 See Jacques Derrida, ‘The Animal That Therefore I Am (More to Follow)’, trans. David Wills. Critical Inquiry 
28, 2 (2002): 369-418, 394-95. 
36 Costello receives a letter saying ‘You took over for your own purposes the familiar comparison between the 
murdered Jews of Europe and slaughtered cattle.  The Jews died like cattle, therefore cattle die like Jews, you 
say… The inversion insults the memory of the dead’ (Coetzee, The Lives of Animals, 49-50).   
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can encourage the reader to take them seriously.  Thus, while Lurie clings to his Eurocentrism 
and anthropocentrism, counterfocalization emphasises the conflict between this and the 
practicalities of his postcolonial world.  As the novel progresses, Coetzee then takes the point 
a significant step further, by having Lurie himself come to acknowledge this conflict. 
Animals and Africa 
As Lucy seems to have intended, Lurie becomes less able to maintain his theoretical and 
arguably humanist positions when he is repeatedly confronted with the realities of her life.  As 
Kissack and Titlestad write, ‘As an academic and intellectual … [Lurie] has always articulated 
and defended abstract schemes and claims.  His dependence upon, and faith in, this kind of 
activity is gradually eroded by his experiences on the farm’.
37
  The result of this is that his 
experiences begin to shape his opinions, rather than the reverse.  
 Even before he philosophises to Lucy about distinctions between humans and other 
animals, Lurie is already becoming associated with Katy, a dog who has been deserted in 
Lucy’s kennels. He goes out to her cage to interact with her, and addresses her directly, 
saying, ‘Abandoned, are we?’(78).  His use of the first person plural appears to be a way of 
talking down to Katy, as one might to a child, but it also points to a commonality between 
their positions: both Lurie and Katy are the recipients of what Lucy calls ‘refuge on an 
indefinite basis’ (65). Indeed, Philip Armstrong suggests that Lurie especially identifies with 
dogs ‘who are now surplus to the requirements of the new South Africa’.
38
  If Lurie’s choice 
of pronoun constitutes recognition of this, then that identification has already begun here.  
Then, when Katy is unresponsive, Lurie proceeds to fall asleep beside her, in what Attridge 
suggests is an ‘ironic parallel with all the women he has slept with’.
39
  If there is a parallel 
here, though, it is another instance of Coetzee’s overlapping treatment of human and animal 
concerns.  The moment does not reduce Katy to the symbolic; she is significant precisely in 
her difference from the snakes, foxes and rabbits of Lurie’s sexual metaphors.  Taken literally, 
an approach that, I am suggesting, Coetzee advocates as an entirely valid reading, Lurie’s nap 
with Katy is an instance of the sharing with an animal that Lucy recommends. 
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 Katy also presents Lurie with a practical example of the plight of animals.  Discussing 
Katy’s abandonment, Lucy comments (making an implicit comparison between Katy and  
Lurie): ‘The irony is, she must have offspring all over the district who would be happy to 
share their homes with her.  But it’s not in their power to invite her’ (78).  The effects of this 
gulf between the powers of humans and other animals are then repeatedly emphasised, and 
this works to disrupt Lurie’s abstract privileging of humans.  Despite his attitude, Lurie 
realises in the course of one visit that what Bev does in the clinic is more ethically complex 
than he had thought: ‘This bleak building is not a place of healing … but of last resort’ (84).  
Bev cannot necessarily offer the animals a cure at all, and even when she can, human 
priorities sometimes stand in the way.  For instance, on his first day, Lurie sees a buck goat 
with ‘fly-strike’ in his scrotum.  This goat has frequently been seen as a reference to Lurie’s 
sexuality.  For instance, Strode writes that Coetzee ‘indirectly compares Lurie’s condition to 
that of various animals in the novel, including a goat whose testicles have become infested 
with maggots’.
40
  As a native animal, the goat can of course be read as a symbol of South 
Africa, his condition perhaps a reference to internal strife.  However, the goat’s real animality 
is, like Katy’s, at least equally significant.  In this case, the issue is the subordination of 
animal interests to those of humans.  Although Bev says that the vet could remove the infected 
scrotum, this would only benefit the goat: he would become infertile even if his owner could 
afford the procedure.  Human preference also prevents him from receiving a lethal injection.  
Bev tells Lurie, ‘It’s their animal, they like to slaughter in their own way’ (83).   
 Lurie also experiences animal death in the clinic on a weekly basis.  As Clare Palmer 
explains in Killing Animals, shelter animals are either accidental strays who may be reclaimed, 
and have a good chance of survival; previously ‘homed’ animals who are no longer wanted 
and ‘will be assessed for their adoptability’; or abandoned and feral animals, who will 
probably be killed quickly.  The dogs in Bev’s clinic do have a period of grace; like the goat, 
their survival is dependant upon their emotional or economic desirability to humans.  When 
Lurie asks if all of the dogs will die, Bev says, ‘Those that no one wants’ (85).  So many are 
unwanted that it is a weekly task to dispose of them.  Lurie concludes that when people bring 
                                                 
40 Strode, The Ethics of Exile, 220.  The idea is reinforced by the fact that Lurie gives a passing thought to 
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 49
dogs in, ‘What is being asked for is, in fact, ‘Lösung (German always to hand with an 
appropriately blank abstraction): sublimation, as alcohol is sublimed from water, leaving no 
residue, no aftertaste’ (142).  Palmer follows Tom Regan’s argument that ‘the killing of 
healthy animals in animal shelters should not be regarded as euthanasia’ because it cannot be 
in the animals’ own best interests.
41
  But in Disgrace’s animal clinic, most of the dogs that 
Bev kills are healthy. They ‘suffer … most of all from their own fertility’ (142), or rather, the 
human view of it: Bev says that there are ‘Too many by our standards, not by theirs.  They 
would just multiply and multiply if they had their way, until they filled the earth.  They don’t 
think it’s a bad thing to have lots of offspring’ (85). Perhaps this consideration is also behind 
the novel’s avoidance of the term ‘euthanasia’.  Lösung, which Lurie uses instead, is, far more 
provocatively, part of the term Die Endlösung – the final solution.  With a degree of subtlety 
entirely absent from The Lives of Animals, Lurie may be making the same comparison 
between the killing of animals and the Holocaust that is met with such horror by Elizabeth 
Costello’s audience.
42
  What this underscores is the extent to which the ethics of killing as a 
solution to what is not, for the dogs, a problem, are being questioned in the novel.   
 Besides Lurie’s work in the clinic, the other major disruption of his initial attitudes 
occurs in his attempts to come to terms with an apparently racially motivated attack on the 
farm.  Lucy is robbed and raped while Lurie is attacked and locked in the toilet.  Some critics 
have seen this episode as criminalising black Africans; however, it is, as Attridge writes, 
important to examine ‘its place in the novel and the responses to it that seem to be 
endorsed’.
43
  While it certainly exists in the novel as a catastrophic event, then, its importance 
lies in Lurie and Lucy’s responses to it, and, where those responses conflict, in their attempts 
to negotiate between them.   
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 For Lurie, his lack of power in respect of the attack leads to a broader questioning of his 
own autonomy.  One aspect of this is his re-evaluation of his European linguistic expertise 
within his South African context.  When Lurie first leaves Cape Town, he is planning to write 
an operetta based on the relationship between the poet Byron and Teresa Guiccioli.  If some of 
Steve Baker’s ideas about postmodern art, which I raised in my introduction, are adapted to 
apply to these ambitions, Lurie’s values might be described as ‘expert thinking’, which is, 
Baker argues, seen as counterproductive in the postmodern context.
44
  I would suggest that in 
the post-apartheid context of Disgrace, while Lurie’s belief in his expertise might inhibit 
experimentation in general, what is most unfavourable to creativity in his expert thinking is 
that his particular expertise is out of place, and so inhibits experimental engagement with his 
South African context.  He wants ‘a chamber-play about love and death … with a complex, 
restless music behind it, sung in an English that tugs continually toward an imagined Italian’ 
(180).  In terms of the argument I am adapting from Baker, perhaps Lurie struggles to begin 
work on this because his plans are too Eurocentric to facilitate creativity in his post-apartheid 
South African context. He finds that his language skills are of no use at all once he is staying 
with Lucy.  He falls asleep in front of a football match because does not understand Sotho or 
Xhosa, only to be woken when Petrus turns the sound back up (75).
45
  This neatly literalises 
the point: Lurie is slowly waking up to the fact that Petrus’s is the relevant linguistic 
knowledge.  The attack makes the same point with more urgency.  Lurie can hear what the 
intruders say but he cannot understand: ‘they stand beneath the window, inspecting their 
prisoner, discussing his fate.  He speaks Italian, he speaks French, but Italian and French will 
not save him here in Darkest Africa’ (95).   
 Despite the appearance of this imperialistic phrase,
46
 this is a defining moment in terms 
of Lurie’s attitudes.  After the attack, he becomes increasingly concerned with the question 
Coetzee asks in White Writing: ‘Is there a language in which people of European identity, or if 
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not of European identity then of a highly problematical South African-colonial identity, can 
speak to Africa and be spoken to by Africa?’
47
  Lurie is increasingly dissatisfied with English: 
‘He would not mind hearing Petrus’s story one day.  But preferably not reduced to English.  
More and more he is convinced that English is an unfit medium for the truth of South Africa’ 
(117).  By extension, then, the novel draws attention to its own limits; if the language of 
Europe is inadequate to the task, then not only is it inappropriate for the white postcolonial 
writer to tell Petrus’s truth, it is impossible.  This is not, therefore, the sort of imperialist 
silencing of which Parry accuses Coetzee in relation to other texts;
48
  rather, as Spivak argues 
of Disgrace, the refusal to ‘give “voice”’ to the subaltern is ‘a politically fastidious awareness 
of the limits of its own power’.
49
 The attack, then, is the turning point which confirms, in 
linguistic terms, the point raised by Lucy’s counterfocalizing role: cultural power relations are 
shifting in post-apartheid South Africa. 
 Although the point is made much less overtly, because Lurie does not reflect on it, the 
events of the attack also raise questions about the superiority of human language in general 
over other animals’ ways of understanding. During the attack, the three strangers use spoken 
language to persuade Lucy to let them into the house, while the dogs’ grasp of the situation 
suggests that theirs is the more reliable source of information.  At the first sight of the 
attackers, ‘The dog at Lucy’s side slows down, bristles’ (91).  The boy who accompanies the 
two men deliberately provokes them; he ‘hisses at the dogs and makes sudden, threatening 
gestures’.  At this, ‘The dog at Lucy’s side tries to tug loose.  Even the old bulldog bitch 
[Katy], whom he seems to have adopted as his own, is growling softly’ (92).  Lucy and Lurie 
see this and are also wary, but their use of human language means that they can also be lied to.  
The attackers gain access to the house place by talking their way in; they ask to use the 
telephone because one of their sisters is in labour, and Lucy lets them in, at which point they 
presumably overpower her. The dogs’ lack of human language is an advantage; it prevents 
them from being misled.  Thus, just as Lucy’s counterfocalization works to question Lurie’s 
received opinion that humans have immortal souls and animals do not, the dogs’ quicker 
understanding here questions another point fundamental to humanist species distinctions: the 
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superiority of human language.  In this way, the linguistic expertise on which Lurie has 
hitherto relied is arguably twice invalidated. 
 The attack also forces Lurie to acknowledge his own mortality, and this is presented as a 
commonality between himself and other animals. During the attack, he, Lucy and the dogs all 
have the same defensive impulses, but they all become victims together.  Lurie thinks, ‘His 
child is in the hand of strangers…  Now he must do something’ (94).  But instead, he is locked 
in the bathroom, his car keys stolen and his hair set on fire; he is quite unable to protect Lucy.  
With the exception of Katy, the dogs can do nothing to protect Lucy either.  They are similarly 
(if already) locked in, and are then shot by the attackers. Lurie considers their killing 
‘Contemptible, yet exhilarating, probably, in a country where dogs are bred to snarl at the 
mere smell of a black man (110).  Thus, the dogs may have been attacked as part of the same 
racial politics that (Lurie supposes) he and Lucy were.  In the aftermath of the attack, Lurie’s 
physical vulnerability is also presented as connecting him with animals while he stays in the 
Shaws’ house.  They willingly offer accommodation and care, and Lurie’s experience of Bev 
changing his dressings makes him expressly conscious of the parallel between his own 
position and that of the animals brought to the shelter: ‘He recalls the goat in the clinic, 
wonders whether, submitting to her hands, it felt the same peacefulness’ (106).  Lurie has thus 
gone from a position of relative power, as an urban academic engaging in exploitative sexual 
relationships with exoticised women, to a position of linguistic inadequacy, vulnerability to 
his African neighbours, and animal mortality.  His individual transition thus reflects the end of 
the apartheid and underscores the irrelevance of his former assumptions to life in the new 
South Africa. 
 After the attack, Lurie changes rapidly.  He and Lucy return to the farm, where cultural 
and animal issues soon come together again in the fate of two sheep, brought home by Petrus 
to be slaughtered.  The sheep become the centre of a dilemma, the cause of which relates to 
race, and the effect to species.  The reason for the sheep’s presence is a party to celebrate the 
transfer of land from Lucy to Petrus.  Lucy says, ‘It’s a big day for him.  We should at least 
put in an appearance, take them a present’ (124).  However, since Petrus’s mysterious absence 
during the attack, Lurie has regarded him with suspicion, and he increasingly sees his 
developing power as a threat.  This may be one reason for his opposition when Petrus leaves 
the sheep tethered on bare ground with no water.  Lurie asks, ‘even if the sheep are for the 
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party, don’t you think they could graze?’ (123).   When Petrus does not move them, Lurie 
does.  He also considers buying them, but concludes, in a problematic metaphor: ‘what will he 
do with the sheep anyway, once he has bought them out of slavery?’ (126).  In thinking of 
their fate in this light, Lurie is making what Marjorie Spiegel calls, in her book of that name, 
‘the dreaded comparison’ between human and animal slavery.  To return to Adams’ 
discussion of absent referents, this comparison is ‘dreaded’ because, like the Holocaust, 
‘Some terms are so powerfully specific to one group’s oppression that their appropriation to 
others is potentially exploitative’.
50
  Spiegel’s position is that this comparison is nevertheless 
valid, because, ‘as diverse as the cruelties and the supporting systems may be … they share 
the same basic essence, they are built around the same basic relationship – that between 
oppressor and oppressed’.
51
  Lurie’s view of the sheep as slaves stems from a new 
acknowledgement on his part that they have been ‘destined since birth for the butcher’s knife 
… Sheep do not own themselves, do not own their own lives’ (123).  Spiegel herself makes 
the animal-slave comparison with regard to similar circumstances to those of the sheep in 
Disgrace.  Likening the transportation of animals to the transportation of slaves, she observes 
that ‘In the United States (as in much of the world), animals on the way to the slaughterhouse 
are usually not fed as this would “waste” food, the cost of which those in the industry would 
rather keep as profit’.
52
  However, this cannot be Petrus’s reason for starving the sheep, 
because he does not have to pay for the grass or the water.  Because his reason is never given, 
his behaviour seems unjustified.  The idea of Petrus as slave-owner, of course, also has 
complicated implications.  It may be seen as a mark of Petrus’s liberation, in that it impedes 
any parallel between him and oppressed animals, but it presents Petrus as a cruel baas or 
master just at the moment of his liberation.  
 Again, it is through Lucy that the narrative counters Lurie’s attitude.  Seen from her 
perspective, Lurie’s reaction to the sheep is metropolitan and unrealistic: 
 I’m not sure I like the way he does things – bringing the slaughter-beasts home to 
 acquaint them with the people who are going to eat them. 
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 What would you prefer?  That the slaughtering be done in an abattoir, so that you 
 needn’t think about it? 
 Yes. 
 Wake up, David.  This is the country.  This is Africa. (124)  
Thus, Lucy does not pass judgement on Petrus’s methods because the fate of the sheep is 
typical of the realities of rural meat-production, and perhaps because the alternative involves 
participation in a deception.  Lucy’s own vegetarianism may be motivated by her awareness of 
the realities; Spiegel suggests, perhaps naïvely, that without the secrecy surrounding most 
meat production, the market for it might decline: 
 in order to avoid change in our lives or habits – which might be the inevitable result of a 
 sober appraisal of the system – we must participate in perpetuating our own ignorance of 
 reality.  We must be able to disassociate the actual producers – the animals themselves – 
 from the ‘products:’ fur, meat, milk, eggs, etc.  Or we must be able to pretend that 
 everyone is happy down on the farm.
53
    
What Lucy is suggesting is that that farm life in Africa does not deal in such illusions or 
permit such denial; it deals in practice, not theory.  It certainly leaves Lurie’s new sensibilities 
unprotected.  The issue thus disrupts his imperialistic leanings again, as Coetzee inverts the 
pastoral idealisation of country life.  Coetzee writes, ‘To pastoral art the West has assigned the 
task of asserting the virtues of the garden – simplicity, peace, immemorial usage – against the 
vices of the city: luxury, competitiveness, novelty’.
54
  Finding his initial impressions of the 
simple country life contradicted, Lurie now becomes very critical of the realities: 
 It seems a miserable way to spend the last two days of one’s life.  Country ways – that is 
 what Lucy calls this kind of thing.  He has other words: indifference, hardheartedness.  
 If the country can pass judgment on the city, then the city can pass judgment on the 
 country too.  (125) 
Lurie is thus indignant where Lucy is accepting, but he is breaking with his earlier idealisation 
and with the literary genre that seemed to inform it, perceiving that it is at odds with the 
practical realities.   
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 Lurie’s judgement also shows that although he is no happier about the sheep, he is no 
longer blaming Petrus personally.  This confirms that Lurie’s concern with the sheep is not 
just a symptom of tension with Petrus; it is also motivated by compassion for them. 
 A bond seems to have come into existence between himself and the two Persians, he 
 does not know how.  The bond is not one of affection.  It is not even a bond with these 
 two in particular, whom he could not pick out from a mob in a field.  Nevertheless, 
 suddenly and without reason, their lot has become important to him.  (126) 
Correctly, then, Lucy attributes his reluctance to attend the party to his feelings about the 
sheep rather than Petrus.  Indeed, as a result of his reflection that sheep do not own 
themselves, Lurie has been revising his default position regarding animal souls.   
 They exist to be used, every last ounce of them, their flesh to be eaten, their bones to be 
 crushed and fed to poultry.  Nothing escapes, except perhaps the gall bladder…  
 Descartes should have thought of that.  The soul, suspended in the dark, bitter gall, 
 hiding.  (123-24) 
This shows that Lurie is now reflecting on such ideas for himself instead of simply citing the 
ideas of the ‘Church fathers’ as he did at first.  He no longer regards key ideas in European 
philosophy as any more reliable than European languages, because he can no longer ignore his 
emotional response.  He says to Lucy, ‘I still don’t believe that animals have properly 
individual lives.  Which among them get to live, which get to die, is not, as far as I am 
concerned, worth agonizing over.  Nevertheless… in this case I am disturbed’ (127).  Lurie’s 
words show that, in his own mind, he is struggling to negotiate between theory and practice: 
his approach at this point is still a failing attempt to lead with reason, instead of with his 
sympathies.  However, the latter impulse is clearly becoming stronger. 
 In the attack and in the slaughter of the sheep, then, the issues of race and species 
relations which Lucy’s counterfocalization has already presented as serious are brought home 
to Lurie through first-hand experiences.  Nostalgic, rather pastoral notions of rural South 
Africa are shown to be irrelevant; there is inter-racial and inter-species violence, and someone 
like Lurie is not in a position to change these facts.  Lucy also continues to function as a foil to 
Lurie in their conversations about the sheep, where she is resigned to circumstances which he 
is not ready to accept.  In relation to this question of humility, however, the novel is more 
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ambiguous; Lurie comes much closer to Lucy’s position in relation to animals, but she 
remains a counterfocalizer in terms of race relations. 
Humility
Lucy’s counterfocalizing capacity in Disgrace derives in large part from the fact that she is 
prepared to make compromises, while, as evidenced in his resignation from the university, 
Lurie would rather give up what he has than compromise in order to keep it.  If the tone of the 
first section of the novel presents this facet of Lurie’s personality with irony, the subsequent 
juxtaposition with Lucy has a similar effect.  Indeed, Lucy herself identifies Lurie’s obstinacy 
as a character flaw.  When they discuss what happened in Cape Town, she tells him, ‘You 
shouldn’t be so unbending, David.  It isn’t heroic to be unbending’ (66).  Lucy herself models 
a white postcolonial version of humility, including what I am terming species posthumanism.  
Although she is white, she does not otherwise fit into the traditional concept of the humanist 
subject; she is female, lesbian, and does not believe in the superiority of Europeans or 
humans.  To the extent that Lurie changes in this respect, however, he does so not because of 
the persuasiveness of Lucy’s arguments, but the persuasiveness of lived experiences.  The 
change in Lurie is such that Kissack and Titlestad claim that his ‘ethical disposition, 
completely divested of any transcendent or optimistic expectation, one that in fact embraces 
the perversity of life, becomes a clear example of secular humility’.  Whether or not Lurie 
does fully attain humility remains questionable, and Lucy’s display of extreme humility is 
presented ambiguously.  For Lurie, though, in relation to species relations, gender relations, 
race relations and art, the novel appears to advocate an attitude of humility over an arrogance 
that, I suggest, can be read as a humanist privileging of the human, the male and the European.   
 Kissack and Titlestad’s description of Lurie’s ‘new attitude to others’ underscores the 
break from his initial Eurocentrism and anthropocentrism.  They write that it is ‘not the 
product of rational deliberation, but of intuition and “sympathetic imagination”, particularly in 
relation to the dogs that he encounters at the animal clinic’.
55
  Certainly, in multiple aspects of 
Lurie’s life, lived experiences replace abstract European theory as the grounds for his 
opinions.  Lurie has a breakthrough in terms of animals when, at Petrus’s party, he is 
confronted with what he had most feared about attending: he is given a plate of mutton.  This 
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confirms the shift in his attitudes.  The idea that humans could be answerable to animals – the 
same idea which he had once found ridiculous in Bev’s concerns about meat-eating – is 
encapsulated in his own reaction to it: ‘I am going to eat this and ask forgiveness afterwards’ 
(131).  Killing the dogs in the clinic now becomes a very complex experience for him too.  
‘His whole being is gripped by what happens in the theatre.  He is convinced the dogs know 
their time has come … They flatten their ears, they droop their tails, as if they too feel the 
disgrace of dying’ (143). Here, as Armstrong writes, ‘Lurie is overtaken by a form of affect he 
cannot comprehend…The form of sympathy that possesses Lurie … cannot be dealt with 
intellectually’.
56
  Instead, the reasons for his behaviour are emotional.  The word ‘too’ in the 
description of the dogs’ reaction to death suggests that Lurie experiences his own mortality as 
disgrace, and is identifying with the dogs.  Perhaps this is also one reason for his response to 
their bodies, which he also fails to explain rationally: he incinerates them himself rather than 
leaving it for the hospital staff to do. He knows he is not helping the dogs in any rational way; 
instead, as Elizabeth Costello advises, he is listening to what his heart says, acting for the sake 
of ‘his idea of the world, a world in which men do not use shovels to beat corpses into a more 
convenient shape for processing’ (146).  Perhaps he is also reluctant to see them treated this 
way because he is thinking of their souls too, which he still sees them as tied to their bodies: 
‘the black bags are piled at the door, each with a body and a soul inside’ (161).  At the very 
end of the novel, he thinks of their souls as leaving their bodies after death: ‘here the soul is 
yanked out of the body; briefly it hangs about in the air, twisting and contorting; then it is 
sucked away and gone’ (219).  This suggests that he no longer imagines animal souls as tied 
to the body, but the description of the soul struggling and then sucked away suggests that he 
may not be thinking of it as immortal either.  This re-conceptualisation of the nature of animal 
souls reflects his re-evaluation of the relationship between species.  Lurie clearly acts 
according to his heart in what Bev calls ‘escorting’ the shelter animals to their deaths:  ‘He has 
learned by now, from her, to concentrate all his attention on the animal they are killing, giving 
it what he no longer has difficulty in calling by its proper name: love’ (219).  Thus, the 
detached anthropocentrism of Lurie’s figurative use of animals and his default position that 
humans are a separate order of being has given way: he is honouring supposedly unreasoning 
nonhuman animals on the basis of a thoroughly emotional engagement with them. 
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 That engagement can also be seen to facilitate another aspect of Lurie’s departure from 
the traditional figure of the humanist subject, and his increasing ability to relate to others.  
When Lurie first meets Bev, he is put off.  She is not exotic to him like Soraya and Melanie, 
and ‘He does not like women who make no effort to be attractive’ (72).  However, in the 
clinic, he lets Bev instigate a sexual relationship.  On the one hand, Lurie’s initial attitude to 
this seems misogynistic.  He regards his participation as a kind of charity – ‘So that in the end 
Bev Shaw can feel pleased with herself’ (150) – and as shameful to himself.   
 Let me not forget this day, he tells himself, lying beside her when they are spent.  After 
 the sweet young flesh of Melanie Isaacs, this is what I have come to…  And let him stop 
 calling her poor Bev Shaw.  If she is poor, he is bankrupt.  (150) 
On the other hand, if he does not desire Bev, then he participates only for her sake.  Strode 
argues that ‘Lurie … gives of himself sexually – he makes love to Bev Shaw, an act that only 
she seems to take pleasure in, that reflects a radical reorientation toward the other in his sexual 
self-conception’ just as he ‘gives of himself in a humane way as a caretaker for animals being 
put to sleep in Bev’s clinic’.
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  Indeed, although the novel does not equate Bev with the 
animals, Lurie’s relationships with them may be connected because it is always after the 
weekly killing of the dogs that he and Bev have intercourse.  This point is significant because 
it remains constant while Lurie’s misogyny diminishes and the relationship becomes asexual 
and more genuine.  ‘He and Bev Shaw lie in each other’s arms on the floor of the surgery’ 
(161).  ‘They have not made love; they have in effect ceased to pretend that that is what they 
do together’ (162).  Instead, they lie embracing after ‘The business of dog-killing is over for 
the day’ and talk over Lurie’s concerns (161-162).  These points imply that because the killing 
of the dogs is upsetting for both of them, their relationship is most important as a source of 
emotional comfort rather than physical pleasure.  Lurie’s relationship with Bev, then, 
continues his gradual break with humanist assumptions in two ways ways.  The relaxation of 
his sexist attitudes can be read as a departure from humanism in that he is ceasing to privilege 
the male.  Additionally, in contrast to his conceptualisation of Soraya and Melanie as 
figurative snake, fox or rabbit, and of himself as having a dog’s irrepressible animal sexuality, 
his relationship with Bev occurs in the context of animal realities: the experiences of dogs are 
no longer his parallels for his behaviour, but perhaps, a reason for it. 
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 Although the vestiges of colonial exoticisation are also absent from this relationship, 
however, Lurie’s humility is less developed in terms of race; he struggles with the new power 
relations in South Africa, only just able to ‘bend’ far enough to accept Lucy’s position, let 
alone agree with it.  Lucy remains a counterfocalizer to Lurie in terms of race, and their views 
are so opposed that Spivak observes, ‘If we, like Lurie, ignore the enigma of Lucy, the novel, 
being fully focalized precisely by Lurie, can be made to say every racist thing’.
58
  Lucy, 
meanwhile, takes her already developed humility to a drastic extreme as a result of her rape.  
She seems prepared to agree with Lurie that the attack was a racially motivated retaliation and 
an assertion of re-empowerment, but refuses to report the rape. Lurie does not understand: ‘Do 
you think what happened here was an exam: if you come through, you get a diploma and safe 
conduct into the future…?’  ‘Is it some form of private salvation you are trying to work out?’  
(112).  The reader is overtly encouraged to counterfocalize; Lucy replies ‘You keep 
misreading me…  I don’t act in terms of abstractions’ (112).  Lucy in fact seems to believe the 
opposite of what Lurie suggests:  ‘what if that is the price one has to pay for staying on?  
Perhaps that is how they look at it; perhaps that is how I should look at it too.  They see me as 
owing something’ (158).  Lurie sees this as slavery, but she says, ‘Not slavery. Subjection.  
Subjugation’(159).  Finally, pregnant from the rape, Lucy accepts Petrus’s proposal of 
marriage: ‘he can put out whatever story he likes about our relationship… But then the child 
becomes his too… I will sign the land over to him as long as the house remains mine… And I 
keep the kennels’ (204).  The opposition between the characters here results in lasting unease 
about Lucy’s choice.  The novel does appear to advocate a secular humility in terms of race 
relations and species relations, but does not offer any real suggestion about what form this 
should take, or how far it should go.  However, Lurie finally brings himself to accept this by 
comparing Lucy to a dog (Lucy speaks first):  
 Yes, I agree, it is humiliating.  But perhaps that is a good point to start from again.  
 Perhaps that is what I must learn to accept.  To start at ground level.  With nothing. Not 
 with nothing but. With nothing.  No cards, no weapons, no property, no rights, no 
 dignity.  
 Like a dog. 
 Yes, like a dog. (205) 
                                                 
58 Spivak, ‘Ethics and Politics in Tagore, Coetzee, and Certain Scenes of Teaching’, 24. 
 60
As Armstrong comments, ‘By now the novel has taught the reader to accord this kind of 
simile a full range of meanings from the literal to the emblematic’.
59
  This one works not on 
the basis of a concept like the snakes and rabbits of Lurie’s earlier metaphors, but on the basis 
of an understanding of real dogs, which could even be read in this passage as something akin 
to role models for Lucy’s chosen white postcolonial position in their possession of this 
nothing.  Thus, while the reference to a dog’s lack of dignity might be something of a cliché in 
another context, in Disgrace it connects to and values animal realities instead of effacing 
them. 
 Although Lurie struggles to come to terms with Lucy’s degree of humility in relation to 
Africans, and he is certainly not left with nothing in the same way, he does abandon his 
elitism in the writing of his opera.  To return to my adaptation of Steve Baker’s argument, 
Lurie thus lets go of the Eurocentric ‘expert thinking’ which inhibits, and this permits an 
engagement with the local and the experiential.   ‘Formally speaking, the conception is not a 
bad one’ (180), yet ‘the project has failed to engage the core of him.  There is something 
misconceived about it, something that does not come from the heart’ (181).  This recalls the 
opposition between reason and feeling made by Elizabeth Costello; now, Lurie is trying to 
express himself.  However, having acknowledged that he does not have the right language to 
access ‘the truth of South Africa’ as it would be told by Petrus, he must experiment in order to 
find a way of telling another story.  The resulting opera takes on a different form from what he 
initially intended, breaking the conventions, of character and music in particular, and possibly 
even of species, which might make for a posthumanist opera. 
 Arguably reflecting the counterfocalizing role played by Lucy, the focus of Lurie’s 
opera shifts from Byron to Teresa.  Additionally, Teresa now looks, in Lurie’s mind, much 
more like Bev.  Rather than being a youthful, idealised member of elite society, Lurie now 
sees her as middle-aged, ordinary and perhaps rural: ‘The new Teresa is a dumpy little 
widow…  The passage of time has not treated Teresa kindly.  With her heavy bust, her stocky 
trunk, her abbreviated legs, she looks more like a peasant, a Contadina, than an aristocrat’ 
(181).  Lurie asks himself, as if taking on Lucy’s earlier accusations about his taste in women, 
‘Can he find it in his heart to love this plain, ordinary woman?  Can he love her enough to 
write a music for her?  If he cannot, what is left for him?’ (182).  Apparently, he can.  He 
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begins to write, first the words, and then, although he had intended to borrow it (63), he writes 
the music too.  It is through this music that the opera comes to inhabit this postcolonial space. 
The problem of localised creation is of course a self-reflexive feature of the novel; the process 
in question is not just that of writing, but of white postcolonial writing in South Africa, which 
as Coetzee argues, requires a means of expression that is neither African nor European.  
Coetzee’s subtle inclusions of the local, in the duiker and the goat, for instance, are examples 
his own response to this problem, in that they remind the reader of the novel’s setting, while 
simultaneously exposing Lurie’s initially problematic relation to that space.  Indeed, when 
Lurie comes to write the opera, Coetzee continues to include such details through Lurie’s 
doing so.  Finding that his piano sounds ‘too rounded, too physical, too rich’ (184), he uses a 
banjo – indeed, a toy banjo.  The surprising appearance of this un-operatic instrument is 
obviously an instance of creative dissent.  Moreover, that Lurie chooses a banjo in particular 
means that the piece is also an instance of cultural hybridity, because the instrument is of 
African origin.  Having once applied classical imagery to Melanie during her performance of a 
South African comedy, he is now using an African instrument as the only accompaniment to 
an opera set in Italy.  Homi Bhabha writes, ‘The social articulation of difference, from the 
minority perspective, is a complex, on-going negotiation that seeks to authorize cultural 
hybridities that emerge in moments of historical transformation’.
60
  Although he is not 
working ‘from the minority perspective’, Lurie’s opera is an attempt to find a mode of 
representation appropriate to his in-between, non-European, non-African position.  He has 
struggled to relate to South Africa through language, but in the opera, he perhaps begins to do 
so through music. 
 Six months ago he had thought his own ghostly place in Byron in Italy would be 
 somewhere between Teresa’s and Byron’s: between a yearning to prolong the summer 
 of the passionate body and a reluctant recall from the long sleep of oblivion. (184). 
Instead, he now connects with the sound of the banjo.   
 It is not the erotic that is calling to him after all, nor the elegiac, but the comic … he is 
 held in the music itself, in the flat, tinny slap of the banjo strings, the voice that strains 
 to soar away from the ludicrous instrument but is continually reined back, like a fish on 
 a line.  (184-85) 
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This new self-deprecating and localised view of himself signals the passing of his elitist and 
Europeanised aspirations, and their replacement with an instance of cultural hybridity.  This 
reflects the condition in which Lurie, as a white South African, now finds himself.  Instead of 
seeing himself as an academic writing serious, European-style music, he has come to see 
himself as comic, playful, and a postcolonial hybrid: with a European history but grounded in 
South Africa.  In this way, Lurie’s opera offers an answer to the linguistic (and therefore 
cultural) dilemma which he has encountered during the novel.  He may not be able to hear 
Petrus’s truth, but he can produce his own, white postcolonial, hybrid truth of South Africa.  
In light of the meta-literary element, perhaps this might also be seen to express Coetzee’s 
hope of doing the same. 
 Furthermore, Lurie’s opera entails not only a cultural but a species hybridity.  As well as 
mixing European and African elements, it also mixes human with canine voices.  Animals, 
whose self-expression is not always thought to qualify as language at all, are relevant to the 
opera perhaps for this very reason.  Since Lurie has lost esteem for language, including his 
own, this may be why the ‘non-language’ of a dog appeals to him.  In this respect, Baker’s 
argument may be adapted to apply to Disgrace, as animals begin to contribute to the 
production of art.  Baker’s idea is not that animals do this actively or voluntarily; rather, they 
make a conceptual contribution.  He writes, ‘If the adoption of an animal perspective can itself 
aid the artist in working against the worst effects of an ‘expert’ conception of knowledge, the 
importance of the animal to artists is hardly surprising’.  This could obviously entail a 
somewhat instrumental approach to animals.  Baker repeatedly emphasises that artists who 
include animals in their work are not necessarily doing so because they are ‘pro-animal’; 
‘postmodern art has dealt with the animal across a spectrum ranging from the animal-
endorsing to the animal-sceptical’.  He explains:  
 Animal-endorsing art will tend to endorse animal life itself (and may therefore align 
 itself  with the work of conservationists, or perhaps of animal advocacy), rather than 
 endorsing cultural constructions of the animal.  Animal-sceptical art, on the contrary, is 
 likely to be sceptical not of animals themselves … but rather of culture’s means of 
 constructing and classifying the animal in order to make it meaningful to the human.
61
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Thus, neither approach endorses cultural constructions of animals.  Therefore, the existence of 
a postmodern (or in this case, postcolonial) motive for including animals in art need not 
preclude the coexistence of an animal-endorsing motive.  In Disgrace, experiences of animals 
lead to the disruption of Lurie’s preconceptions, both about them and about himself, because 
he comes to identify with them.  Thus, they irrupt into his art not perhaps in the same way but 
with the same effect as that which Baker describes.  The animal contribution to creative 
disorder appears as literally discordant in Byron in Italy, as Lurie considers the possibility of 
including a dog in the opera.  For the dog who has adopted him is very interested in his 
project:  
 The dog is fascinated by the sound of the banjo … and seems on the point of singing 
 too, or howling.  Would he dare to do that: bring a dog into the piece, allow it to loose 
 its own lament to the heavens between the strophes of lovelorn Teresa’s?  Why not?  
 Surely, in a work that will never be performed, all things are permitted? (215)  
Of course, the question about the inclusion of a dog in the opera is also a self-referent 
comment on Coetzee’s part, foregrounding the presence of animals in Disgrace (and The 
Lives of Animals) and emphasising that the question of human-animal relations can also be 
treated seriously within writing which is for public consumption.  For Lurie, the idea of 
including the dog is a response to what he now perceives as the problem of the privileging of 
humans at the expense of animals; it makes a significant bridge across the species divide.  
Now, far from separating animals from his intellectual ‘higher life’, Lurie is tempted to 
combine the two.  For in his life, they are now interconnected; he no longer has a sense of a 
higher life than this one, which he shares with animals.  
 However, although Lurie’s perspective now approaches what I am calling species 
posthumanism, in that he no longer considers humans exceptional or superior, this is not 
presented as offering a solution for animals because he does not have the power to undo their 
general ‘unwantedness’.  Instead, Lurie is resigned to the fate of the dogs in the clinic in the 
same way that, earlier, Lucy is resigned to that of the sheep.  This resignation is underscored 
at the very end of the novel, in relation to the dog who likes music.   
 It is not ‘his’ in any sense; he has been careful not to give it a name (though Bev Shaw 
 refers to it as Driepoot); nevertheless, he is sensible of a generous affection streaming 
 out toward him from the dog.  Arbitrarily, unconditionally, he has been adopted. (215)   
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That Lurie is aware of the dog’s attitude to him shows that he is now recognising animal 
subjectivity and affection.  However, while this reverses the usual species relations of 
adoptions at the shelter, it does so without reversing the power relations: the dog’s adoption of 
Lurie could spell rescue (and it does lead to some preferential treatment), but of course, this is 
up to Lurie, who never appears to consider adopting him in return.  Instead, just as he decides 
against buying the sheep out of their ‘slavery’ (for practical reasons), Lurie chooses to accept 
the dog’s death.  He agrees with Bev that the killing gets harder all the time, but, in an 
observation connected to his acceptance of mortality, he finds, ‘One gets used to things 
getting harder; one ceases to be surprised that what used to be as hard as hard can be grows 
harder yet’ (219).  ‘[A] time must come, it cannot be evaded, when he will have to bring him 
to Bev Shaw’ (219).  ‘Bearing him in his arms like a lamb, he re-enters the surgery… “Yes, I 
am giving him up”’ (220).   
 This decision, which constitutes the final line in the novel, goes largely unexplained 
within the text.  Lurie himself obviously feels that there is no possibility of adopting the dog.  
Earlier, in relation to the sheep, he says that he does not believe that animals have properly 
individual lives and that it is not worth agonizing over which live or die, but that in this case 
he is disturbed (127).  In the case of the dog, he is again disturbed and he may now believe 
that animals do have properly individual lives, but perhaps he feels that he cannot afford, 
emotionally, to agonize over which live or die. The possible meanings of Lurie’s decision 
within the novel are also complex.  Armstrong raises two possible interpretations.  One of 
these relates to the problem of possessions:  
 what Lurie is really giving up when he offers Driepoot for euthanasia is the prerogative 
 of maintaining a privileged category of saved animals, whose existence is permitted 
 only insofar as it is encompassed by the property rights which underlie contemporary 
 capitalist societies. 
In that case, giving up the dog ‘is perhaps Lurie’s version of starting again, with nothing’.  
Alternatively, Armstrong suggests, the decision might be interpreted as an abstract sacrifice 
on Lurie’s part.  He writes, ‘According to this perspective, Lurie … remains caught within the 
structure of humanism, as expressed by its characteristic treatment of non-human life’.  ‘The 
final reduction of Driepoot to a… sacrificial token – ‘like a lamb to the slaughter’ – …repeats 
the earlier tendency to treat animals in the abstract or turn them into metaphors and thus 
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surrenders to the anthropocentric metaphysics of Lösung’.
62
  My reading lies somewhere 
between those offered by Armstrong: I would argue that Lurie’s decision to give the dog up is, 
as the expression implies, one of surrender; that is, an acknowledgement of his own 
powerlessness.  In terms of the broader picture of both species and race relations, to rescue the 
dog would perpetuate the illusion of an agency that Lurie does not in fact possess.  To bring 
him willingly contrasts with Lurie’s earlier, more humanist view of himself as thoroughly 
autonomous, as displayed in his presumptuous behaviour towards Soraya and Melanie and his 
almost offended reactions to events like the slaughter of the sheep and Lucy’s decision to join 
Petrus’s household, as if he should not have to tolerate anything he does not like.  The 
surrendering of the dog without a struggle does not necessarily make the dog a symbol, 
according to this reading; it simply reflects Lurie’s new capacity for acceptance.  Therefore, if 
Lurie is on one level sacrificing the dog, and the reference to the lamb does gesture in this 
direction, then he is sacrificing him not to humanism, but perhaps to humility.  Lurie is 
acknowledging that there are limits to his own power to, as Lucy puts it, ‘share some of [his] 
human privilege with the beasts’ (74), because there are limits to that privilege in the first 
place.  For this reason, although the novel challenges the Eurocentric and anthropocentric 
values which, I argued, aligned Lurie with humanism, and although his new view of life as 
shared with animals approaches what I am terming species posthumanism, there are no easy 
solutions.  
 
Conclusion
Through Lurie’s development in Disgrace, and through the counterfocalization on Lucy 
which runs alongside it, the representation of concerns regarding non-human animals and 
white post-apartheid identity work productively together to disrupt attitudes to otherness 
which I am regarding as humanist.  In terms of human-animal relations, Lucy models 
perspectives and practices which foreground alternatives to the abstract, anthropocentric and 
often Eurocentric concepts which dominate Lurie’s thinking and actions.  Then, practical 
experiences of rural life in South Africa force Lurie to re-evaluate his preconceptions.  The 
result of this is that his opinions become informed by practice instead of theory, and they 
effectively align with Lucy’s after all; he comes to feel that animals are beings to whom 
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humans have responsibilities, and develops reluctant and then fully-accepted compassion for 
them, both living and dead.  In these respects, his new perspective approaches what I call 
species posthumanism.  However, Lucy retains her counterfocalizing role in matters of race 
relations.  After the attack, Lurie strongly disagrees with her decision to keep the child of the 
rape, to give up her land and to become Petrus’s ‘wife’ in exchange for protection rather than 
leave the farm.  When Lucy gives him no choice, his eventual acceptance seems to be 
facilitated by the comparison he makes between her humility and that of dogs.  For himself, 
Lurie acknowledges his own limitations, both physically as he ages and in terms of his 
cultural expertise, and he comes to terms with his white South African status through writing 
an opera which is culturally hybrid.  He also considers the possibility of adding a canine 
voice, and making it a species hybrid as well.   
 These points would seem to suggest that engagement with the question of animals can 
offer a productive way of re-envisaging and re-articulating the white postcolonial condition; in 
Disgrace, this is conducive to the development of a degree of humility which the novel 
presents as necessary for white South Africa.  This in turn seems to connect to Cary Wolfe’s 
point that undermining speciesism is a necessary step in undermining imperialistic attitudes.63  
However, Disgrace also suggests ways in which it is possible to go beyond Wolfe’s 
suggestion.  Animals in Disgrace are certainly not exclusively representative of human 
concerns; the point that Lucy makes, that humans simply share life with animals and, by 
implication, are not a separate order of creation, seems to be endorsed by the novel. 
 To this extent, then, Disgrace can be seen as a post-apartheid example of what I term 
species posthumanism: for Lucy, Bev and gradually for Lurie, anthropocentrism is challenged 
in a way that, without equating species and race relations, reflects the changing cultural 
politics of the new South Africa.  However, the opposition to humanism within white 
postcolonial literature does not necessarily contest the subordination of animals.  In the next 
chapter, I explore the contrasting approach taken in Yann Martel’s Life of Pi, which, adapting 
Althusser’s ideas, I describe as ‘theoretical anti-humanist’, because this novel opposes 
excessive rationalism but promotes a coherent, autonomous view of humanity, using animals 
for both purposes. 
 
63 Cary Wolfe, Animal Rites: American Culture, the Discourse of Species, and Posthumanist Theory (Chicago 
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2. A story with animals: theoretical anti-humanism in Life of Pi 
 
Yann Martel’s Life of Pi (2001) is in many ways very different from Disgrace and indeed in 
the other novels addressed in this thesis.
1
  In particular, the extent to which it can be seen to 
challenge humanism is limited.  Life of Pi does not seek to undermine in all respects the figure 
of the western male rationalist human who is superior to all other humans and animals, in the 
way that I suggested Disgrace does.  It overtly challenges the value of rationalism, but it 
concentrates on largely male characters, its non-western content is mediated by white 
Canadian perspectives, and although animals are used as part of the disruption of rationalism, 
the humanist notion of the coherent human subject is maintained through what Derrida calls 
the ‘sacrifice’ of the other.
2
  In this respect, I suggest, Life of Pi can be read as offering a 
version of Althusser’s theoretical anti-humanism.  The rejection of rationalism can arguably 
be understood to undermine the theoretical basis for the humanist privileging of the western, 
the masculine and the human, yet the novel maintains the ideological centrality of these three 
characteristics of the humanist subject. 
  In its focus on the Indian character of Pi and his rejection of rationalism, the novel’s 
approach has something in common with Elleke Boehmer’s observation that 
  Like post-structuralist theory …it followed that the writing of decolonization would put 
 in question some of the respected assumptions of earlier imperial times: the faith in the 
 superiority of western rationality, for example, and in the universalizing potential of that 
 rationality.
3
   
Rationalism is perceived in Life of Pi as offering too limited a perspective, impeding the full 
experience of joy in life and faith in the divine that is modelled by Pi, and I read this as the 
novel’s rejection of one aspect of humanism.  Additionally, the novel displays an appreciation 
and celebration of postcolonial culture, in terms of the workings of cultural hybridity in India 
and, to some extent, Canada.  However, Life of Pi is not the writing of decolonisation that 
Boehmer describes.  Despite its focus on Pi, the novel does not succeed in marginalising the 
western perspective, for two reasons.  Firstly, Pi’s story is framed by and mediated by western 
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voices.  Martel does not show Coetzee’s caution about who tells whose story, and his white 
Canadian presentation of an Indian character’s story risks being perceived as ventriloquism.  
Within the world of the novel, the frame narrator who interviews Pi in Canada and chooses to 
tell his story in the first person is also a white Canadian writer (Martel is playing with the idea 
that this character might be himself).  Secondly, both his and Pi’s narratives put the reader in 
the position of tourist in relation to what is Indian.  The frame narrator describes the adult Pi 
and his house in Canada in terms of exotic similes.  The ‘Indian lilt’ to Pi’s accent is ‘like a 
trace of incense in the air’ (xiii), and he has a ‘Pleasing coffee-coloured complexion’ (7).  ‘His 
spice rack looks like an apothecary’s shop’ (24), and ‘His house is a temple’ (45).  Ironically, 
this exoticising is also echoed by Pi’s narrative; indeed, Philip Armstrong suggests that ‘Pi’s 
sensibility is, more than anything else, that of the tourist’.
4
  Pi says, ‘I miss the heat of India, 
the food, the house lizards on the walls, the musicals on the silver screen, the cows wandering 
the streets’ (6).  He says that he is Hindu because of ‘sculptured cones of red kumkum powder 
and baskets of yellow turmeric nuggets, because of garlands of flowers and pieces of broken 
coconut, because of the clanging of bells to announce one’s arrival to God’ (47).  Although 
such details are often presented as Pi’s nostalgia, they again put the reader in the position of a 
tourist, a consumer of the exotic.   
 Because of Life of Pi’s selective challenge to humanism, its representation of animals 
has much the same effect.  Animals are central to the opposition to rationalism, but the novel 
avoids challenging the concept of the supremacy of humans.  The narrative begins with an 
‘Author’s Note’ in which the frame narrator tells of travelling to India and meeting a man 
called Adirubasamy, who says that Pi Patel’s story ‘will make you believe in God’ (xii).  The 
treatment of animals works towards this purpose, in two related ways.  Firstly, animals 
provide evidence of the surprising extent of God’s creation, beyond the comprehension of a 
strictly rationalist perspective.  In Parts I and II of the narrative, they repeatedly come into 
play as unpredictable and remarkable.  They include zoo animals first in zoos and then in Pi’s 
life boat, the sea creatures around him, and finally a colony of meerkats living on an 
effectively magic realist floating island of carnivorous algae.  All of these animals disrupt 
human categorisations and defy expectations.  However, the effect is that, as Armstrong 
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suggests, ‘[Pi’s] affection for zoos as embodiments of the wonder of nature … suggest[s] the 
superficial perspective of the transient visitor’.
5
  Animals appear as a form of spectacle; they 
are present in the narrative because they are exotic, as the objects of interest and even 
fascination, but seldom of concern in themselves.  Indeed, in its representation of animals, Life
of Pi as a whole might be regarded, conceptually speaking, as a kind of zoo itself.   
 Thus, despite the subversive approach to rationalism, the novel does not question 
humans’ position in relation to other species.  On the contrary, animals’ other role in the novel 
is as essential constitutive others: Pi’s humanist view of himself as superior to animals is 
apparently necessary to his morale and his religious faith (thus, with the exception of extreme 
rationalism, which is seen to encourage atheism, humanism and religion are compatible in this 
novel).  In the first story of Pi’s survival, he overtly constructs himself as zookeeper and tiger-
tamer in relation to a tiger called Richard Parker.
6
  In a second story elicited by two men who 
come to interview Pi, Richard Parker is absent and Pi’s sense of his human exceptionality is 
threatened because there is nothing to set it against; in particular, another survivor, who is 
killed by the tiger in the first story, is murdered by Pi in the second.  However, Pi’s choice of 
‘the better story’, also accepted by his interviewers, works to recover his status by retaining 
the animals as a counterpoint to his coherent human subjectivity.  Although there could be 
some authorial distance from Pi’s construction of animals in the novel, there is no specific 
evidence of this.  There is none of the counterfocalization that Disgrace offers through Lucy; 
the only candidates for this would be the frame narrator or Pi’s interviewers, but they all come 
to agree with Pi about stories, and never raise questions about human-animal relations.  This 
suggests, if inconclusively, that the retention of an anthropocentric view of humans is the 
novel’s as well as Pi’s.   
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Parker, and in 1884, survivors from the Mignonette in 1884 cannibalised their cabin boy, also called Richard 
Parker or ‘the boy Parker’, resulting in the criminal case of R. v. Dudley and Stephens.  See A.W. Brian 
Simpson, Cannibalism and the Common Law: A Victorian Yachting Tragedy (London: Hambledon, 1994); Neil 
Hanson, The Custom of the Sea (1999; repr., London London: Corgi Books, 2000).  Martel has commented, ‘So 
many victimized Richard Parkers had to mean something. My tiger found his name. He's a victim, too--or is he?’ 
Yann Martel, ‘How Richard Parker Came to Get His Name’, 
http://www.amazon.com/gp/feature.html?ie=UTF8&docId=309590. 
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 There is, then, a paradoxical tension between the disruption of rationalism that can be 
seen as anti-humanist, and the novel’s humanist construction of the human subject as superior 
to other species.  I suggest that this apparent paradox can be understood by applying 
Althusser’s concept of theoretical anti-humanism: a foundational precept of humanism is 
rejected, but humanist ideologies are still regarded as valuable.  In this chapter, I begin by 
examining the representation of Pi’s childhood in Pondicherry (now Puducherry),
7
 where 
cultural and species juxtapositions and human and animal escapes reflect one another, but 
where zoos themselves are defended and the human boundary is maintained.  I then examine 
the role of animals within the stories of Pi’s survival at sea, the first being Pi’s preferred, 
remarkable story and the second the strictly rational one elicited by his interviewers.  I argue 
that the contrast between the two stories illustrates the centrality of the symbolic sacrifice of 
animals to humanist constructions of the subject. 
 
Disrupting boundaries 
The danger of excessive rationalism, according to the perspective of Life of Pi, is that to deny 
what is not logically explicable is to miss much of the value of life.  Pi’s biology teacher Mr 
Kumar is to Pi an example of rationality taken too far.  He tells Pi that ‘There are no grounds 
for going beyond a scientific explanation of reality and no sound reason for believing anything 
other than our sense experience’ (27).  He explains that suffering from polio as a child led him 
to ask ‘Where is God?’, but ‘God never came’ and instead medicine saved him (28).  As an 
atheist biologist, Mr Kumar thinks of the zoo run by Pi’s family as his ‘temple’ because it 
confirms what he believes.  However, it has a similar role for Pi, who is very religious. The 
zoo is one of many sources of surprising and uplifting events in the novel, which disrupt 
rationalist categories and explanations.  It is presented as it might be encountered by an 
unsuspecting visitor to the Botanical Garden (where the zoo is located).  
 Suddenly, amidst the tall and slim trees up ahead, you notice two giraffes quietly 
 observing you…  The next moment you are startled by a furious outburst coming from a 
 troupe of monkeys, only outdone in volume by the shrill cries of strange birds… What 
 can you expect beyond a low wall?  Certainly not a shallow pit with two mighty Indian 
 rhinoceros.  (13) 
                                                 
7 In 2006 Pondicherry became Puducherry, but I follow the novel’s usage for the sake of clarity. 
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Animals repeatedly function in this way as sources of surprise and, to some extent, they 
challenge imposed categories in ways that resonate with the novel’s celebration of cultural 
hybridity.  For instance, cross-species cooperation and cohabitation on the part of zoo animals 
are often presented as acceptable and even admirable from the point of view of the human 
characters.  Pi’s general examples of this include dogs wanting human acceptance, dolphins 
keeping humans afloat, circus lions accepting the mastery of human tamers, and dogs 
fostering lion cubs (84, 85).  Examples from the Patels’ zoo include human-orchestrated co-
habitations that result in companionships, such as golden agouti and the spotted paca 
‘contentedly huddling together and sleeping against each other’ (84),
8
 and a rhinoceros that 
joins a herd of goats.  While humans find these arrangements ‘surprising’, so much so that ‘we 
had to put up a sign pointing out that rhinoceroses are herbivores and do not eat goats’ (85), 
they are understood in positive terms.  Pi suggests that the acceptance of another species is a 
way of meeting social requirements. ‘The golden agouti, like the rhinoceros, was in need of 
companionship.  The circus lions don’t care to know that their leader is a weakling human; the 
fiction guarantees their social wellbeing and staves off violent anarchy’ (85-86).  The 
relevance of these points to human concerns is underscored when Mr Kumar comments, ‘If 
we had politicians like these goats and rhinos we’d have fewer problems in our country’ (27).   
 Although there is not the same explicit comparison, the animals’ cross-species 
arrangements can also be connected to the novel’s exploration of multicultural cohabitation, 
via the Patel family’s cultural hybridity.  In Post-colonial Transformation, Bill Ashcroft 
emphasises that ‘colonized communities are more than simply the objects of imperialism’.  He 
writes, ‘the model of post-colonial societies reveals that local empowerment comes by means 
of the creative interpolation of the dominant, and increasingly a globally dominant, 
discourse’.
9
  Culturally borrowing in the opposite direction, then, from Disgrace’s Lurie in his 
use of the banjo in his opera, the Patels and their friend Adirubasamy are shown interpolating 
various European influences, but often giving them a new application in the Indian context.  
Adirubasamy has studied in Paris ‘in the early 1930s, when the French were still trying to 
make Pondicherry as Gallic as the British were trying to make the rest of India Britannic’ (10).  
He has been ‘made Gallic’ in the sense that he has French citizenship, but Pi’s parents, who 
                                                 
8 An agouti is a Mongolian gerbil; a paca is a large rodent native to Central and South America.  
9 Bill Ashcroft, Post-colonial Transformation (London and New York: Routledge, 2001), 214, 209. 
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have heard all about Adirubasamy’s experiences, are creative in their reception of the 
francophone influence. Regaled with stories of Parisian swimming pools, they take the name 
Piscine Molitor out of context to be Pi’s name (12).  When combined with a second European 
influence, the English language, this name makes Pi the butt of many jokes; people pronounce 
it, accidentally or deliberately, as ‘pissing’.  Pi then makes a borrowing of his own, turning to 
the Greek ʌ for a nickname to solve this (23).  Later, in Canada, Pi’s son Nikhil is known as 
Nick, and his cat, in the novel’s only allusion to Native Canadian culture, is called Moccasin 
(92), but he also maintains his Indian culture: he shows the narrator photographs of ‘A Hindu 
wedding, with Canada prominently on the edges’, and himself ‘during Diwali on Gerrard 
Street’ (86).  Thus, as Ashcroft suggests, the postcolonial ‘capacity to adjust global influences 
to local needs disrupts the simple equation of globalization and Westernization, the idea that 
globalization is simply a top-down homogenizing pressure’.
10
 
 The juxtaposition of different cultures within India also exposes Pi to various different 
belief systems.  He encounters atheism in Mr Kumar, who says, ‘Reason is my prophet and it 
tells me that as a watch stops, so we die…  If the watch doesn’t work properly it must be fixed 
here and now by us’.  To dispense with religion, however, is presented as an instance of 
excessive reason. Pi says, ‘I was … afraid that in a few words thrown out he might destroy 
something that I loved’ (28) (later, the frame narrator, who is sceptical at being told that Pi’s 
story will make him believe, shows signs of developing faith (63)).  Pi rejects atheism in 
favour of not just one but multiple religions: he has been Hindu from birth, and he adopts 
Christianity and Islam after encounters with a priest and a Muslim baker.  Rather than being 
‘converted’ from one religion to another, Pi tries to create a postcolonial patchwork of 
religions, using the term ‘God’ to reduce a conflicting multiplicity (the Christian God, Allah, 
and the many gods of Hinduism besides Krishna or Vishnu) to a monotheistic harmony.  All 
three of his spiritual guides are displeased by this, and there is a debate as his parents and the 
‘three wise men’ try to dissuade him from his multiple faith, but he replies, ‘Bapu Gandhi 
said, “All religions are true”…I just want to love God’ (69).  Pi wants rules like those of 
nationality to apply to religious identity too.  ‘I don’t see why I can’t be all three.  Mamaji 
[Adirubasamy] has two passports.  He’s Indian and French’ (73).  Although this is a 
contradictory and perhaps impossible endeavour, Pi is responding to his cultural situation in 
                                                 
10 Ashcroft, Post-colonial Transformation, 16. 
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the way that Ashcroft describes, by interpreting influences in his own way.  He maintains this 
attempt throughout his life; in his Toronto house the frame narrator sees ‘a small framed 
picture of the Virgin Mary of Guadalupe … next to it is a framed photo of the black-robed 
Kaaba, holiest sanctum of Islam. On the television set is a brass statue of Shiva’ (45).  Thus, 
multiple cultural influences are shown to coexist within the postcolonial culture of Pi and his 
family.  While this is not explicitly compared with the cohabitation of animals, inter-cultural 
and inter-species instances of acceptance are being used to make the same point in opposition 
to rationalism: openness to difference is preferable to compartmentalisation.  More disruptive 
border crossings, in the form of human and animal displacement, are also presented this way. 
 In their exploration of human-animal geographies, Chris Philo and Chris Wilbert write 
that although some animals understand human boundaries, ‘most animals will wander in and 
out of … human spatial orderings without knowing that they are doing this’.
11
  The examples 
of animal escape in Life of Pi tend to involve crossing into (human-defined) human spaces, 
either from zoos or the wild.  The presence of the tiger called Richard Parker in the zoo results 
from this sort of disruption.  A panther has been attacking people in the Khulna district of 
Bangladesh, but the hunter sent after it instead finds a tiger and her cub: ‘This animal was not 
the man-eater, but so close to human habitation she might pose a threat to the villagers, 
especially as she was with cub’ (133).  However, Pi attempts to dispel this sort of disquiet at 
the proximity of animals.  He argues that ‘animals don’t escape to somewhere but from 
something’, and that ‘Animals that escape go from the known into the unknown – and if there 
is one thing that an animal hates above all else, it is the unknown.  Escaping animals usually 
hide in the very first place they find’ (41).  Consequently, animal proximity to humans is 
surprisingly common.  Prefacing his points by saying ‘I’ll give you hard to believe’ (297), Pi 
gives the example of a black leopard escaping a zoo in Zurich for ten weeks, and a polar bear 
which escaped from a zoo in Calcutta and was never seen again, ‘not by police or hunters or 
poachers or anyone else’ (297).  He continues: 
 If you took the city of Tokyo and turned it upside down and shook it, you would be 
 amazed at the animals that would fall out…  Boa constrictors, Komodo dragons, 
                                                 
11 Chris Philo and Chris Wilbert, eds. ‘Animal Space, Beastly Places: An Introduction,’ in Animal Spaces, 
Beastly Places: New Geographies of Human-Animal Relations (London: Routledge, 2000), 22.  
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 crocodiles, piranhas, ostriches, wolves, lynx, wallabies, manatees, porcupines, orang-
 utans, wild boar.  (42, 297) 
These animals are living without regard to human spatial and conceptual boundaries, but they 
simultaneously contradict the human assumption that this makes them a threat.  Pi comments, 
‘escaped zoo animals are not dangerous absconding criminals but simply wild creatures 
seeking to fit in’ (42).  Here, then, Pi displays comfort with and even pleasure in these 
transgressions of rationalised order and spatial species boundaries. 
 The attempt by Pi’s family to migrate to Canada is presented in a similar way to these 
zoo animal escapes, emphasising the involuntary nature of some contemporary migrations.  
As he describes the family’s preparations to leave India, Pi likens himself and his brother to 
zoo animals: ‘two animals were being shipped to the Canada Zoo.  That’s how Ravi and I felt.  
We did not want to go.  We did not want to live in a country of gale-force winds and minus-
two-hundred-degree winters’ (88).  This comparison suggests some awareness of captive 
animals’ lack of control (it might also refer to the removal of zoo animals from their natural 
climates).  For Pi’s father, the decision to leave has more in common with the discussion of 
zoo animals’ escapes.  Pi says, ‘people move in the hope of a better life… because of wear 
and tear and anxiety … Because of the feeling that nothing will change, that happiness and 
prosperity are only possible somewhere else’ (77-79).  Pi explains that ‘In February 1976, the 
Tamil Nadu government was brought down by Delhi … it was to Father the crowning touch in 
Mrs. Gandhi’s dictatorial takeover of the nation’ (78).  Thus, the possible parallels with 
escaping zoo animals could be seen to liken the Patels to animals in their incomplete 
autonomy.  The boys are being moved against their will (initially) as zoo animals are, while 
their parents are moving only to get away from something, as animals are described as doing. 
 In the representation of Pondicherry and its zoo, then, Life of Pi explores instances of 
species and cultural juxtaposition, and animal and human escapes, offering potential parallels 
between human and animal border-crossings and using both to undermine rationalist 
categories and divisions.  Paradoxically, while this might be seen as rejecting a western 
discourse, the parallels between zoo escapes and the Patels’ migration risk being seen to 
repeat the imperialistic animalisation of non-westerners.  However, apart from Mr Kumar’s 
comment that politicians could learn from animals and the likening of Ravi and Pi to 
transported animals, these potential connections between humans and animals are left implicit, 
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and are outweighed by a much stronger distinction.  Humans’ superiority to animals, 
especially that of Pi and his family, is repeatedly reinforced. 
   
Maintaining boundaries 
As discussed in my introduction, Cary Wolfe observes that, because ‘much of the work in … 
cultural studies and identity politics arose to reassert the social and material … [status]… of 
the subject’, such discourses often echo the humanist construction of humans as superior to 
animals.
12
  Whether this is the reason for Life of Pi’s representation of human-animal relations 
is questionable, because the exoticising tendencies I noted earlier suggest that the novel does 
not engage fully with the politics of decolonisation.  However, the subordination of nonhuman 
animals does work to assert the subject status of Pi, his family and his community in India.  
This first occurs in Pi’s discussion of zoos and of human-animal relations within them.  The 
zoo in Life of Pi is both an instance of human dominion over animals, and of the legacy of 
imperialism.  Stephen Bostock explains that menageries and zoos often functioned as 
signifiers of an individual proprietor’s wealth and political power, from ancient Greece and 
Egypt to the Renaissance.
13
  With the spread of global imperialism, collections became status 
symbols on an international political level, often permitting the public to participate in 
imperial triumph.
14
  Life of Pi acknowledges that animal-keeping is associated with power: 
‘What maharaja’s son had such vast, luxuriant grounds to play about?  What palace had such a 
menagerie?’(14).  Additionally, the zoo has its origins in Indian politics.  ‘Pondicherry entered 
the Union of India on November 1, 1954.  One civic achievement called for another.  A 
portion of the grounds of the Pondicherry Botanical Garden was made available rent-free’ 
(12).  Pondicherry’s membership of the Union of India became possible only when it became 
independent of French administration, so the founding of Pondicherry’s zoo is a celebration of 
the end of colonial rule and the transfer of power into local hands. However, the signifiers at 
work are the same as those of an imperial zoo, in that this power is still represented by 
dominance over animals.  In presenting Pi as a zookeeper, the novel thus places him on a par 
                                                 
12 Cary Wolfe, Animal Rites: American Culture, the Discourse of Species, and Posthumanist Theory (Chicago 
and London: University of Chicago Press, 2003), 9. 
13 Stephen St C. Bostock, Zoos and Animal Rights: The Ethics of Keeping Animals (London and New York: 
Routledge, 1993). 
14 Harriet Ritvo, The Animal Estate: The English and Other Creatures in the Victorian Age (Cambridge and 
London: Harvard University Press, 1987), 209. 
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with Europeans by constructing his subjectivity in the traditional European way: as distinct 
from and superior to animals.  
 Although, as Philo and Wilbert observe, zoos’ objectives ‘have been precisely to 
translate wild animals from “the wilderness” to the special, enclosed and policed enclaves 
nearer to our human homes in “the city”’,
15
 humans’ conceptual boundaries are unthreatened 
by this. On the contrary, zoos are presented as advancing humans’ intellectual mastery.  The 
zoo in Life of Pi is described as ‘a cultural institution. Like a public library, like a museum, it 
is at the service of popular education and science’ (78).  From the Enlightenment onwards, 
zoos have often constructed themselves in this way.  Harriet Ritvo writes, ‘When, as was the 
case at Regent’s Park beginning in 1840, animals were arranged taxonomically, the exhibit 
showed nature not only confined and restrained, but interpreted and ordered’.
16
  The 
Pondicherry Zoo organises nature in the way that Ritvo describes. Both the plants of the 
Botanical Garden where the zoo is located, and the zoo animals themselves are labelled (12-
13, 25), and the zoo is ‘designed and run according to the most modern, biologically sound 
principles’ (12).  In these respects, of course, the zoo is imposing a rational order in which 
animals become physical realisations of ‘classificatory schemes wherein each identified thing 
has its own “proper place” relative to all other things, and can be neatly identified, delimited 
and positioned in the relevant conceptual space’.
17
  Pi’s atheist teacher, Mr Kumar, 
experiences the zoo animals this way: 
 Each to him was a triumph of logic and mechanics, and nature as a whole was an 
 exceptionally fine illustration of science…  When Mr. Kumar visited the zoo, it was to 
 take the pulse of the universe, and his stethoscopic mind always confirmed to him that 
 everything was in order, that everything was order.  (26) 
By extension, the zoo is also confirming Mr Kumar’s rationalist capacity to comprehend the 
rest of nature, and thus his own position in relation to it, and although Pi does not share Mr 
Kumar’s atheism, he does not oppose his view of the animals.  Thus, as in Randy Malamud’s 
description, ‘The zoo’s forte is its construction of zoogoers as paramount masters of all they 
                                                 
15 Philo and Wilbert, ‘Animal Spaces, Beastly Places’, 13. 
16 Rivto, The Animal Estate, 218. 
17 Philo and Wilbert, ‘Animal Spaces, Beastly Places’, 6. 
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survey, and zoo animals as subalterns’.
18
  In Life of Pi, this point might be connected to Indian 
decolonisation: in the context of their municipal zoo, the Indian visitors are not subalterns, and 
the owners especially are in a clear position of power.  The zoo thus twice symbolises the 
recuperation of non-western autonomy, at the expense of animals and so of what Derrida 
describes as their conceptual sacrifice.  
 Indeed, Pi repeatedly tries to defend the practice of keeping animals in zoos. His logic is 
that because animals are not motivated by a desire for freedom as a concept, and because wild 
life does not entail such freedom, it is not cruel to keep them in zoos if they are properly 
looked after.  He argues that in the wild, animals are still bound by their particular territorial 
and environmental needs, which a good zoo can supply more safely (15-17).  Thus, Pi’s 
position echoes the European Enlightenment belief that humans can and do know enough, 
through science, to manipulate and improve upon natural life.  Although he believes that 
‘animals are incapable of such discernment’, he claims:  
 One might even argue that if an animal could choose with intelligence, it would opt for 
 living in a zoo, since the major difference between a zoo and the wild is the absence of 
 parasites and enemies and the abundance of food in the first, and their respective 
 abundance and scarcity in the second.  (18)  
Zoo commentators often approach this idea more cautiously. For instance, Bostock writes that 
despite the many advantages of captivity, ‘to give the provision of regular food and safety … 
as pure and simple advantages of captivity over against life in the wild is to leave out certain 
related disadvantages…: the loss, in particular, of purposeful living’.  He warns that it is 
important to ‘recognise that positive side [to the wild] to realise our responsibility to provide 
suitably enriched captive conditions’.
19
  However, Pi’s position is that good zoos do achieve 
this: ‘A biologically sound zoo enclosure … is just another territory, peculiar only in its size 
and in its proximity to human territory’ (17).  Thus, as Armstrong writes, ‘Pi’s account of the 
contracted space that typifies the condition of contemporary non-human animals … makes 
into virtues … constriction of movement along with control by, dependence upon, and 
intimate proximity to, human beings’.
20
  In claiming that animals would only want to escape 
                                                 
18 Randy Malamud, Reading Zoos: Representations Of Animals and Captivity (Basingstoke: Macmillan Press, 
1998), 58. 
19 Bostock, Zoos and Animal Rights, 71, 72. 
20 Armstrong, What Animals Mean, 178. 
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this situation if they were not properly looked after, Pi tries to minimise the extent to which, as 
Philo and Wilbert put it, zoo escapes ‘suggest a measure of (resistant) agency on the part of 
animals’.
21
  If animals only escape because, for instance, ‘Something within their territory has 
frightened them’, then escapes are based only on more passive responses to need.   
 Of course, Pi’s argument falls down here because keeping animals in zoos involves far 
too much room for error; zookeepers cannot predict or control everything that might unsettle 
an animal.  Indeed, he himself demonstrates that zoos place animals in a position of 
vulnerability.  Pi says, ‘We commonly say in the trade that the most dangerous animal in a zoo 
is Man’ (29).  The text also includes a rare expression of environmentalism at this point: ‘In a 
general way we mean how our species’ excessive predatoriness has made the entire planet our 
prey’ (29).  However, the discussion concentrates on zoo visitors, with an implicit distinction 
from keepers: ‘specifically, we have in mind the people who feed fishhooks to the otters, 
razors to the bears’ (29).  Pi gives examples from ‘the literature’ of animals being fed 
dangerous objects, and being physically attacked.  In his family’s own zoo, incidents of 
human hostility involve thefts of animals, and ‘stone-throwers, who found the animals too 
placid and wanted a reaction’ (30).  More problems arise from ‘enteritis or gastritis due to too 
many carbohydrates, especially sugar’ (30).  What such points demonstrate, although Pi fails 
to acknowledge it, is that it is because they are captive, and because the zoo is trying to make 
money from visitors, that the animals suffer.  These points undermine his justification for zoos 
as safer than the wild.  However, Armstrong suggests that while Pi’s claims are easily 
discredited, ‘These considerations are ignored because Martel is less concerned with the fate 
of animals than with advancing a particular view of the human condition, which is – despite 
the novel’s glossy postmodern style – fundamentally that of humanist modernity’.
22
  Indeed, 
the discussion immediately following Pi’s description of dangerous zoo-goers reinforces the 
prevailing anthropocentrism, by presenting threats to humans as more serious than threats to 
animals. 
 Pi’s father believes that another animal still more dangerous than humans is ‘Animalus
anthropomorphicus, the animal as seen through human eyes’ (31).  He offers a live goat to a 
Bengal tiger (Mahisha) as a lesson to his sons, because he suspects them of 
                                                 
21 Philo and Wilbert, ‘Animal Spaces, Beastly Places’, 23. 
22 Armstrong. What Animals Mean, 178. 
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anthropomorphism.  Pi notes, ‘I would like to say in my own defence that though I may have 
anthropomorphized the animals … the fancy was always conscious…  I never deluded myself 
as to the real nature of my playmates’ (34).  Elsewhere, he says, ‘I am not one given to 
projecting human traits and emotions onto animals’ (4).
23
  Tom Tyler explains that 
anthropomorphism is considered undesirable because it risks ‘demeaning humans by failing to 
appreciate their unique traits’, and similarly, ‘by focusing on that which the animal shares 
with the human, we are in danger of missing all that is peculiar and proper to it’.
24
  Tyler 
himself concludes that anthropomorphism constitutes an anthropocentric failure of 
imagination.  Pi’s father, however, is averse to it for practical anthropocentric reasons; he 
believes that if his sons forget about differences between humans and other animals, they will 
be placing themselves in danger.  This is clearly presented as more serious than the human 
threat to animals. On a conceptual level, anthropomorphism also threatens the distinctiveness 
of the human.  Philo and Wilbert write, ‘The basic logic to the anthropomorphism critique is 
that a category mistake is occurring because humans are radically different from animals’.  
They suggest, ‘if the possibility is entertained that humans and animals may not be so 
completely different after all … then the logical grounding for the charge of 
anthropomorphism becomes much more rickety’.  Their recommendation is 
 a measured, hesitant and reflected-upon form of anthropomorphism … which would 
 allow the possibility of insights to be produced from considering some non-humans in 
 some situations as if they could perceive, feel, emote, make decisions and perhaps even 
 ‘reason’ something like a human being.
25
 
However, this would destabilise concepts of species in which animals are denied many of 
these abilities, and would probably destabilise institutions like zoos along with them.  
Therefore, anthropomorphism could undermine the foundations upon which the decolonising 
Indian characters’ subjectivity is constructed and asserted in the novel.  Pi’s father’s anti-
                                                 
23 Later, he thoroughly anthropomorphises whales, imagining that they understand his plight, tell each other 
about him, and try to help him, only to be harpooned by whaling ships (231). He also uses multiple similes with 
humans to describe the meerkats: they are like ‘commuters waiting for a bus’, ‘children self-consciously posing 
for a photographer or patients in a doctors office’, people ‘standing to attention’ and people praying in a mosque 
(266).  However, these are perhaps instances of anthropomorphism as conscious fantasy.   
24 Tom Tyler. ‘If Horses Had Hands...’ in Animal Encounters, ed. Tom Tyler and Manuela Rossini (Leiden: 
Brill, 2009), 15, 16. 
25 Philo and Wilbert, ‘Animal Spaces, Beastly Places’, 19. 
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anthropomorphic demonstration instead confirms for Pi that ‘an animal is an animal, 
essentially and practically removed from us’ (31).   
 In relation to the politics of zookeeping, then, the novel maintains traditional distinctions 
and power structures.  Because Life of Pi never overtly explores questions of identity politics, 
one can only speculate as to the reasons for this ideological humanism.  The insistence on 
human supremacy in Pondicherry Zoo could be intended to assert not merely human subject 
status in general, but specifically Indian subject status during a period of liberation from 
colonial rule.  Certainly its effect is that subjectivity is not destabilised but rather remains 
available for and is accorded to decolonising India.  However, the effect for animals is that 
although some get out of their cages in a literal sense, and the fascination with them arguably 
fosters their appeal for humans, they remain within the bounds of a conceptual zoo of which 
Pi is always the keeper.  This retention of humanist ideology despite the opposition to 
rationalism continues to inform the narrative even as it moves outside the zoo in Parts II and 
III, in an exploration of storytelling that is increasingly surprising, yet strongly reinforces 
humanist species distinctions. 
A survival story 
During the Patels’ voyage across the Pacific towards Canada, their ship, the Tsimtsum,
 
suddenly sinks and Pi is left to drift on a lifeboat for 227 days until he reaches Mexico.  The 
theme of survival can be read as a mark of the novel’s Canadian provenance.  Atwood has 
argued that survival is a central theme or symbol for Canada, and lists three types: bare 
survival, grim survival (after a crisis or disaster) and spiritual survival, ‘as anything more than 
a minimally human being’. She suggests that the Canadian sense of being out of place is one 
reason for the importance of this theme.  ‘Canada is an unknown territory for the people who 
live in it, and … I’m talking about Canada as a state of mind, as the space you inhabit not just 
with your body but with your head’.
26
  This impression is not limited to Canada. Ashcroft, 
Griffiths and Tiffin write, ‘A major feature of post-colonial literatures is the concern with 
place and displacement… with the development or recovery of an effective identifying 
                                                 
26 Margaret Atwood, Survival: A Thematic Guide to Canadian Literature (Toronto: House of Anansi Press, 
1972), 33, 32, 18. 
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relationship between self and place’.
27
  Indeed, survival in the context of displacement is also 
a significant theme within each of the texts under discussion here.  Life of Pi perhaps presents 
the concept most literally, however, in that Pi is actually lost, and of course quite out of his 
element on the sea.  Pi’s survival is also the vehicle for the novel’s central anti-rationalist 
theme of what it terms ‘the better story’.  Although reason is presented as necessary to 
survival, so is imagination. Pi says,  
 I applied my reason at every moment. Reason is excellent for getting food, clothing and 
 shelter. Reason is the very best tool kit. Nothing beats reason for keeping tigers away. 
 But be excessively reasonable and you risk throwing out the universe with the 
 bathwater. (298) 
The novel does not seek to dispense with reason altogether, then, but to foster openness to 
surprise, where, for instance, Mr Kumar’s atheist rationalism does not.  The account of the 
voyage that Pi tells to the frame narrator borders on magic realism: not only is Pi’s survival 
remarkable, so are his experiences, especially in relation to animals.  However, as is the case 
in relation to zookeeping, the concept of human superiority is also maintained, apparently for 
the sake of two of the types of survival described by Atwood: bare (physical) survival and 
spiritual survival (as more than a minimally human being). 
 Life of Pi’s first survival story contains many details which are not impossible, but 
which are very unlikely.  The first example of this is the presence of zoo animals in the 
lifeboat.  Pi describes being thrown into a boat which already contains a hyena, because, he 
surmises, the crew is trying to use him as fodder.  A zebra then either jumps or is thrown into 
the lifeboat too, Richard Parker is rescued by Pi (who throws him a life ring before he realises 
the danger to himself), and Orange Juice the orang-utan arrives floating on a raft of bananas.  
Over the next few days, she and the zebra are killed by the hyena, which is in turn killed by 
Richard Parker.  The presence of these animals, especially Richard Parker, who survives 
alongside Pi until they reach Mexico, is so improbable that it must be omitted from the 
second, believable story that Pi later tells for the interviewers.  Natural phenomena are also 
presented as remarkable, and Pi obviously derives spiritual sustenance from them, in relation 
to his Hinduism, Christianity and Islamism.  He observes in Richard Parker, during a hail of 
                                                 
27 Bill Ashcroft, Gareth Griffiths and Helen Tiffin, The Empire Writes Back: Theory and Practice in Post-
Colonial Literatures, 2nd ed.  (London: Routledge, 1989), 8. 
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flying fish, ‘a mix of ease and concentration, such a being-in-the-present’ as ‘would be the 
envy of the highest yogis’ (182).  He finds peace watching the sea life on the underside of his 
raft (built to put him out of reach of Richard Parker): ‘What I saw was an upside-down town, 
small, quiet and peaceable, whose citizens went about with the sweet civility of angels.  The 
sight was a welcome relief for my frayed nerves’ (198).  An electrical storm is ‘something to 
pull me out of my limited mortal ways and thrust me into a state of wonder’, and he praises 
Allah, saying to Richard Parker ‘Stop your trembling!  This is miracle.  This is an outbreak of 
divinity’ (233).  Pi’s remarkable experiences are not always uplifting; his meeting with 
another castaway is quite the reverse.  This encounter has a dreamlike quality, because Pi and 
Richard Parker are both temporarily blind from malnutrition, and when he hears a man’s 
voice, Pi thinks that he is hallucinating.  He first believes that he is talking to himself, and then 
to Richard Parker, before realising that the voice in fact belongs to a Frenchman who is 
confessing to cannibalism.  When he threatens Pi, Richard Parker kills him and this facilitates 
Pi’s own cannibalism: ‘driven by the extremity of my need and the madness to which it 
pushed me, I ate some of his flesh…  You must understand, my suffering was unremitting and 
he was already dead’ (256).  This is detrimental to Pi’s morale even before he eats the flesh.  
When Richard Parker kills the man, ‘Something in me died … that has never come back to 
life’ (255).  Yet compared with the alternative strictly rationalist story, in which Pi is the killer 
and cannibalism is direct and brutal, the presentation of human death as if dreamed and 
cannibalism as accidental maintains his ability to cope. 
 However, although Pi’s morale is supported by uplifting natural phenomena and the 
dreamlike gloss over cannibalism, his spiritual survival as more than minimally human is also 
presented as dependent on his ability to transcend his physical conditions.  In this respect, the 
danger is that the exigencies of physical survival, specifically in terms of consumption, might 
render him uncivilised and less than human.  Most obviously, Pi has no choice but to kill other 
animals, and here he faces both spiritual as well as practical obstacles.  He begins for his own 
safety by catching fish to feed to Richard Parker, and although he is not eating them himself 
yet, he feels guilt: ‘A lifetime of peaceful vegetarianism stood between me and the willful 
beheading of a fish’ (183).  Despite the fact that this vegetarianism presumably originates 
from his Hinduism, and despite having just lost his real brother, Ravi, Pi describes this in 
terms of biblical fratricide: ‘I wept heartily over this poor little deceased soul…  I was now a 
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killer.  I was now as guilty as Cain’ (183).  This reference implies that Pi might see nonhuman 
animals as beings not dissimilar from himself, whom he must not kill.
28
  However, he adapts 
readily: ‘the explanation … is simple and brutal: a person can get used to anything, even to 
killing’ (185).  The image of human-animal equality is thus rapidly replaced by one of 
mastery.  ‘It was with a hunter’s pride that I pulled the raft up to the lifeboat’ (185).  ‘With 
time and experience I became a better hunter’ (195).  As Armstrong observes, Pi ‘even 
establishes his control over nature … by ‘farming’, albeit for water,’ with his solar stills.
29
  Pi 
refers to one as ‘My sweet sea cow’ (187) and comments, ‘these technological contraptions 
became as precious to me as cattle are to a farmer.  Indeed, as they floated placidly in an arc, 
they looked almost like cows grazing in a field.  I ministered to their needs’ (188).  Pi sees his 
killing and consuming of animals, however, as threatening to blur the distinction between 
humans and other species. ‘I descended to a level of savagery I never imagined possible’ 
(197).  He realises, ‘I ate like an animal … this noisy, frantic, unchewing wolfing-down of 
mine was exactly the way Richard Parker ate’ (225).  This is a good example of Boria Sax’s 
observation that, ‘In a very visceral way, people have always been inclined to judge types of 
animals by the things and manner in which they eat’.
30
  The comparison between Pi and 
Richard Parker is a judgement in the same terms of savagery and refinement.  The dangers of 
this failure of distinction are especially significant in the context of decolonisation, a point 
emphasised in the novel when, in an Indian restaurant in Canada, a waiter sees Pi eating with 
his fingers and says ‘Fresh off the boat are you?’(7). Pi has literally just come off the boat, but 
the expression means inexperienced and unsophisticated.  The recovery of refinement is 
therefore important to the assertion not only of Pi’s humanity but his civilised status. These 
qualities are further threatened by his eating of human flesh.  Sax’s point about consumption 
also applies to people and what they eat.  Cannibalism, traditionally regarded as the most 
extreme example of savagery, represents the lowest point in Pi’s struggle to survive 
spiritually.  The description of the act represents it as a failure on Pi’s part to maintain 
boundaries.  What he eats are ‘strips [of flesh] that I meant for the gaff’s hook that, when 
dried in the sun, looked like ordinary animal flesh’ (256).  Thus, Pi’s cannibalism results from 
                                                 
28 Pi might also be seen as connected to fish in that his name, Piscine, though inspired by a swimming pool, is 
also an adjective meaning ‘pertaining to fish’. 
29 Armstrong, What Animals Mean, 178. 
30 Boria Sax, cited in Malamud, Reading Zoos, 231. 
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a blurring of the proper distinction between a human and an ‘ordinary animal’.  It may be in 
an attempt to recover this distinction that Pi ‘pray[s] for his soul every day’ (256).   
 The threat to Pi’s status as the human of humanism is also combated by his responses to 
Richard Parker.  The domination of the tiger is the chief means by which human superiority is 
maintained in the face of the animalised and cannibalistic acts that are part of Pi’s efforts to 
survive physically.  Concluding that he has no way to kill him, Pi’s first idea is simply to keep 
Richard Parker well fed and to remain out of reach on a raft attached to the boat.  This 
changes when Richard Parker indicates that he means no harm.  ‘He was simply taking me in, 
observing me, in a manner that was sober but not menacing… He made a sound, a snort from 
his nostrils… He did it a second time. I was astonished. Prusten?’ (162-63). Pi explains, 
‘Prusten is the quietest of tiger calls, a puff through the nose to express friendliness and 
harmless intentions’ (163-64).  Ironically, given his interpretation of Richard Parker’s 
meaning, this leads Pi to decide, ‘I had to tame him.  It was at that moment that I realised this 
necessity.  It was not a question of him or me, but of him and me. We were, literally and 
figuratively, in the same boat’ (164).  Armstrong suggests that Pi’s conclusion here 
‘encapsulates a dominant environmentalist structure of feeling, according to which the crucial 
factor in safeguarding the continuation of life in general is the preservation of inter-
relationships between species,’ and that the lifeboat provides ‘an allegory of biodiversity; 
environmentally speaking, humans and animals are “in the same boat”’.  Similarly, Pi’s 
expression might be interpreted as approaching what I am calling species posthumanism, if it 
means that he and a nonhuman animal are regarded as being in an equal position.  However, 
as Armstrong puts it, ‘the environmentalist veneer of Life of Pi proves rather thin’.
31
  In terms 
of Richard Parker, although Pi’s decision to tame him is expressed in terms of shared survival, 
the result does not echo the tiger’s friendly ‘prusten’.  Instead, it is an ongoing assertion of 
mastery.  For one thing, Pi very clearly regards himself as continuing to occupy the position of 
keeper, while Richard Parker remains a zoo animal.  ‘It occurred to me that with every passing 
day the lifeboat was resembling a zoo enclosure more and more: Richard Parker had his 
sheltered area for sleeping and resting, his food stash and now his watering hole’ (188-89).  
Indeed, as in the zoo, Richard Parker is dependent on Pi for physical survival because humans 
have removed him even further from his natural habitat: Pi observes,  
                                                 
31 Armstrong, Knowing Animals, 177. 
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 I was the source of food and water… when he looked beyond the gunnel, he saw no 
 jungle that he could hunt in and no river from which he could drink freely…  My agency 
 was pure and miraculous. It conferred power on me.’ (223)  
 In addition to this zookeeping, Pi imagines himself as a ringmaster in relation to Richard 
Parker, shouting out an announcement of ‘the Pi Patel, Indo-Canadian, trans-Pacific floating 
circuuuuussssssssssss!!!’ (165).  As a substitute for physical barriers, Pi imposes 
psychological ones.  He trains Richard Parker by provoking and then punishing him, rocking 
the boat to make him seasick and blowing on his whistle until the tiger responds to the sound 
alone (203-05).  When Richard Parker backs down before his stare, he says, ‘I felt my mastery 
was no longer in question’ (222).
32
  What most aligns Pi with the role of trainer, then, is his 
attitude. 
 Finally, both the counter-rational and uplifting qualities of nature and the assertion of 
Pi’s more than minimally human being are reiterated in concentrated form in relation to a 
floating island.  This island is so extraordinary as to approach magic realism.
33
  This genre is 
defined by Wendy B. Faris as combining ‘realism and the fantastic in such a way that magical 
elements grow organically out of the reality portrayed’.
34
  Within Pi’s first story, the 
discovery of the floating island is conveyed in typical magic realist terms; it is the seemingly 
impossible made real through realistic detail.  Although at first sight, Pi is ‘certain it was an 
                                                 
32 In fact, Pi is also careful of Richard Parker’s boundaries, observing that ‘Richard Parker’s territorial claims 
seemed to be limited to the floor of the boat’ (171), and with his own urine, Pi only reinforces the tiger’s spatial 
division, by ‘animal’ means 
33 Martel’s use of magic realist elements in Life of Pi might be seen by some as appropriative of a decolonising 
literary technique.  Stephen Slemon writes that magic realism in literature is perceived as carrying ‘a residuum of 
resistance towards the imperial center and its totalizing systems of generic classification’.  He suggests, ‘This 
structure of perception … is a controversial one … as mainstream writers find a ready market for the 
recirculation of what the imperial center takes to comprise the “characteristic” literary and cultural forms of 
formerly colonized cultures’.  Thus, a white writer like Martel might be perceived to capitalise on a notion of 
literary exotic in using magic realism, and he does arguably use the genre in the stereotypical way that Slemon 
describes in making it a feature of his (arguably ‘mainstream’) rejection of rationalism.  However, as Slemon 
notes, magic realism already features within Canadian literature, which means that Martel is not instigating the 
appropriation if this constitutes one.  Additionally, white postcolonial borrowings from a decolonising culture 
need not be read as exploitative; an alternative interpretation is that, as William Riggan argues, Canadian 
literature is diversifying with the emergence of recent immigrant authors and becoming ‘a truly multicultural … 
entity’.  Stephen Slemon, ‘Magic Realism as Postcolonial Discourse’, in Magical Realism: Theory, History, 
Community, ed. Lois Parkinson Zamora and Wendy B. Faris. (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1995), 408.  
William Riggan, ‘Of Obstacles, Survival, and Identity: On Contemporary Canadian Literature.’ World Literature 
Today 73, no. 2 (1999): 230. 
34 Wendy B. Faris. ‘Scheherazade’s Children: Magical Realism and Postmodern Fiction.’ In Magical Realism: 
Theory, History, Community. ed. Lois Parkinson Zamora and Wendy B. Faris (Durham, NC: Duke University 
Press, 1995), 163. 
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illusion’ (256), he is convinced by a more animal sense: ‘it was my nose that was the judge of 
land.  It came to my olfactory sense, full and fresh, overwhelming: the smell of vegetation…
It was then that I believed’ (258).  The island is made of edible algae and is populated with 
meerkats, ‘a subspecies that had specialised in a fascinating and surprising way’ (267), living
on dead saltwater fish dragged from the island’s pools.  Pi guesses that these pools are open to
the sea beneath the island, and that in fact it is a floating mass of algae which desalinates the 
water. In this way, the island is presented as explicable, and thus as growing out of realit
is sufficiently astonishing that it illustrates the limitations of a strictly rationalist perspective.
  
 
 
y, but 
   
 However, the theoretical nature of the novel’s anti-humanism is again in evidence here, 
for magic realist details are simultaneously used for otherwise humanist ends.  In terms of 
human-animal relations, the island provides an opportunity to test and confirm the extent of 
Pi’s domination of Richard Parker.  Because he has a plentiful supply of fresh water and 
meerkat meat, Richard Parker not only returns to health, he is free of the previous dependence 
that conferred power on Pi.  Pi worries: ‘[h]e might become relaxed and confident, less open 
to my influence’ (273).  However, Pi successfully renews his efforts to dominate Richard 
Parker, literally making him jump through hoops for half a meerkat each (a particularly 
remarkable feat of training given the proximity of the meerkat colony) (274).  There can be no 
practical reason for the use of hoops in particular; they are simply an artefact of the circus 
epitomising the concept of human mastery.  In this way, Pi’s human ascendency is retained 
even outside the lifeboat despite Richard Parker’s comparative freedom.  Indeed, Pi’s initial 
experience of the island can be interpreted as a microcosmic example of an anthropocentric 
view of life: everything seems designed to meet his needs:   
 What reason could I have to leave the island?  Were my physical needs not met here? 
 …More algae than I could eat, and when I yearned for variety, more meerkats and fish 
 than I could ever desire?  …did I not have these delightful meerkats to keep me 
 company?  And wasn’t Richard Parker still in need of improving his fourth jump? (279)   
There is no longer any question here of whether it is acceptable to eat not only fish that he 
does not have to kill, but also meerkats whom he regards as companions: such animals are 
now presented as resources, while Richard Parker is no longer a threat.  Despite its challenge 
to realism and so to rationalism, then, the magic realism of the island so far works to reinforce 
other humanist notions of humans’ privileged position in relation to the rest of nature. 
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 This situation lasts until Pi makes another surprising discovery that suddenly 
undermines the stability of the discourses that the island first appears to support.  After finding 
human teeth wrapped in the trees’ foliage (280), Pi experiments with a meerkat and then his 
own feet to confirm his fear that the island’s algae becomes acidic at night.  Pi is very upset by 
this.  Of course, the carnivorous island is dangerous, but so is the sea, and so is Richard 
Parker, who Pi takes with him when he escapes the island.  Thus, Pi’s departure does not seem 
motivated by fear.  Partly, he feels betrayed: ‘The radiant promise it offered during the day 
was replaced in my heart by all the treachery it delivered at night’ (282).
 
However, his 
decision is phrased as preferring ‘to set off and perish in search of my own kind than to live a 
lonely half-life of physical comfort and spiritual death on this murderous island’ (282-83).  
Until now, he has not been worried about solitude, so the concept of spiritual death must refer 
to something else.  He does not explain, but one possibility is that the island’s carnivorousness 
is a reminder of his own cannibalistic act, which threatens his sense of his own humanity.  
Alternatively or additionally, he may be disturbed by the idea that the island’s predatory 
nature challenges his supremacy in a way that he cannot overcome.  Unlike Richard Parker, 
over whom Pi has repeatedly asserted his power, the island cannot be subdued with ‘taming’.  
On the contrary, he would remain dependent on island to meet his needs in the way that a zoo 
animal is dependent on him. 
 The first story of Pi’s survival, then, can be described as a version of theoretical anti-
humanism.  Its remarkable and magic realist elements continue the opposition to abstract 
rationalism, which I am reading as humanist.  However, the notion of human exceptionality is 
maintained as ideology necessary to survival.  For Pi, this is true not only because he needs to 
kill animals to sustain Richard Parker and himself, but also because eating like an animal and 
engaging in cannibalism challenge his sense of his own human status, which he reasserts via 
mastery over animals.  The risks of inverting the dynamics of his first story and viewing his 
journey more ‘realistically’, but without opportunities for maintaining the ideology of human 
mastery, are underscored when Pi’s interviewers request an alternative account. 
 
A story without animals
In an interview taped while Pi is recovering in Mexico, Mr Okamoto and Mr Chiba, the 
representatives of the Japanese Maritime Department, come to interview him to try to find out 
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why the ship sank.  These two men are simultaneously characters in the novel and, like the 
frame narrator, another audience sitting between Pi and the reader. They function as 
intermediary ‘readers’ of Pi’s stories; their analysis of what he says effectively directs the 
interpretation of the novel as a whole and encourages the reader to choose the first story over 
the second.   This is underscored in the ‘Author’s note’ at the novel’s outset, where the frame 
narrator writes, ‘It was as I listened to that tape that I agreed with Mr. Adirubasamy that this 
was, indeed, a story to make you believe in God’ (xiii). In other words, it is when taken in 
conjunction with the interviewers’ disbelief that Pi’s story has the power to convert.   
 Pi begins by telling them the same story which, more than twenty years later, he tells to 
the frame narrator in Toronto. Okamoto and Chiba react as if Pi has tried to deceive them; 
Chiba comments in Japanese, ‘He thinks we’re fools’ (282).  The ensuing debate underscores 
the novel’s theme of belief.  Okamoto and Chiba’s first objection is easily answered: they 
assert that bananas don’t float (in Pi’s story, Orange Juice the orang-utan reaches the lifeboat 
on a raft of bananas), whereupon Pi produces some and they do.  However, other aspects of 
Pi’s story are less readily proven.  Okamoto says, ‘Carnivorous trees?  A fish-eating algae that 
produces fresh water?  Tree-dwelling aquatic rodents?  These things don’t exist… Your island 
is botanically impossible’ (294).  They also question the existence of Richard Parker, as there 
has been no evidence of his presence in Mexico. Pi then begins to argue with Okamoto and 
Chiba about the nature of credibility.  He refers to various scientific discoveries which proved 
the apparently impossible, and Chiba’s reference to bonsai trees, which Pi claims never to 
have heard of, helps to make his point.  He asks, ‘If you stumble at mere believability, what 
are you living for?  ... What is your problem with hard to believe?’  This is when Pi warns that 
excessive reason risks ‘throwing out the universe with the bathwater’ (297-98).  The point that 
Pi is making here is lost on Okamoto and Chiba; the latter misses the metaphor – ‘Why is he 
talking about bathwater?’ – thereby illustrating that it is indeed limiting to perceive only 
through the faculty of reason.  This is then iterated through an illustration of what happens to a 
story when rationalism is imposed upon it. 
 The interviewers’ preoccupation with the cause of the sinking of the ship, a detail which 
seems incongruously insignificant after Pi’s ordeal, eventually forces Pi to conclude that what 
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is being asked for is ‘a story that won’t surprise you … a story without animals’ (302-03).
35
  
The result threatens Pi’s spiritual survival because the details that made it possible – the 
animals, the hallucinatory presentation of Pi’s encounter with the Frenchman, and the 
‘magical’ floating island – are all absent.  Of these, the lack of animals is the most significant.  
Instead of the tiger, hyena, zebra and orang-utan, the others in the lifeboat with Pi are a French 
cook, a Taiwanese sailor and Pi’s mother.  The cook cuts off the sailor’s broken leg to use for 
bait, and when the sailor dies, he cannibalises the body.  He then kills Pi’s mother, and Pi 
fights, kills and eats him.  This story is violent in its brevity as well as its content.  Very little 
of Pi’s time in the lifeboat is accounted for, and details like the awe-inspiring storms, the 
island, and the presence of a Bengal tiger, all of which served to temper the harshness of 
survival in the first story, are entirely absent.  Thus, the imposition of strictly rational criteria 
on Pi’s narrative results, as Okamoto and Chiba acknowledge, in a ‘horrible story’ (311), in 
which he is reduced to physical survival only, and to the ‘spiritual death’ which he associates 
with the island once he realises it is carnivorous.   
 Moreover, without Richard Parker, human subjectivity comes into question in a way 
that, I suggest, iterates the central role of animals in the construction of the humanist subject.  
As performed by animals, the actions of the hyena and Richard Parker are largely 
unproblematic; both kill because they need to eat.  When, unable to see the man in the boat, Pi 
thinks that he is conversing with Richard Parker, he is critical of the consumption of human 
flesh.  The speaker says that he killed from need, and ‘It was them or me’ (247), and Pi 
replies, ‘The need of a monster… expressed in all its amoral simplicity… Instinct … the very 
definition of an animal, that’s all you are’ (247).  Yet need, self-defence and instinct would all 
normally be acceptable justification for a tiger’s actions.  In Brutal Reasoning, Erica Fudge 
observes that according to humanist thought, ‘animals never had reason to abandon in the first 
place.  Because of this, animals cannot be vicious’.
36
  Pi’s implication is that humans would 
                                                 
35 Their imposition might also be seen as problematic because it echoes the way colonised peoples’ own stories 
have repeatedly been presented as mythological or superstitious, and discounted in favour of supposedly 
objective accounts.  If it is intended this way, Martel’s use of Japanese interviewers is appropriate; though it was 
on a small scale compared with British colonialism, the Japanese briefly invaded and occupied India’s Andaman 
and Nicobar Islands during the Second World War.  See for instance Jayant Dasgupta, Japanese in Andaman and 
Nicobar Islands: Red Sun over Black Water (New Delhi: Manas, 2002); Christopher Bayly and Timothy Harper, 
Forgotten Wars: The End of Britain's Asian Empire (London: Allen Lane, 2007).  
36 Erica Fudge, Brutal Reasoning: Animals, Rationality and Humanity in Early Modern England  (Ithaca, NY: 
Cornell University Press, 2006), 66.
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not act in the same way, but then he learns that he is speaking to a man who has committed 
cannibalism, and then does so himself.  In this first story, though, only Pi is guilty of 
cannibalism, and he does not kill the man but only eats his flesh, opportunistically, when it is 
unrecognisably human.  As is underscored for the reader via Okamoto and Chiba’s 
observations, the roles played by animals in the first story are played by humans in the second.  
Okamoto says, ‘The Taiwanese sailor is the zebra, his mother is the orang-utan, the cook is … 
the hyena – which means he’s the tiger!’ (311).
37
  As performed by humans, their actions are 
more open to condemnation. 
 There are two possible moral interpretations of the second story.  One is that the 
problem of morality comes into play where it did not in relation to animals.  According this 
view, humans have reason and morality to abandon, so Pi is guilty of murder where Richard 
Parker is not, and the French cook is guilty of both murder and cannibalism where the hyena 
is not.  As humans, they are also answerable for their actions.  Fudge writes that according to 
Aristotelean philosophy, ‘humans can fail to be human.  They have the essence, but they do 
not always use it, and this failure makes them worse than the beings they have become’.
38
  If 
similar logic is applied here, the decolonizing subject status which Pi achieves in the first 
story through his mastery of animals disappears, and he becomes less than animal, like the 
savage cannibals in Robinson Crusoe who are presented as worse than lions and tigers. 
Alternatively, castaway cannibalism might be justified on the grounds of need.  This point was 
taken into consideration in the 1884 case of Dudley and Stephens who cannibalised their cabin 
boy, a real Richard Parker.  Although they were sentenced to death on the grounds of murder, 
they were, in Lord Coleridge’s words, ‘recommended most earnestly to the mercy of the 
Crown’, and were in fact released after six months’ imprisonment.
39
  In Life of Pi, the 
justification of need is not applicable to the French cook’s actions because he chooses 
cannibalism over rationing out the lifeboat’s supplies.  It might be applicable to Pi’s. The cook 
has already killed everyone else in the boat, so he has reason to suppose that he will be next.  
Therefore, Pi might not be worse than an animal after all.  However, he would in this story 
still be reduced to instinct and need, and thus, in his own terms, no more than an animal. This 
                                                 
37 This view of  use of an animal to externalise an aspect of the human recalls Martel’s inclusion of a dog in his 
previous novel, Self: while the gender-changing protagonist is a woman, she has a dog whom she sees as so 
much resembling male genitalia that she calls him Figleaf. Yann Martel, Self (London: Faber, 1996) 
38 Fudge, Brutal Reasoning, 48. 
39 Hanson, The Custom of the Sea, 427-28. 
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point is obviously underscored by the idea that Richard Parker is Pi, or part of him.  Various 
other details from Pi’s first story support this interpretation. For instance, when Richard 
Parker kills the French castaway, Pi comments, ‘This was the terrible cost of Richard Parker. 
He gave me a life, my own, but at the expense of taking one’ (255).  In Mexico, he says that 
the tiger is ‘hiding somewhere you’ll never find him’ (317).  Thus, again as in Aristotelean 
thought, ‘The logical description of [the] absence of evidence of reason is a descent to the 
animal, is the revelation of the “beast in man”’.
40
  Pi cannot separate himself from or 
dominate this part of himself as he can a tiger, so it consumes him where the tiger does not; Pi 
says that the French cook ‘met evil in me – selfishness, anger, ruthlessness.  I must live w
that’ (311).  The anti-anthropomorphic lesson that animals are removed from humans is 
thoroughly undermined.  Pi’s subjectivity becomes fragmented and conflicted, and his human 
morality becomes blurred by animality.  Uncontested by animals or other remarkable 
phenomena, rationalism reduces Pi to physical survival only, and undermines the subjectivity 
that is maintained by human-animal distinctions in the first story.  This effect is counteracted, 
however, by the reinstatement of animals through the novel’s valuation of one story over the 
other. 
ith 
thus 
                                                
 Within the context of magic realism, a genre which arguably informs the presentation of 
the island, it is common for two stories to exist in tension with one another.  Slemon writes, 
 Since the ground rules of these two worlds are incompatible, neither one can fully come 
 into being, and each remains suspended, locked in a continuous dialectic with the 
 ‘other,’ a situation which creates disjunction within each of the separate discursive 
 systems, rending them with gaps, absences and silences.  (409) 
The effect of this is that, as Faris writes, ‘The reader may hesitate (at one point or another) 
between two contradictory understandings of events – and hence experiences some unsettling 
doubts’.
41
  In Life of Pi, Okamoto and Chiba, as Pi’s audience, are faced with this problem.  
Okamoto recognises the parallels between the animals and the human characters, but there are 
still gaps; the parallels do not fully explain the original story.  Chiba asks, ‘But what does it 
mean …what about the island?  Who are the meerkats?  …Whose teeth were those in the 
tree?’ (311-12).  Thus, the first story is not so easily eliminated by the imposition of 
 
40 Fudge, Brutal Reasoning, 60. 
41 Faris, ‘Scheherazade’s Children’, 171.  
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rationalism and the interviewers are more confounded than before.  However, whereas, 
Slemon observes, ‘the characteristic maneuver of magic realist fiction is that its two separate 
narrative modes never manage to arrange themselves into any kind of hierarchy’,
42
Martel 
imposes one.  At the outset of the novel, the frame narrator comments, ‘That’s what fiction is 
about, isn’t it, the selective transforming of reality? The twisting of it to bring out its essence?’ 
(x).  Then at the end of his first story, disappointed that Richard Parker has left without a 
farewell glance, Pi says, ‘I am a person who believes in form, in the harmony of order.  Where 
we can, we must give things a meaningful shape’ (285).  This desire for ‘order’ implies that 
despite his theoretical rejection of rationalism, Pi may want to retain this too on an ideological 
level, together with the notions of essence and meaning.  These, indeed, are ideologies that 
arguably inform both Pi’s first story and the novel as a whole.  The essence or meaningful 
shape is drawn out when, after telling the Japanese interviewers both stories, Pi asks them, and 
implicitly the reader, to choose which is better.  Since neither one explains the sinking of the 
Tsimtsum, and neither can be proven, they agree that it is the story with animals.  In their final 
report, they conclude by observing that Pi’s is an astounding story, as ‘Very few castaways 
can claim to have survived so long at sea … and none in the company of an adult Bengal 
tiger’ (319).  If Richard Parker is admitted by the interviewers to exist as a tiger after all, the 
rationalism with which they have tried to ‘colonise’ Pi’s story has been argued away to even 
their satisfaction.  Paradoxically, this means that the ideology of stable human subjectivity, as 
demonstrated by the mastery of animals, remains available for and accessible to Pi.  In this 
way, animals appear essential to the conception of the coherent, autonomous subject that the 
novel seeks to retain.  Thus, the question of animals is symbolically ‘sacrificed’ not just to the 
humanist concept of the human but in order to maintain it at all.  
 
Conclusion
In Life of Pi, then, the presence of animals is essential to what I am calling theoretical anti-
humanism.  Their crossing of physical boundaries and their role as a source of surprise and 
optimism help disrupt the notion of strict rationalism that the novel opposes.  More 
importantly, however, Pi’s humanity is also defined through distinctions with and mastery of 
Richard Parker’s animality in particular, thus permitting the retention and assertion of aspects 
                                                 
42 Slemon, ‘Magic Realism as Postcolonial Discourse’, 410. 
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of humanist ideology that the novel treats as necessary.  In Pi’s second story, unopposed 
rationalism reduces Pi from spiritual to bare survival.  The suggestion that the frightening and 
predatory tiger and hyena might be facets of humanity fragments subjectivity and might not 
only bring humans down to the level of animals, it might make them lower if they are seen as 
failing to exercise the morality available to them.  If the novel were to accept this story, it 
could put Pi into the position of Disgrace’s Lurie, who slowly abandons his view of humans 
as a separate order of being from other species.  However, the overriding preference for a 
story with animals, at face value so like Lurie’s idea of including a dog in his opera, in fact 
closes this possibility down, by using them to support Pi’s status as a human subject.  The 
result is that the novel’s presentation of animals is itself like that of a zoo; they are the objects 
of fascination, but they remain essentially and practically removed from us, as Pi’s father puts 
it (31), by conceptual boundaries which are, if anything, reinforced.  Thus, the novel does not 
attempt to address species concerns in alliance with its other preoccupations: animals facilitate 
the novel’s disruption of rationalism, but that disruption does not in turn facilitate any 
interrogation of species relations as they are constructed within humanist discourse.  
 
*  *  *  *  * 
 
The examination of Disgrace and Life of Pi offered in this first section opens up ideas that run 
through the remainder of the thesis.  Together, the novels illustrate the potential range of 
approaches to human-animal relations and to challenging humanism within the context of 
recent white postcolonial literature, and show how other cultural and thematic preoccupations 
shape the engagement with these ideas.  The next section continues to work toward offering 
some picture of white postcolonial cultures’ understandings of their relation to animals, but 
adopts a specifically temporal focus, in order to explore how the remaining novels’ attention 
to history informs the treatment of species relations and humanism.  The three novels 
addressed in this section, Fiona Farrell’s Mr Allbones' Ferrets (2007), Julia Leigh’s The 
Hunter (1999) and Margaret Atwood’s Oryx and Crake (2003), are set in the past, present and 
future respectively.  They oppose humanist notions of species relations and history and 
explore posthumanist alternatives, although none embraces such ideas unreservedly.  Mr
Allbones' Ferrets offers a fictionalised story of the introduction of mustelids to New Zealand 
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in the 1880s, making use of retrospective irony to expose the arrogance of Enlightenment 
humanism, and exposing the limits to their power to shape history through the mastery of 
nature by showing that in fact, humans are subject to nature.  However, in implying that the 
present should learn from this, the novel leaves room for the idea that contemporary humans 
could still shape the future of human-animal relations more positively.  The Hunter is less 
optimistic about this point.  Leigh presents a protagonist who is comfortable with a view of 
humans as producing history through their destructiveness, and she sets technological 
posthumanism against species posthumanism in such a way that the historical extinction of 
thylacines is effectively replayed in the present.  Finally, Oryx and Crake appears thoroughly 
to undermine the Enlightenment view of history as progress, painting a dystopian picture of 
the future in which both species and postcolonial concerns are subordinated to a hegemonic 
scientific regime.  Although humans are presented as significantly, and in one case very 
deliberately shaping history, Atwood, like Farrell, also emphasises that humans are not the 
only influence on the history of life on earth. 
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SECTION TWO 
3. Subject to nature: retrospect in Mr Allbones’ Ferrets
In this second section of my thesis, as I have indicated, my evaluation of white 
postcolonial representations of animals addresses explicit engagements with history, 
past, present and future.  Beginning chronologically, then, with the past, this chapter 
investigates how a white postcolonial culture’s problematic relationship with its heritage 
can inform its understanding of human-animal relations. This chapter’s discussion 
concentrates on Fiona Farrell’s Mr Allbones' Ferrets (2007), a novel which retells a late 
nineteenth-century shipment of mustelids to New Zealand, where they were intended to 
control the imported rabbit population but instead preyed largely on native birds.
1
Postcolonial and species concerns connect in two ways in this text. The representation of 
human-animal relations underscores that colonialism included not just the colonisation 
of humans (something which Farrell scarcely addresses) but also the colonisation of 
animals; that is, the settlement of New Zealand resulted in the arrival of European 
animals as well as humans, which proceeded to displace and to exterminate native 
species. In that sense, the novel can be read as an acknowledgement of the colonial 
impact on native animals, and even as extending the phenomenon of colonial guilt to 
encompass human-animal relations. However, the destructive actions of the introduced 
animals, in this case mustelids, are also important because they were unexpected, at least 
by those humans who introduced them: whether or not they were worried about the 
native birds, they were still expecting mustelids to prey on the troublesome rabbits to a 
much greater extent than they did. This is presented within the novel as a lesson. It 
creates irony at the expense of the colonial characters who believe themselves capable 
of mastering nature, which functions as a warning to the present to avoid the same 
arrogance. Thus, Mr Allbones' Ferrets, like Life of Pi, presents animals’ own actions as 
contributing to the contradiction of humanist rationalism, and like Disgrace, it opposes 
Eurocentrism and the privileging of the human species as well.   
1 Fiona Farrell, Mr Allbones’ Ferrets (Auckland: Vintage, 2007).
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 As Linda Hutcheon explains, white postcolonial cultures may feel colonised or 
under threat from globalisation, yet their history always ‘means descent from colonisers 
or settlers’.
2
  This means that while periods of colonialism and settlement are defining 
ones for postcolonialism, the contemporary descendants of settlers may also feel a 
certain distance from aspects of this past.  In New Zealand, European settlement began 
in earnest in the nineteenth century.  As the European colony established itself, it had an 
increasing impact on Maori culture and on the environment.  Historian Michael King 
explains that as a result of gold rushes and provincial and central government schemes, 
the Pakeha (European New Zealander) population increased from just over 300 in 1830 
to around 500,000 in 1881.  He writes, ‘Those who had to relinquish ground, literally 
and metaphorically … were the … indigenous Maori.  And, in relinquishing ground, 
they would lose it’.  That ground was then to be dramatically altered.  King observes 
that while Maori had introduced rats, dogs, and perhaps pigs and chickens to New 
Zealand, Europeans brought many more species, reshaping the landscape ‘to remind 
settlers of their lands of origin and to enable them to generate livelihoods from the kinds 
of extractive or agricultural activities with which they were familiar’.  He later describes 
this as ‘intense colonisation of the flora and fauna’.
3
  For some Pakeha, such points 
result in the kind of discomfort with colonial heritage that Hutcheon describes.  In 
Maoriland, Jane Stafford and Mark Williams, examining the little-known New Zealand 
writing from between 1872 and 1914, explain that literature from this period is 
significant because ‘it is not only part of New Zealand history but a formative part; 
because that which embarrasses us usually tells us something important about ourselves 
we do not wish to own’.
4
Mr Allbones' Ferrets revisits this period, but it does not 
engage with Pakeha-Maori relations in any depth. The narrative’s only reference to a 
non-European culture is one character’s memory of seeing picture-box images of a girl 
‘from one of them islands’ removing her clothes, which leads to false expectations of 
New Zealand (117-18). Any explanation for this almost complete absence can only be 
speculative, but Stafford and Williams’ point about contemporary embarrassment could 
2 Linda Hutcheon, Splitting Images: Contemporary Canadian Ironies (Toronto and New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1991), 72. 
3 Michael King, The Penguin History of New Zealand (Auckland: Penguin, 2003), 169, 178, 24, 194. 
4 Jane Stafford and Mark Williams, Maoriland: New Zealand Literature 1872-1914 (Wellington: Victoria 
University Press, 2006), 14. 
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be one.  Alternatively, Farrell’s approach may constitute a recognition, not unlike 
Coetzee’s caution about telling the stories of others, that colonial history is controversial 
because questions of what constitutes it and how it is to be interpreted are often seen as 
contingent upon who records history and who it records.  Perhaps this explanation is 
more likely, since the false impressions created by the picture-box draw attention to the 
problem of misrepresentation, while Farrell shows a willingness to engage with other 
embarrassing aspects of European colonisation and indeed, to present her colonial settler 
characters with considerable irony.
 Hutcheon suggests in Splitting Images that irony is valuable for white Canada as 
a way of ‘pretending to speak a dominant “language” while subverting it at the same 
time’.
5
  New Zealand critic Lydia Wevers has shown how history itself can be a 
simultaneously spoken and subverted ‘language’ within postcolonial literature, 
observing that although the ‘recognition that history is a contemporary political issue’ is 
not new in New Zealand fiction, it is currently informed by ‘a postmodern willingness to 
ironize and negativize discourse’.  Recent postcolonial historical novels, she writes,   
 re-present historical events, reinforcing the effects poststructuralism and 
 deconstruction have had on history as a discipline, while reaffirming a 
 postcolonial desire for origin, for location, a recognition that even a shameful 
 history is a shared history, even the history of colonial oppression lends itself to 
 a confirmation of common cause, a claim on a shared identity. 
6
One of Wevers’ examples is Peter Hawes’ Tasman’s Lay, in which a Balinese translator 
on Abel Tasman’s ship gives an alternative version of events which contradicts 
historical records.
7
  Wevers writes,  
 The novel’s postmodern strategies draw attention to the fiction of fiction as well 
 as the fiction of history, but Tasman’s Lay also maps the chaotic messiness of 
 human affairs and pushes past history’s tidy retrospective horizons into new 
 worlds of possibility.
8
5 Hutcheon, Splitting Images, vii. 
6 Lydia Wevers, ‘The Fact of the Matter: History, Narrative and Record in The Singing Whakapapa and 
Tasman's Lay,’ The Literary Criterion 33, 1 (1998): 47. 
7 Peter Hawes, Tasman’s Lay (Christchurch: Hazard Press, 1995). 
8  Wevers, ‘The Fact of the Matter’, 56.   
98
Part of the point of this subversion of traditional accounts is to emphasise the way 
cultural specificity affects the interpretation of history.  In Carolyn Steedman’s 
autobiography Landscape for a Good Woman (1986), she writes, ‘This book is about 
lives lived out on the borderlands… for which the central interpretative devices of the 
culture don’t quite work’. She argues that ‘specificity of place and politics has to be 
reckoned with in making an account of anybody’s life, and their use of their own past’.
9
Although she is writing about her London childhood, this offers a clear articulation of 
points that are central to the issue of history within a postcolonial context. Mr Allbones' 
Ferrets raises questions about the interpretation of history by showing how vulnerable 
the historical record might be to individuals’, and by extension to larger social or 
cultural groups’ self-definitions. For instance, Farrell undermines the validity of the 
historical records from which she has taken the names for the characters of Allbones and 
Fowler Metcalfe; in the narrative, Allbones assumes Metcalfe’s name and Metcalfe 
assumes his, showing how potentially fictional such records are.  Thus, here, as in 
Wevers’ account, ‘Historical fictions expand with possibility in the ironized discourse of 
postmodernism, and provide a lens which can bend over the horizon of the objective and 
humanist truths of the historical record’.
10
 While Wevers does not explain what she 
means by ‘humanist’ here, this is true of Mr Allbones' Ferrets in the way that I am using 
the term: the novel disrupts the concepts of the human species as exceptional and 
superior in relation to others, of human reason as permitting mastery over nature, and of 
the white male subject as autonomous and coherent, as part of its interrogation of 
colonial human-animal relations. 
 Set in the 1880s, Mr Allbones' Ferrets explores one event in which the 
combination of imperialism and a belief in humans’ mastery of nature irrevocably 
altered interspecies relations in New Zealand.  Ferrets, stoats and weasels, introduced as 
the ‘natural solution’ to the country’s overwhelming rabbit population, eradicated many 
already vulnerable bird species. Early conservationist Herbert Guthrie-Smith, describing 
‘the disgust felt at the freeing, firstly, of rabbits, and secondly, of weasels, in the 
Wairarapa’, writes that ‘It was an outrage that any individual or local body should have 
9 Carolyn Steedman, Landscape For a Good Woman: a Story of Two Lives (London: Virago, 1986), 4, 5. 
10 Wevers, ‘The Fact of the Matter’, 57. 
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been allowed to attempt to correct a blunder by a crime’.
11
  This view of the 
introduction of mustelids to New Zealand is shared by Mr Allbones’ Ferrets.   In its 
fictionalisation of this introduction, the novel provides an excellent example of the way 
the discourse of humanism figures at the root of both anthropocentric and imperialistic 
perspectives, and how these two perspectives functioned in tandem.  Both imperialism 
and its subversion are illustrated in the novel almost exclusively in relation to human-
animal relations.  In the historical note, Farrell writes that New Zealand’s European 
settlers ‘brought with them religious notions of supremacy over nature, a fierce 
determination to reshape the land … and a dispassionate curiosity shaped by that 
European mode of enquiry called natural science’(217).
12
  It is the last of these which is 
the particular target of what I see as Mr Allbones' Ferrets’ challenge to humanism. 
Science
The nineteenth century was a formative period in Europe as well as New Zealand in 
terms of human-animal relations. During the eighteenth century, increasing numbers of 
naturalists had embraced the view that humans are animals. Notably, Carl Linnaeus 
categorised humans among the primates in his taxonomies.  Nineteenth-century 
evolutionary theory built upon these challenges to the notion of human distinctiveness. 
Robert Chambers wrote, in his anonymously published Vestiges of the Natural History 
of Creation (1844), that ‘Common observation shews a great general superiority of the 
human mind over that of the inferior animals’, but that ‘The difference between mind in 
11 Herbert Guthrie-Smith, Tutira: The Story of a New Zealand Sheep Station (Edinburgh and London: 
William Blackwood and Sons, 1921), 334. http://www.archive.org/details/tutirastoryofnew00guthuoft 
12 If Farrell means that all settlers were guilty of these things, she is making a considerable over-
simplification. Stafford and Williams, discussing Maoriland writing, naturally find that ‘Not all colonial 
writers felt the same way about empire and race, and the writers themselves display conflicting and 
contradictory stances, often within a single text’ (15). With regard to the introduction of mustelids, 
Carolyn King writes: 
 The sad thing about it all is that the dawning realization by the government of the need to protect 
 the endemic native fauna was already growing rapidly at the very time that the introductions 
 were going on, but it did not gain enough strength … in time to prevent the introductions 
 altogether.  
Carolyn King, Immigrant Killers: Introduced Predators and the Conservation of Birds in New Zealand
(Auckland, Melbourne, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984), 89-90.  Farrell’s comment thus obscures 
a more complex picture.  Yet she presumably does not mean this unfavourable description to apply to all 
of the settlers, because it does not apply to Allbones, the protagonist in her own narrative.  The comment 
refers, then, to those perspectives which had the most impact.   
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the lower animals and in man is a difference in degree only; it is not a specific 
difference’. He also argued that
 mental action, being proved to be under law, passes at once into the category of 
 natural things.  Its old metaphysical character vanishes in a moment, and the 
 distinction usually taken between physical and moral is annulled, as only an 
 error in terms.
13
More than thirty years later, in The Descent of Man, Charles Darwin echoed the first 
sentiment almost exactly: ‘the difference in mind between man and the higher animals, 
great as it is, is certainly one of degree and not of kind’.  Darwin also echoed Chambers’ 
suggestion that reason and morality, those most defining human capacities, might be 
subject to natural law.  However, Darwin took the idea further still by making 
suggestions about how those capacities might have evolved; he writes, for instance, that 
morality might simply have developed out of social interaction:  
 the social instincts, – the prime principle of man’s moral constitution – with the 
 aid of active intellectual powers and the effects of habit, naturally lead to the 
 golden rule, ‘As ye would that men should do to you, do ye to them likewise;’ 
 and this lies at the foundation of morality. 
14
Of course, the concept of evolution was often unpalatable: humans did not necessarily 
like the idea that they were animals or that they were related to other animals. Gillian 
Beer writes that evolutionism ‘aroused many of the same dreads as fairy-tale in its 
insistence on the obligations of kinship, and the interdependence between beauty and 
beast.  Many Victorian rejections of evolutionary ideas register a physical shudder’. She 
notes, for example, John Ruskin’s response to ‘the filthy heraldries which record the 
relation of humanity to the ascidian and the crocodile’.
15
  Where the implications of 
evolutionism were not entirely rejected, they were often applied in such a way as to 
maintain the status quo. Harriet Ritvo explains: 
13 Robert Chambers, Vestiges of the Natural History of Creation and Other Evolutionary Writings, 1844, 
ed. James A. Secord (Chicago and London: Chicago University Press, 1994), 335-36, 331-32.
14 Charles Darwin, The Descent of Man, and Selection in Relation to Sex (1871; repr., Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press, 1981), 105, 106. 
15 Gillian Beer, Darwin's Plots: Evolutionary Narrative in Darwin, George Eliot and Nineteenth-Century 
Fiction (London: Routledge and Paul Kegan, 1983), 9, Ruskin cited in Beer, 9. 
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 Although [Darwin’s work] eliminated both the divine sanction for human 
 domination and the separation between man and beast, it did not diminish human 
 superiority.  On the contrary, it described the very process by which that 
 superiority has been established.  Clearly, if people were animals, they were the 
 top animals.
16
In Mr Allbones' Ferrets, an upper-class scientist, Mr Pitford, and his teenage 
granddaughter and pupil, Eugenia, appear to subscribe to the interpretation of 
Darwinism as supporting human superiority and mastery.  However, the protagonist, 
Walter Allbones, consistently, if often unknowingly, exposes the Pitfords’ shortcomings 
and models alternatives to their attitudes and practices.  The novel comes down firmly in 
favour of what I would describe as an anti-humanist reading of Darwinian Theory, in 
which it ‘suggested that man was not fully equipped to understand the history of life on 
earth and that he might not be central to that history.  He was neither paradigm nor 
sovereign’.
17
One sense in which the Pitfords’ ability to understand the natural world seems 
limited is in their perception of it. Indeed, sight and touch must be Eugenia’s only fully-
functional senses because she claims, ‘I am tone deaf, just as I have no sense of smell’ 
(92).  She says, ‘drawing is my one great talent’ (92), and she hopes that one day her 
botanical and zoological sketches will be ‘examined closely by naturalists and scientists’ 
(90).  However, this means reducing her subjects to reconstructed material which can 
only be understood in visual terms.
18
  Eugenia’s sensory limitations make her an 
extreme case, but this approach was not uncommon, especially in colonial natural 
history where the specimens were often distant. Carol Freeman writes,  
 A ‘specimen’ of an animal discovered for the first time by Europeans in the 
 colonies was an object to be examined and documented, generally and in minute 
 detail.  A drawing or engraving in a zoological work supplied what was 
 perceived as a ‘definitive’ representation for the classification of new species, 
 the identification of dead animals sent to museum collections and the recognition 
16 Harriet Ritvo, The Animal Estate: The English and Other Creatures in the Victorian Age (Cambridge, 
MA: Harvard University Press, 1987), 40. 
17 Beer, Darwin’s Plots, 19. 
18 They are unreliable even in visual terms: she says, ‘most of the specimens I have to work from are dried 
and pressed.  So it is not easy to imagine their original colour and setting’ (83).
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 of live ones in the exploration of newly acquired countries, or for sporting 
 purposes.
19
Allbones, by contrast, has a far richer perception of life; indeed, he seems to have 
heightened senses. He can put his ear to the ground and hear the ‘murmurings of things 
growing and things easing through narrow crevices’, and the movement of his ferret in a 
rabbit hole: ‘the brush of something squeezing through a shaft, its fur burnishing clay’ 
(10).  He can smell and identify ‘damp earth and last season’s rotting leaf’, ‘ferret musk 
and blood and raw spirit’ (21).  He even interprets the Pitfords’ smells as other animals 
are understood to do, as social signifiers: ‘The stink of wealth is as strong as the 
markings of fox or cat’ (26):   
 … it is as though Allbones belongs to one species – a small species favouring the 
 undergrowth, like moles or frogs or little disregarded birds – while Whiskers 
 [Pitford] and his like belong to another: bigger animals whose scent is laid over 
 wider territories.  (28) 
As Alain Corbin’s work shows, interpretations of different modes of sensory perception 
fluctuate.  He writes that in nineteenth-century France, it was thought that ‘The delicacy 
of an individual’s atmosphere and the sensitiveness of his sense of smell were evidence 
of his refinement and proved his ignorance of the sweat of hard labor’.  He notes, ‘This 
acuity could even become excessive … delicate young girls, for example, might fall 
victim to parosmia (confusion of smells)’.
20
   In Mr Allbones' Ferrets, this class 
division is inverted in Eugenia and Allbones, together with an implication that 
impairment is a deformity of the upper classes and perhaps a mark of inbreeding.
sensory
21
Thus, the distinction between refinement and animality is maintained in terms of 
perception, but its values are inverted. 
 Initially, Eugenia seems emotionally limited too, unable to feel sorrow over 
animals, perhaps because, as Lynda Birke writes of her own scientific training, 
19 Carol Freeman, ‘Figuring Extinction: Visualising the Thylacine in Zoological and Natural History 
Works 1808-1936’ (PhD diss., University of Tasmania, 2005), 35. 
20 Alain Corbin, The Foul and the Fragrant: Odor and the French Social Imagination, trans. Aubier 
Montaigne (Leamington Spa, Hamburg and New York: Berg Publishers, 1986), 141.   
21 The same inversion of the stereotypical class sensibilities appears in Farrell’s The Hopeful Traveller,
where the aristocratic Monsieur de Marcigny has no sense of smell: ‘he was born deficient in that one 
regard.’  Fiona Farrell, The Hopeful Traveller (Auckland: Vintage, 2002), 26. 
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‘Learning to be objective means learning to distance yourself from those feelings’.
22
Eugenia obviously considers her objectivity a mark of intellectual superiority.  Allbones 
suggests, ‘If a bird dies, singing its heart out and flying up and up into the sky, you’d 
feel the loss of it in a way you’d never feel sad at stepping on some ugly great slug’ 
(95).
23
  Eugenia refuses to answer this directly: she says that extinction is ‘not a matter 
for emotion’, and that his subjective appreciation for animal beauty is ‘irrelevant’ 
because ‘nature won’t care one way or another.  Nature is concerned only with survival’ 
(95).  In adopting this standpoint, Eugenia is disrupting gender stereotypes.  Birke 
writes, ‘Objective detachment is, as feminist writers have often pointed out, 
stereotypically masculine in our culture … while “not letting your emotions get in the 
way” is reminiscent of suppressing something feminine’.
24
  Pitford, indeed, has 
consciously suppressed emotional and ‘feminine’ tastes in Eugenia; for instance, he 
‘prefers her to read reality and not the romances so often preferred by young women’ 
(138-39).  Consequently, when Allbones admires some insects she is collecting – 
thinking that, as a girl, ‘Of course she would collect what was pretty and colourful’ –
she disrupts his assumptions. ‘I don’t collect them because they’re pretty…  I collect 
them because they interest me.  Especially the Odonata – that’s dragonflies…  I already 
own one hundred and eighty specimens representing thirty-seven species’ (124).  Then 
she says, ‘You have your ferrets.  Do you collect them because they’re ‘pretty’?’ (125).  
Now it is Allbones’ turn to disrupt stereotypes.  Although he kills both rabbits and 
ferrets, Allbones does not see anything wrong with having subjective appreciation for 
animals.  He replies, ‘They’re useful… An’ I like ‘em, I suppose.  I could use a dog for 
ratting … but I prefer the ferrets.  I like their faces … they don’t care what you think, 
22 Lynda Birke, Feminism, Animals and Science: The Naming of the Shrew (Buckingham: Open 
University Press, 1994), 46.
23 His impression that extinction is ‘a pity’ is not a view which all natural scientists avoided: Walter 
Buller, in the epigraph to Leigh’s chapter five, writes of the demise of the pitoitoi (robin) that 
‘Ornithologists everywhere must regret this’, and describes his own affection for the species (Farrell, 
119). See Walter L. Buller, A history of the birds of New Zealand, 2nd ed. (Published by the author, 
London, 1888), 35.  http://www.nzetc.org/tm/scholarly/tei-BulBird.html 
24 Birke, Feminism, Animals and Science, 46. 
104
not the way a dog cares … An’ yes, they’re pretty creatures’ (125).
25
  Indeed, Allbones 
even demonstrates humility in his personal relationships with animals.  When Pinky 
(one of his ferrets) bites him after he starts to doubt her, he interprets her action as 
making ‘some point about due patience and due respect’ (20).  Rather than insisting on 
mastery, he is accepting the perceived reproof.  Allbones and Eugenia thus invert the 
gendered stereotypes associated with objectivity and subjectivity in relation to animals.  
The effect in the novel is to make Eugenia’s view appear more detached and destructive.
 Indeed, what both Pitford and Eugenia are doing is imposing their human ideas 
onto animals.  They are participating in the construction of what Chris Philo and Chris 
Wilbert call ‘animal spaces’: ‘abstract spaces… which are cleaved apart from the messy 
time-space contexts, or concrete places, in which these animals actually live out their 
lives as beings in the world’. Philo and Wilbert also note that ‘Related to the conceptual 
placing of animals is also a strong human sense of the proper places which animals 
should occupy physically’, and that although they bring animals atypically close to 
humans, zoos provide ‘a highly tangible expression of the dual conceptual and material 
placements of animals’.
26
   In Mr Allbones' Ferrets, Eugenia ‘places’ local animals in 
both of these senses in her dragonfly collection: ‘when they’re dry I pin them onto cards 
and label them properly, then put them into my cabinet’ (124).  Eugenia is working 
towards conceptual order. She says, ‘it is not done out of cruelty, but for science’ (124), 
and asks, ‘How else are we to understand the natural world?’ (125).  To Allbones, 
however, ‘It does seem a shame, all this collectin’, when they might be off flyin’ about 
the fields and woods’ (124).  Later, seeing Pitford’s taxidermy collections, Allbones 
laments this ‘cabinetry in which the natural splendours of the world had been captured, 
25 In fact the ferrets are useful to him for more reasons than he can admit to Eugenia, because they are 
better for poaching in both size and appearance.  He also breeds his ferrets with this purpose in mind, 
applying the concepts that Darwin describes as ‘variation under domestication’(27): through selective 
breeding, he produces ferrets of ‘A rich creamy white easy to spot out in the woods on a dark night, a 
white that made Allbones’ kits the best of their kind for miles around’ (17).  Nevertheless, his stated 
personal liking for ferrets appears to be genuine. It is also unconventional.  Ritvo writes that in the 
nineteenth-century many people favoured ‘co-operative’ animals like dogs and horses, which appeared to 
welcome human mastery, while animals which seemed not to acknowledge it, like cats, were often 
disliked and mistrusted (Ritvo, The Animal Estate, 21-22).  Yet what Allbones likes about ferrets is their 
indifference to mastery – a point which can, indeed, be seen to reflect his own attitudes to authority. 
26 Chris Philo and Chris Wilbert, eds. ‘Animal Spaces, Beastly Places: An Introduction,’ in Animal
Spaces, Beastly Places: New Geographies of Human-Animal Relations (London: Routledge, 2000), 6-7, 
10, 13. 
105
labelled, studied and understood’ (55).  Allbones’ view, indeed, resonates with some 
contemporary opinions of collection, such as that expressed in another recent New 
Zealand novel, Butler’s Ringlet, by a protagonist who is increasingly disgusted with his 
own moth collection:  
 Occasional images of nineteenth-century naturalists would spring to [Warwick’s] 
 mind: men who killed and collected vast quantities of insects or birds in what 
 seemed like total disregard for the impact on the environment.  To be located 
 among that group of people, now, in the twenty-first century … struck him as 
 shameful.
27
Of course, Warwick’s view is probably also informed by the knowledge, perhaps less 
apparent to Allbones, of the extent to which colonial collections were also imperialistic.   
 In Mr Allbones' Ferrets, imperialism is a significant feature of Pitford’s 
practices.  The abstract ‘animal spaces’ which he imposes are European taxonomic 
categories, while the physical ones are enclosures in Europe.  Pitford organises animals 
on an international scale, echoing the colonising natural history of the previous century 
described by Mary Louise Pratt: 
  natural history called upon human intervention (intellectual, mainly) to compose 
 an order…  One by one the planet’s life forms were to be drawn out of the 
 tangled threads of their life surroundings and rewoven into European-based 
 patterns of global unity and order.
28
Pitford displaces New Zealand animals from their habitats, and brings them, alive or 
dead, half way around the world into European ‘animal places’, both physical and 
conceptual.
29
 One of the European concepts being imposed is language.  When Allbones 
encounters Pitford’s specimens, both plants and animals, he is struck by the 
unpronounceable names they have been given as part of the classification process. Birke 
explains:
27 Laurence Fearnley, Butler’s Ringlet (Auckland: Penguin Books, 2004), 144-45. 
28 Mary Louise Pratt, Imperial Eyes: Travel Writing and Transculturation (London: Routlege, 1992), 31. 
29 His taxidermy cabinets include ‘birds with big flat orange paddling feet and crests brushed erect’, 
‘lizards far larger than any lizard Allbones had ever seen in his life’, ‘round brown birds’ which remind 
Allbones of quail, and ‘two pigeons with feathers of luminous bluegreen and white vests’ (51). These are 
probably erect-crested penguins, New Zealand quail, tuatara and kereru (New Zealand woodpigeons) 
respectively.
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 While the meanings of animals to humans were being contested in the wider 
 society, scientists and naturalists were busy creating another set of meanings 
 through the process of naming and describing.  Colonial expansions meant not 
 only the discovery of new species (by Europeans); it also entailed the 
 development of systems of classification that were themselves mired in 
 assumptions of European superiority, and which, inevitably, paid no heed to the 
 classification systems of peoples indigenous to the areas from which the animals 
 were taken.
30
Pitford’s activities work in just these ways.  Maori names are discounted and replaced 
with English and Latin: tui become ‘prosthemadera novaseelandiae’. Weka become 
‘woodhens’, and Pitford says that their spurs are ‘Proof absolute of its correct 
assignation to the species Gallirallus!’ (66).
31
   This naming system seems particularly 
irrelevant to the birds by contrast with the Maori one, in which at least some of names 
for birds are based on the sounds which they make themselves.
32
  The linguistic 
colonisation of animals is also performed directly by Eugenia. Allbones is startled to 
hear a tui calling ‘hello’ in her voice.  In the wild, tui are imitative of other birds, and 
some captive tui are still encouraged to imitate humans.
33
  The tui in the novel, 
significantly, cannot make other sounds anymore; Eugenia has replaced the tui’s 
extensive repertoire and reduced it to a single English word.  A stable boy tells 
Allbones, ‘Used to sing when he first came, but now it’s just Hello hello and bleedin’ 
hello’ (70).  Emphasising the colonisation this entails, its call is later described as ‘the 
voice that was foreign to it and not its own native tongue’ (98).  Thus, both Pitford and 
Eugenia demonstrate a disregard for the non-European in their linguistic colonisations 
of animals.  The same is true of their pursuit of their primary scientific aims. 
30 Birke, Feminism, Animals and Science, 33. 
31  Birke also observes that ‘By the nineteenth century, in the heyday of Victorian empire, the names of 
British imperialists were frequently commemorated in the Latin names of newly discovered (or named) 
species’ (Birke, Feminism, Animals and Science, 33).  In Mr Allbones' Ferrets, Eugenia’s deceased father 
has been recognised in this way in the name of a Himalayan snow finch: Montifringilla Pitfordii.
32 Many Maori terms have resurfaced since; tui and weka long ago replaced parson bird and woodhen, 
while other birds are increasingly known by their Maori names (such as the kotuku or white heron). 
33 For instance, Woof Woof at the Whangarei Native Bird Recovery Centre in New Zealand, produces 
various human phrases and tunes. http://www.whangareinativebirdrecovery.org.nz/woofwoofvids.html . 
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  As Beer explains, ‘Evolutionary theory emphasised extinction and annihilation 
equally with transformation – and this was one of its most disturbing elements, one to 
which gradually accrued a heavier and heavier weight in consciousness’.
34
  This is 
Pitford’s scientific focus.  Eugenia says that he is ‘one of the foremost authorities’ (84) 
in this area and that he is working on a ‘great catalogue.  His definitive study of 
extinction’ (92).  However, this very study contributes to the phenomenon.  As Carolyn 
King writes, ‘Though they might not have been numerous, the collectors had a special 
significance in that they collected the rarest specimens’.
35
  Farrell makes this point too, 
via several epigraphs detailing extensive collection catalogues, and one citing Walter 
Buller’s paradoxical lament over the demise of the pitoitoi or toutouwai: ‘Personally I 
regard this gentle Robin with a strong sentiment of affection … It was the first bird of 
which I ever prepared a specimen’ (119).
36
  Pitford too is removing rare animals from 
their environment.  The New Zealand quail which appear amongst his taxidermy were 
thought to be extinct even at the time when the novel is set,
37
 while most of the other 
species in his collections are now classified as threatened in some respect.
38
  His 
collection of live birds apparently ignores Darwin’s emphasis on ‘how infinitely 
complex and close-fitting are the mutual relations of all organic beings to each other and 
to their physical conditions of life’.
39
  His acquisition of a pair of weka and his desire 
for a pair of huia,
40
 already a rare species at the time, again ignores an opinion of 
Darwin’s: ‘Nothing is more easy than to tame an animal, and few things more difficult 
than to get it to breed freely under confinement, even in the many cases when the male 
and female unite’.
41
  For multiple reasons, then, taking rare birds into captivity seems 
particularly irresponsible.  Like Eugenia’s teaching of the tui, Pitford’s attempts to 
34 Beer, Darwin’s Plots, 16. 
35 King, Immigrant Killers, 78. 
36 Buller, A History of the Birds of New Zealand, 35. 
37 New Zealand quail supposedly became extinct in 1875 (before the year in which Mr Allbones' Ferrets is 
set), although it has recently been suggested that quails on Tiritiri Matangi Island may be of the native 
species.  http://www.wildlifeextra.com/do/ecco.py/view_item?listid=1&listcatid=258&listitemid=1781.
38Rod Hitchmough, Leigh Bull and Pam Cromarty, comps, ‘New Zealand Threat Classification System 
lists 2005,’ http://www.doc.govt.nz/upload/documents/science-and-technical/sap236.pdf.   
39 Charles Darwin, The Origin of Species, 1859, ed. Gillian Beer (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), 
67. 
40 That he wants this species in particular is significant because to Maori, huia feathers were symbols of 
rank.  Pitford, of course, hopes to advance his own position through the possession of huia, which he 
believes (correctly) are soon to become extinct. 
41 Darwin, The Origin of Species, 9. 
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impose European scientific theory onto non-European animals have the potential to be 
very destructive. 
 Thus, through the contrasting characters of the Pitfords and Allbones, Farrell sets 
up the novel’s thematic concern with imperialistic science as colonising animals. The 
Pitfords are detached from the natural world in their modes of perception and their 
rational objectivity, and they remove animals from their natural habitats in order to 
impose their European human systems onto them, regardless of whether or not they 
eradicate them in the process.  These imagined colonisers are thus both anthropocentric 
and imperialistic, and through the contrasts with Allbones, the novel conveys a strong 
sense of distance from them.  The condemnation of historical treatments of animals then 
intensifies as Pitford commits his greatest offence, in the novel’s terms, in contributing 
to the introduction of mustelids to New Zealand. 
The natural solution 
In The Origin of Species, Darwin explains that
 Every being, which during its natural lifetime produces several eggs or seeds, 
 must suffer destruction during some period of its life, and during some season or 
 occasional year, otherwise, on the principle of geometrical increase, its numbers 
 would quickly become so great that no country could support the product.
He notes that there is ‘striking’ evidence of this ‘from our domestic animals of many 
kinds which have run wild in several parts of the world’.  He concludes, ‘Lighten any 
check, mitigate the destruction ever so little, and the number of the species will almost 
instantaneously increase to any amount’.
42
   This was exactly the problem with the 
rabbits introduced to New Zealand: they had no natural check.  King writes that their 
population increase was such that ‘By the 1870s, runholders were becoming alarmed…  
Sheep died from starvation by the hundreds, and it is no exaggeration to say that the 
majority of the high-country pastures were ruined’.
43
  Pitford is aware that this problem 
could have been predicted and avoided.  He says, ‘Oryctolagus cuniculus is proving yet 
again, when introduced to virgin territory devoid of any customary predators, to be a 
42 Darwin, The Origin of Species, 53-4, 54, 56. 
43 King, Immigrant Killers, 82. 
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tasty but troublesome guest.  As history might have warned us he would’ (58).  He 
explains how Ancient Roman colonies on the Gymnesian Islands suffered from the 
introduction of one pair of rabbits.  ‘From this single Lagomorphic Adam and Eve a vast 
progeny had sprung, so that the very houses of the Gymnesiae were being undermined, 
trees were toppling, crops were being consumed and famine threatened’ (59).
44
  He also 
knows that the Roman Empire responded to the problem by sending mustelids.  In 
implementing this solution for New Zealand, Pitford perceives history as offering proof 
of its effectiveness (and perhaps also an ennobling parallel between the British and 
Roman Empires).  He says to Allbones, ‘History supplies the precedent … and it is 
history, too, that teaches the solution. The “wildcats from Africa”… Ferrets!’ (60).  
However, Pitford is missing the broader lesson that humans cannot predict the course of 
nature.  King explains that some New Zealand settlers were aware of the dangers: many 
acclimatization societies had learned their lesson in relation to rabbits, and they and 
ornithologists strongly objected to the proposed introduction of mustelids. Walter 
Buller, one of the scheme’s most eloquent opponents, said in an 1876 meeting of the 
Wellington Philosophical Society that ‘the grave question to be considered is whether, 
in the attempt to put down one evil, you are not permitting a larger one to grow up into 
its place’.
45
   However, these objections were overruled, and both government-
sponsored and private shipments of ferrets began in 1884.  In Mr Allbones' Ferrets,
Pitford is in charge of a (presumably private) shipment of this kind.
46
 Although, as the title suggests, the mustelids are always under Allbones’ care, he 
is made to seem a more or less innocent party in the overall project.  He becomes 
44 Perhaps H.G. Wells was aware of the history of rabbit introductions in writing The Island of Doctor 
Moreau, where the introduction of rabbits to Moreau’s island (by his assistant Montgomery) proves 
problematic.  Montgomery introduces the rabbits for food, not liking to be vegetarian like Moreau.  The 
rabbits, however, rekindle a taste for blood in the beast people too and contributes to their reversion to an 
animal state; ultimately, they kill Montgomery himself.  Of course, the messages of the novels are slightly 
different: Montgomery is guilty of failing to distinguish himself from animals; in Mr Allbones' Ferrets 
New Zealand’s Pakeha settlers are portrayed as failing to recognise that they should not try to manipulate 
nature because they are not distinct from it.  H.G. Wells, The Island of Doctor Moreau, 1896, ed. Leon 
Stover (Jefferson: McFarland, 1996). 
45 W. L. Buller, ‘On the proposed introduction of the Polecat into New Zealand’, Transaction and 
Proceedings of the New Zealand Institute 9 (1877):634-5, cited in King, Immigrant Killers, 85. See 
http://rsnz.natlib.govt.nz/volume/rsnz_09/rsnz_09_02_008740.html 
46 Pitford does not specify, but according to her historical note, Farrell has taken the names Allbones and 
Metcalfe from ‘receipts for a consignment of stoats ordered in 1885 by the Wairarapa runholder, Edward 
Riddiford’ (271). 
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involved after impressing Pitford with his understanding of animals.  On the night of 
their first meeting, the Pitfords have been waiting outside a badger sett without seeing 
any cubs.  When they meet Allbones, he is able to tell them where they are and why: 
‘Boar and sows moved a month ’n’ more since, when the stream backed up and flooded.
They can’t stand it wet in the sett, not when they’re kindlin’’ (28).  Allbones enjoys the 
experience of undermining Pitford; ‘He cannot resist it: a featherweight punch at the 
older man’s pompous certainty’ (29). However, Pitford simply appropriates Allbones’ 
skills. When they meet, he must suspect that Allbones has been poaching.  He asks 
around and learns that Fowler Metcalfe, whose name Allbones has given as his own, is 
known to deal in ferrets.  He announces, ‘I could do with the assistance of a man like 
yourself, a man with a strong practical knowledge of this part of the country’ (56).  This 
sort of reliance on the lower classes was a seldom-acknowledged feature of much 
natural scientific investigation.  Just as overseas, ‘Obtaining specimens … relied on the 
(unacknowledged) expertise of indigenous peoples’,
47
 educated scientists also relied on 
‘uneducated’ Europeans.  Bob Iliffe observes that in the 1600s, ‘The Royal Society of 
London published advice in the early numbers of the Philosophical Transactions for 
sailors and gentlemen travellers to make observations in ethnography and natural history 
to report back to both the Society and the Admiralty’.
48
  Similarly, in New Zealand’s 
nineteenth-century search for a solution to rabbits, King writes: 
 Most of the stoats and weasels probably came from British stock; there were 
 about 17,000 gamekeepers employed on ‘vermin control’ on the great game 
 estates in Britain at the time, who were no doubt delighted to be paid twice for 
 catching these relatively abundant small predators on their beats.
49
In Mr Allbones' Ferrets, Pitford employs Allbones in this role, and as a buyer of ferrets, 
and later, together with the real Fowler Metcalfe, as their keeper on the ship.  Allbones, 
47 Birke, Feminism, Animals and Science, 33. 
48 Bob Iliffe, ‘Science and Voyages of Discovery’, in The Cambridge History of Science, ed. David C. 
Lindberg, Roy Porter, Ronald L. Numbers and Mary Jo Nye (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 2003), 602.  Farrell herself makes a similar point in The Hopeful Traveller, when the 
gardener Firmin has to accompany his employer’s niece and her friends as they try to establish a utopian 
island off New Zealand.  He has explained to them the rudiments of fertilising melons, and they declare 
him ‘a philosopher of muck!’, and conclude (quite correctly) that ‘They would have need of a philosopher 
Melonist’ in setting up their colony.  Farrell, The Hopeful Traveller, 31, 56. 
49 King, Immigrant Killers, 86. 
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then, is a vital instrument rather than an orchestrator of their introduction.  The blame is 
laid at Pitford’s door, because he is the one with the power, and more importantly, 
because he is also the one who should have known better. 
 Given his position as an expert on New Zealand extinctions, Pitford must know 
that the birds there are vulnerable; indeed, upon receiving his pair of weka, he says that 
their wings are ‘perfect proof … of the laws of natural adaptation…  In the absence of 
predators, the bird has no need of flight and its wings have become … no more than 
ornament’ (66). This suggests an awareness of Darwin’s discussion of use and disuse as 
a cause of variation under nature: 
 As the larger ground-feeding birds seldom take flight except to escape danger, I 
 believe that the nearly wingless condition of several birds, which now inhabit or 
 have lately inhabited several oceanic islands, tenanted by no beast of prey, has 
 been caused by disuse. 
50
If, despite knowing that the birds have no defences, and despite the outcry in New 
Zealand over the proposal, Pitford does not consider mustelids a threat to the birds, then 
he appears very foolish.  It seems more likely, though, that he is simply unconcerned by 
the risks.  One possibility is that he considers, as Eugenia does, that colonial 
introductions are advancing a natural process.  She says that New Zealand birds are 
becoming extinct because they are ‘encountering the blackbirds and starlings of the 
English countryside’, and that ‘It is a law of nature that competition for resources is 
fiercest between those creatures that most resemble one another, and in this battle the 
indigenous species are destined to fail’ (93). The first of these ideas presumably comes 
from Darwin, who writes:  
 As species of the same genus have usually, though by no means invariably, some 
 similarity in habits and constitution, and always in structure, the struggle will 
 generally be more severe between species of the same genus, when they come 
 into competition with each other, than between species of distinct genera.
At one point, Darwin also implies that the species of New Zealand are evolutionarily 
inferior to European ones: 
50 Darwin, The Origin of Species, 111. 
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 Natural selection tends only to make each organic being as perfect as, or slightly 
 more perfect than, the other inhabitants of the same country with which it has to 
 struggle for existence.  And we see that this is the degree of perfection attained 
 under nature.  The endemic productions of New Zealand, for instance, are 
 perfect one compared with another; but they are now rapidly yielding before the 
 advancing legions of plants and animals introduced from Europe.
51
 This sort of naturalising of extinction was very common.  Walter Buller, cited in 
epigraphs to the novel’s chapters, was an eloquent protester against the introduction of 
mustelids, but in his lament over the demise of the pitoitoi or robin, he attributes it to 
wild cats or rats or to ‘some inescapable law of nature’. Even though wild cats and rats 
were introduced, and even where he makes a direct link between the pitoitoi and Maori 
(the inclusion of this epigraph being the novel’s only reference to Maori), he avoids 
blaming colonisation; indeed, he blames the Maori for their own decline, which he 
assumes will also result in extinction. ‘Well may the Maori say, as he laments over the 
decadence of his own race – “Even as the Pitoitoi has vanished from the woods, so will 
the Maori pass away from the land and be forgotten”’(119-120).  Robert Paddle finds a 
similar displacement of responsibility in attitudes to the thylacine or Tasmanian tiger.  
He writes, ‘the animal was said to be primitive, unfeeling, un-adaptable and stupid … 
and really had only itself to blame for becoming extinct’.  Paddle, who suggests that all 
the possible causes of the thylacine’s extinction might have had their origin in 
colonisation, considers that such arguments were simply attempts to construct ‘scientific 
innocence’.
52
 However, the above passages from The Origin of Species show that 
Darwin saw the difference between natural and human-induced competition.  Thus, it 
would be a misreading as well as ‘dangerous in the extreme’, as David Owen puts it, ‘to 
ascribe positive Darwinian notions of the survival of the fittest (that humans need to eat) 
to justify extinction of, say, the dodo or the passenger pigeon’.
53
  This is what Eugenia 
appears to be doing in presenting the extinction of New Zealand species as if it were 
natural and inevitable.  If Pitford shares this view, this might explain why he has no 
51 Darwin, The Origin of Species, 64, 164. 
52 Robert Paddle, The Last Tasmanian Tiger (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 207, 204. 
53 David Owen, Thylacine: The Tragic Tale of the Tasmanian Tiger (Crows Nest, Allen and Unwin, 
2003), 27. 
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qualms about importing species which might accelerate extinction.  However, there is 
also another possible explanation.  Eugenia reports: 
 My grandfather says we are enormously fortunate to be living in this era.
 Extinction normally takes ages and ages, but in the islands of the Pacific, so 
 recently settled, science has the perfect laboratory to examine the process at 
 close quarters.  (94)
The repeated descriptions of New Zealand as a ‘laboratory’ suggest that to Pitford, it is 
primarily a resource, like Eugenia’s insects, for the advancement of science.  
Furthermore, the fact that Pitford considers rapid extinctions advantageous gives rise to 
the possibility that in sending mustelids to New Zealand, he may be knowingly 
promoting extinction as a means of promoting himself.  Thus, Pitford’s expertise in the 
area of extinction potentially inculpates him.   
 Again, Pitford’s characterisation is contrasted with that of Allbones, who 
demonstrates a strong sense of duty towards animals which he has interfered with:  
 He had lifted them from their appointed place among hedgerows and fields and 
 woods, where they were safe and could lead the lives they were intended for… 
 now it was his task to convey them, whole and sound, to the other side of the 
 world. (148-49)  
The idea that animals are ‘intended’ for certain lives in certain ‘appointed places’ might 
suggest that Allbones believes in a divine plan.  His sense of duty also resonates with 
the epigraph to the chapter in which the characters embark, which, taken from the story 
of Noah’s Ark, ends with God telling Noah and his sons that the animals shall dread 
them, but also, ‘Into your hand they are delivered’.
54
 However, religion is not the primary source of Allbones’ principles. He has had 
very little religious education, and when Eugenia supposes that he believes in the 
creation story, he says ‘Can’ say I’ve given it much thought’ (86).  Instead, Allbones 
simply feels that he has obligations to the mustelids. During the voyage to New Zealand, 
54 Of every clean beast shalt thou take to thee by sevens, the male and his female, and of beasts that are 
not clean by two, the male and his female.  Of the fowls also of the air by sevens, the male and the female: 
to keep seed alive upon the face of all the earth…   
And God blessed Noah and his sons and said unto them, Be fruitful and multiply and replenish the earth.  
And the fear of you and the dread of you shall be upon every beast of the earth and upon every fowl of the 
air, upon all that moveth upon the earth and upon all the fishes of the sea.  Into your hand they are 
delivered.  (Genesis, 7:2-3; 9:1-2, in Farrell, 134) 
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he tends them as if they are not unlike humans. ‘He had the mulatto cook add warm 
water to their slops, and plumped up their straw bedding.  He kept the tarpaulin drawn to 
protect them from the great waves’ (176).  When some die, ‘They were dropped over the 
side, like the children… carried in their parents arms to the rail’ (176). The alternative is 
to permit cannibalism: ‘he knew that they would be indifferent to cannibalising their 
own kind, in fact would welcome the fresh titbit’ (178).  However, as in Life of Pi,
cannibalism might be the purely rational approach but it is not morally acceptable to 
Allbones. ‘He could not quite bring himself to feed his ferrets to one another’ because ‘it 
seemed indecent’ (178).  Instead, like David Lurie in Disgrace, he treats animal bodies 
with a degree of dignity which suggests that his sense of commonality with them 
extends beyond reason and even compassion toward a quasi-spiritual respect.  This 
means breaking both with a purely rational view, like that apparently held by the 
Pitfords, in which animal death does not matter, and with traditional religious views in 
which humans are spiritually distinct from other species.  Nevertheless, Allbones’ 
position does little to thwart the anthropocentrism being practised all around him. It is 
instead disrupted by nature and animals.
Subversions
In his article ‘The Postcolonial Animal’, Philip Armstrong writes:   
 Defined as that bit of nature endowed with voluntary motion, the animal  
 resists the imperialist desire to represent the natural (and especially the colonial 
 terrain) as a passive object or a blank slate ready for mapping by Western 
 experts.
55
Mr Allbones' Ferrets’ primary critique of colonial anthropocentrism derives from 
disruption by natural events and by animals themselves.
One respect in which this occurs in the novel is in the tendency of bodies to 
subvert the distinctions that the scientist characters (although they are familiar with the 
concept of human evolution) are trying to retain between humans and other species.  
One example of this is illness.  The mustelids emphasise the commonalities between 
species because they are susceptible to some of the same conditions as humans.  While 
55 Philip Armstrong. ‘The Postcolonial Animal.’ Society and Animals 10, 4 (2002): 413-19, 
http://psyeta.org/sa/sa10.4/armstrong.shtml 
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Allbones is collecting animals for Pitford, he finds that some are becoming sick from 
contact with another of Pitford’s employees.  He admonishes the boy: ‘They takes the 
influenza!  Just like us! … What was you thinkin’ of, to tend ‘em when you’re ill?’ 
(111).
56
  Later, on the voyage to New Zealand, the rapid temperature transition in the 
tropics again causes apparently related illnesses in humans and animals: children die 
from ‘a kind of pneumonia not unlike the disease that was carrying off the ferrets’ (176).
Another feature shared between humans and mustelids during the voyage is increased 
libido in warm weather.  Because sexual urges are considered ‘animal’, this is 
acceptable in the mustelids: Allbones and Metcalfe can take male to female until all are 
‘safely serviced and in kindle’ (167).  The human parallel is apparent, even if it is 
expressed in jest, to the characters themselves.  When Allbones says that the mustelids 
are, ‘come into season and if they’re not mated they’ll die’, another man replies, ‘Sure 
and I understand them completely…  That’s myself, so’ (168).  However, as Marian 
Scholtmeijer writes, ‘Human sexuality is … treated as unwholesome to the extent that it 
imitates the habits of animals… Innocent biological drives, then, are landed with a 
heavy burden of guilt’.
57
  The human passengers must attempt to exercise intellectual 
and moral restraint – characteristics that were thought to separate human from beast – 
and they condemn each other for any weakness in this regard.  A prime example of this 
point surfaces in the form of Eugenia’s unsuspected pregnancy. 
 When Eugenia suddenly goes into labour, the other passengers initially accuse 
Pitford of being the father and turn on him, but Metcalfe blames Allbones and attacks 
him, supported by an angry mob.  Afterwards, the ship’s doctor judges Allbones: 
 He had no time for men like this one, pleasing themselves, exercising no 
 restraint, prey to every carnal whim.  A man needed discipline and a proper 
 degree of moral fortitude or else he was no better than the beasts.  No glorious 
 piece of work…but a brute, a clever monkey, as the men of science had proven 
 by the steady accumulation of fact. (199-200)
58
56  Ferrets are consequently used in influenza research in the present. See for instance Susan Brown, 
‘History of the Ferret’, http://www.veterinarypartner.com/Content.plx?P=A&A=496  
57 Marian Scholtmeijer, Animal Victims in Modern Fiction: From Sanctity to Sacrifice (Toronto: 
University of Toronto Press, 1993), 183. 
58 This is the same conceptual division that is literalised in Robert Louis Stevenson’s  Strange Case of Dr 
Jekyll and Mr Hyde, in which Jekyll seeks to separate the rational and animal sides of himself into two 
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This is the opposite of the idea raised by Chambers that evolution invalidates the 
distinction between the physical and the moral.  The doctor feels, as Pi seems to in Life
of Pi, that human animality threatens the boundaries between humans and the rest of 
nature. Since humans are no more than clever monkeys, he concludes that only humans’ 
discipline and morality set them apart from other animals.  However, if Allbones has 
failed to restrain himself (assuming his relationship with Eugenia is sexual), he is not the 
only one: so have the scientists. 
 Eugenia is so surprised by her pregnancy that although she must be aware that 
evolutionary theory undermines a human/nature divide, she has apparently been 
thinking of herself in terms of a mind/body divide which has more in common with 
Cartesian thought.  Descartes argued:
  because, on the one side, I have a clear and distinct idea of myself inasmuch as I 
 am only a thinking and unextended thing, and as, on the other, I possess a 
 distinct idea of body, in as much as it is only an extended and unthinking thing, 
 it is certain that this I (that is to say, my soul by which I am what I am) is 
 entirely and absolutely distinct from my body, and can exist without it.
59
Eugenia has made a similar distinction, perhaps unconsciously, by failing to 
acknowledge how the principles of biology apply to her own body.  Intellectually, she 
has known that ‘Everything is alive and changing in little ways that we, who are 
changing ourselves, cannot detect’ (86), but she has disregarded even detectable changes 
in herself: ‘I did know something was different, but I decided it was just ill health and 
that the voyage would make me better’ (203).  Consequently, she is emotionally 
unprepared for motherhood.  ‘Eugenia had been moved to her cabin, where she 
remained listless in her bed, refusing all food, refusing all contact with her child’ (195).
When she finally does acknowledge him, Eugenia has an apparently physical experience 
of the instincts which she has so far evaded: 
 She feels his grip and in her stomach there is an uncurling, like something 
 growing.  She takes a moment to identify it, but thinks it might conceivably be 
distinct identities.  However, through the ultimate failure of this experiment (Hyde takes over), Stevenson 
makes the point that humans in fact need both of these facets of their being.  Robert Louis Stevenson 
Strange Case of Dr Jekyll and Mr Hyde (1886; repr., Harmondsworth, UK: Penguin, 1994). 
59 René Descartes (1641), ‘Sixth Meditation’, in Discourse on Method and Meditations, trans. Elizabeth S. 
Haldane and G.R.T. Ross (New York: Dover Publications Inc, 2003), 112. 
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 the beginnings of that sensation she has read about: the one Allbones called 
 ‘love’.  (210) 
Her dawning understanding of this emotion undermines her initially extreme rational 
position.  However, it also situates her in the conventional female roles which she has 
hitherto avoided.  Although Allbones knows the child is not his (because she must have 
conceived before they met), he accepts Pitford’s suggestion that he take responsibility 
and marry her regardless (206).  This means that the narrative effectively relegates her 
to traditional female roles. Defined by her biology, Eugenia, who has had scientific 
aspirations and who tries to depart from the gender stereotypes of romance, ends up in 
an apparently clichéd relationship with the protagonist in which he rescues her from the 
villain (and from impending social doom) and makes her his wife. However, she is not 
the only person to be redefined by the birth of this child: it reveals that not only the 
lower classes or women, but also upper-class men, can be governed by the body. 
 After the characters reach New Zealand, it is revealed that Pitford has committed 
incest with Eugenia.  Describing her baby, the narrator explains,
 The tide of life runs strongly in him.  But then it should, shouldn’t it?  For as 
 anyone conversant with the scientific breeding of livestock will tell you, the 
 strongest progeny are those fathered by the grandsire... why should the laws of 
 genetics be any different for primates?  We are just clever monkeys after all, 
 subject to the same regime of natural selection. (213)
60
This emphasis on scientific principles suggests that, theoretically, Pitford could have 
acted or at least justified his actions on the basis of such ideas.
61
   However, given the 
potential social consequences, it seems unlikely that he intended to father a child. In that 
case, he has failed to exercise control over his own and Eugenia’s nature, so that instead, 
these are the forces that come to shape the lives of Allbones and Eugenia. 
 In this way, the novel can be seen to suggest that because nature exerts influence 
over humans, it also exerts influence over history.  On one hand, historical records are 
shown not to be objective, because humans manipulate them. Emphasising the extent to 
which migration could mean self-definition, some of the passengers speculate about 
60 Eugenia’s own name, of course, is a reference to this: both in appearance and in meaning it is associated 
with eugenics, the selective breeding of humans. 
61 Chambers, Vestiges of the Natural History of Creation, 331-32. 
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whether Pitford is really Eugenia’s grandfather, and realise that ‘from now on, anyone 
might be whoever they said they were’ (193).  For the Pitfords, this means that they can 
conceal the ways in which they have been defined by nature.  When Allbones assumes 
responsibility for Eugenia’s pregnancy, their marriage records them as Mr and Mrs 
Metcalfe, overwriting both Allbones’ original name and the baby’s parentage.  In this 
way, the human authorship of records works to elide the influence of nature.  On the 
other hand, however, the novel as a whole implies that ‘real’ history is quite different, 
and while humans clearly shape it, they cannot necessarily do so in the ways that they 
intend, because other forces are also at work. 
 The novel thus underscores evolutionism’s anti-humanist implication that 
apparently rational and objective human subjects do not govern but are governed by 
nature, and therefore are not central to the history of life on earth.  Because this is such a 
familiar concept in the present, the novel’s emphasis on it seems somewhat heavy-
handed.  However, this is of central relevance to the novel’s representation of human-
animal relations, because humans’ inability to govern nature leaves animal immigrants 
space to self-define as well, and thus to disrupt humans’ interventionist endeavours in 
the way that Armstrong describes. 
Animal actions 
Philo and Wilbert observe that animal disruptions of human ordering sometimes create 
the unsettling impression that other species might have agency as well as humans. They 
write: 
 the concept of ‘resistance’ is generally taken to entail the presence of conscious 
 intentionality, seemingly only a property of human agency in that only humans 
 are widely recognised to possess self-consciousness and the facility for acting on 
 intentions with a view to converting plans into outcomes.
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However, as Philo and Wilbert recognise, animals need not always meet these criteria in 
order to resist humans.  Regardless of whether or not they do so deliberately (or whether 
humans are capable of deciding this point), animals do sometimes act, individually or 
collectively, in ways which humans do not expect and which frustrate human 
62 Philo and Wilbert, ‘Animal Spaces, Beastly Places’, 15. 
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endeavours.  In Mr Allbones' Ferrets, there are several minor instances of this on the 
part of individual animals.  While Pitford is authoritatively examining a weka, it 
excretes over him.  A ferret runs up the trousers of Pitford’s grumpy carpenter and bites 
him, and another sprays Eugenia while she is trying to instruct Allbones.  Of course, 
these ‘animal actions’ are only subversive at the micro-level of the narrative; Farrell has 
imagined them and timed them to look subversive. However, the large-scale equivalents 
of these moments in the novel are historical.  Here, although they are still mediated by 
the text, Farrell is employing real rather than invented instances of animal subversion.   
 Eugenia’s nightingales provide one example of this.  She has brought a pair with 
her on the voyage in the hope that they will populate the New Zealand bush, ‘for she 
simply could not imagine a country devoid of the nightingale’s song, no matter how 
charming the songs of its native species’ (157).  She says,
 I know that, scientifically, birdsong is nothing more than an expression of 
 territorial possessiveness or an attempt to attract a mate… but I cannot resist the 
 conviction that the call of a nightingale is much to be preferred to any dreary 
 piano sonata.  (157)   
This expression of aesthetic partiality seems more consistent with Samuel Taylor 
Coleridge’s estimation of nightingales than with Eugenia’s earlier claims of tone-
deafness and scientific objectivity.
63
  It shows that Eugenia does have appreciation for 
beauty after all; however, especially given that she has already erased the song of one 
New Zealand’s native birds, it is clear that her preference is for the European.  As she 
has said to Allbones, Eugenia is also of the opinion that nature will display similar 
preferences.  Certainly, ‘Blackbirds thrive here, and thrushes.  And the house sparrows 
released by mistake for hedge sparrows in Lyttelton have produced a mighty progeny 
that infest farms the length and breadth of the country and must be poisoned’ (214).  But 
as the narrator asserts, ‘Nature’s laws are all-powerful.  Her clever monkeys cannot 
anticipate how new organisms will conduct themselves once released into a strange 
environment’ (214). King observes that ‘A surprising proportion of attempted 
63 The speaker of one of his poems similarly describes their singing as music: ‘choral minstrelsy, / As if 
some sudden gale had swept at once/ A hundred airy harps!’ (vv80-82). Samuel Taylor Coleridge, ‘The 
Nightingale,’ 1798, in Samuel Taylor Coleridge: The Major Works, ed. H.H. Jackson (1985, repr., Oxford 
and New York: Oxford University Press, 2000), 101. 
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introductions failed. Only 36 species of exotic birds are now established, of 130 … and 
33 species of mammals, of 51’.
64
 Eugenia is wrong, then, to assume that that natural 
selection always favours European species.  The introduction of nightingales to New 
Zealand was tried in reality, but without success; in 1900, F.W. Hutton observed that 
there was inadequate insect life to sustain nightingales in the New Zealand winter, but 
he believed that instinct was the main barrier to introducing migratory birds.
65
  In Mr
Allbones' Ferrets, Eugenia’s nightingales ‘stay only for that summer.  And in the 
autumn they fly south … seeking in the wide and empty reaches of the Pacific the warm 
breeding grounds of Africa’ (214).  Thus, even though the nightingales do not benefit 
themselves at all, Eugenia’s Eurocentric project is nevertheless undermined by their 
actions. The same is true of the much larger project of the introduction of mustelids to 
New Zealand.
  Here, the fact that she is re-presenting historical events allows Farrell to take an 
indirect approach.  She can assume that at least some of her readers will have some idea 
that mustelids caused extinctions, and she represents this obliquely via a short passage 
giving the impressions of Pinky:
 Her pink nose whiffles as she smells the sweet deep soil of her new home.  She 
 smells feathers and flesh and warm blood.  She hears thousands upon thousands 
 of birds singing songs new to her: korimako and tui.  Piopio, miromiro, matata, 
 hihi, kakariki, kaka and unsuspecting huia…  She sniffs and presses her lithe and 
 perfect body against the cage, eager for release.  Not long now. (213)
This passage underscores Pinky’s growing power: she is no longer mediated by 
Allbones as the moment approaches when she will be released and move outside human 
control.  The references to her perception of the bird life all around her, meanwhile, 
point to the extinctions that will result.  However, the passage also raises certain 
problems.  One is that the narrative purports to enter into the being of an animal. As 
64 King, Immigrant Killers, 65. 
65 Hutton concludes: 
 It is the same with all insect-eating birds—like nightingales, which cannot support themselves in 
 the winter in the absence of insect life… But, in my opinion, it is idle to attempt to introduce into 
 New Zealand any bird that has inherited strong migratory instincts… So, I am afraid, it always 
 will be, and attempts to introduce migratory birds into New Zealand will always end in failure. 
Hutton, F.W., ‘Our Migratory Birds,’ Transactions and Proceedings of the Royal Society of New Zealand 
1868-1961 33 (1900): 264. http://rsnz.natlib.govt.nz/volume/rsnz_33/rsnz_33_00_006270.html.   
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Thomas Nagel has famously argued, humans can assume that other creatures have 
experience, but we cannot imagine what it is like to be another animal. He writes, ‘I 
want to know what it is like for a bat to be a bat. Yet if I try to imagine this, I am 
restricted to the resources of my own mind, and those resources are inadequate to the 
task’.
66
  Elizabeth Costello makes the opposite argument in Coetzee’s The Lives of 
Animals: she claims that if, as a writer, ‘I can think my way into the existence of a being 
who has never existed, then, I can think my way into the existence of a bat or a 
chimpanzee or an oyster’.
67
 However, Costello is eliding the difference between a 
fictional character and a real animal, and given the possible authorial distance from her 
here, Coetzee may not be dismissing Nagel’s argument.  Pinky, of course, is a fictional 
character, but suddenly to enter into her impressions seems contradictory in the context 
of a novel which in part concerns the limits to humans’ understanding of animals.  A 
second potential problem with this passage is that Pinky is made to stand for all of the 
introduced mustelids.  This reduces species to the level of the individual, an approach 
that Greg Garrard warns against: ‘Writing extinction involves not simply the problem of 
representing absence, but also the difficulty of narrating ongoing systemic crises within 
intrinsically individualising forms such as the travelogue and the novel’.
68
  Farrell’s 
only negotiation of this consists in relying (arguably too heavily) on her readers’ 
knowledge of the history which she is re-presenting; having alluded to it via Pinky’s 
impressions, she stops short of narrating extinction at all.  To represent it, Farrell would 
have to either continue the unmediated representation of Pinky and of other mustelids, 
or cover or skip some years until the human characters themselves could become aware
that mustelids were having minimal impact on rabbits and a highly adverse affect on 
birds.
individual level, and the latter would alter the nature of the novel’s ironic distance from 
69
 Either tactic would mean reducing the representation of extinction to the 
66 Thomas Nagel, ‘What is it like to be a bat?’ The Philosophical Review, 83, 4 (1974): 439. 
67 J.M. Coetzee, The Lives of Animals, ed. Amy Gutmann (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 
1999), 35. 
68 Greg Garrard, Ecocriticism (London: Routledge, 2004), 157-58. 
69 They certainly might live to realise this.  Carolyn King explains that ‘Within six years came the first 
reports of weasels and stoats spreading into forests far from their release sites and of dramatic declines in 
native birds in the forests of Westland and Fjordland’.  ‘By the turn of the century, even their former 
supporters could see that the passage-paid overseas experts were no match for the rabbits’. Carolyn King, 
Immigrant Killers, 88. 
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the characters.  Instead, extinction is only approached directly in the historical note
which explains: 
,
Hundreds of stoats, weasels and ferrets were imported from Britain at great 
 expense and effort and released into New Zealand’s fragile environment, whose 
 bird species – many of them flightless – were already in retreat… The result has 
 been a record of extinctions of bird species without equal anywhere in the 
 world. (217)
This method allows Farrell to point out the extent of the mustelids’ disruption of human 
manipulation without trying to fictionalise it at all.  She leaves the interpretation of 
events to the readers themselves. 
 Because mustelids’ deviation from human plans for them in New Zealand is an 
historical and not an invented scenario, some readers will already have knowledge of it 
or perhaps of a parallel one. For readers in this position, their knowledge means that 
they always participate in the novel’s ironic view of the colonial past.  Because most of 
the information about extinction is given after the text, and because this information is 
not extensive, there seems to be an assumption that the majority of readers know 
something about this.  However, readers in this privileged position of participation are 
therefore unsurprised and unchallenged by the mustelids’ actions.  Indeed, by satirising 
mistakes with which these readers are already familiar, the novel might, 
counterproductively, foster a degree of complacency, even though this is obviously not 
Farrell’s intention.  It might be argued, indeed, that the experience of those readers who 
do not have good knowledge of mustelids’ impact in New Zealand, a position apparently 
less anticipated by the narrative, is more conducive to the lesson which it seeks to 
convey.  These readers are initially placed in much greater proximity to the novel’s 
characters.  Only going beyond Allbones’ knowledge in the final chapter and historical 
note, they might apprehend the novel’s lesson in much more immediate terms, 
permitting less complacency and more humility with regard to human-animal relations 
in general. 
 Nevertheless, Farrell’s intended message is clear.  For readers in either position, 
Mr Allbones' Ferrets emphasises, first through the manifestations of humans’ own 
animality, and then through the disruption of imperialistic scientific endeavours by 
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animals themselves, that the humans remain subject to nature, and that nature is not 
subject to them.  Those characters who, like Eugenia, attempt to manipulate nature by 
redistributing other species are apparently thwarted by the unexpected actions of 
animals, while the more humble positions taken by others, like Allbones, are vindicated.
The one character whose position remains ambiguous is Pitford. But even if he is 
corrupt, and therefore not disappointed by the mass extinctions occasioned by the 
mustelids in New Zealand, he is at least condemned by hindsight, as the novel echoes 
Guthrie-Smith’s description of the so-called natural solution as responding to a blunder 
by a crime.
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Conclusion
In presenting a narrative concerning the colonial introduction of mustelids to New 
Zealand, Mr Allbones' Ferrets foregrounds the interrelationship between nineteenth-
century imperialism and science, and presents the humanism that united them as an 
object of both condemnation and satire. The novel thus connects two major issues for 
white postcolonial cultures: colonial history and conservation. For white postcolonial 
people who are descended from colonial settlers, their history can carry with it a certain 
burden of guilt about the colonisation of first peoples, varying according to the context. 
However, whether as a way of bypassing or deflecting this kind of guilt or as a reminder 
that it extends still further, Mr Allbones' Ferrets concentrates on showing how European 
settlement colonised animals. In doing so, the novel elides the usual understanding of 
colonisation, yet the colonisation of animals is not a metaphor: the arrival of European 
humans and other animals displaced, threatened and in some cases annihilated species 
native to the areas they settled.  In this way, while the novel constitutes the kind of 
postcolonial interrogation of history that Lydia Wevers describes, it provides a 
specifically animal-oriented version of this trend: the shameful yet shared history it 
explores is a history of species relations. Mr Allbones' Ferrets thus suggests that white 
postcolonial cultures must inherit the sort of responsibilities towards animals that the 
nineteenth-century Allbones feels, because he has interfered with them. This is 
particularly pertinent in that the novel appears at a time when a new ‘natural solution’ to 
rabbits has recently been introduced to New Zealand.  Since they became established, 
70 Guthrie-Smith, Tutira, 334. 
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the danger has always been that attempts to manage rabbits might threaten native 
animals.  This danger was acknowledged when, in the late 1990s, the New Zealand 
Ministry of Health chose not to authorise the introduction of RHD, or rabbit 
haemorrhagic disease (then known as RCD or rabbit calicivirus disease).  It was then 
deliberately imported by desperate farmers, in an illegal echo of the events of 1884.
RHD was not transmitted to native birds, as was first feared, but has been a problematic 
introduction: it is regarded as an inhumane means of killing rabbits, and it has been only 
partially successful in containing their populations. To the extent that it has, that very 
success has sometimes made the ongoing presence of mustelids an increased threat to 
birds, as their alternative prey diminishes.
71
Mr Allbones' Ferrets thus re-examines the 
origins of what is an ongoing problem in New Zealand, and implies that the negotiation 
of past mistakes needs to be performed with caution and not the arrogance with which 
they were committed.  In doing so, the novel also connects its white postcolonial 
concerns with larger contemporary issues to do with environmentalism and 
conservation.  The novel’s message resonates with David Owen’s point, expressed with 
regard to the fate of the Tasmanian tiger, that ‘Extinction has always been integral to the 
life process, but when … it is both manifestly unnatural and recent, it becomes our 
ineluctable duty to learn from the experience’.
72
 In these respects, the novel’s challenge to humanism takes the form of criticism 
and blame.  The prioritisation of the interests of the European and the human in 
particular are presented as the causes of multiple extinctions of bird species in New 
Zealand.  However, the novel also represents humans and animals in ways which 
directly undermine the assumptions on which such humanist privileging is based. 
Through the ironic depiction of its colonial scientist characters, Farrell emphasises that 
humans are ‘subject to nature’, in the form of ‘natural’ vulnerabilities, sexual desires 
and reproductive processes.  Moreover, their apparent failure to predict the animals’ 
response to their new setting similarly contradicts humanist ideas about the superiority 
of the rationalist and the European, and the assumption that humans can render history a 
71 See for instance John Haselmayer and Ian G. Jamieson, ‘Increased Predation on Pukeko Eggs after the 
Application of Rabbit Control Measures,’ New Zealand Journal of Ecology 25,1 (2001): 89-93. 
http://www.nzes.org.nz/nzje/free_issues/NZJEcol25_1_89.pdf 
72 Owen, Thylacine, 25. 
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narrative of their own progress.  Instead, animals’ resistance demonstrates that nature’s 
power has not, after all, been tamed by human science at all.  Thus, animals contribute 
to the novel’s creation of ironic distance from the colonial heritage of imperialism and 
anthropocentrism against which white postcolonial cultures in the present seek to define 
themselves.   
 In these two ways, Mr Allbones' Ferrets emphasises the species dimension of 
colonial imperialism and presents animals as participating in a resistance to humanism.  
Both of these themes also feature to varying extents in the novels treated in the 
remainder of this thesis.  Julia Leigh’s The Hunter displays a similar consciousness of 
the colonisation of animals which gives the issue of conservation an added pertinence 
within these contexts, while Margaret Atwood’s Oryx and Crake presents animals, 
again, as resisting human manipulation.  Both novels also emphasise the dangers of 
repeating past mistakes, exploring these through their different temporal settings, in 
ways that suggest a shared fear of the continued exacerbation of the sorts of cultural and 
species exploitations depicted in Farrell’s novel.
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4. What his ancestors have always done: repeating history in The Hunter
In the previous chapter, I discussed the representation of human-animal relations in an 
historical context in Mr Allbones' Ferrets, where, I suggested, the depiction of colonial 
science as colonising animals and animals’ unexpected responses combine to offer an anti-
humanist warning against repeating past mistakes.  Continuing the chronological discussion 
of this section of the thesis, this chapter explores how similar ideas about the history of 
human-animal relations are represented within a contemporary context in Julia Leigh’s The
Hunter (1999).
1
  This novel connects postcolonial and species issues in a similar way to Mr
Allbones' Ferrets, emphasising the relationship between the pursuit of international power and 
the destruction of rare animal species, in this case that of the Tasmanian tiger or thylacine, 
which has not been seen since the 1930s.  However, Leigh brings its extinction into the 
present,
2
 so that it becomes informed by contemporary influences on human-animal relations.  
I suggest that these influences take the form of the two contrasting versions of posthumanism 
set out in my introduction: technological and species posthumanism.  However, technological 
posthumanism in this novel is not presented positively.  The imperialism and natural science 
that are the cause of bird extinctions in New Zealand, and were the cause of the extinction of 
thylacines in the early twentieth century, have evolved in the contemporary setting of The
Hunter into globalisation and technology, both represented by international biotechnology 
company that sends a man called ‘M’ to hunt the last thylacine.
3
  In the biotechnology 
company, I suggest, humans’ interrelationship with technology may blur the boundaries of the 
figure of the humanist subject, but does not otherwise undermine it; rather, it perpetuates it 
through technohumanism.  Indeed, in individual terms, technology empowers M in his desire 
1 Julia Leigh, The Hunter (1999; repr., London: Faber and Faber, 2000). 
2 The novel’s action could also be understood to take place in the near future.  References to a biological arms 
race and reliable cloning techniques suggest advances on present science (40, 166).  However, the secrecy and 
power of the corporations involved might explain their possession of otherwise unknown technology, and no 
other details suggest the action is anything other than contemporaneous with the time of writing. 
3 The codename M is never explained, but the fact that he has a codename at all underscores that he is a secret 
agent.  The choice of letter also emphasises this point, being that used by the head of the SIS in Ian Fleming’s 
James Bond fiction. (Fleming took this idea from the ‘C’ used by the real chiefs of the SIS, ever since its first 
chief, Mansfield Smith-Cumming, used his initial as his mark. M is first introduced in Ian Fleming, Casino 
Royale (London: Jonathan Cape, 1953)).  The letter also resonates with a 1931 Fritz Lang film entitled M, in 
which it is used to mark the coat of a serial killer to identify him as the ‘murderer’.  M, dir. Fritz Lang 
(Vereinigte Star-Film GmbH: 1931; Paramount: 1933).  This meaning might be considered appropriate to The 
Hunter given the protagonist’s relation to animals.  A third possibility, suggested by ecofeminist elements in the 
novel and perhaps also the anti-humanist tone drawn out in my argument, is that ‘M’ is for ‘Man’.  
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to contribute to history as he views it, as one long narrative of human mastery.  Thus, the 
combined globalising and technohumanist values represented by the company and its agent 
are such that postcolonial Australians and native animals can be seen to have a common 
enemy.  However, this does not result in a productive alliance, because both are presented as 
having limited agency to resist.  Set against M and the biotechnology company are 
environmentalist characters who are deep ecologists: their philosophy is a quasi-spiritual 
interpretation of what I am calling species posthumanism: they understand life and the history 
of life (human and nonhuman) as part of a cycle of energy and matter.  However, they are 
presented as having minimal agency in terms of human-animal relations.  M’s intended 
relation to the thylacine is more challenged by a redirection of what I term his ‘hunterly 
empathy’ towards positive relationships with his host, Lucy Armstrong, and her children, but 
an accident sees him return to his hunt and kill his prey after all.  Ultimately, then, The Hunter
engages with history in such a way as to question whether, given a second chance in a 
contemporary context, the history of human-thylacine relations would play out any 
differently. It does not contradict M’s view of history, but it presents the results of accepting 
or promoting such a view as catastrophic.   
History contemporised 
Since the death of the last captive thylacine in Tasmania’s Beaumaris Zoo in 1936, no 
conclusive proof of the species’ survival has been recorded, and the general consensus is that 
it is extinct.
4
  The story of this extinction is understood to begin with European settlement.  
Thylacines were, of course, familiar to Aborigines, and more popular with some than with 
others.  A positive Aboriginal view of thylacines is conveyed by the legend of ‘Corinna, the 
brave one’, in which a thylacine pup earns his stripes (literally) by rescuing a spirit boy, 
Palana, from a kangaroo.
5
  Historian Robert Paddle notes that while travelling in the 1830s, 
the preacher George Augustus Robinson found that ‘while some Tasmanian Aboriginal 
groups ate thylacines, other groups and individuals revered the species and refused to do so’.
4 Robert Paddle considers that this animal was the last; David Quammen supposes that some wild thylacines may 
have outlasted it for a short time.  Robert Paddle, The Last Tasmanian Tiger (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2000), 1. David Quammen, Song of the Dodo: Island Biogeography in an Age of Extinction (London: 
Hutchinson, 1996), 286. 
5 Jackson Cotton, Touch the Morning: Tasmanian Native Legends (Hobart, OBM, 1979), cited in David Owen, 
Thylacine: The Tragic Tale of the Tasmanian Tiger (Crows Nest: Allen and Unwin, 2003), 59-61. 
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Paddle concludes that ‘In similar manner to European attitudes to the thylacine, different 
Aboriginal groups had different perspectives on the value, importance, use and nature of the 
animal’.
6
  However, as Eric Guiler observes,
 In Tasmania thylacines and Aborigines lived together into modern times, and since 
 neither dogs and/or dingoes nor Aborigines can be held responsible for the decline 
 and diminution of the thylacine in Tasmania, here we have to look at the activities of 
 whites.
7
Indeed, thylacines were present in Tasmania even after thousands of years of coexistence with 
Aborigines, but survived for less than 150 years after European settlement began at the start 
of the nineteenth century.
 From a European perspective, thylacines were exotic, being both geographically foreign 
and very unusual, especially in terms of the taxonomic naturalism then in vogue.  As well as 
being marsupials, their appearance suggested an intermingling of different species categories: 
their heads and bodies resembled those of dogs, while the dark stripes against their pale gold 
coats recalled the markings of feline tigers.  This appears to have resulted in considerable 
confusion.  English names for them included ‘Tasmanian wolf, marsupial wolf, zebra 
opossum, dog-headed opossum, opossum hyena, striped wolf’,
8
 and of course, tiger or 
Tasmanian tiger.  Thus, thylacines were understandably seen as something of a marvel, both 
by scientists and by the general European public.  Paddle writes that ‘there is a wealth of 
hitherto neglected nineteenth-century comment on the species, indicative of its having had a 
high profile amongst Tasmania’s naturalists and scientists at this period’.
9
  The result was 
that, like the New Zealand birds discussed in the previous chapter, thylacines were very much 
in demand for living and preserved natural historical collections, undoubtedly with 
considerable detriment to the survival of the species.  There was demand both within 
Australia and internationally.  Owen writes that ‘Thylacines were shipped to zoos in Antwerp, 
Berlin, Cologne, New York, Washington, and, mostly, London…  They were keenly sought 
… particularly when extinction warnings began to be made and it was also realised that they 
6 Paddle, The Last Tasmanian Tiger, 20. 
7 Eric Guiler, Thylacine: The Tragedy of the Tasmanian Tiger (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1985), 14. 
8 Quammen, Song of the Dodo, 282. 
9 Paddle, The Last Tasmanian Tiger, 219 
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did not breed in captivity’.
10
  By 2006, the International Thylacine Specimen Database 
directed by Stephen Sleightholme had found 714 specimens in 101 museum, university and 
private collections internationally.  Sleightholme writes, ‘This total represents an estimated 
body count of four hundred wild thylacines as in the majority of cases several specimens were 
normally taken from the same animal’.
11
 Despite all this fascination with thylacines, however, they were accorded little practical 
protection.  As I have noted previously, exoticisation of any description is an inherently 
‘othering’ attitude, and not necessarily conducive to sympathy.  In Tasmania, it fuelled dislike 
and fear of thylacines when they appeared to come into conflict with colonisers, and they 
began to be seen as monsters in the most negative sense.  European settlers sought to 
appropriate Tasmania’s resources for the purposes of agriculture and this encroached upon 
thylacines’ habitat and brought foreign livestock into proximity with them.  Although, 
according to Owen, ‘the thylacine as a specialist predator would have an overwhelming 
natural preference for native prey’,
12
 their occasional interest in sheep caused them to become 
scapegoats.  Biogeographer David Quammen explains: 
 domestic dogs brought ashore from British ships had gone feral in Tasmania, and  those 
 rampaging wild dogs were themselves killing quite a few sheep.  Sheep were also being 
 stolen, presumably by bushrangers, the runaway convicts who lived off the land.  But 
 the thylacine, an alien-seeming creature (though in ecological terms it was native and 
 the sheep were alien), made a more satisfactory object of loathing and dread…
 Thylacines took blame for killings they did commit and for many they didn’t.
13
Thylacines’ exotic qualities and the related confusion surrounding them now facilitated their 
representation as aberrational and malevolent.  In The Hunter, M shows in an imagined 
address to the thylacine (a habit that I explore below) that he is aware of the exaggerated 
reputation of thylacines:
 You were the farmer’s scourge, and your reputation went ahead of you: they said you 
 roamed the country in yellow-eyed packs, padded through the night with bristling  hair 
 and drooling jaws agape, killing at will.  Young women were afraid to go for afternoon 
10 Owen, Thylacine, 109 
11 Sleightholme, Stephen. ‘The International Thylacine Specimen Database’ 
http://www.naturalworlds.org/thylacine/morefeatures/itsd/itsd_1.htm. 
12  Owen, Thylacine, 10-11. 
13 Quammen, Song of the Dodo, 383. 
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 strolls in case they crossed your path.  You’d drag babies out of their frilly cots and wolf 
 down frilly girls whole… no wonder… the government of the day offered a one-pound 
 bounty for your hide.  (47-48) 
This characterisation of thylacines, which reads like something out of a European fairytale, 
accords with Owen’s observation that the names for thylacines affected settlers’ 
understandings of them.  He writes, ‘Colonial experience of, for example, Bengal tigers, 
meant stealth, ferocity, cunning, near-invisibility, powerful swimming, nocturnalism, 
awesome strength and, from time to time, man-eating’.  Similarly, ‘although there is no link to 
the canid family, the thylacine suffered through its perceived association with Canis lupus, the 
grey wolf of the Northern Hemisphere’.
14
  The demonization of thylacines is both an instance 
of the unreliability of popular history, and of the practical ramifications that human 
(mis)representations of animals can have.  Farmers’ accusations resulted in the establishment 
of various bounties on thylacines, including progressive ones,
15
 without, according to Guiler, 
any investigation into the claims being made.
16
  Hunting alone probably does not account for 
the extinction of the species, for as Guiler observes, ‘If thylacines had been hunted to 
extinction …it would be logical to expect the animals to disappear first from the places where 
they had been most vigorously hunted … but this did not take place’.
17
  However, Paddle’s 
four possible causes of the species’ extinction are all associated with European colonisation: 
besides hunting, he lists disease (probably introduced),
18
 the destruction of the original 
environment and of native prey species, and the introduction of other carnivores.  What this 
list implies is that one way or another, colonisation brought about thylacines’ extinction.
 Of course, efforts were made to protect the species.  Paddle explains that concern was 
already being expressed in the nineteenth century, especially once the bounty came into force, 
14 Owen, Thylacine, 9, 10. 
15 Under the progressive bounty system, the more animals the hunter killed, the greater the reward. Quammen 
explains that this ensured the depletion of the species because it compensated for the increasing effort needed to 
find thylacines as they became rarer. Quammen, Song of the Dodo, 283.    
16 Guiler writes, ‘The decision was based upon wildly exaggerated claims which in reality covered up bad 
farming practice.  No attempt was made to check the veracity of the claims, nor was any effort made to ascertain 
the numbers of thylacines doing the damage’ . Guiler, Thylacine, 21. 
17 Guiler, Thylacine, 26-27. 
18 Paddle explains that ‘An epidemic disease passed through the thylacine population at the end of the nineteenth 
century,’ but guesses that ‘the disease was episodic and debilitating, without necessarily being fatal’.  He writes,  
 While the origins of the epidemic disease are unknown, it would appear far more likely to have arrived 
 as an invasive micro-organism from the wealth of foreign species, deliberately and accidentally 
 introduced into Australia by Europeans, rather than a chance introduction from a migratory bird or bat. 
Paddle, The Last Tasmanian Tiger, 202, 203. 
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and ‘During the first twenty years of the twentieth century broad environmental concerns 
surfaced in Tasmanian public debate’.
19
  He observes that scientists were increasingly 
advocating the protection of thylacines, as there was growing evidence of its decline.  Both 
Paddle and Guiler, in his self-published account of the Animals and Birds Protection Board, 
regard Clive E. Lord, Director of the Tasmanian Museum and secretary of the Tasmanian 
Advisory Committee re Native Fauna, as one of the most successful advocates of the 
thylacine’s conservation.
20
  Paddle explains that Lord recommended its total protection in a 
letter to his cousin J.E.C. Lord, chairperson of the committee, who responded by consulting 
the Tasmanian police about the status of the species.  However, despite little evidence of 
thylacines’ presence, their protection was not recommended.
21
 In 1928, both cousins, together 
with Arthur Reid, who was trying to breed thylacines at Hobart Zoo, attended a 
Commonwealth Fauna Conference at which a subcommittee was appointed to list endangered 
species needing total protection. However, although ‘all three Tasmanian representatives at 
the conference in 1928 were personally and professionally committed to the immediate total 
protection of the thylacine’, there was not enough time to address mammals at all. In the same 
year, the Tasmanian government evaded the Native Fauna Advisory Committee’s request that 
the thylacine be placed on the protected list by dissolving the committee altogether and 
replacing it with the Tasmanian Animals and Birds’ Protection Board which represented 
hunting and agricultural interests.  Clive Lord eventually persuaded this new Board to grant 
thylacines partial protection during the month of December.  However, Guiler writes, ‘This 
was totally inadequate as by now it was too late to have any effect and few were being 
captured for export’.  Finally, Joseph Pearson ‘successfully moved their total protection which 
was gazetted on 14 July 1936’.
22
  Paddle, who assumes the thylacine in Beaumaris Zoo was 
the last, comments, ‘Unequivocally, the species was totally protected for the last fifty-nine 
days of its existence’.
 One of the explanations offered for their extinction was that thylacines were a primitive 
species, always destined to die out.  Paddle explains that they were characterised as ‘an 
19 Paddle, The Last Tasmanian Tiger, 169. 
20 Eric Guiler, The Enthusiastic Amateurs: The Animals and Birds Protection Board 1929-1971 (Sandy Bay: 
published by the author, 1999). 
21 Paddle, The Last Tasmanian Tiger, 176-77 
22 Guiler, The Enthusiastic Amateurs, 180, 74 
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evolutionary experiment in every way inferior to placental mammals’, an idea supported by 
the fact that in Europe, marsupials could only be found in fossil form.  Theorists reasoned: 
 direct competition between placental and marsupial mammals … was bound to be 
 won by the higher European mammals, the Placentalia…  The process of colonisation 
 could readily be seen as … likely to have but one conclusion: the eventual  replacement 
 and extinction of out-moded species by superior placental types.
23
This view is very similar to the imperialistic opinion expressed by Eugenia, in Mr Allbones' 
Ferrets, that animal introductions to New Zealand simply advanced natural selection.  
‘Primitivisation’ was also being used to justify human-human relations.  Lyndall Ryan notes 
that the supposed extinction of the Tasmanian Aborigines ‘became a source of grim 
celebration which accorded with another equally pervasive nineteenth century myth, namely, 
that the Aborigines as a people were inevitably doomed to extinction’.  Ryan explains that the 
theory at the beginning of the twentieth century was that ‘they were low on the scale of 
humanity, with such a primitive technology that they had no means to contain or withstand or 
even adjust to invasion from a technologically superior group’.  She adds, ‘More recently this 
view has been enlarged to the belief that as a result of ten thousand years of isolation…, by 
1800 the Tasmanians were suffering from “slow strangulation of the mind” and would have 
died out anyway’.
24
  L. Lloyd Robson and Michael Roe explain that in fact, the Tasmanian 
Aborigines were induced to trust George Augustus Robinson and were sent to Flinders Island, 
which they describe as ‘a sort of concentration camp where most of them perished’.  They 
conclude that
 the Aborigines were victims of government indifference and confusion of aims.  As 
 well, the ravages of pulmonary diseases reduced their numbers so much that by 1837 
 there were probably not enough left to recover and establish a population on their own.
25
 In The Hunter, the similarities between the colonisation of thylacines and of Tasmanian 
Aborigines are made explicit.  M finds ‘a ring of blackened stones and he imagines that they 
might have been laid by the local Aboriginal people, in the years before, they, the full-bloods, 
were almost driven to extinction’(57).  He then immediately observes that 
23 Paddle, The Last Tasmanian Tiger, 184, 207. 
24 Lyndall Ryan, The Aboriginal Tasmanians (St. Leonards: Allen & Unwin, 1996), 1, 2.  
25 L. Lloyd Robson and Michael Roe, A Short History of Tasmania ( Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 1997), 
12, 13, 34. 
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 the government had once tried to make another island, De Witt, an Aboriginal sanctuary 
 – anything to redress their embarrassing demise.  It was a tiny and forbidding rock of a 
 place, shunned by all.  And, naturally, the experiment failed.  Then in 1936 … it was 
 again suggested that De Witt Island could be put to use – any tigers to be rounded up 
 and sent away.  (57) 
In practice, no more thylacines were ever found to send there.  However, like the Aboriginal 
‘sanctuaries’ on Flinders and De Witt Islands, a thylacine one on De Witt would entail no 
sacrifice on the part of new settlers (who had occasioned the threat): on the contrary, the 
island was a place where no one wanted to live.  Guiler describes De Witt as ‘a miserable 
place … which has no suitable habitat and very little prey for thylacines’.  The inadequacies 
of such islands as sanctuaries, human or animal, suggest that they might really have been 
oubliettes, in which ‘primitive’ native groups, supposedly destined for extinction, might be 
put out of the way until they met with it.     
 Despite the disappearance of thylacines, Eric Guiler writes in the conclusion to his book, 
‘at all times and in spite of many dissenters I assume that the thylacine still exists’.
26
  This 
remote possibility forms the central premise of The Hunter: in the novel, the species has 
survived out of the sight of humans, slowly dwindling until apparently only one, a female, 
remains.  This constitutes a fictional re-presentation of history, both in the sense of retelling 
exemplified by Mr Allbones' Ferrets and in the sense that Leigh resituates an historical event 
in the present.  The effects of this resonate with Lydia Wevers’ observation that the 
incorporation of historical detail into fiction has the ‘effect of validating the novel’s claim to 
truth by palpably connecting it to truths’.
27
  In The Hunter, the narrative’s appearance of 
flowing out of accepted history certainly contributes to its verisimilitude; it is not quite
impossible.  Indeed, the survival of thylacines, undetected for decades, foregrounds the 
limitations of human knowledge and therefore of accepted history.  In these respects, the 
novel makes similar points to Mr Allbones' Ferrets.  However, M’s view that ‘there is always 
new history to be made’ (37) suggests a belief that in causing extinctions for the 
biotechnology company, he personally shapes history.  Because he proceeds to achieve this, 
26 Guiler, Thylacine, 30, 185. 
27 Lydia Wevers. ‘The Fact of the Matter: History, Narrative and Record in The Singing Whakapapa and 
Tasman's Lay,’ The Literary Criterion 33,1(1998), 49. 
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The Hunter does not provide a more optimistic version of events than the historical record; on 
the contrary, it resituates them only to repeat them.   
 The re-presentation of the thylacine’s extinction foregrounds the continued relevance of 
imperialism and science to contemporary human-animal relations, and the survival of the 
relative power relations of those discourses.  Here, like Disgrace and Mr Allbones' Ferrets,
The Hunter stages a struggle between the rationalist and the compassionate.  On one side of 
this struggle, the humanist attempt to master nature and the imperialistic desire for 
international conquest persist in contemporary versions, despite the emergence of 
posthumanist ideas and Australia’s increasing independence from the British Empire since the 
disappearance of thylacines.  In The Hunter, technological posthumanism (in which humans 
are seen as interrelated with technology) results, as N. Katherine Hayles warns that it can, in 
technohumanism, in which humanist subjectivity is prolonged by technology.  Even if this 
does not mean literally downloading human consciousness into a computer as in Hayles’s 
example from Moravec,
28
 technology serves to confirm M’s belief in human superiority and 
to empower him in his exploitations of other animals.  Imperialism also survives here in that 
M’s task is connected to globalisation. Although he rejects the view that ‘globalization is 
simply recolonization’, Bill Ashcroft argues that because both globalisation and Western 
imperialism are ‘grounded in systems of domination that emerged from, and characterize, 
European modernity’, ‘Globalization is the radical transformation of imperialism, continually 
reconstituted’.
29
  In The Hunter, anthropocentrism, globalisation and technology are united in 
M’s work for the biotechnology company.
 M himself has the advantages of the latest high-tech equipment, including guns and 
titanium traps custom-made to his own design (56).  He also has plastic ‘superskin’ to protect 
his heels from blisters (33), and a night vision headset, which so changes his vision that ‘he … 
might even be a star-creature himself, with alien eyes’ (51).  Thus, technology physically 
improves the human body not just in terms of weaponry but also resilience and perception.
Indeed, the last image of M as a ‘star-creature’ might be read as an example of 
technohumanism, in that the technology affects at least M’s perceptions of the boundaries of 
28 N. Katherine Hayles, How We Became Posthuman: Virtual Bodies in Cybernetics, Literature and Informatics.
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1999), 287. 
29 Bill Ashcroft, Post-colonial Transformation (London and New York: Routledge, 2001), 208, 213. 
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his humanity, yet by enhancing rather than undermining his sense of superiority to other 
species and potentially advancing the anthropocentric purpose of his hunt. 
 Indeed, the company’s relation to other species matches Val Plumwood’s definition of 
‘instrumentalism with respect to nature’ as ‘use of an earth other which treats it as … one 
whose being creates no limits on use and which can be entirely shaped to ends not its own’.
30
The biotechnology company echoes the destructive desire on the part of international 
scientists to possess specimens of rare animals, not regardless of but because of their rarity, 
like Pitford in Mr Allbones' Ferrets and like the collectors of thylacines described by Owens.  
However, the biotechnology company seems even more instrumentalist in that it does not 
even appear to regard its acquisitions with fascination: they are no more than resources.  M 
reflects, ‘Inbred thylacine, dodo, moa, mammoth, bunyip, yeti …mutations all, this was now 
the stuff that dreams – and wars – were made of’ (50).  The company’s objective is to access 
rare animals’ genetic material to gain the upper hand in an international arms race.  
 [B]y studying one hair from a museum’s stuffed pup, the developers of biological 
 weapons were able to model a genetic picture of the thylacine, a picture so beautiful, 
 so heavenly, that it was declared capable of winning a thousand wars.  Whether it will 
 be a virus or antidote, M does not know, cannot know and does not want to know, but 
 there is no question the race is on to harvest the beast. (40) 
 In killing the thylacine, the company also ignores any other value that she might have.  
In terms of conservation, she might offer an invaluable resource; although The Hunter does
not include any reference it, the Thylacine Genome Project (1999-2005) sought to map and 
replicate the species’ genetic code, but had only fragmented ‘ancient DNA’ (from preserved 
specimens) to work with.  Genetic analyst Karen Firestone commented in an interview, ‘If 
someone found a living breathing thylacine… that would help a lot’.
31
  A living thylacine 
would also have considerable cultural value.  Even in its absence, the thylacine species is so 
significant that there are quarrels over its very image.  Owen describes an attempt by 
Aborigines in 2002 ‘to claim copyright over native animal images – particularly the thylacine, 
emu, platypus and kangaroo – as sacred symbols’.  He cites Rodney Dillon’s assertion that 
‘These native animals are part of our people and it is an insult the way they are being used … 
30 Val Plumwood, Feminism and the Mastery of Nature  (London: Routledge, 1993), 142. 
31 Karen Firestone, interview by Bryndis Snaebjörnsdóttir and Mark Wilson, Big Mouth (Glasgow: Tramway and 
Carlisle: Cumbria Institute of the Arts, 2004), 67. 
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They steal our land and they steal our animals and then use them as their signs’.
32
  If 
Aborigines regard this as an instance of ongoing domination, the appropriation of the last 
remaining thylacine by an international company would surely constitute a very serious theft.
For the biotechnology corporation, however, the value of the species’ survival is outweighed 
by the risk of enemy companies accessing the resources it represents; as M is well aware, he 
is both ‘sampler and ensurer of exclusivity’ (50).  Thus, in technologically enhancing the 
human, reducing the thylacine to a resource and disregarding other humans’ conservationist 
and local cultural values, M’s work for the biotechnology company illustrates the survival of 
anthropocentrism within technological posthumanism and of imperialism within 
globalisation.
33
  On the other side of the struggle over the thylacine are the environmentalists whom M 
meets while he is based with Lucy Armstrong.  They believe he is monitoring Tasmanian 
devils,
34
 and so never oppose him directly.  They arrive not because of the thylacine but for a 
folk festival, and even the two who stay to tag the thylacine for National Parks never realise 
that M is her enemy.  However, their objectives echo those of Clive Lord and his colleagues 
in the context of contemporary conflicts and philosophies, and they are therefore M’s 
ideological opponents.  They participate in campaigns against the construction of roads 
through Tasmania’s ancient-growth Tarkine Forest (10, 106),
35
 and later, two of them are 
employed to tag the thylacine for National Parks so that she can be monitored and protected.  
32  Owen, Thylacine, 166-67; Rodney Dillon, The Mercury, 31 January 2002, in Owen, 167. See also Andrew 
Probyn, ‘The roo is taboo, Australians told; Suit claims copyright on native animals,’ Herald Sun, 1 January 
2002, www.williams.edu/AnthSoc/native/rooemu.htm, and ‘Aborigines take roo, emu to court,’ The Australian,
30 January 2002, www.williams.edu/AnthSoc/native/rooemu.htm.  
33 Ironically, Leigh has also been accused of appropriating the local in writing The Hunter.  Owen notes,  
 particularly in Tasmania, Sydney-based Leigh’s use of the state was thought by some to be both gratuitous 
 and inaccurate…  It led to a debate, still unresolved, about the appropriation in fiction of a place with 
 which an author is but passingly familiar.   
Owen, Thylacine, 175-76. 
34 There is no specific reason given; this could be a reference to the outbreak of Devil Facial Tumour Disease, 
but that issue was not publicised until 2003.  See David Owen and David Pemberton, Tasmanian Devil: A 
Unique and Threatened Animal (London: The Natural History Museum, 2005). 
35 Owen explains that the plan was to build a road through the forest from Smithton to the mining town of 
Zeehan.  ‘Promoted by the government as a future tourist enhancement, it was dubbed by conservationists “the 
road to nowhere”.  Its opponents said it was being built solely in the interests of forestry and mining companies’. 
Owen, Thylacine, 159.  Construction of this road was completed in 1996, and another road threatened in 1997. 
This conflict was also associated with thylacines when ‘A direct action group, the Tarkine Tigers, came into 
existence … which took the thylacine as its symbol.’  Owen, Thylacine, 160.  See also World Wildlife Fund 
Australia, ‘Tarkine Conservation Timeline,’ http://wwf.org.au/ourwork/land/tarkinetimeline/; The Wilderness 
Society, ‘Tarkine Road to Nowhere.’http://www.wilderness.org.au/campaigns/forests/tasmania/tarkine/ 
19970914_mr/.  
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However, only Lucy Armstrong’s husband Jarrah seems to offer a positive model of 
environmentalism.  He apparently espoused an ecological version of what I am calling species 
posthumanism: a sentence in his book reads, ‘At a time when the planet is so overrun with 
man, is it really so unfeasible to question whose life is more …’ (108).  The missing word 
presumably has to do with value, suggesting that Jarrah saw humans not only as one species 
among many, but also as less important than other, less numerous species.  Jarrah is no longer 
around to model this, however. Foul play is a possibility: at the pub, M is told that ‘greenies’ 
are unwelcome, “unless you want to join your mate Jarrah” (63); alternatively, the 
biotechnology company may have eliminated him, since it appears Jarrah was the one to make 
the confirmed sighting of the thylacine (according to his son Bike (78-79)).  His surviving 
friends also model alternatives to M’s anthropocentric relation to nature, but they seem to 
fulfil negative ‘greenie’ stereotypes in ways that ironically seem to hinder species 
posthumanism.
One such stereotype is the feminisation of environmentalism.  To some extent, the 
narrative of The Hunter perpetuates this gendering.  Plumwood observes that ecofeminist 
utopias are often imagined as ‘surviving against the hostile intent of men, who control a world 
of … military and technological might … where power … means domination of both nature 
and people’.
36
  From this perspective, M’s pursuit of the female thylacine for technological 
and military reasons makes him an ecofeminist villain.  This can also be seen as a rejection of 
the sexism of humanism’s privileging of the masculine in the construction and of course the 
designation of the figure of ‘man’.  However, the novel also appears to present ecofeminism 
as maintaining unhelpful binaries, impeding the repositioning of all humans in relation to 
nature (as advocated by Jarrah) by often failing to present positive alternatives to the 
destructive masculinity it indicts.  Even Plumwood, who states that her ecofeminism-derived 
‘relational selfhood’ is equally practicable by men, and acknowledges that the virtues of 
‘respect, sympathy, care, concern, compassion, gratitude, friendship and responsibility’ have 
36 Plumwood, Feminism and the Mastery of Nature, 7.  The thylacine’s female sex could also be read as a 
feminist revision of the popular belief that the last thylacine was a male called Benjamin, a point which Paddle 
has since drawn into question.  He suggests that perhaps ‘the reason for the ready acceptance of the Benjamin 
story lies in its resonance with patriarchal scientific assumptions’. Paddle, The Last Tasmanian Tiger, 201.  
Paddle’s book came out a year after The Hunter, but the gender of Leigh’s thylacine could still be read as a 
retelling of this accepted history. 
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been constructed as feminine,
37
 offers little discussion of how they are practiced by men.  
Leigh’s use of her environmentalist characters makes this point. In his role as caring father 
and naturalist, Jarrah exemplifies the sort of masculine connection to others that Plumwood 
means to promote, and to which even M might have been able to relate.  However, as Richard 
Kerridge suggests, the absent Jarrah ‘signifies the lost possibility of a different sort of 
masculinity to M’s’.
38
  Instead, a character called Free, a male heterosexual cross-dresser, 
seems to be a parody of the stereotype of the effeminate environmentalist which ecofeminist 
discourse can perpetuate.  M is disconcerted by this: ‘he falters when the front door opens and 
a berry-brown man in a green velvet dress walks out’ (103). This shows how the construction 
of environmentalism as feminine is alienating to some men and is thus counterproductive to 
its widespread adoption.
 Indeed, The Hunter is wary of contemporary environmentalist philosophies even where 
they are not gendered.  Although Jarrah’s view exemplifies what I am calling species 
posthumanism, the other environmentalists, like Free in his cross-dressing, seem more 
stereotypical.  During a fireside conversation, M overhears their interpretation of Jarrah’s 
idealism: 
 Jarrah Armstrong had it right: energy and matter, that’s what it’s all about.  No 
 beginnings and no ends…  Dust to dust, my fine friend, and dust is earth and earth is 
 beautiful, and the rest, the real thing, that goes on too. 
 Hallelujah, brother, yeah, I’m going to live forever…  (107) 
These characters, whom M calls ‘the immortals’, are expressing something very like the 
‘indistinguishability account’, in which, Plumwood explains, some deep ecologists embrace a 
cosmic view in which ‘the self is merged with the other’.  This would also amount to species 
posthumanism, if the blurring of boundaries between humans and other species is understood 
to contradict the humanist assumption that humans are a privileged species.  However, 
Plumwood points out that the indistinguishability account does not necessarily do this, 
because ‘The analysis of humans as metaphysically unified with the cosmic whole will be 
equally true whatever relation humans stand in with nature’.
39
The Hunter foregrounds this 
37 Plumwood, Feminism and the Mastery of Nature, 172-3.  
38 Richard Kerridge, ‘Narratives of Resignation: Environmentalism in Recent Fiction,’ in The Environmental 
Tradition in English Literature, ed. John Parham (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2002), 98. 
39 Plumwood, Feminism and the Mastery of Nature, 177, 177-8. 
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difficulty when M, on hearing the immortals, wonders, ‘If everything is transformed then 
what is extinction?’(107). According to the indistinguishability account, extinction might 
have no meaning.  Perhaps this explains why these ‘immortals’ seem so unconcerned to find 
the thylacine for National Parks; instead, they fulfil yet another stereotype: that of the 
ineffectual, drug-using environmentalist.  M finds them in the thylacine’s territory smoking 
marijuana and concludes that ‘they haven’t been searching for the tiger at all, and have 
instead been … doing the absolute minimum they can get away with’ (151). 
 In The Hunter, then, Leigh arguably uses the scenario of a surviving thylacine to 
demonstrate a lack of change in human attitudes to animals and conservation, the persistence 
of appropriative international attitudes to Australia and the failure of local resistance to them.  
Yet as Kerridge observes, ‘Because the environmentalist viewpoint is so crushingly absent 
from this narrative perspective, environmentalism has a paradoxical, implied emphasis, 
powerful as a ghostly presence but entirely thwarted and unspoken’.
40
  Indeed, I would 
suggest that the limitation of the third-person narrative to M’s perspective also functions as an 
instance of the postcolonial irony described by Linda Hutcheon, in which the ironist (the 
author) adopts a dominant voice in order to subvert it from within.
41
  In Disgrace, as Gayatri 
Spivak points out, the relentless focus on Lurie encourages the reader to pay attention to 
Lucy’s opinions.
42
  In The Hunter, the enduring power of imperialism and anthropocentrism, 
the narrative concentration on M and the presentation of the environmentalists as inadequate 
all have a similar effect: they work to heighten the reader’s sensitivity and perhaps receptivity 
to the underrepresented perspectives.  Meanwhile, a more positive relation to animals begins 
to emerge from the unlikely quarter of M himself. 
Hunterly empathy 
Inverting the effect of Mr Allbones' Ferrets, The Hunter conveys the tragedy but not the scale 
of extinction, presenting it as intimately as possible through a single animal.  Here, Greg 
Garrard’s concerns about the representation of extinction, which I mentioned in the previous 
chapter, again come into play (indeed, it is in relation to The Hunter that he raises them): he 
40 Kerridge, ‘Narratives of Resignation’, 97. 
41 Linda Hutcheon, Splitting Images: Contemporary Canadian Ironies (Toronto and New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1991), vii.
42 Gayatri Spivak, ‘Ethics and Politics in Tagore, Coetzee, and Certain Scenes of Teaching.’ Diacritics 32, 3-4 
(2002). 
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considers that it is difficult to represent the species-wide phenomenon of extinction within 
novels because the genre is an individualising one.
43
  As discussed in the previous chapter, 
Farrell negotiates extinction by representing it from a distance, presenting only the 
antecedents to it and using retrospective irony to provide an ecocentric view from outside the 
main story.  But in The Hunter, where there is only one animal involved, extinction figures in 
the very individualising or biocentric terms of which Garrard is critical.  However, Val 
Plumwood considers that 
 environmental ethics needs a different and richer understanding of ethics, one which … 
 allows for ethical concepts owning to emotionality and particularity, and abandons the 
 exclusive focus on the universal and the abstract … and the dualistic and oppositional 
 accounts of the reason/emotion and universal/particular contrasts given in rationalist 
 accounts of ethics.
44
In The Hunter, the distinction between particular animal and general species is disrupted for 
the reader and for M because the thylacine is the last of her kind.  The use of what might be 
termed synecdoche allows Leigh to negotiate – or perhaps evade – the problem of 
individualism; the species is not just represented but embodied by a single animal.  Thus, 
inverting the effect of Mr Allbones' Ferrets, Leigh conveys the tragedy but not the scale of 
extinction.  This tragedy is both underscored and intensified by its intimate representation 
through M.  Although the thylacine species is already doomed, it is by no means a foregone 
conclusion that he will kill the last one.  In this section, I suggest that this depends on whether 
rationalism or empathy prevails not in the external struggle between M and the unsuspecting 
environmentalists, but in M’s internal struggle between opposing impulses.
 In his examination of hunting in Killing Animals, Garry Marvin writes that ‘A 
fundamental difference between hunting for food and hunting as sport lies in the nature of the 
contest between the hunters and the hunted’.  Whereas ‘A person hunting for food … does all 
in his or her power to minimize the nature of that contest’, for a sports hunter, ‘contest is 
deliberately sought out and elaborated.’
45
  This distinction is blurred in The Hunter.  As the 
biotechnology company’s professional hunter, M needs to be as efficient as possible and has 
43 Greg Garrard. Ecocriticism (London: Routledge, 2004), 157-58. 
44 Plumwood, Feminism and the Mastery of Nature, 184 
45 Garry Marvin, ‘Wild Killing: Contesting the Animal in Hunting’, in Killing Animals, ed. The Animal Studies 
Group (Urbana and Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 2006), 19. 
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the advantages of military training and high tech equipment.  However, he obviously enjoys 
hunting for its own sake as well.  Kerridge comments that in The Hunter, ‘The highly 
contemporary theme of biopiracy … combines with spy-thriller elements and the traditional 
format of the Hemingwayesque hunting story’.
46
  Like several of Hemingway’s protagonists, 
M pits himself against the natural world, finding his sense of purpose in the notion of human 
superiority and even regarding nonhuman extinctions as the natural result of that superiority:
 What must the plateau have been like before?  Ragged and jagged, teeming with 
 animals, giant fauna now extinct…  But it was not, he knows, the last Ice Age that had 
 killed them…  What had made the last one different was a two-legged fearsome little 
 pygmy, the human hunter: a testimony to cunning, to mind over matter…  What he is 
 doing is what his ancestors have always done, and done well.  (30-31)
47
This perspective seems to extend the notion that some species are doomed by their inferiority 
to include potentially all nonhuman animals.  Moreover, M is concentrating on ways in which 
human agency has been central to the shaping of history and obviously regards this as a 
source of inspiration and affirmation for his own work.  In both respects, then, M’s view of 
his hunting can be read as a particularly anthropocentric instance of humanism.  However, his 
relation to other species is in fact much more complex than he wants to believe: it becomes 
clear that he has a considerable capacity to empathise with his own prey.  
 In Feminism and the Mastery of Nature, Plumwood advocates an ecological ethics based 
on virtue, which, she explains, ‘expresses what the individual wants to do … rather than what 
he or she is constrained to do through duty’.  She suggests that  
 Were the use of such a virtue-based account to be explicitly admitted by deep ecology, it 
 would be unnecessary to incur the many problems of Self-interest, especially the denial 
 of difference, in order to find a basis for consideration of others in nature which flows 
 from the self and is not based on prohibition.     
What Plumwood is putting forward here can be interpreted as a version of what I have been 
calling species posthumanism, in which humans are regarded as interconnected with but not 
46 Kerridge, ‘Narratives of Resignation’, 97-98 
47 Paddle writes, ‘The demands of human predation, accompanying an increasing human population, caused the 
complete disappearance of the previous ecological balance and the decimation of whole prey species.  
Aboriginal artefacts, stone tools and hand axes dated at slightly more than 30,000 years have recently been 
identified as possessing traces of blood and been found in association with the bones of megafaunal … species’.  
Paddle, The Last Tasmanian Tiger, 18.   
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indistinguishable from other animals.  She writes, ‘With nature, as with the human sphere, the 
capacity to care, to experience sympathy, understanding and sensitivity to the situation and 
fate of particular others is an index of our moral being’.
48
  Somewhat paradoxically, many of these capacities are features of what I call M’s 
‘hunterly empathy’, which develops out of a style of hunting which Marvin calls ‘hunting by 
disguise’.  Here, the distance between human and animal that is present in ‘hunting by 
disturbance’ is closed: ‘Although the hunter does not in any way cease to be human, he or she 
must adopt the ways of a wild animal…  The hunter must disguise or camouflage the human 
shape and presence … to blend into the environment, to become one with it’.
49
  This is just 
what M does when he arrives on the plateau to hunt the thylacine, smearing himself with 
wombat and wallaby droppings ‘until he is not quite human, a strange but not entirely 
unfamiliar beast’ (30).  M is not trying to liberate his own animality here.  Instead, as Marvin 
writes, ‘understanding and skill based on sight, hearing, and smell is instinctual to the animal, 
part of its repertoire for survival, and the human must become equally adept in using such 
senses when hunting’.
50
  M understands this as becoming  
 the natural man, the man who can see and hear and smell what other men cannot; the 
 man of delicate touch and sinuous movement; the man who can find his way through the 
 bush by day and night, and sit motionless through the long hours with his finger married 
 to the trigger.  (58)
51
Here, M cultivates the same heightened sensory awareness that Allbones displays in Mr
Allbones' Ferrets (although Allbones seems less conscious that his abilities are unusual); in 
both cases, then, hunting is facilitated not by pretending to be other than human, but, as 
Marvin suggests, by relying on the same abilities as the animal prey. 
 However, M adds to this another technique that brings him emotionally closer to the 
thylacine: imagination.  He reasons, ‘If I have imagined you here … then here I should set my 
snares.  My imagination is my companion, my man who does the hard yards and reports back 
48 Plumwood, Feminism and the Mastery of Nature, 183, 185. 
49 Marvin, ‘Wild Killing’, 24. 
50 Marvin, ‘Wild Killing’, 24. 
51  This image of the trigger as wedding band can be seen to reflect M’s priorities: as I argue below, hunting is 
generally much more important to him than human-human relationships, including romantic ones. 
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what he has seen’ (55).
52
  Later, he is encouraged by the mental image of ‘a thylacine… black 
stripes huddled over one of his traps: caught’ (95).  This opens up a less rational, more 
empathic relation to his prey.  He finds himself wondering, ‘Has she … descended to picking 
at carrion?  Is her striped and honeyed coat short and dense like that of a Doberman’s, or has 
it fallen to maggot-ridden mange?’ (66).  He is quick to stem this train of thought, aware that 
it diminishes what Marvin terms the contest of hunting: 
 This ignoble image of his prey discourages M and he immediately sets about to rectify 
 it: Yes, there is virtue in being a survivor.  The last tiger must be wary, she must be 
 strong, she must be crafty and ruthless and wise.  And if the mutation has endowed her 
 with any new qualities, they must be qualities which enhance, not detract from, the 
 inescapable drive to survive.  (66) 
At other times, his imagination of the thylacine also goes beyond what is realistic.  Laying 
sheep offal as bait, he thinks:
 Do you remember, tiger, when you were young and used to follow your mother down 
 the escarpment onto the verdant plains?  …Ah, perhaps you were so young then you had 
 not been born, had only savoured the sheep … through your mother’s blood, through her 
 mother’s blood.  (48) 
As it does on several occasions, M’s train of thought here takes the form of a direct address to 
the thylacine, casting her as his interlocutor; indeed, he thinks of it as a dialogue.  Perhaps this 
helps him to convince himself of her reality or proximity (it might also be seen to emphasise 
that his life is defined not by other people but by his relationships with his prey), but as he 
realises himself, it does not make the real animal more likely to appear:   
 He stops himself: this dialogue with the tiger is no good.  The animal does not care for 
 talk, or for history or for what passes as history.  If the food is there and she is hungry, 
 then she will eat.  (48) 
These sorts of self-corrections suggest that, like Pi’s father in Life of Pi, M is wary of 
‘Animalus anthropomorphicus’.  From this perspective, Philo and Wilbert explain, 
anthropomorphism ‘is to misrepresent [animals’] quite different “true nature”, and thus to 
52 This could be a reference to J.M. Coetzee’s Nobel Prize lecture, ‘He and His Man’.  There, the ‘man’ of the 
title is Crusoe’s man, Defoe, who reports to Crusoe but who is, it turns out, a figment of his imagination.  M’s 
man is the imagination who goes looking for the thylacine and reports her position. J.M. Coetzee, ‘He and His 
Man’ (Nobel Lecture presented at the Swedish Academy, Stockholm, 7 December 2003), 
http://nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/literature/laureates/2003/coetzee-lecture-e.html. 
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foster woeful misunderstandings of what they, the animals, are really about’.
53
  Because M 
regards his fantasies as irrelevant to the hunt, he must therefore assume, as Pi does, that other 
species are ‘essentially and practically removed from us’.  Yet M keeps having these fantasies 
and sometimes forgets to stop himself, as is the case when he wonders if she has her own 
mythology:  ‘The tiger, he wonders, when she sees the stars, does she push them into animal 
shapes, give them names, and then pull them down from the sky so that she can eat them, 
make them part of her?’(51).  What this pattern suggests is that although M is using his 
imagination as a hunting tool, it is not always within his control.  This becomes increasingly 
clear as M crosses the boundary in the other direction: he ‘zoomorphises’ himself.  
 On two occasions, M deliberately imagines himself into a thylacine body.  One night as 
he is falling asleep, 
 he performs his favourite trick: he changes shape, swallows the beast.  The eyes in his 
 head are no longer his own, short thick fur runs along the back of his neck, and his spine 
 grows thick and strong, right out of his back, out into a long stiff tail.  He hangs his 
 body off this strong spine, hollows out his belly, shrinks his gangly limbs.  His arm is 
 bent at the elbow, and a paw, not a hand, rests against his bony convex chest. (91) 
Later, while fully awake, ‘to reacquaint himself with the tiger he gets down on his knees and 
crawls along an open pad with his jaw dropped wide until his rough palms begin to smart’ 
(148).  These ‘embodiments’ of the thylacine resonate with Rane Willerslev’s discussion of 
the ‘perspectivist’ and mimetic hunting practices of the Yukaghir people of Siberia.
Perspectivism, he explains, is the idea that ‘different species see things in similar or identical 
ways to humans, but what they see is different and depends on the body they have’.  While 
the underlying soul remains the same, it can move between bodies and perspectives.  
Willerslev suggests that the Yukaghirs put this into practice through ‘mimetic’ hunting:   
 what Yukaghirs strive for when transforming their bodies into the image of prey is … to 
 assume the point of view of the animal, while in some profound sense remaining the 
 same.  Mimetic practice … grants the hunter a ‘double perspective’ whereby he can 
53 Chris Philo and Chris Wilbert, eds. ‘Animal Spaces, Beastly Places: An Introduction,’ in Animal Spaces, 
Beastly Places: New Geographies of Human-Animal Relations (London: Routledge, 2000), 19.
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 assume the animal’s point of view but still remain a human hunter who chases and kills 
 the prey.
54
M’s self-animalisation seems very similar to this: in his imagined assumption of a thylacine 
body, he is apparently trying access the perspective of his prey by positioning himself 
between species.  However, through his mimetic hunting, the boundaries between himself and 
his prey also become disrupted in ways that he does not intend. 
 M’s psychological state appears to become less rational as he becomes more attuned to 
the thylacine.  He is already susceptible to paranoia, in part because of his involvement in the 
biotechnological arms race.
55
  However, his nervousness also seems to be a side effect of his 
imagined entry into the subjectivity of the thylacine.  M has a recurring nightmare (apparently 
since before this particular assignment) in which he dreams of being hunted: 
 does she have the same dream he has, the only dream he has…the running  dream, where 
 he is being chased for hours by an unknown foe … where, finally, he knows he will be 
 caught and that capture means a blank death.  (45)
This nightmare seems to resonate with Willerslev’s explanation of the risks of mimetic 
hunting: according to the Yukaghirs, ‘If [a hunter] allows his intentions to merge with his 
bodily movements (which are that of an elk), he will surrender to the perspective of prey and 
turn into it’.
56
  This may be what is happening to M.  It is as if, in his career as hunter, he has 
become so sensitised to animals as a deliberate part of his hunting that he also involuntarily 
assumes their position in his dreams, as his prey.  He even develops waking fears of role-
reversal: 
 he wonders if she is leading him into some trap of her own.  Would a tiger kill a man? 
 … not that he knows of, but it is possible: if she was crazed, she could lure him into 
54 Rane Willerslev, ‘Not Animal, Not Not-Animal: Hunting, Imitation and Empathetic Knowledge among the 
Siberian Yukaghirs,’ Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute 10, 3 (2004), 630. 
55 He is bothered that he has been sent on a solo mission and billeted with the unreliable Lucy because it reminds 
him that he is expendable to the biotechnology company.  When he injures his head in a fall and Free asks, “Did 
they get at you, man?”, M’s first thought is ‘Who?’ (103). Free must suspect the local loggers, if anyone, but M 
is probably afraid of enemy agents.   
56 Willerslev, ‘Not Animal, Not Not-Animal’, 639. 
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 some secret spot and then … launch herself at his throat.  (116)
57
M’s paranoia suggests that his understanding of what it is like to be prey extends beyond his 
control, so that in a psychological if not a literal sense, the hunter has become the hunted.  
 Over the course of M’s hunt for the thylacine, then, the distinction between enmity and 
empathy begins to dissolve.  M does not believe in the conservation or the cultural value of 
other animals: he thinks of human superiority and the human extermination of other species as 
natural.  Yet his understanding of and sensitivity to the situation of the thylacine are qualities 
that Plumwood advocates as means of relating to both human and nonhuman others.  
Moreover, although he is trying to use this empathy as a hunting tool, it also seems to cause 
him to identify with the thylacine, to the point that he experiences fear of becoming prey.  
Thus, like David Lurie’s growing attention to animals in Disgrace, Pi’s wonder at them in 
Life of Pi and their unpredictability in Mr Allbones' Ferrets, M’s experience of hunting the 
thylacine works to undermine humanist notions of the human subject as rational.  M never 
consciously questions such beliefs, but his growing empathy with the thylacine has parallels 
with Lurie’s involuntary empathy with the dogs and sheep.  Just as Pi believes, imagination is 
necessary in order for M to comprehend animals, especially an animal that, like the meerkats 
on Pi’s floating island, seems almost impossible.  Yet for all the intimacy with the thylacine 
that M experiences on his side of the hunt, the thylacine, like the rabbits, mustelids and birds 
of Mr Allbones' Ferrets, remains unpredictable and elusive.  Indeed, for a time, it seems likely 
that M will redirect his ability to empathise towards developing positive relationships with 
other humans, and forget all about her.  
Familial alternatives 
As Kerridge suggests, M’s growing desire for family life among the Armstrongs, with whom 
he is lodging on Tasmania, offers an alternative destiny for him, both in ecofeminist terms 
(which is what Kerridge is referring to) and, I suggest, in terms of his relation to place, as he 
almost settles in Tasmania.  Leigh implies that one reason for M’s initial dedication to hunting 
57 Guiler writes that ‘The general picture of the thylacine is of a docile creature which does not attack people, 
even under provocation, and this view was held by those trappers I interviewed’. Guiler, Thylacine, 126.  
According to Paddle, ‘It can be concluded that occasional acts of predation were carried out against both 
Aborigines and Europeans, with a probably preference, associated with a greater degree of success, for the 
juvenile members of the species rather than adults.  More usually, humans were left alone’. M may be right that 
the thylacine is curious, however: ‘Some thylacines were obviously attracted to humans and often followed them 
in the bush’. Paddle, The Last Tasmanian Tiger, 93, 94.  
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is his lack of dedication to anything or anyone else.  He is ‘anchored by neither wife nor 
home, nor by a lover nor even a single friend’ (15).  He is estranged from his parents: ‘It’s 
been … at least – what? ten years – and it occurs to M that his parents might in fact be dead, 
done away with.  This placebo brings him a sudden and unexpected peace’ (16).  M also sees 
love as a liability.  He has known men ‘who wouldn’t go on a job without their lucky love-
struck spoon’, and plans not to let himself fall in love: ‘that’s where those boys went wrong, 
they let it happen’ (34).  Instead of sentimental tokens, M carries coffee (25), and the tradition 
of human hunting provides him with ‘the kind of comfort and satisfaction that another man 
might derive from leafing through a set of family photo albums’ (31).  Indeed, he derives his 
sense of his centrality to history from participating in the destruction of animal species: 
 now the trappers themselves were near extinct, one or two perhaps whiling away their 
 nursing-home days in a fog of pleasant fantasies…  There is a symmetry to this that 
 pleases M, a peculiar aesthetic, and that he is a part of it, and knows it, only makes the 
 pleasure more exquisite.  (38)   
 This, then, is the closest M comes to the immortals’ sense of sharing in the cycle of 
energy and matter.  He lacks what Plumwood calls relational identity, in which 
 the individual fulfils his or her own ends as well as those of the other…  He or she 
 stands in particular relations, which may be those of care, custodianship, friendship, or 
 various virtue concepts, to that other, who is treated as deserving of concern for its own 
 sake, and hence as intrinsically worthy or valuable.
58
Of course, this means that M is also anchorless in a geographical and cultural sense.  He has 
none of the attachment to place that the environmentalists, for instance, demonstrate in their 
attempts to defend the Tarkine Forest.  M very much belongs to the sort of globalised world 
described by Zygmunt Bauman, who writes, ‘The deepest meaning conveyed by the idea of 
globalization is that of the indeterminate, unruly and self-propelled character of world affairs; 
the absence of a centre, of a controlling desk, of a board of directors, of a managerial 
office’.
59
  Even the biotechnology corporation may have no single headquarters; it is 
described as a ‘multinational’ and there is certainly never any indication of its location.  The 
result of inhabiting this world is that M himself is global and globalising, willing to go 
58 Plumwood, Feminism and the Mastery of Nature, 185. 
59 Zygmunt Bauman, Globalization: The Human Consequences (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1998), 59.
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anywhere and to appropriate the natural resources of any location.  However, Kerridge 
observes that ‘We are made to feel that a relatively slight tilt of the scale, at some point, a 
slight difference in M’s chemical, emotional, or intellectual balance, might have been all
was required for a diffe
 that 
rent outcome’.
60
 M’s relationship with the Armstrongs is a good example of this.  As I suggested earlier, 
Jarrah models a masculine example of relational identity, with both his family and other 
animals, and M is attracted to the idea of filling this role in relation to his widow, Lucy, and 
her children, Sass and Bike.  At first, this sees an unlikely possibility.  Lucy is taking sleeping 
pills to cope with the loss of Jarrah, and she is affiliated with environmentalism and 
conservation.  M is on a mission to exterminate a species, and at first he values the family 
only insofar as they are conducive to it, humouring Sass because ‘Anything that will make her 
more agreeable to my demands is to be encouraged’ (22).  However, the longer he knows the 
children, the more personal and genuine their relationships become, as M directs his ability to 
empathise towards fostering human connections instead of killing animals.  He tries to make 
amends when he realises that Sass considers him untrustworthy, and they develop ‘the kind of 
wary intimacy to be found amongst old friends who have in the past betrayed one another’ 
(71).  He is forced to relate to her younger brother when Bike tries to follow him into the bush 
and becomes upset.  ‘He slips off his pack and takes the boy in his arms – anything to calm 
him down.  How tiny he is, and how warm’ (110).  Later, he voluntarily takes Bike for a 
drive, letting him steer (122).  Thus, M develops real relationships with both children.  The 
idea of a relationship between Lucy and M is planted when, disoriented, she mistakes him for 
Jarrah (60-61), and as she recovers, they exhibit increasing attraction towards to one another. 
He decides that ‘he will resist it until the job is over’ (85).  However, he is already distracted; 
just as he is unable to escape his irrational thoughts about the thylacine, M now finds his 
hunting infiltrated by the emotional ties that he is beginning to develop, an early indication 
that the new future he is imagining is incompatible with his present life.  
 Here, Leigh plays with the stereotypical associations between women and nature, as M 
first repeats and then rejects them.  Inspired by a snow-daisy, M begins to reflect on romance 
and then conflates this with the hunt, echoing traditional metaphors of the hunt as romance, or 
of romance as hunting. ‘Yes, he is romancing his prey.  This thought rankles him a little, 
60 Kerridge, ‘Narratives of Resignation’, 99 
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because at heart he knows he is only hunting, but for entertainment’s sake he lets it run’ (90).  
He pretends the thylacine is a woman, and that they are in ‘those first few heady days of 
romance, when he has already bedded the girl, whispered in her ear, sent her roses…  He has 
confessed his jealousy, watched her soften before him … but not quite give herself over’ (90).  
This romantic fantasy is not necessarily incompatible with hunting to kill.  Matt Cartmill 
observes, ‘This motif crops up again and again throughout the literature of hunting: many 
hunters deeply and sincerely love the animals they kill, and they identify that love as one of 
their reasons for wanting to kill them’.  Cartmill’s interpretation of this is that ‘hunting is 
often entangled with something dark, violent and irrational in the human psyche, whatever the 
source of that darkness may ultimately prove to be’.
61
  Of course, hunting is also used as a 
metaphor for romance; in Disgrace, David Lurie applies the motif this way around where he 
conceptualises his relationships with Soraya and Melanie in terms of animal predation.  M, 
however, quickly dispenses with his anthropomorphic metaphor: ‘This nostalgia for seduction 
is seductive itself.  And it’s delusory.  The animal is no woman.  He will not win it over with 
sweet words, wine and roses’ (90).  Thus, trying to reassert his belief in a fundamental 
distinction between humans and animals, M returns to the view of anthropomorphism as 
misleading as to the thylacine’s real nature (which in this case, indeed, seems likely).  
However, M’s increasing anthropomorphism is again an indication that his relational 
impulses, this time in connection to humans, are becoming increasingly influential and are 
now taking priority over the hunt.  The more the hunt seems doomed to failure, the more 
receptive he becomes to such impulses.   
 Marvin writes that ‘Possible and actual failure, both in terms of failing to find a suitable 
animal and failing to kill that animal when it is found, is essential to sports hunting’.
62
  Of 
course, in terms of professional hunting like M’s, where expediency as well as the contest is 
important, an unsuccessful hunt also means failing his employer.  As I suggested above, M 
has coped with disappointed personal relationships in the past by immersing himself in his 
hunting; now, as he begins to struggle with the hunt, this pattern inverts.  Although he finds 
evidence of the thylacine’s presence, his prized precision does not always outweigh the factor 
of luck, and when he starts to feel thwarted, he seeks comfort in other people.  An example of 
61 Matt Cartmill, A View to Death in the Morning: Hunting and Nature through History. (Cambridge, MA and 
London: Harvard University Press, 1993), 238, 239. 
62 Marvin, ‘Wild Killing’, 25. 
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this occurs when he falls from a rock face, and lies on a ledge slipping in and out of 
consciousness.  Just as his amorous desires became conflated with the hunt earlier, his filial 
longings do now, as he dreams of his mother and the thylacine.  He thinks that ‘the rock is his 
mother’s soft and warm bosom; he can smell her’ (96).  Then,  
 he thinks he sees the tiger … and then he watches as she slouches toward him, curious 
 … until she is so close he can feel her warm breath on his cheek.  But her breath is 
 sweet, and she does not guzzle at his throat, and that is when he realises he must be 
 dreaming, or hallucinating.  (97)  
Finally, he has a dreaming memory of his mother telling him “time to go” (97).  The 
appearance of his mother as well as the thylacine in these hallucinations implies the 
resurfacing of the emotional yearnings that he has tried to suppress beneath his hunter’s 
purpose. On his next trip to the plateau, despite actually glimpsing the thylacine, he misses his 
shot and loses her tracks in the rain.  At this, his rational control over his emotions disappears: 
‘he gets down on his knees, one man on the plateau, and – speechless – holds his head 
between his hands…  This time it seems he will fail…  He thinks: I will cosset myself in 
failure’ (121).   
 On his return from the plateau, M is summoned to another job, and thus is no longer 
committed to killing the thylacine either personally or professionally.  Instead, M suddenly 
acknowledges that he is not just attracted to Lucy but has real feelings for the whole family.  
When Lucy says that she will miss him, ‘A feeling of warmth, actual bodily warmth, flushes 
through his chest and he realises that he, too, will miss her, will miss them, and this feeling 
doesn’t leave him as he drives away’ (128).  Here, then, M reaches the same point of 
conscious acknowledgement of his feelings that Lurie does in relation to the sheep and dogs 
in Disgrace; in M’s case this concerns humans rather than other animals, but it is a similar 
mark of acceptance of the emotional over the rational.  After his (undocumented) eight weeks 
away, it becomes apparent that he has finally developed an anchor in the Armstrong family as 
he voluntarily returns to Tasmania.  Worrying that Lucy might not like the chocolate he has 
bought, M realises ‘he wants them to be happy to see him, as happy as he will be to see them.  
This is what makes him nervous, this loaded sense of anticipation’ (132).  It is clear that at 
this point, M is hoping to give up his global existence with the biotechnology company and 
build a new, local identity; he tries to rationalise, but cannot resist the thought ‘that maybe 
151
one day he might like to grow old on a farm, with loved ones around (loved ones!)’ (132).
Ultimately, however, the novel explores how a hunter remains a hunter.
Extinction
Although the novel re-presents history in the sense that the thylacine species has survived into 
the present, Leigh cannot afford to offer any hope with regard to its future, or even the fate of 
the remaining animal.  If M’s desire for family life were realised, the narrative might become 
one of a hunter redeemed, leaving his erstwhile prey alive and resulting in the kind of guarded 
optimism offered by Disgrace.  Because extinction is inevitable, however, that story cannot 
be told.  If there were, as M briefly imagines, ‘an entire tribe of tigers – so crafty that they 
have avoided the human gaze for years’ (118), the narrative would offer a degree of optimism 
which would imply complacency about human-animal relations.  Indeed, even if the single 
thylacine managed to escape M,  that might suggest that at least nature or conservation has 
enough power to protect her from anthropocentrism, even though extinction is a foregone 
conclusion.  M’s success in killing her instead emphasises that the anthropocentric and 
colonising forces that brought about extinction in the 1930s are thriving in contemporary 
versions.  Leigh foregrounds the tragic results of this through the intimate and emotional 
depiction of the thylacine’s death.
 M reaches a point where he actively wants to become a father to the Armstrong family 
and stay in Tasmania, but is denied this and returns to his default role as the global and 
globalising hunter.  His mistake, to the extent that this is his fault, is in taking the new eight-
week mission from the biotechnology company, again deferring his emotional fulfilment.  
The narrative does not follow him on this mission, instead remaining firmly grounded in 
Tasmania, and thereby emphasising that M, by contrast, has prioritised the corporation’s 
globalising perspective over the local roots he was starting to put down.  On his return, M 
finds these roots ripped out; the family is gone from Tasmania.  An accident has left Sass in a 
special burns unit in Sydney, as a result of which Lucy has suffered a nervous breakdown, so 
Bike is to go into foster care.  There is clearly an element of chance in this tragedy, but the 
dispersal of the family could perhaps have been avoided had M stayed. It is clear that his 
presence was having a positive effect on Lucy’s mental health, and if this prevented Sass’s 
accident or Lucy’s breakdown, then the life he wanted might have remained a possibility.  
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Instead, in what seems like a culmination of his waking and dreaming identification with his 
prey, M experiences his misery through images of a hunted thylacine’s death: ‘M has had his 
chest scooped out.  His skin has been peeled from his body.  He can dislocate his jaw and fill 
the universe with a stone-grey roar’ (135).  Ironically, it is this experience that eventually 
prompts M to kill the real thylacine after all. 
 From this point on, the narrative becomes an intensification of M’s struggle between 
emotion and detachment, as, in a conceptual realisation of his nightmares, he is now 
continually prey to emotions which he tries to escape in his hunt.  ‘The escarpment beckons...  
He wishes he was there now, up where it was calm and pure, with space enough for a man to 
think’ (139).  However, ‘he is not yet to the top of the escarpment before the lamentations 
begin.  I have been forsaken, he thinks, the world conspires against me.  I try, I try, and look 
what happens’ (141).  The Armstrongs haunt him.  ‘At night, lying on the hard ground, he is 
plagued by thoughts of the girl, Sass, now condemned to lying down, and of her mother, who 
knows no better’ (142). He worries that Bike might suffer teasing at school and alienation 
within a foster family (152).  In these moments, M’s sensitivity to the situation of another, 
which has so often been a hunting tool, is working as Plumwood means it to, as a way of 
caring for that other, but now it makes him miserable.  Therefore, ‘To give himself some 
purpose, and not because he really has a purpose, he sets out to examine his traps and snares.  
What else can he do?  There is no better option’ (142).  He becomes the detached hunter 
again:
 He comes to think of his fondness for Lucy and the children as an aberration, a 
 monumental lapse in judgement, and his vision of growing old and happy in a bluestone 
 house seems to him near laughable…  What he sees now is that he has been tested, 
 steeled, and seduced, and that his true purpose is the one which he first set out to 
 achieve: to be a hunter, to harvest the tiger.  What else could it be?  (147-48) 
In this renewed conviction regarding his own identity, M again devotes himself to the hunt.  
However, even in the final stages and the aftermath of the hunt, M displays a much more 
fragmented subjectivity than the one he defines here. 
 Following the immortals, who are seeking the thylacine for National Parks, M discovers 
a lair or den containing the skeleton of a thylacine pup, and his reaction is far from detached; 
it is like an intensification of his reverence at the Aboriginal fireplace.  He finds it ‘so 
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alarmingly beautiful that he touches it as he would the Holy Grail or his own first child’ 
(159).  He concludes that it is too old to be the offspring or sibling of his prey, but there are 
signs of recent occupation: ‘lonesome, is this where she comes for company?’ (159). Again, 
M is demonstrating sensitivity to the thylacine’s situation.  He then engages in a communion 
of his own: 
 he lies down on the ground in a mirror position, eye to eye with the skull, and imagines 
 for a second that he, too, will rot in this cave.  In years to come, decades later, an 
 intrepid explorer will find the skeletons and ponder the relationship between the two.
 (159-60) 
M obviously experiences the discovery as a memento mori, a reminder of mortality as 
common to all species.  M’s reflections also connect to the novel’s emphasis on the 
unreliability of accepted history: if history has no record of a thylacine in M’s time, future 
explorers will have no way of deducing his relation to the older skeleton.  And despite his 
apparent feelings of commonality, this remains a hunter-prey relation. M now lies in wait in 
the cave for some weeks, becoming once more ‘the natural man, who can see and hear and 
smell what other men cannot’, so that although he is asleep when the thylacine returns, ‘he 
finds this sleep needled and disturbed’ (161).  He emerges to see the thylacine leaving and 
circles around to intercept her.
 The killing of the thylacine is, of course, the moment of extinction, but in The Hunter as
in Mr Allbones’ Ferrets, the sense of the tragedy of extinction derives largely from what the 
reader knows (the thylacine is the last) rather than from its representation in the text.  Instead, 
the thylacine’s death is presented on a thoroughly personal level, and M’s experience of it 
both resembles and contrasts with Garry Marvin’s analysis of hunting deaths.  Marvin 
describes these as ‘passionate deaths’, in terms of the human hunter’s experience of them, 
because
 a personal and emotional connectivity is a defining feature of the relationship between 
 the hunter and hunted, and I would argue that it even obtains in that short moment when 
 a hunter aims at a particular pheasant.  At the moment of aiming and pulling the trigger, 
 that individual bird is the hunter’s bird.
63
63 Marvin, ‘Wild Killing’, 25. 
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In The Hunter, M’s experience of this moment is certainly personal, but it is not a moment of 
connection with the prey but with himself; he pulls the trigger in fulfilment of his humanist 
understanding of himself as having one true identity. 
 There is no way he will miss this shot, and he holds the animal in his sights, knowing 
 that he is a killer, and that he, too, will be killed.  Part of him wants to keep watching, 
 perhaps even walk away, but another part fixes him there, poised and ready, and it is the 
 part of him he recognises as strong and true.  (162-63)
Instead, the passion of M’s ‘personal and emotional connectivity’ with the thylacine surfaces 
immediately after he fires, not as pleasure but as a sudden grief which immediately 
undermines the detachment informing the shot itself.  As the thylacine lies dying,
  Ancient words which might once have helped him, words big enough for the beautiful 
 terribleness of the deed, are long lost and out of reach, so he says, whispers, the best he 
 can think of which is – simply – you won’t die alone. (163-64). 
Just as he has done with the pup skeleton, M looks into her eyes, but already, ‘she in turn does 
not seem to see him – her eyes are blank and vacant and say nothing’ (164).  M now appears 
to experience genuine grief, intensifying the sense of pathos and of irony surrounding her 
death.
 She is more than an animal to him, more than a wallaby or a pademelon, and he 
 observes her body as he would the body of a friend laid out in the morgue.  It galls him 
 that he can press a finger against her wet nose, that he can close her eyes: it feels so 
 wrong.  She looks nothing like the creature he knew before. (164) 
 These feelings make the final task of dissection particularly unpleasant to him.  M finds, 
as David Lurie does in Disgrace, that dealing with the death of another animal stirs up 
thoughts of his own mortality and a desire to care for the body.  ‘Marvelling at the 
extraordinary patience of the dead, he suddenly decides he will be cremated when he dies’ 
(165).  M shaves her fur ‘like a mother tenderly brushing the hair of a murder victim,’ and 
‘For a split second he wonders if one day he will go bald – stop it’ (165).  However, the 
technological perspective slowly takes over as M reduces the thylacine from prey to 
specimen.  At the moment when another hunter might start taking photographs and trophies, 
and M himself seems inclined to perform a funerary rite, he unpacks his surgical kit.  Piece by 
piece, the thylacine is reduced to biotechnological samples that are packed away in high tech 
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storage devices.  Steeling himself, M precisely takes the thylacine’s blood and transfers it to 
‘a test tube bearing an opalescent glob of herapin; the test tube he cradles in a titanium cold-
pack’ (166).  Then, in keeping with his returning status as ecofeminist villain, he is more 
comfortable with the gendered penetration of taking the reproductive organs: ‘the obstetrics… 
is more his style.  He cuts into the groin and slides a hand in’ (166).  As M transfers the 
thylacine’s body into scientific storage, he also conceptually transfers it into that discourse: 
‘he locks each [ovary] away in a custom-built vial of liquid nitrogen’, knowing that ‘An egg 
…can be fertilized with the sperm of a semi-compatible organism, like a lynx or a wolf.  Or, 
better still … a sperm could be fashioned from the thylacine’s own blood’ (166).  By the time 
he has finished, ‘the bloody gutted thing is no longer a body to him’ (167).  Thus, the 
corporation’s globalising interests work to detach M from the thylacine, and as he returns 
from the plateau, it is clear that he is once again detached from other humans too.  When he 
meets the National Parks workers, ‘he decides, almost immediately, that if he has to, he will 
shoot them’ (167).  Speaking with them, he finds that, ‘Mention of the Armstrongs is now as 
foreign to M as mention of another planet; he knows it exists, that it has subtle but powerful 
effects, that it is very far away’.  This idea is briefly modified by the next sentence: ‘Only 
Bike is real to him’ (169), but M never formulates a specific intention to find Bike.  Instead, it 
seems that he has weighed anchor once more.  He heads for the buried coffee that takes the 
place, for him, of sentimental tokens, returning to the globalising perspectives and practices 
that informed his character at the novel’s outset.
 Thus, although the fate of the thylacine species arises from collective human actions, the 
choice between compassion and detachment is personalised through the novel’s presentation 
of the human-animal relation at the biocentric (individual) level.  In terms of M’s role, the 
outcome is not a foregone conclusion, and his experiences, like those of Lurie, show how 
someone initially resistant to forming human connections might come to do so.  What is most 
optimistic about this is that although, here as in his hunting, he tries to prioritise his mission 
over any development of compassion, he fails to do so and consciously is ready to change.
Less encouragingly, however, his conclusion is that ‘it does not matter what he had hoped for, 
hoping itself was an exercise in delusion, and all the hope in the world could not determine 
which way a bird would fly, or a leaf would fall’ (147).  
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Conclusion
On the personal level of the narrative, M’s sense of self is initially defined by a belief in his 
own rationality and superiority to other species, the same attitudes that inform the 
characterisation of the Pitfords of Mr Allbones' Ferrets or Disgrace’s David Lurie.  Like the 
animals of those novels, the thylacine unknowingly counters these views to some extent, and 
her elusiveness arguably affects M’s attitudes.  What I have called his hunterly empathy – the 
sensitivity to the thylacine that is intended to facilitate the hunt – involves similar skills to 
those central to Plumwood’s concept of relational identity, and these begin to be redirected 
towards a familial belonging that would mean abandoning his hunting and his global lifestyle.  
However, when M misses this opportunity, in part through failing to prioritise it, the rational 
and anthropocentric subjectivity that began to blur during the hunt reasserts itself in its 
culmination and he becomes once again an emotionally and geographically detached killer of 
animals.  Ultimately, the thylacine is killed in the pursuit of human interests rather than 
remaining or moving further outside human control like the mustelids of Mr Allbones' 
Ferrets.
 This narrative can also be regarded as a microcosm for the broader problems of human-
animal relations raised in the novel (in much the way that the thylacine is made to represent 
her whole species).  Central to The Hunter’s role in terms of the temporal focus of this section 
is its re-presentation of history.  Like Mr Allbones' Ferrets, The Hunter concentrates on an 
extinction resulting from colonial human-animal relations, but it also underscores its 
contemporary relevance by bringing it into the present.  The first effect of this is to emphasise 
the survival of the discourses that led to the thylacine’s official extinction in the 1930s.  The 
subjective appreciation for animals displayed by Allbones in Mr Allbones' Ferrets survives in 
the environmentalists – some of whom display a version of what I call species posthumanism 
– but the anthropocentric nineteenth-century science that is presented as colonising in Mr
Allbones' Ferrets also reappears in the globalising biotechnology company.  The second effect 
of the novel’s re-presentation is to show that the power relations that surrounded the 
thylacine’s extinction have not shifted.  The boundaries of the human may be blurred by 
interrelationships with technology, but the humanist emphases on the value of rationalism and 
the superiority of the human are enhanced by technology.  The novel also implies that 
imperialism still dominates international relations in the form of an amorphous globalisation 
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which, having no centre of its own, is detached from local interests everywhere.  The strength 
of these discourses, the novel suggests, would probably result in the destruction of a surviving 
thylacine.  Conservationist initiatives fail to prevent this, partly because of flaws in their 
interpretation and implementation, but also because they simply do not have enough power 
compared with their adversaries.  In terms of both globalisation and anthropocentrism, then, 
the novel’s re-presented opposition between compassion and detachment demonstrates that 
although the former can disrupt the latter, it has not so far effected real change, and The
Hunter seems doubtful about the possibility. 
 The challenge to humanism in this novel, then, is articulated in the form of a challenge 
to the technology-enhanced humanism known as technohumanism and to the prioritisation of 
global over local concerns.  However, unlike Mr Allbones' Ferrets and Life of Pi, the novel 
does not so much undermine humanist rationalism or the view of humans as central to history, 
as condemn these perspectives as destructive and in the latter case, self-fulfilling.  Thus, The
Hunter is less optimistic than the other texts that I have discussed so far.  Disgrace does not 
solve problems in terms of either species or cultural relations, but explores the possibility of 
positive change in both areas.  Life of Pi is a story of survival, and emphasises the power of 
the unexpected, including in animals and nature, to preserve religious faith and to combat the 
experience of atrocity.  Even in Mr Allbones' Ferrets, where the actions of the characters 
result in multiple extinctions, the narrator celebrates the unpredictability of nature, and the 
novel leaves space for the present to avoid repeating history.  By contrast, The Hunter
expresses serious doubts about the contemporary situation, most obviously in terms of human-
animal relations, but also in terms of the influence of external forces, as represented in the 
presence of multinational company engaged in the manufacture of biotechnological weapons 
and defences.  This particular danger seems to point to a larger crisis in the offing, which will 
include and will derive impetus from ongoing, broad scale globalisation and exploitation.  In 
this novel, however, this is only ever a dimly perceived threat.  Elsewhere, this concept takes 
centre stage: my final chapter explores the representation of cultural and species relations 
within what might be termed the ‘postcolonial apocalyptic’ in Margaret Atwood’s Oryx and 
Crake, where technological and species posthumanism are again set against one another in a 
futuristic context. 
158
5. What if? Playing God in Oryx and Crake 
In the previous two chapters of this section, I suggested that both Mr Allbones' Ferrets
and The Hunter use their engagements with the colonial past to illustrate the dangers of 
maintaining humanist values in contemporary postcolonial and human-animal relations.  
Mr Allbones' Ferrets warns against repeating history, while The Hunter indicates that 
this is just what is happening, and, as I suggested at the end of the previous chapter, 
seems to suggest that worse might lie ahead.  This chapter forms the remaining third of 
the temporal analysis undertaken in this section, taking as its focus Margaret Atwood’s 
futuristic Oryx and Crake (2003).
1
  This novel offers an elaboration of the sort of 
warnings given in both Mr Allbones' Ferrets and The Hunter.  The ideas that the past 
holds valuable lessons about human-animal relations, and that the present is failing to 
learn such lessons, are both taken up in relation to the future: the implication in Oryx
and Crake is that there is little sign that these lessons will be learned either.  Indeed, in 
this respect the novel overtly contradicts the humanist notion of ‘progress’, specifically 
in terms of technological advance as improvement.
2
  The world of Oryx and Crake is 
also anti-humanist in that the deterioration imagined is a worst-case scenario of the 
effects of continuing to privilege western over non-western cultures and humans and 
technology over other species and the environment.  The novel’s protagonist, Snowman, 
believes himself to be the last surviving human in the wake of the JUVE virus (Jetspeed 
Ultra Virus Extraordinary).  He lives alone in a tree, scavenging, negotiating encounters 
with hybrid animals and trying to socialise with quasi-humans called Crakers.  As in 
Atwood’s The Blind Assassin,
3
 the linear narrative of the protagonist’s present frames an 
extensive, disjointed body of flashbacks to his past, which the reader must reconstitute.  
Snowman’s pre-apocalyptic life as Jimmy is also dystopian, but is more recognisable. 
Atwood describes the novel’s genre as ‘speculative fiction’, because ‘it invents nothing 
we haven’t already invented or started to invent’.  She writes, ‘The What if of Oryx and 
Crake is simply, What if we continue down the road we’re already on?  How slippery is 
the slope? What are our saving graces?  Who’s got the will to stop us?’
4
  Thus, in 
1 Margaret Atwood, Oryx and Crake (London: Bloomsbury, 2003). 
2 In this chapter, I continue to use the term humanism as I have been using it, to denote the conceptual 
privileging of a western, male, rationalist human figure who is a central agent within history.  However, it 
is important to distinguish, in relation to this novel in particular, between this meaning and humanism as 
placing value in ‘the humanities’, because Oryx and Crake places considerable value on art and especially 
language. 
3 Margaret Atwood, The Blind Assassin (London: Bloomsbury, 2000). 
4 Margaret Atwood, ‘Writing Oryx and Crake’, http://www.randomhouse.com/features/atwood/essay.html. 
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imagining Jimmy’s late twenty-first century world, Atwood distorts a very familiar 
picture, while still leaving scope for humans in the present to adopt different attitudes, 
and so avoid the imagined scenario.  
 In this chapter, I suggest that Oryx and Crake explores the relationship between what
I am terming technological posthumanism and species posthumanism, and shows how 
both of these challenges to the notion of human exceptionality can still entail the 
perpetuation and exacerbation of the notion of humans’ exceptionality and superiority to 
other species, rendering globalisation ‘post-postcolonial’ and nature ‘post-natural’.  The 
relationship between science and international power relations that features in Mr
Allbones' Ferrets and The Hunter is again at work as biotechnology and globalisation 
marginalise and ‘instrumentalise’ animals and non-western humans.  This dynamic can 
be said to extend Atwood’s suggestion, in Survival, that white Canadians might identify 
with animals as victims.  However, here as in Life of Pi and Mr Allbones' Ferrets,
animals are also seen as having a capacity to resist humanism or in this case, its 
futuristic forms, and attempts to subvert the hegemony of technology include not only 
direct confrontation by marginalised groups, but also rebel scientists who use 
biotechnology to effect subversion in collaboration with other animals.  Thus, Oryx and 
Crake also shows humans actively trying to ally themselves with animals, through 
technology, in the resistance of oppression. Finally, I address Jimmy’s friend Crake’s 
attempt to destroy humanity and replace it with the animalised humans called Crakers, 
and the subsequent subversion by various transgenic creatures of their creators’ 
intentions.  I argue that Crake’s endeavour, while it includes anti-humanist elements, 
simultaneously epitomises humanist notions of mastery over nature and human centrality 
to history, and that although Oryx and Crake is pessimistic about humans’ ability to 
change, the transgenic creatures’ unwitting ‘rebellion’ conveys the enduring power of 
nature to resist such dictation.
Post-postcolonialism and post-nature 
A key feature of Oryx and Crake’s dystopia is the persistence and exacerbation of the 
sorts of contemporary and historical human-human and human-animal relations 
discussed in previous chapters.  Like The Hunter, Oryx and Crake represents 
imperialistic power relations as reincarnated in globalisation.  Working on a much larger 
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scale than Leigh, Atwood offers ‘a dystopian scenario of globalisation’s endgame’,
5
which can be called ‘post-postcolonial’.  As mentioned in the previous chapter, Zygmunt 
Bauman has suggested that the fundamental idea of globalisation is that world affairs 
become decentred without any core of control.
6
  However, Atwood gives her global 
culture a defined centre, emphasising that, as Bill Ashcroft argues, globalisation means 
not the end but the evolution of imperialism.
7
  The same ‘western’ culture that is 
dominant in Mr Allbones' Ferrets, and infiltrates Life of Pi and Disgrace, retains and 
indeed gains in power, but is now based in the United States.  Fredric Jameson writes 
that within globalisation,
 the United States is not just one country, or one culture, among others…  There is a 
 fundamental dissymmetry in the relationship between the United States and every 
 other country in the world, not only third-world countries, but even Japan and those 
 of Western Europe.
8
This is exactly the shape of globalisation in Oryx and Crake. The world beyond the 
United States is at best a source of feeble competition; at worst, subject matter for an 
entertainment industry that takes delight in torment.  The internet spectacles which 
Jimmy and Crake watch as teenagers resonate with Val Plumwood’s argument that 
anthropocentrism, ethnocentrism and ‘androcentrism’ all entail the stereotyping, 
devaluation, assimilation and instrumentalism of the margins.
9
  The centre ‘others’ 
humans by depicting criminals, especially those of non-western cultures, undergoing 
corporal and capital punishment; there are ‘enemies of the people being topped with 
swords in someplace that looked like China’, ‘various supposed thieves having their 
hands cut off and adulterers and lipstick-wearers being stoned to death by howling 
crowds, in dusty enclaves that purported to be in fundamentalist countries in the Middle 
East’ (82), and the live execution of American criminals.  Just as historical colonists 
asserted that extinctions of other peoples, like the Tasmanian Aborigines, were 
inevitable, so Jimmy and Crake find ways to exonerate themselves in the face of these 
killings, in this case by questioning the veracity of what they are seeing.  Crake 
5Fiona Tolan, Margaret Atwood: Feminism and Fiction (Amsterdam and New York: Rodopi, 2007), 277. 
6 Zygmunt Bauman, Globalization: The Human Consequences (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1998), 59.
7 Bill Ashcroft, Post-colonial Transformation (London and New York: Routledge, 2001). 
8Fredric Jameson, ‘Notes on Globalization as a Philosophical Issue,’ in 
The Cultures of Globalization: The World-System and the Limits of Modernity, ed. Fredric Jameson and 
Masao Miyoshi (Durham, N.C. and London: Duke University Press, 1998), 58.  
9 Val Plumwood, ‘Androcentrism and Anthropocentrism: Parallels and Politics’, in Ecofeminism: Women, 
Culture, Nature, ed. Karen J. Warren (Bloomington and Indianapolis, Indiana University Press 1997), 343. 
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maintains that ‘these bloodfests were probably taking place on a back lot somewhere in 
California with a bunch of extras rounded up off the streets’ (82), while Jimmy asks, ‘Do 
you think they’re really being executed? …A lot of them look like simulations’ (83).  
 Ethnocentrism also informs Atwood’s use of sexual exploitation as a measure of the 
cultural centre’s corruption.  In a late twenty-first century echo of the ‘picture-box’ that 
appears in Mr Allbones' Ferrets, in which an ‘island’ girl removes her clothes, Jimmy 
and Crake frequent websites where the exotic and the erotic overlap.  The main example 
of this is a paedophilia site called HottTotts,
10
 which is ethnocentric and androcentric at 
once; it ‘claimed to show real sex tourists, filmed while doing things they’d be put in jail 
for back in their home countries’ (89).  At first, Jimmy has the same removed response 
to this that he does to the killing of criminals:  ‘None of those little girls had ever seemed 
real – they’d always struck him as digital clones’ (90).  However, he is captivated by a 
child who turns her own gaze directly on the camera and seems to say, ‘I see you 
watching.  I know you.  I know what you want’ (91).  Jimmy ‘felt burned by this look … 
for the first time he’d felt that what they’d been doing was wrong’ (91).  Jimmy’s 
indifference is now replaced with obsession, but this is strongly informed by exoticism 
and even animalisation.  When he sees a similar girl who has been kept in a San 
Francisco garage, he admires her ‘beautiful cat’s face’ which displays ‘the same blend of 
innocence and contempt and understanding’ (255).   
 Finally, Jimmy meets Oryx, originally a prostitute chosen by Crake for her likeness 
to the HottTotts child, and now both his girlfriend and employee.  However, although 
‘she was no longer a picture…  Suddenly she was real, three dimensional’ (308), Jimmy 
persists in his voyeuristic othering. When he too begins a relationship with Oryx, Jimmy 
insists that she really is the girl from HottTotts (91)
11
 and from the garage (315-16), and 
starts demanding intimate details: ‘What else did they make you do?’(139), ‘Did they 
10 The name HottTotts sexualises the children, but also exoticises them in that it recalls the derogatory 
European term ‘Hottentot’ once applied to the Khoikhoi people of Southern Africa.  Atwood also 
explicitly connects the content with Swift’s parody of travel narratives; a HottTotts client is described as 
‘the standard gargantuan Gulliver-in-Lilliput male torso – a life-sized man shipwrecked on an island of 
delicious midgets’ (90). 
11 Some commentators, including Tolan (286), have accepted this idea, probably because Snowman still 
believes it: the text reads ‘This is how the two of them first saw Oryx’ (90).  However, although the 
narrative is in the third person, the views being conveyed are always Snowman’s and not those of a 
reliable narrator. What Oryx says is, ‘I don’t think this is me … A lot of girls did these things. Very many’ 
(91).  It is only upon seeing Jimmy’s disappointment that she amends, ‘It might be me...  Would that make 
you happy Jimmy?’ (91).  The novel’s larger points about ethnocentric and sexual exploitation are of 
course revealed either way, but in individual terms, Oryx’s control of her own story is at stake here. 
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rape you?’(144), ‘What went on in that garage…?’ (314).
12
  He is obviously fascinated 
by her physical otherness too: ‘She had a triangular face – big eyes, a small jaw – a 
hymenoptera face, a mantid face, the face of a Siamese cat’ (115).  These repeated 
associations with cats could derive from more than face shape: Jimmy is struck by each 
girl’s ‘look’ of innocence, contempt and understanding, which may contribute to his 
impression of them as feline. If so, this even resonates with Derrida’s experience of his 
cat’s gaze: ‘at the moment when, caught naked, in silence, by the gaze of an animal, for 
example the eyes of a cat, I have trouble … overcoming my embarrassment’. However, 
whereas Derrida builds on this to the point of concluding that, were compassion for 
animals to be taken seriously, it ‘would have to change the very basis … of the 
philosophical problematic of the animal’,
13
 Jimmy’s perception of Oryx’s look does not 
alter his relation to her.  Instead, he continues to regard her as an object to be defined by 
his fantasies, as if she were still on a website.  In their exoticisation of both violence and 
sex, then, the spectacles consumed by Jimmy and Crake demonstrate the continued 
presence of the western cultural imperialism represented in the novels already discussed.
Meanwhile, closer to the centre, globalising American culture is apparently swallowing 
up nearby nations in an obvious echo of historical colonisation. 
 Americanisation, of course, has long been of concern to Canada.  Linda Hutcheon 
writes that Canadians ‘often feel somehow politically threatened by the constant 
reminders of the power and the imperialist impulses of our neighbour to the south’,
14
while Atwood herself has argued that this is a factor in Canada’s preoccupation with the 
idea of survival:
 For early explorers and settlers, it meant bare survival in the face of ‘hostile’ 
 elements and/or natives...  For French Canada after the English took over it became 
 cultural survival…  And in English Canada now while the Americans are taking over 
 it is acquiring a similar meaning.
15
12 As Tolan observes, Jimmy’s curiosity simultaneously exposes the reader too: ‘eastern Oryx’s narrative 
perpetually threatens to also turn Atwood’s typically affluent western reader into a voyeur, making him or 
her complicit in Jimmy’s morbid fascinations’ (Tolan, Margaret Atwood: Feminism and Fiction, 288).   
13 Jacques Derrida, ‘The Animal That Therefore I Am (More to Follow),’ trans. David Wills. Critical 
Inquiry 28, 2 (2002): 372, 395.  
14 Linda Hutcheon, Splitting Images: Contemporary Canadian Ironies (Toronto and New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1991), 78. 
15 Margaret Atwood, Survival: A Thematic Guide to Canadian Literature (Toronto: House of Anansi 
Press, 1972), 32. 
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In Oryx and Crake, these fears have apparently been realised by assimilatory 
globalisation.  With the exception of her other dystopia, The Handmaid’s Tale,
16
Atwood’s previous novels are set at least partially in Canada, and many address 
Canada’s postcolonial condition directly, as do her non-fictional texts Survival and 
Strange Things.
17
  In Oryx and Crake, however, Canada is conspicuous by its absence; 
various locations (such as Chicago and Hudson’s Bay) show that the setting is North 
America, but there is no reference to Canada by name, as if there were no longer a 
national distinction.
18
  Thus, Canada has effectively been colonised for a second time. 
Meanwhile, as in the novels previously discussed, animals are also the victims of this.  
However, what is striking about Atwood’s rendition of this point is that, whereas the 
extinction of animals in Mr Allbones' Ferrets is occasioned by European colonisation, 
the futuristic colonisation depicted in Oryx and Crake can be seen to result from
environmental destruction. 
 In Survival, Atwood argues that animal victims in Canadian literature are often 
symbols of a national victim complex.  Her suggestion is ‘that Canadians themselves 
feel threatened and nearly extinct as a nation, and suffer also from life-denying 
experience as individuals – the culture threatens the “animal” within them – and that 
their identification with animals is the expression of a deep-seated cultural fear’.
19
  In 
Oryx and Crake, the depiction of extinction is the opposite of Julia Leigh’s intimate 
account of the death of the last thylacine: Atwood illustrates extinction on as large a 
scale as possible through ‘Extinctathon’, an online game that Jimmy and Crake play as 
teenagers.  When they log on, a phrase reads, ‘Adam named the living animals, 
MaddAddam names the dead ones’ (80); the aim of the game is to identify extinct 
species by classification, habitat and cause of extinction.  The database, although it 
covers only fifty years of species loss, amounts to ‘a couple of hundred pages of fine 
16 There are several references to smuggling resources and people over the border into Canada, and it 
seems likely that this is the same border that, in a flashback, the protagonist tries to cross with her family. 
Margaret Atwood, The Handmaid’s Tale. (1986; repr., London: Vintage, 1996), 93, 323, 94-95, .
17 Margaret Atwood, Strange Things: The Malevolent North in Canadian Literature (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1995).
18 Coral Ann Howells suggests that ‘national boundaries have blurred as Atwood responds to her widening 
international readership, arguing for a shared recognition of complicity in globalisation, which threatens 
human survival’. Coral Ann Howells, Margaret Atwood, 2nd ed. (Basingstoke and New York: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2005), 12. 
19 Atwood, Survival, 79. 
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print’ (81).
20
  Thus, the parallel extinctions of Canada and animals resonate with 
Atwood’s symbolic association in Survival.  However, Oryx and Crake is demonstrably 
more concerned than Survival with the impact of environmental destruction on other 
animals.  These disappearances are not just parallel; they also have the same cause.  As 
Philip Armstrong puts it, the environment in Oryx and Crake has become ‘post-
natural’.
21
  In Florida, ‘the rains had stopped coming, the same year Lake Okeechobee 
had shrunk to a reeking mud puddle and the Everglades had burned for three weeks 
straight’ (63).  Just during Jimmy’s parents’ lifetime, ‘the coastal aquifers turned salty 
and the northern permafrost melted and the vast tundra bubbled with methane, and the 
drought in the midcontinental plains regions went on and on, and the Asian steppes 
turned to sand dunes’ (24).  The result is a loss of human habitat:   
 There were the things [Jimmy’s] mother rambled on about sometimes, about how 
 everything was being ruined and would never be the same again, like the beach 
 house … that got washed away with the rest of the beaches and quite a few of the 
 eastern coastal cities when the sea-level rose so quickly.  (63) 
Elite scientists like Jimmy’s parents are still protected from the increasingly hostile 
environment, because they are housed in corporation-owned Compounds, gated 
communities contained by checkpoints and armed guards.  However, climate change has 
also driven people north; realising a threat that appears in Surfacing when an American 
company wants to set up a holiday resort on the protagonist’s island,
22
 the ‘top brass’ of 
the HelthWyzer corporation retreat to ‘the Moosonee HelthWyzer Gated Vacation 
Community on the western shore of Hudson’s Bay’, when they want ‘to beat the heat’ 
(178).  Damage to the environment may be a significant reason, then, for Canada’s 
apparent assimilation. And alarmingly, despite the obviously destructive impact that 
anthropocentrism has already had, the scientists at the heart of the new post-postcolonial 
world are persisting undeterred with their exploitation of such animals as are left. 
20 This is obviously a reference to Adam’s naming of animals for the first time, just after their creation; 
MaddAddam is listing animals at the other end of the process.  Indeed, David Wood observes that ‘in the 
sixth major period of global species extinction that we are currently witnessing, most of the 27,000 species 
that become extinct each year die out before even having been discovered, let alone named’. So it may be 
that at least some of the animals that MaddAddam lists were not named even the first time until after their 
extinction. David Wood, ‘Thinking With Cats’, in Animal Philosophy: Ethics and Identity, ed. Matthew 
Calarco and Peter Atterton (London and New York: Continuum, 2004), 135. 
21 Philip Armstrong, What Animals Mean in the Fiction of Modernity (London and New York: Routledge, 
2008), 173. 
22 Margaret Atwood, Surfacing (1972; repr., London: Virago Press, 1979), 88. 
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 In Oryx and Crake’s internet spectacles, anthropocentrism surfaces in the killing of 
animals for human ends, just as it does in Disgrace, Life of Pi, Mr Allbones' Ferrets, and 
The Hunter.  However, unlike the protagonists of those novels, Jimmy and Crake are not 
killers but spectators.  Just for entertainment, ‘they’d watch animal snuff sites, Felicia’s 
Frog Squash and the like’ (82).  This means that these animals’ deaths have far less 
immediacy or significance than they do in any of the other texts; neither the Lösung
offered by Bev Shaw in Disgrace, nor the hunger that motivates Pi and Allbones in their 
fishing and poaching, nor even the assertion of human superiority that informs M’s 
hunting has any application here.  Instead, the boys are thoroughly divorced from and 
indifferent to what they are seeing: ‘one stomped frog, one cat being torn apart by hand, 
was much like another’ (82).   
 While both domestic and wild animals are being destroyed, however, the Compound 
scientists are busy producing more, exclusively for human use, and in Atwood’s own 
terms, this amounts to sacrilege.  For Atwood, as for Pi in Martel’s Life of Pi, reverence 
for God and nature are the same thing.  However, whereas this is uplifting to Pi, Atwood 
calls her position ‘pessimistic pantheism’, because she feels that ‘God is everywhere, but 
losing’.  She explains that if God created everything and everything has God in it, then 
‘each time we terminate a species, “God” becomes more limited’.  She concludes, ‘if I 
were the Biblical God I would be very annoyed. He made the thing and saw that it was 
good. And now people are scribbling all over the artwork’.
23
  This is, of course, already 
evident in human-animal relations.  The importation of animals like rabbits and 
mustelids to New Zealand was, as Farrell emphasises, a case of humans believing that 
they could interfere with nature without negative consequences.  Humans in Oryx and 
Crake, however, are much more ‘sacrilegious’ in their ‘scribbling’; they demonstrate the 
same desire to control nature, but have greatly enhanced power to do so because of 
advances in transgenic science.  The result is that the kind of admiration for God 
attached to ‘natural’ animals in Life of Pi gives way to sport and self-congratulation: 
The rakunks had begun as an after-hours hobby on the part of one of the OrganInc 
 biolab hotshots.  There’d been a lot of fooling around in those days: create-an-animal 
 was so much fun, said the guys doing it; it made you feel like God. (51) 
Now that humans have established this god-like power, the anthropocentric assumption 
that animals only exist as resources for humans becomes a reality. 
23 Margaret Atwood, ‘Interview with Margaret Atwood,’ 
http://www.randomhouse.com/features/atwood/interview.html. 
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 As F. Barbara Orlans et al. explain in The Human Use of Animals, the creation of 
transgenic animals raises multiple problems, including questions of religion, 
environment and animal welfare.
24
  For Atwood, these issues overlap, and in Oryx and 
Crake, they surface in relation to the many transgenic species being created to serve 
human needs.  The bobkittens (dwarf bobcats) are an early example of such practices: 
they are created solely to control feral cats and a strain of luminous transgenic rabbits 
(apparently the escaped descendants of Alba, a real transgenic rabbit designed by the 
‘transgenic artist’ Eduardo Kac and born in 2000
25
).  The story of the bobkittens has 
much in common with the New Zealand animal introductions addressed by Mr Allbones' 
Ferrets; like the mustelids, the bobkittens are intended to deal with rabbits, but this has 
disastrous side-effects: ‘Small dogs went missing from backyards, babies from prams; 
short joggers were mauled’ (164).   
 In creating the bobkittens, then, futuristic humans have obviously failed to learn 
from their past mistakes.  Nor have they been deterred by the unexpected actions of the 
bobkittens.  Jimmy sees similarly customised animals-in-progress at Crake’s university. 
The wolvogs (wolf-dogs) are vicious canines commissioned as a form of defence, and 
Crake describes them as ‘Better than an alarm system – no way of disarming these guys’ 
(205).  This comparison emphasises that, as Orlans et al. warn, transgenic technology 
means that ‘Living things become objectified, designed, and invented to suit our needs, 
as if they were computers or stereo equipment’.
26
  However, the bobkittens and wolvogs 
at least retain or regain their wild animality; when he is threatened by wolvogs later, 
Snowman observes, ‘[I]t hasn’t taken much to reverse fifty thousand years of man-canid 
interaction’ (108).
 The ChickieNobs, the most ethically complex of the novel’s transgenic animals, are 
chickens taken to the opposite extreme, reduced to meat and almost to plants. Jimmy is 
shown ‘a large bulblike object … covered with stippled whitish-yellow skin.  Out of it 
came twenty thick fleshy tubes, and at the end of each tube another bulb was growing’ 
(202).  Although as a child, Jimmy was once upset to see the incineration of dead cows, 
sheep and pigs, because ‘Steaks didn’t have heads’(18), he is equally horrified by the 
living ChickieNobs’ lack of heads.  ‘The thing was a nightmare.  It was like an animal-
24 F. Barbara Orlans, Tom L. Beauchamp, Rebecca Dresser, David B. Mortan and John P. Gluck, The 
Human Use of Animals: Case Studies in Ethical Choice (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998).  
25 See Eduardo Kac, ‘GFP Bunny’, http://www.ekac.org/gfpbunny.html#gfpbunnyanchor. 
26 Orlans et al., The Human Use of Animals, 97.
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protein tuber’ (202).
27
  The ChickieNobs also raise questions of welfare.  As Orlans et 
al. explain, problems arise in relation to the treatment of transgenic animals, especial
when no natural equivalent exists.
ly
 What constitutes humane treatment for an animal that has substantial genetic 
 material from more than one species?  … how are its human caretakers to assess its 
 well-being?  At minimum, the normal approach of assessing species-appropriate
 behavior in a natural or captive habitat will need to be refined to formulate humane 
 treatment standards.  
They observe, ‘It has even been suggested that genetic engineers could strive to create 
animals that suffer less in cages or confined pens, because their ability to learn, 
remember and perceive their environment has been genetically impaired’.
28
 In Oryx and Crake, this is exactly what has been done in the creation of the 
ChickieNobs; Crake and Jimmy’s guide explains that most of the brain function has 
been removed, and remarks, ‘the animal-welfare freaks won’t be able to say a word, 
because this thing feels no pain’ (203).  In When Species Meet, Donna Haraway suggests 
that the ChickieNobs ‘illustrate exactly what Sarah Franklin means by designer ethics, 
which aim to bypass cultural struggle with just-in-time, “high technology” 
breakthroughs’.
29
  Franklin writes,
 It is not so much that the pre-genomic beliefs that life has a structure, or some kind 
 of internal design, have been displaced than that these long-held attitudes to ‘life 
 itself’ have been repositioned alongside a new enthusiasm for the potential of made-
 to-order recombinant outcomes.
30
Jimmy and Crake’s final exchange on the subject illustrates the fundamental debate.  
Jimmy asks about the wolvogs, ‘What if they get out?’ (205), while worrying about both 
species, ‘Why is it he feels some line has been crossed, some boundary transgressed?  
How much is too much, how far is too far?’ (206).  Crake answers both the spoken and 
the unspoken questions: ‘they won’t get out.  Nature is to zoos as God is to churches … 
Those walls and bars are there … Not to keep us out, but to keep them in.  Mankind 
needs barriers in both cases’ (206).  When Jimmy says, ‘I thought you didn’t believe in 
God’, Crake replies ‘I don’t believe in Nature either … Or not with a capital N’ (206).
27 Jimmy later tries to ignore what he has learned; he even consumes ChickieNobs ‘nubbins’ when they 
become available.  However, his initial discomfort appears genuine.  
28 Orlans et al., The Human Use of Animals, 96. 
29 Donna J. Haraway, When Species Meet (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2008), 268. 
30 Sarah Franklin, ‘Stem Cells R Us2’, in Global Assemblages: Technology, Politics, and Ethics as 
Anthropological Problems, ed. Aihwa Ong and Stephen Collier (London: Blackwell, 2004), 60. 
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Thus, what Jimmy is struggling to express is something very like Atwood’s own 
impression that humans are defacing God’s or nature’s work, while Crake goes beyond 
designer ethics to adopt Plumwood’s description of anthropocentric instrumentalism: 
‘Since there are no moral limits, expediency is the appropriate morality’.
31
  However, 
this ‘expediency approach’ is most evident in Oryx and Crake in relation to human 
hybridisation, including xenotransplantation and finally transhumanism. 
 In her ‘Manifesto for Cyborgs’, Donna Haraway argues that humans are already 
cyborgs, because biology, evolutionary theory and technology have blurred the 
boundaries between humans and animals and between organisms and machines. She 
suggests that a cyborg world could be ‘about the final imposition of a grid of control on 
the planet, about the final abstraction embodied in a Star War apocalypse.’ Alternatively,
it could be ‘about lived social and bodily realities in which people are not afraid of their 
joint kinship with animals and machines, not afraid of permanently partial identities and 
contradictory standpoints’.
32
  Xenotransplantation in Oryx and Crake brings all three 
facets of Haraway’s cyborgs into play, but the result is more like an imposed grid of 
control than an embracing of cyborg interrelationships (although, as I will suggest in the 
next section, the latter view does make an appearance).  Few creatures in the novel meet 
the traditional definition of a cyborg; their artificial components are usually organic 
rather than synthetic, but technology, in the form of biotechnology, is what makes this 
possible.  Thus, technology permits physical interrelationships between human and 
animal, which blurs the boundaries between technological and species posthumanism.  
For the most part, however,  the result amounts to technohumanism; N. Katherine 
Hayles warns that humans’ interrelationships with technology can serve to perpetuate 
the humanist subject,
33
 and this is very much the case in Oryx and Crake as 
biotechnology prolongs and enhances human lives, on an individual level, at the expense 
of other species.  Indeed, with xenotransplantation as with splicing, designer ethics 
ensures that conceptual human boundaries remain stable, so that the blending of species 
facilitates rather than contests anthropocentrism.   
 Jimmy’s father is ‘one of the foremost architects of the pigoon project’, which grows 
‘an assortment of foolproof human-tissue organs in a transgenic knockout pig host’ (22).
31 Plumwood, ‘Androcentrism and Anthropocentrism’, 341.
32 Donna J. Haraway, ‘A Manifesto for Cyborgs: Science, Technology, and Socialist Feminism in the 
1980s’, The Haraway Reader (New York and London: Routledge 2003), 11-12, 13. 
33 N. Katherine Hayles, How We Became Posthuman: Virtual Bodies in Cybernetics, Literature and 
Informatics (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1999), 287.  
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Pig-to-human xenotransplantation has already begun at the clinical level. A PBS 
Frontline report in 2001, for instance, documented trials in which stroke and Parkinson’s 
disease patients received foetal pig neural cells, and one man survived liver failure with 
an external ‘bridge’ liver from a transgenic pig.
34
  The risks of organ rejection and pig-
to-human infection which are still being negotiated in the present
35
 have been overcome 
in the transgenic pigoons of Oryx and Crake.
 However, the paradoxical human-animal relations central to xenotransplantation 
remain.  In her discussion of xenotransplantation in Animal, Erica Fudge observes that 
potentially,
 the underlying principles of [medical science] might lead us closer and closer to 
 finding something like a scientific basis for anthropomorphism … Animals are like 
 us, and if they are like us it is very difficult to make the case for using them as if they 
 were like a breathing equivalent of the auto spare-part centre.
36
Biological science, then, could support attitudes to other animals based on similarity 
rather than difference, perhaps like the deep ecology of The Hunter’s immortals or 
Jarrah Armstrong.  Often, however, new boundaries are simply constructed.  For 
instance, Lynda Birke makes the observation that species is conventionally defined in 
terms of genes.  She writes, ‘if you start to think about the similarity of DNA, or the 
similarities of its function, then … the boundaries start to dissolve.  To avoid that 
worrying prospect, we can label the genes as embodying essence’.
37
  In Oryx and Crake,
Atwood gives a similar example of designer ethics.  Publicly, ‘it was claimed that none 
of the defunct pigoons ended up as bacon and sausages: no one would want to eat an 
animal whose cells might be identical to at least some of their own’ (23-24).  However, 
even designer ethics seem to be replaced with the ethics-free ‘expediency approach’ in 
the thinking of the scientists themselves: ‘as time went on … and meat became harder to 
come by… it was noticeable how often back bacon and ham sandwiches and pork pies 
34 Frontline, ‘Organ Farm’, PBS, 2001. http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/organfarm/  
35 Rejection may be minimised by either removing or ‘knocking out’ the D -1, 3- galactosyltransferase 
gene, both modifications which were successfully made in 2002. The dangers of pig-human infection 
might also be minimised by transgenic means, or, as in a recent New Zealand project to produce insulin in 
diabetics, by using pigs from long-isolated breeding lines.  Roger Dobson. ‘Scientists produce genetically 
engineered, cloned pigs for xenotransplantation’.  British Medical Journal 324, 7329 (2002).  
http://www.bmj.com/cgi/content/full/324/7329/70/f; New Zealand Press Association, ‘Govt approves pig-
human tissue transplant medical trial,’ Three News, http://www.3news.co.nz/News/NationalNews/Govt-
approves-medical-trial-involving-pig-cells-in-humans/tabid/423/articleID/76580/cat/64/Default.aspx.   
36 Erica Fudge, Animal (London: Reaktion Books, 2002), 109.
37 Lynda Birke, Feminism, Animals and Science: The Naming of the Shrew (Buckingham: Open 
University Press, 1994), 84. 
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turned up on the staff café menu’ (24).
38
  OrganInc’s scientists, then, do not share the 
scruples attributed to the general public regarding the consumption of human cells.
39
Later scientific developments in the novel suggest even more complacency about species 
distinctions; working for HelthWyzer, Jimmy’s father grows human neocortical tissue in 
the pigoons.  Neocortex, which controls higher brain function in mammals, including 
learning ability and language, is the site of much that has traditionally been seen to set 
humans apart from other species.   Thus, through the pigoons, Atwood explores the 
possible extremes to which biotechnology might go in its manipulation of life and of 
ethics; not even their own species, it seems, is sacred to these scientists. 
 In Jimmy’s dystopian world, then, Oryx and Crake offers a bleak outlook for both 
postcolonialism and for nonhuman species, exploring the possibility that, instead of 
being undermined by posthumanist interrelationships between humans and technology 
or animals, notions of mastery might come to dominate political and species relations 
even more than they do now.  The humanist concept of progress is thus contradicted too 
by the representation of technological advance as disadvantaging all but a privileged 
human, western, capitalist, technohumanist few, and as ultimately self-destructive.
However, the hegemony of those few in Oryx and Crake is met with direct confrontation 
on the part of human groups, as well as indirect subversion both by rebel scientists and 
by nonhuman animals.   
Posthumanist resistance 
In Post-colonial Transformation, Bill Ashcroft underscores that colonised people are not 
passive victims but resist via various ‘strategies in the transformation of colonial power’.  
Discussing the relationship between colonisation and globalisation, he argues that ‘The 
strategies by which colonized communities have coped with, resisted and consumed the 
cultural capital presented to them by imperial cultures are recapitulated on a global scale 
38 The characters usually eat products like ‘SoyOboy burgers’ and ‘sveltana no-meat cocktail sausages’ 
instead of meat.  Real Japanese beef is ‘rare as diamonds’, and Snowman prizes spam as a delicacy.  
Given the prevalence of feedlots in the present, what this alimentary scenario implies is not that meat 
animals can no longer survive, but rather that natural resources are becoming so scarce that humans can no 
longer afford to feed crops to animals.  
39Already, some people are entirely comfortable with the consumption of animals with a human 
component. Daniel Dinello notes that ‘Aqua Bounty Farms applied for FDA approval for a salmon with 
human growth hormone.  The fish grows ten times faster than normal.  It would be the first genetically 
modified animal approved for human consumption.’ Daniel Dinello. Technophobia! Science Fiction 
Visions of Posthuman Technology (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2005), 259.  The consumption of 
pigoons, then, is not so far-fetched.  For just as the definition of species shifts, so can the definition of 
cannibalism. 
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in local communities throughout the world’.
40
  The theme of resistance pervades much 
of Atwood’s work.  In Survival, she delineates a process towards non-victimhood, and 
this is gone through by many of the protagonists of her other novels, including The
Edible Woman, Surfacing, Lady Oracle and The Blind Assassin.  However, as I have 
been suggesting, Oryx and Crake is much more concerned with species issues than 
Atwood’s previous work.  In Survival, Atwood writes,
 There comes a point at which seeing yourself as a victimised animal – naming your 
 condition, as the crucial step from the ignorance of Position One through the 
 knowledge of Position Two to the self-respect of Position Three – can become the 
need to see yourself as a victimised animal, and at that point you will be locked into 
 Position Two, unable to go any further.
41
These ideas are at work in some of Atwood’s earlier novels: Surfacing’s protagonist 
starts to believe that she is becoming an animal (of indeterminate species), but recovers 
after a few days, while The Edible Woman’s Marian becomes unable to eat meat or any 
other food until she breaks off her oppressive engagement.
42
  Jimmy’s childhood 
relation to animals is similarly informed by a view of animals as mirrors of his own 
feelings of victimhood.  He is upset when his father’s colleagues joke about eating 
pigoons, because ‘he thought of pigoons as creatures much like himself.  Neither he nor 
they had a lot of say in what was going on’ (24).  Later, when his mother Sharon leave
taking his pet rakunk Killer to liberate her, his concern that Killer will ‘be helpless on
her own … everything hungry would tear her into furry black and white pieces’ (61)
s,
 in 
imals 
43
seems partly conflated with his own feelings of abandonment and concern for his mother 
(67).  On the other hand, to entertain any such feeling for animals is obviously rare
Jimmy’s cultural context; even more than Pi, who regards animals as expressions of
God, or Allbones, who maintains his subjective liking for animals despite Eugenia’s 
lecturing, Jimmy is going against the grain in resisting rationalist values. Moreover, 
breaking with Survival’s patterns, Jimmy matures not by ceasing to worry about an
but by acknowledging, in his responses to the wolvogs and ChickieNobs, a genuine 
discomfort at humans’ interference with nature.  In this respect, although Jimmy takes 
40 Ashcroft, Post-colonial Transformation, 207. 
41 Atwood, Survival, 81. 
42 Margaret Atwood, The Edible Woman (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1969). 
43 Snowman later acknowledges that rakunks must be able to take care of themselves after all: ‘how else to 
account for the annoyingly large population of them now infesting this neck of the woods?’ (61). 
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no action, his attitudes are aligned with those of his rebellious mother and of radical 
activist groups. 
 Sharon goes through a process comparable to that experienced by David Lurie in 
Disgrace.  Before Jimmy’s birth and during his early childhood, she is in a similar 
privileged and rationalist position to that held by Lurie as a university lecturer; s
in the Compounds working as a biotechnologist on the pigoon project.  She initially 
holds the sorts of hopes expressed by Ronald M. Green, who argues that ‘Gene 
enhancements, if properly handled, could narrow the gap between society’s ha
have-nots and between the developed and developing nations’; for instance, ‘germline 
gene modifications may actually lower health care costs for everyone’.
he lives 
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supposes that ‘she got involved with some God’s Gardeners-type outfit’ (213). This 
group is never explicitly defined in the novel, but Atwood has since commented,
44
  In a 
conversation with Jimmy’s father, Sharon says, ‘Don’t you remember … everything we 
wanted to do?  Making life better for people – not just people with money’ (57).  Over
time, however, Sharon’s position is undermined by her experiences and, like Lurie, she 
expresses increasing reverence for the nonhuman.  She condemns the project to grow 
human neocortical tissue in pigoons, saying to Jimmy’s father, ‘You’re interfering wi
the building blocks of life.  It’s immoral.  It’s … sacrilegious’.  He counters, ‘It’s just
proteins, you know that! There’s nothing sacred about cells and tissue’ (57).  Sharon 
replies ‘I’m familiar with the theory’ (57); she obviously no longer subscribes to it.  
Then, in a more radical version of Lurie’s attempts at action in the clinic and in 
the sheep, Sharon escapes to become an activist. She reappears during the Coffee 
a conflict over an interference with nature which disadvantages human groups: 
  the Happicuppa coffee bush was designed so that all of its beans would ripen 
 simultaneously, and coffee could be grown on huge p
 machines.  This threw the small growers out of business and reduced both them
 their labourers to starvation-level poverty. (178-79) 
This meets with opposition on a global scale. ‘Riots broke out, crops were burned, 
Happicuppa cafés were looted, Happicuppa personnel were car-bombed or kidnappe
shot by snipers or beaten to death by mobs’ (179).  Sharon appears in footage of a 
blockade of Happicuppa’s Maryland headquarters.  Later, talking to Crake, Jimmy
44 Ronald M. Green, Babies By Design: The Ethics of Genetic Choice ( New Haven and London: Yale 
University Press, 2007), 137. 
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 It is noteworthy that the covenant made by God after the flood was not just with 
 Noah, but with every living thing. I assume that the ‘God’s Gardeners’ organization 
 in Oryx and Crake used this kind of insight as a cornerstone of their theology.
45
This group is much more active than the environmentalists of The Hunter, who are 
drugged and ineffectual even when they supposed to be looking for the thylacine, but its 
members are presented even less sympathetically.  The representation of God’s 
Gardeners has much in common with the derogatory depiction of animal activists by 
scientists, as discussed by Lynda Birke, Arnold Arluke and Mike Michael: ‘put simply, 
animal rights activists are represented as anti-human, deceivers, and terrorists’.
46
Jimmy’s university roommate Bernice is described as a ‘God’s Gardeners pyromaniac 
vegan’ (204), and is the author of some of the ‘hate mail and death threats from the 
God’s Gardeners’ (244) that his girlfriend Amanda receives over the use of animal 
corpses in her art.  Later, during the spread of the JUVE virus, newscasters report ‘a 
crazed mob of God’s Gardeners, liberating a ChickieNobs production facility … those 
ChickieNob things can’t even walk!’(340). However, like the representation of the 
environmentalists in The Hunter, the overall effect of this is to convey frustration with 
God’s Gardeners’ methods, rather than a lack of sympathy with their ends, especially 
since another group’s approach to a similar agenda is presented with less irony. 
 Whereas Sharon’s response to unscrupulous biotechnology is to flee, other scientists 
remain to attempt subversion from within the Compounds, pretending to conform in 
order to learn about the corporations’ projects and sabotage them using their own 
technology.  An outbreak of disease among the animals at OrganInc is a possible 
instance of this sort of resistance.  Jimmy overhears his father and a colleague 
speculating about possible sources, including competing scientists or ‘just a nutbar.
Some cult thing’ (18).  Then Jimmy’s father adds, ‘This bug is something new though. 
We’ve got the bioprint’ (19).  This suggests that the disease has been deliberately 
developed as well as released, and it could therefore have been produced within the 
Compound by rogue OrganInc scientists (it is even possible that Sharon herself is 
involved, since her job was to develop the pigoons’ biological defences).  Years later, 
Jimmy learns from Crake that MaddAddam, the host of the internet game Extinctathon, 
45 Margaret Atwood.  ‘Interview with Margaret Atwood’ 
http://www.randomhouse.com/features/atwood/interview.html.  Atwood elaborates in her recently released 
The Year of the Flood (London: Bloomsbury, 2009).  I concentrate here on their representation in and in 
relation to Oryx and Crake.
46 Lynda Birke, Arnold Arluke and Mike Michael, The Sacrifice: How Scientific Experiments Transform 
Animals and People. (West Lafayette: Purdue University Press, 2007), 130.
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takes just this approach. Crake continues to play until he is a Grandmaster, and finds that 
the game is a front for organised biotechnological resistance.  When he logs in, the 
slogan now reads ‘Adam named the animals.  MaddAddam customizes them’ (216).
47
Crake says, ‘I thought at first that they were just another crazy Animal Liberation org.  
But there’s more to it than that.  I think they’re after the machinery.  They’re after the 
whole system, they want to shut it down’ (217).  Most significantly in terms of species 
relations, MaddAddam’s activities involve what Philip Armstrong describes as 
cooperation with nonhuman agents.
48
  Indeed, Oryx and Crake approaches Haraway’s 
vision of a cyborg world where humans embrace their kinship with technology and with 
other animals simultaneously.  The Grandmasters, who must be ‘Compound, or 
Compound-trained’ (217),
49
 are using biotechnology to enhance pest species’ disruptive 
potential, often targeting the Compounds’ ethically questionable projects: 
 A tiny parasitic wasp had invaded several ChickieNobs installations, carrying a 
 modified form of chicken pox, specific to the ChickieNob and fatal to it.  The 
 installations had had to be incinerated before the epidemic could be brought under 
 control… Happicuppa coffee bean crops were menaced by a new bean weevil found 
 to be resistant to all known pesticides… A microbe that ate the tar in asphalt had 
 turned several interstate highways to sand.  (216) 
These modifications obviously entail the use of animals on MaddAddam’s part, but 
perhaps not one that Plumwood would consider instrumental,
50
 since human and animal 
ends are apparently complementary here.  In MaddAddam, then, Oryx and Crake
recovers the potential of posthumanism to combat anthropocentric and political 
hegemony.  Indeed, it offers further sources of such subversive power.  As well as 
exploring the positive impact of a view of humans as one species among many, which I 
am calling species posthumanist, in the way that Disgrace and The Hunter do, Oryx and 
Crake also shows how technology in the form of transgenic science allows the 
Grandmasters to promote the agency of animals rather than reduce them to resources.   
47 Like God’s Gardeners, MaddAddam’s name, slogans and agenda associate them with Christianity; 
Adam may be significant to them not only for his naming of animals but also for his role as steward of 
animals.   
48 Armstrong, What Animals Mean, 93. 
49 Again this means Sharon could have been involved. Atwood offers no evidence either way, but raises 
the possibility of a connection when, meeting the former-Grandmasters, Jimmy wonders, ‘had any of them 
known his mother…?’ (300).   
50 She writes that in non-instrumental use, ‘even where the other’s agency is overridden by the user’s own 
in the process of bringing it into use, it is acknowledged as more than a means to these ends, as an 
independent centre of striving which places limits on the self and on the kinds of use which may be made 
of it.’ Val Plumwood, Feminism and the Mastery of Nature (London: Routledge, 1993), 142. 
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 In terms of resistance, then, Oryx and Crake, like the other novels I have discussed, 
explores discomfort with and opposition to the instrumentalism of animals and 
foregrounds animals’ own disruptive power.  Moreover, it explores ways in which what 
I am calling technological and species posthumanism collaborate as humans use 
technology to promote animals’ disruptions of the oppressive regime.  Ultimately, 
however, the influence of both Compound and anti-Compound agents pales in 
comparison to that of Crake.  Believing that the human species has doomed itself, he 
takes matters into his own hands and sets about replacing it with a sustainable 
alternative. In the aftermath, Atwood arguably brings her version of pantheism to the 
fore, as some form of life-force reclaims control. 
Post humans 
In her brief acquaintance with the teenage Crake, Sharon concludes that he is 
‘intellectually honourable’, because ‘You could have a conversation with him … in 
which events and hypotheses were followed through to their logical conclusions’ (69).
However, this may be partly because, as Crake tells Jimmy, God and nature remain 
within defined boundaries for him and do not pose any ethical obstacles to the pursuit of 
hypotheses.  This holds true despite the fact that the hypothesis that obsesses him is that 
humans are highly unsatisfactory animals.  Snowman remembers, 
 Monkey brains, had been Crake’s opinion.  Monkey paws, monkey curiosity, the 
 desire to take apart, turn inside out, smell, fondle, measure, improve, trash, discard – 
 all hooked up to monkey brains, an advanced model of monkey brains but monkey 
 brains all the same. (99)  
 This is of course very similar to the narrator’s insistence in Mr Allbones' Ferrets that 
humans are only ‘clever monkeys’: Crake considers human thought instinctive and not a 
mark of superiority.  Indeed, in terms of sexuality, Crake appears to consider humans 
inferior to other species; in a twist on Descartes’ description of other animals as 
automata, he describes humans as faulty hormone robots (166).  He even blames ‘the 
external causes of death’ on ‘War, which is to say misplaced sexual energy, which we 
[he and his employees] consider to be a larger factor than the economic, racial, and 
religious causes often cited’ (293).
51
  Moreover, according to Crake, humans have 
effectively doomed themselves:   
51 Here, Crake’s perspective seems closely related to the view expressed by Freud, in Civilization and its 
Discontents, that sexual desires and competitiveness result in aggression.  For instance, Freud writes,  
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As a species we’re in deep trouble, worse than anyone’s saying… we’re running out 
of space-time.  Demand for resources has exceeded supply for decades in marginal 
geopolitical areas, hence the famines and droughts; but very soon, demand is going 
to exceed supply for everyone. (295) 
Taking these considerations to their logical conclusions, Crake’s ‘solution’ pushes the 
concept of environmentalist sacrifice to its most radical extreme.    
 In ‘Thinking With Cats’, David Wood discusses a significant conflict between 
compassion for the individual, as expressed by animal rights advocates, for instance, and 
environmentalists’ concern for ecosystems, a conflict in which the latter have sometimes 
met with ‘the charge of eco-fascism, for the apparent willingness to sacrifice some 
animals (even humans!) for the greater good’.  Wood explains that some 
environmentalists ‘stress the value of change, even dramatic change’, observing, 
If we send two-thirds of the species on the planet into extinction, and then die out 
ourselves, we can assume that evolutionary forces would continue, and perhaps a 
new dominant species, less predisposed to violence, would emerge in a few million 
years.   One would have to be very patient, and very detached to acquiesce in such a 
process with such an outcome.
52
In Oryx and Crake, Crake’s motivations are never fully spelt out, but this is his apparent 
ambition.  Indeed, Crake is so detached from his own species that he does more than 
acquiesce in human extinction; he tries to instigate it.  He tells Jimmy that the BlyssPluss 
pill he has developed is an aphrodisiac which will secretly sterilise people: ‘With the 
BlyssPluss Pill the human race will have a better chance of swimming … Fewer people, 
therefore more to go around’.  When Jimmy asks, ‘What if the fewer people are very 
greedy and wasteful?’, Crake only says, ‘They won’t be’ (295).  When the 
‘contraceptive’ ingredient in BlyssPluss turns out to be an anthropocidal virus (JUVE),
53
Snowman is left alone in the world, wondering, ‘Had he been a lunatic or an 
 If we do away with personal rights over material wealth, there still remains prerogative in the field of 
 sexual relationships, which is bound to become the source of the strongest dislike and the most violent 
 hostility among men who in other respects are on an equal footing.  
Sigmund Freud, Civilization and its Discontents, trans. James Strachey (New York, Norton, 1986), 60-61. 
http://www.archive.org/details/CivilizationAndItsDiscontents.  Crake, however, is inclined to concentrate 
on the frustration of unrequited love or desire as the cause of problems (165), whereas Freud appears to 
blame sexual competitiveness and its repression by civilization. 
52 Wood, ‘Thinking With Cats, 142. 
53 The aphrodisiac claim might, like the ‘birth control’ claim, be another euphemism on Crake’s part; 
earlier, he observes that ‘Men can imagine their own deaths, they can see them coming, and the mere 
thought of impending death acts like an aphrodisiac’ (120).  He might, therefore, consider this a likely 
effect of BlyssPluss, as people start to realise they are doomed. 
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intellectually honourable man who’d thought things through to their logical conclusion?  
And was there any difference?’ (343). However, Crake does not exhibit the patience that 
Wood describes as necessary to environmentalist sacrifice. Instead, Crake can be seen as 
an extreme example of a tendency within humanity towards anthropocentric arrogance, 
which the novel already condemns in relation to the transgenicists who play ‘create-an-
animal’.  Failing to acknowledge that he too might have shortcomings, Crake becomes 
the exaggeration of all that is humanist, empowered by technology.  He regards himself 
as the ultimate master of nature and of history, as he tries to seize control and dictate the 
future of life on earth, replacing humans with his own design: the Crakers.
 The different values informing the creation of the Crakers belong to apparently 
opposing standpoints.  Crake’s intention is to initiate a scenario resembling that of the 
catastrophe novel as described by Richard Kerridge: ‘The catastrophe novel is always an 
opportunity for a new start,’ in which ‘A community is able to sever itself cleanly from 
the culture of the past, while remembering that culture well enough to learn from its 
mistakes’.
54
  Crake explains that in his transgenic humans or Crakers, as Oryx calls 
them, ‘What had been altered was nothing less than the ancient primate brain.  Gone 
were its destructive features, the features responsible for the world’s current illnesses’ 
(305).  The Crakers effectively literalise what Armstrong calls ‘therio-primitivism’, a 
‘specifically modern conjunction between animality and pre- or non-modern forms of 
humanity’.  In the negative version of this, he writes, ‘animality is conceived as a state 
out of which the human must be forced, or from which it must travel, using … the 
innovations of science’.  However, Armstrong explains that after World War I, when 
technological progress appeared destructive, modernists began to see primitivism as a 
desirable state: ‘Animality, at its most wild and untamed, was not the enemy of 
humanity, but its possible, perhaps its only, salvation’.
55
  In Oryx and Crake, where
progress has become unquestionably destructive, Crake embraces this view in designing 
the Crakers.  Their ‘primitive’ component resonates with Atwood’s discussion in 
Strange Things of a ‘desire among [Canadian] non-Natives to turn themselves into 
Natives’, deriving in part from an older tradition in which ‘Indians became identified 
with Rousseau’s “noble savage” concept, and their reputation benefited from 
54 Richard Kerridge, ‘Narratives of Resignation: Environmentalism in Recent Fiction’, in The
Environmental Tradition in English Literature, ed. John Parnham (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2002), 92-93. 
55 Armstrong, What Animals Mean, 142, 143. 
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Romanticism generally, with its love of nature an its yen for the “primitive”’.  She 
concludes,
 Perhaps the thing to do with it is … to take it a step further: if white Canadians 
 would adopt a more traditionally Native attitude to the natural world, a less 
 exploitative and more respectful attitude, they might be able to reverse the galloping 
 environmental carnage of the late twentieth century.
56
This is, of course, precisely what Crake hopes the Crakers will achieve by being more 
primitive.  He also seems to be trying to ensure their harmlessness by making them more 
like other animals. His attitude recalls one expressed in Plutarch’s That Brute Beasts 
Have Use of Reason, which Erica Fudge discusses in Brutal Reasoning.  In the dialogue, 
a man called Gryllus, turned into a pig by Circe, does not want to be turned back 
because humans are not naturally virtuous like other animals.  Fudge writes, ‘To be an 
animal, in this text, is to be more natural and less vicious than, and thus superior to, a 
human’.
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 Similarly, the Crakers’ nonhuman features are what make them an improvement on 
humans.  Crake explains to Jimmy that they are not territorial because they are 
herbivores (with a digestive system based on that of rabbits (158-59)), and ‘neither 
hunters nor agriculturalists hungry for land’ (305).  Indeed, like other nonhuman 
animals, they are ‘perfectly adjusted to their habitat, so they would never have to create 
houses or tools or, for that matter, clothing’.
58
  Therefore, Crake reasons, ‘They would 
have no need to invent any harmful symbolisms’ (305).  Finally, Crake has removed 
what he regards as the danger of human sexuality: ‘they came into heat at regular 
intervals, as did most mammals other than man’ (305), and when they do, the females’ 
buttocks and stomachs turn blue, ‘a trick of variable pigmentation filched from the 
baboons, with a contribution from the expandable chromosphores of the octopus’ (164). 
‘Since it’s only the blue tissue and the pheromones released by it that stimulate the  
56 Atwood, Strange Things, 35, 39, 60. 
57 Erica Fudge, Brutal Reasoning: Animals, Rationality and Humanity in Early Modern England (Ithaca, 
NY: Cornell University Press, 2006), 90. 
58 Again, this echoes Freud, who writes: ‘If private property were abolished, all wealth held in common, 
and everyone allowed to share in the enjoyment of it, ill-will and hostility would disappear among men’.  
However, Freud also believes that  ‘Aggressiveness was not created by property’. Freud, Civilization and 
its Discontents, 60. 
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males, there’s no more unrequited love these days, no more thwarted lust’ (165).
59
  In 
the Crakers, then, the therio-primitivist ideal has become a reality.  Paradoxically, 
however, the values informing Crake’s creation of them seem entirely at odds with the 
values they are to embody. 
 Firstly, Crake’s overall project in creating the Crakers is fundamentally 
anthropocentric in that although he eradicates humans, he also replaces them.  Although 
he uses multiple species as the inspiration and sometimes the resources for various 
features of the Crakers, they are modified humans rather than anything else.  The reason 
for this is not apparent.  One of the key arguments against the idea of human extinction 
as an ecological solution is that it would leave no-one to minimise the ongoing impact of 
human technology on the environment (of nuclear energy for instance), yet the Crakers 
are in no way equipped to deal with such hazards.  On the contrary, Snowman has to 
check that the children do not collect anything harmful during their beachcombing.  
They are not conceived of as actively solving problems, but simply as creating no more.  
This suggests that the replacement of humans at all in fact betrays an aspect of 
anthropocentrism at the heart of Crake’s antihuman scheme, in his desire for humans to 
go on in some form. 
 The practical process of creating the Crakers is also, I would suggest, 
technohumanist.  Crake employs the same transgenic techniques used in making the 
rakunks, wolvogs, ChickieNobs and pigoons; as applied to humans, this is known as 
transhumanism.  Heidi Campbell and Mark Walker define this as ‘the view that humans 
should (or should be permitted to) use technology to remake human nature’. They write,  
 It is believed that through stem cell technology, genetic engineering and 
 nanotechnology … we might be able to greatly enhance the healthy life span of 
 persons, increase intelligence, and some would argue, make ourselves happier, and 
 more virtuous… transhumanism presents a radical view of our future world: the 
 merging of humanity with technology as the next stage of our human evolution - we 
 have the opportunity to become something more than human.
60
59 Freud, by contrast, considered that:  
 If we were to remove this factor too … we cannot, it is true, easily foresee what new paths the 
 development of civilization could take; but one thing we can expect, and that is that this indestructible 
 feature of human nature will follow it there 
Freud, Civilization and its Discontents, 61.  This suggests that whereas Crake thinks removing the 
problem of sexual frustration will remove aggression, Freud did not. 
60 Heidi Campbell and Mark Walker, ‘Religion and Transhumanism: Introducing a Conversation.’ Journal 
of Evolution and Technology 14, 2 (2005), i. http://jetpress.org/volume14/specialissueintro.html.  
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Thus, if technohumanism means an interrelationship with technology that does not 
challenge but rather perpetuates and exacerbates humanism’s prioritisation of humans 
and of progress as improvement, then transhumanism is a subset of this that involves 
physically enhancing the human through biotechnology.  The Crakers, of course, are 
designed to avoid perpetuating those humanist values, but Crake’s role as practitioner of 
transhumanism is very like that of Pitford in Mr Allbones' Ferrets; he behaves as if his 
knowledge of life is such that he can rearrange it without negative consequences.
However, Ted Peters warns that transgenic enhancement and transhumanism ‘risk 
promising too much.  They promise to make us into fabulous human beings ... Tacitly, 
they risk assigning science the job of providing the equivalent of salvation’.
61
  This is an 
apt description of the task which Crake appears to have taken upon himself; he even 
names his biosphere Paradice.
62
   However, the results are far from utopian.  The 
destruction of the original humans can only be described as apocalyptic, while, though 
they are unaware of it themselves, the Crakers seem caged by Crake’s extensive 
restrictions.  Snowman observes that ‘no thou shalt nots would be any good to them, or 
even comprehensible, because it’s all built in.  No point in telling them not to lie, steal, 
commit adultery, or covet.  They wouldn’t grasp the concepts’ (366).  Armstrong 
suggests that ‘Atwood presents Crake’s meticulous genetic programming as another 
form of confinement, which locks his creatures into a territorial and behavioural 
enclosure.  The Crakers are stuck in their own ark, so to speak, which is both sanctuary 
and prison’ (195).  Ultimately, Crake is trying not just to create a species but to arrest 
evolution in the Crakers by removing their need for progress.
 Overall, then, Crake’s destruction of humans and his creation of the Crakers appears 
thoroughly paradoxical in humanist terms.  He has no faith in humans and thinks other 
species are better designed in many ways, so he tries to remove humans from their 
centrality to history.  However, he makes more humans according to transhumanist 
principles in which he regards himself as the ultimate master of nature and shaper of 
history.  The one thing that might explain all these discrepancies is what Snowman 
61 Ted Peters, ‘Perfect Humans or Transhumans?’ in Future Perfect? God, Medicine and Human Identity,
ed. Celia Deane-Drummond and Peter Manley Scott (London and New York: T & T Clark, 2006), 16. 
62 The word paradise is usually used to refer to either Eden or heaven, but has its origins in terms referring 
to enclosed gardens or royal parks, rather than to a wild or divine place.  It is therefore appropriate for 
Crake’s use for three reasons: he is pretending to create immortality (heaven); he is really creating new 
people (Eden); and the project is in fact far from wild and is thoroughly contained within the dome.  
Additionally, of course, the -dice of his chosen spelling points to the fact that the whole project is 
something of gamble. 
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describes as Crake’s ‘truly colossal ego’ (321): it may be that Crake simply regards 
himself as able and entitled to improve on creation, and that both his destruction of 
humans and his creation of the Crakers are part of that conviction.  In that case, Crake 
can be read as a parody of humanist exceptionality at an individual level.  However, as 
in Mr Allbones' Ferrets, nature ultimately reclaims control, as Crake’s influence wanes 
along with that of other humans and the post-natural world becomes literally posthuman.   
 In Babies by Design, Green writes that ‘Atwood’s novel criticizes our excessive love 
of science and our environmental intrusiveness’, and he reads Oryx and Crake as 
expressing a ‘fear … that we can never retain full control of our creations’.
63
  I want to 
suggest, however, that though the novel certainly conveys a fear of scientists getting out 
of control, it also celebrates the unpredictability of their creations as, like the mustelids 
of Mr Allbones' Ferrets, contradicting the anthropocentric denial of ‘Nature’s agency 
and independence of ends’.
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  The representation of Snowman’s experience certainly 
reflects contemporary concerns about transgenics.  Birke et al. discuss a 2001 report by 
Phil Macnaghten on the British public’s views of biotechnology, which revealed 
questions about usefulness and risk:
These two dimensions often combined as concerns about violating natural 
boundaries and the capacity of nature to fight back with a vengeance, or that 
‘messing about with nature’ was ‘likely to rebound on humans’.
65
It certainly rebounds on Snowman.  Immunised against BlyssPluss so that he can guide 
the Crakers, he is tortured by the fact that he has failed to understand or warn anyone 
about Crake’s anthropocidal project (this guilt is one reason for his adoption of the name 
Snowman: ‘He’s kept the abominable to himself, his own secret hair shirt’ (8)
66
).  He is 
also at the mercy of the transgenic animals whose behaviour is rapidly changing in their 
newfound freedom.  Wolvogs, of course, are already programmed to be dangerous, but 
Snowman fears they will become more so: 
63 Green, Babies by Design, 5 
64 Plumwood, Feminism and the Mastery of Nature, 341 
65 Birke et al., The Sacrifice, 183. 
66 The name is also appropriate for other reasons.  It breaks Crake’s Paradice rule of using only real animal 
names, and the Abominable Snowman appeals to Jimmy, ‘flickering at the edges of blizzards, apelike man 
or manlike ape, stealthy, elusive, known only through rumours and through its backward pointing 
footprints’ (7-8).  Indeed, for the Crakers, he is liable to become a kind of missing link figure, like them 
but monstrous and mythological.  He also compares himself to a real snowman in his vulnerability to the 
newly tropical North American environment: 
 Maybe he’s the other kind of snowman …  the last Homo sapiens – a white illusion of a man, here 
 today, gone tomorrow, so easily shoved over, left to melt in the sun, getting thinner and thinner until 
 he liquefies and trickles away altogether.  As Snowman is doing now.  (224) 
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They’re smart; very soon they’ll sense his vulnerability, start hunting him.  Once 
they begin he’ll never be able to go anywhere, or anywhere without trees.  All they’ll 
have to do is get him out in the open, encircle him, close in for the kill.  There’s only 
so much you can do with stones and pointed sticks. (107) 
These fears may well be justified, since bobkittens and the pigoons are already more 
dangerous than anticipated. The bobkittens, of course, begin to behave unpredictably 
even before the apocalypse, while the pigoons’ modifications, paradoxically, accelerate 
their return to their wild origins. ‘Pigoons were supposed to be tusk-free, but maybe they 
were reverting to type now they’d gone feral, a fast-forward process considering their 
rapid-maturity genes’ (38).  On the other hand, the pigoons’ human component is not 
receding; instead, their human neocortical tissue seems to be affecting their behaviour.  
When this technology is first developed, Jimmy’s mother comments, ‘That’s all we need 
… More people with the brains of pigs’ (56). Now, Snowman has the opposite problem: 
pigs thinking like humans. On a visit to the Compound, he becomes the victim of an 
organised hunt: 
 It’s as if they’ve had it planned, between the two groups; as if they’ve known for 
 some time that he was in the gatehouse and have been waiting for him to come out, 
 far enough so they can surround him. (267) 
Snowman escapes into a watchtower and is trapped there, confined by the pigoons as 
they were once confined by humans, and barely escapes.  Human-nonhuman power 
relations, then, are quickly inverting, which is a disaster for Snowman, but perhaps not 
in terms of the novel’s broader fears that a natural/divine life force is currently losing too 
much control to humans.  The Crakers, too, support this idea. Like the transgenic 
animals, they start to break the restrictions that their creators sought to impose, but as 
those creators are humans, this does not necessarily constitute a fall, but perhaps a return 
to the garden. 
 Inspired and encouraged by Snowman, the Crakers begin to display just those 
characteristics that Crake sought to eradicate.  Because they effectively embody the 
colonial stereotype of primitive innocents, Snowman finds himself in the position of the 
stereotypical coloniser, and indeed, a missionary or prophet in his guidance of the 
Crakers.  Atwood is quite overt about this parallel; as Snowman is trying to relate to the 
Crakers, ‘the book in his head’ says,
When dealing with indigenous peoples … you must attempt to respect their traditions 
and confine your explanations to simple concepts that can be understood within the 
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contexts of their belief system… If she [the author] were here she’d need a whole 
new take on indigenous. (97) 
His most exploitative colonisation of the Crakers is making them kill fish, fitting his 
needs into their belief system but certainly not in a way that respects it. Snowman knows 
that Oryx has told the Crakers not to hurt other animals, because ‘If things had gone as 
Crake wanted, there would be no more such killing – no more human predation’ (101), 
but he claims that Crake has spoken to him (through his watch) and ordained that he 
should receive a cooked fish each week.
67
 More often, however, Snowman’s relation to the Crakers recalls MaddAddam’s 
relation to other animals: he manipulates them only to encourage and advance their 
unwitting transgressions.  This pattern originates with the Crakers’ own existential 
curiosity, which Crake tried to eradicate but which Snowman is inclined to foster. Even 
while Oryx is still instructing them, she reports, ‘they asked who made them … I said it 
was Crake’ (311), and when they ask him more questions, Snowman builds on this, 
inventing a myth in which they are the Children of Crake and animals are the Children 
of Oryx:
 In the beginning, there was chaos … The people in the chaos were full of chaos 
 themselves, and the chaos made them do bad things.  They were killing other people 
 all the time.  And they were eating up all the Children of Oryx … And so Crake took 
 the chaos, and he poured it away. (102-03) 
Snowman’s stories are somewhat problematic in that they repeat humans’ conceptual 
binaries, separating human(oid) from nonhuman and gendering that distinction.  While 
the Crakers are constructed by Crake from coral and mango, the animals ‘hatched out of 
… a giant egg laid by Oryx herself’ (96).
68
  The natural and female even appears as a 
resource, in the sense that Oryx lays another egg of words, which only the Crakers get to 
eat.  In this sense, then, the binaries of the religion Snowman offers are built along the 
lines of humanist distinctions.  On the other hand, Snowman is constructing an aetiology 
which glorifies the female as well as the male, and fosters respect for nature, language 
67 As part of this, Snowman also tells the Crakers that they should return the fish bones to the sea, so that 
Oryx can make more; this gives the Crakers a basic story of an afterlife (reincarnation) and a basic 
funerary ritual for animals.   
68 The novel does not explore the Crakers’ own interpretation of these points, but this could cause other 
prohibited behaviours if they take the story too literally.  None of them dies in the narrative, but if they 
believe that they are really made of coral and mango, they might take each other’s bones to the sea, as 
Snowman has told them to do with the fish bones, developing the funerary practices which Crake tried to 
rule out.   
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and Oryx herself, all of which were presented as violated by the anthropocentric 
humanism and technohumanism displayed by original humans.  However, these points 
reveal more about Snowman than the Crakers.  The greater challenge to Crake’s 
authority is not that Snowman gets them to think in religious ways, but that they have 
the capacity to do so.  Moreover, they then start to develop beliefs independently of 
Snowman’s influence. 
 As they speak of Crake with increasing admiration, Snowman is jealous but also 
pleased, because ‘Crake was against the notion of God, or gods of any kind, and would 
surely be disgusted by the spectacle of his own gradual deification’ (103-04).  Then, 
apparently inspired by Snowman’s claims of speaking with Crake, the Craker women 
begin to talk about communing with Oryx: after driving an aggressive bobkitten away 
with stones, they decide, ‘Tonight we will apologize to Oryx … And we will request her 
to tell her children not to bite us’ (157).  Snowman, who never witnesses this, supposes 
that
 They must perform some kind of prayer or invocation, since they can hardly believe 
 that Oryx appears to them in person … They’re up to something … something Crake 
 didn’t anticipate: they’re conversing with the invisible, they’re developing reverence. 
 Good for them…  He likes it when Crake is proved wrong.  (157) 
 The Crakers are also inspired by Snowman’s use of ‘pictures’ in his storytelling, 
such as sand and water mixed to represent chaos: ‘They’d struggled with pictures, at first 
– flowers on beach-trash lotion bottles, fruits on juice cans.  But now they appear to have 
grasped the concept’ (102).  It is here that Atwood shows the Crakers coming to grips 
with representation, a concept which is of course central to the medium of fiction too. 
According to Crake, ‘Symbolic thinking of any kind would signal downfall …  Next 
they’d be inventing idols, and funerals, and grave goods, and the afterlife, and sin, and 
Linear B, and kings, and then slavery and war’ (361).  However, the Crakers reach the 
deceptively simple conclusion that ‘Not real can tell us about real’ (102). That they can 
grasp this suggests that Crake, in his rationalism, has underestimated the human capacity 
for symbolic thought, and so perhaps its value.  Additionally, the Crakers’ formulation 
of the concept expresses just what a novel like Oryx and Crake tries to do.  Fiction – the 
‘not real’ – can tell us about ‘real’; in this case, the futuristic scenario is intended to warn 
‘us’ (in the present) about the dangers of making assumptions like Crake’s. 
 Finally, the Crakers actively undermine Crake’s technohumanism by putting pictures 
and mythology together, entirely of their own accord: Snowman discovers them chanting 
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his name to an effigy they have made ‘to help us send out our voices to you’ (361).
They thus have developed a complex concept of communion through representation, 
which they should be entirely incapable of doing.  Although, as is the case in Life of Pi,
religion and humanism can be compatible, the Crakers’ development of religion appears 
to be regarded in positive anti-humanist terms in Oryx and Crake.  Anthropocentrism 
and technohumanism are presented as violating religion and respect for nature, as 
epitomised by Crake in his attempt to play and to erase God, whereas the Crakers, with 
Snowman’s help, undermine both aspects of Crake’s arrogant ideas.  In these ways, the 
Crakers, like the bobkittens, wolvogs and pigoons, transgress the boundaries supposedly 
imposed by science, implying that even in a world where extensive biotechnological 
modification is possible, some life force remains unconquered, just as it did in the 
nineteenth-century context of Mr Allbones' Ferrets. This point is also underscored, 
somewhat more ambiguously, by the survival of other humans besides Snowman. 
 During Snowman’s scavenging trip to the Compounds, he finds a radio and hears 
other isolated humans who have also managed to escape the JUVE virus.  When he 
returns to the Crakers, they tell him that there are two men and a woman nearby.  
Though Snowman is pleased by the Crakers’ human characteristics, he is very concerned 
by the survival of fully human beings.  Worried that they might kill him (or perhaps that 
he might die of an infection in his foot), he wants to warn the Crakers about violence, 
rape, molestation or slavery (367); he obviously fears that more than his own cultural 
colonisations might be reproduced in human-Craker relations.  In this sense, the 
problems of how to negotiate cultural and species differences (which are almost the 
same thing where they concern the Crakers) have added urgency as the novel ends.  On 
the other hand, however, the survival of humans, like the behaviour of the bobkittens, 
pigoons and Crakers, is another contradiction of Crake’s dismissal of nature and God; 
again, some such force is escaping the confines of zoo or church and reclaiming control 
over life.  Some hope therefore remains, if not for Crake’s vision, then for his pretended 
goal of fewer, less destructive humans.  Together, they and the Crakers could still 
become the sort of the post-catastrophe community which Kerridge describes, made up 
of people who have learned enough from the past not to repeat its mistakes.  Caught 
between these two possibilities, Snowman limps along the beach towards the other 
humans, armed and knowing that they are also armed, not knowing whether they are 
friend or foe.  Ending the narrative here, Atwood ultimately refuses to answer this 
question, leaving it for the present to answer. 
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Conclusion
Oryx and Crake’s pre- and post-apocalyptic worlds, then, provide a futuristic 
perspective on the sorts of questions raised by Disgrace, Life of Pi, Mr Allbones' Ferrets
and The Hunter.  Atwood offers a warning about future evolutions of imperialism and 
anthropocentrism, imagining a centralised globalisation from which Canada is 
conspicuously absent, where transgenic hybridisation and xenotransplantation have 
become the norm, and where a rogue scientist might obliterate human life.  Thus, if The
Hunter undermines the idea of philosophical progress to date, Oryx and Crake paints 
future technological progress as thoroughly dystopian.  The modes of resistance 
explored in the novel, however, include the opposition to anthropocentrism on the part 
of certain characters that also features in each of the other novels, and the conception of 
animal agency that appears in Mr Allbones' Ferrets. Oryx and Crake also offers an 
additional contribution, however, in that it is the only one of the novels under discussion 
to unite these two forms of resistance in the human recognition and promotion of other 
species’ disruptiveness.  That alliance is not very successful, but later nature’s influence 
on the Crakers, who already literally combine humans and other species, helps them cast 
off some of the restrictions that have been imposed on them, so the alliance is arguably 
successful there to an extent.  Overall, Oryx and Crake’s version of the postcolonial 
challenge to humanism that is my focus here lies somewhere between those of The
Hunter and Mr Allbones' Ferrets.  As in The Hunter, technology-enhanced
anthropocentrism and the prioritisation of the global is criticised as destructive, causing 
mass extinctions rather than a single one and considerable imbalances in cultural power.  
However, like Mr Allbones' Ferrets, Oryx and Crake also illustrates the limits to 
humans' power over nature, showing that they are not as masterful as they believe 
themselves to be.  Of all the novels I address, then, Oryx and Crake perhaps most fully 
realises both the cultural and ecological threats of technologically enhanced humanism 
or technohumanism, and what I call the species posthumanist perspective in which 
humans are regarded as interwoven with other animals.
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Conclusion: challenging humanism 
Because this thesis has been concerned with a very small sample of literature 
concentrating on specific themes, it is not possible to draw conclusions about the shape 
of contemporary white postcolonial fiction in general on the basis of what is here.
However, from the analysis of the novels that have been addressed, commonalities 
emerge which suggest the existence of certain threads running through that literature 
where animals are a focus.  I have suggested that all five novels are united by their 
contestation of aspects humanist discourse, such as the conceptual privileging of the 
western, male, rationalist and human in its construction of figure of ‘man’, which can be 
seen to inform the historical imperialism and contemporary globalisation against which 
white postcolonial societies variously seek to define themselves.  In the novels I have 
addressed, connections between imperialism or globalisation and anthropocentrism are 
often underscored, and an adherence to detached rationalism over emotion is seen as 
contrary to animal and often human interests.  Animals, however, are also presented as 
having disruptive power, on conceptual or practical levels or both.  Thinking seriously 
about animals often affects the attitudes of individual human characters in one way or 
another.  Additionally, although animals’ actions do not necessarily assist human 
attempts at resistance or even serve their own best interests, they often directly, if 
accidentally, disrupt anthropocentric and imperialistic or globalising endeavours.  In 
each novel, then, animals are of interest not because their situations are identical or even 
(necessarily) parallel to those of humans, but because they appear to challenge the same 
discourses that white postcolonial cultures seek to resist. These features of their 
attention to animals unite the novels despite their various origins and their sometimes 
considerable differences of approach.
Anti-humanism and posthumanism 
Partly due to their specific cultural concerns, the challenge to humanism is articulated 
slightly differently in each novel.  These differences are particularly apparent in the 
contrast between Disgrace and Life of Pi drawn in my first two chapters.  Disgrace
concentrates on the need for white humility in the new post-apartheid South Africa, and 
animals are connected to this in ways that challenge anthropocentrism alongside 
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Eurocentrism and racism.  Lurie, who can be seen to embody humanist values at first, is 
set against his more ethically engaged daughter, Lucy, who offers a counterfocalizing 
figure for the narrative.  Implicitly, Coetzee draws parallels between racism and 
speciesism, particularly in Lurie’s comment that humans are ‘Not higher, necessarily, 
just different’ (74), a formulation that seems more than coincidentally reminiscent of the 
United States segregation catch phrase, ‘separate but equal’.  Lurie only grudgingly 
accepts Lucy’s insistent humility in response to racial conflict, but he becomes keenly 
aware that his own Europeanising is irrelevant in South Africa.  In relation to animals, in 
a process catalysed by his daily contact with them, Lurie develops a sense of 
responsibility resembling that modelled by Lucy and Bev.  The novel thus appears to 
advocate white (secular) humility in the new South Africa, and the sort of relativising of 
humans and other animals which I am calling species posthumanism.  While they are 
not solutions, these attitudes are presented as helping to navigate and perhaps to avoid 
exacerbating problems in terms of species and race relations.
Life of Pi’s cultural focus is a celebration of multiculturalism in India and, to an 
extent, Canada.  Martel uses animals’ disruptions of categories in ways which can be 
seen to parallel the cultural border-crossings effected by the characters as part of 
postcolonial hybridity.  However, notions of human exceptionality are not drawn into 
question. As I explained in the introduction and chapter two, decolonising cultures 
cannot necessarily afford to abandon their assertion of a subject status previously denied 
them, because the possession such status remains significant in practice.  Whether for 
this reason or another, Life of Pi does not question human-nonhuman distinctions. 
Instead, its challenge to humanism is to rationalism only. The novel thus tries to 
undermine what is arguably the theoretical basis for humanism while retaining the 
ideologies of human distinctiveness and superiority and asserting them through the 
subordination of animals.  I suggested that this approach can therefore be seen as a 
version of Althusser’s concept of ‘theoretical anti-humanism’.   
Mr Allbones' Ferrets concerns the nineteenth-century European settlers of New 
Zealand.  It distances contemporary Pakeha culture from their attitudes by approaching 
them with irony, representing their anthropocentric beliefs in European superiority and 
rationalist mastery as not only imperialistic but mistaken.  This point is made through 
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evidence of the human characters’ own physical vulnerability, sexuality and fertility, but 
also through animals’ disruptions of colonial endeavours.  However, perhaps partly 
because the historical content makes the outcome a foregone conclusion, Mr Allbones' 
Ferrets show that humans are subject to nature without suggesting that this solves 
anything; at best, the novel implies that contemporary awareness could improve current 
or future human-animal relations.  
The Hunter and Oryx and Crake have related cultural concerns despite their 
different contexts, in that they speculate about present Australian and future Canadian 
relations to global influences. The Hunter warns that historical imperialism and 
assumptions about human mastery survive in the present in the form of multinational 
organisations and anthropocentric technology. The biotechnology corporation prioritises 
international power over the local and over animals, while the representation of 
technology itself resonates with N. Katherine Hayles’ observation that technological 
posthumanism can perpetuate anthropocentric values,
1
 in the form of technohumanism.  
What I call species posthumanism also appears in this novel in the form of the deep-
ecological philosophy of Jarrah Armstrong and his environmentalist friends.  However, 
Jarrah is dead and his vision does not survive him.  Instead, the logic of the 
environmentalists’ ‘indistinguishability account’ is drawn into question, especially in 
relation to extinction.  The rationality that M believes himself to possess is undermined 
by his emotional response to the Armstrong family and to the thylacine, but his initial 
view of himself as triumphing over emotion and over animals eventually dominates.  
Thus, the concept of humans’ superior power is not presented as untrue in this novel, 
but as resulting in tragedy.
Oryx and Crake takes these problems a step further again.  The humanist notion 
of progress as improvement is thoroughly undermined by Atwood’s futuristic dystopia.  
However, although the privileging of the western, the rational and the human is again 
presented as destructive, posthumanist interconnections between human and nonhuman 
increase the power of the dominant group as well as contributing to the resistance to it.
Because the technology central to Oryx and Crake is biotechnology, the difference 
1 N. Katherine Hayles, How We Became Posthuman: Virtual Bodies in Cybernetics, Literature and 
Informatics (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1999), 287. 
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between technological and species posthumanism blurs as biological interrelationships 
between species are exploited via transgenics to produce hybrid animals-as-instruments, 
including animals with human cells to be used for xenotransplantation. Oryx and Crake
thus emphasises that the dismantlement of human species boundaries might not impede 
anthropocentric interests at all, and could even facilitate their pursuit. 
 All five novels, then, are united not only by their white postcolonial origins and 
their attention to nonhuman animals, but through a common opposition to aspects of 
humanist discourse, whether they offer a limited, theoretical anti-humanism like Life of 
Pi’s anti-rationalism, or a more extensive opposition to the concepts of human and 
western superiority like that offered by Disgrace.  In making these challenges to 
humanism, the novels can also be seen to engage with broader social, ideological and 
literary concerns which extend beyond their specific cultural contexts, to do with the 
negotiation of the kinds of difference which humanist discourse reinforces.   
 In Disgrace and Life of Pi, this involves exploring ideas about how cultures and 
species should live with one another. Disgrace foregrounds problems to do with animal 
welfare in terms of both companion and meat animals which obviously extend beyond 
its immediate South African context.  Similarly, its advocacy of humility and acceptance 
in relation to both animals and post-apartheid race relations has a more widespread 
application as a means of approaching the goal of sharing life.  Life of Pi concentrates 
on cultural hybridity as a creative and positive response to cultural juxtapositions, 
although in its response to questions about how humans should regard their relationship 
with animals, its promotion of an admiration that maintains the status quo seems quite a 
conservative answer compared with Disgrace’s.
Mr Allbones' Ferrets, The Hunter and Oryx and Crake can all be seen to share 
more widespread concerns about globalisation and extinction.  They present the 
prioritisation of European and global interests as an ideology against which white 
postcolonial cultures, but by extension other marginalised cultures, must define 
themselves, in establishing distance from colonial history and/or in defending local 
resources or cultural specificity against assimilation by larger international powers.  The 
impact of imperialistic or global perspectives on animals is also a problem with 
widespread relevance.  Mr Allbones' Ferrets and Oryx and Crake take a largely 
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ecocentric approach to the threat of extinction; that is, they pay more attention to the 
scale of the problem than to its impact on individual animals.  The Hunter, in its 
concentration on a single surviving member of a species, presents the threat through a 
more biocentric attention to the fate of individual animals.  These three novels, then, are 
less concerned with issues like the killing of companion animals and the welfare of meat 
animals that Disgrace confronts, but they can be seen to advocate, at a broader 
environmentalist level, a similar concept of life as shared by humans and other animals 
to that which Lucy promotes and Lurie appears to adopt. 
 The novels can also be seen to engage with general questions about the role of 
literature in the negotiation of difference. Fiction offers a space in which to explore 
scenarios, and this can provide ways of experimenting with or putting forward 
alternative or hypothetical responses to real problems of cultural or species relations.
Literature’s potential in this respect is most explicitly addressed in Disgrace.  Here, as 
elsewhere in his work, Coetzee raises questions about the responsibilities and limitations 
of fiction, and uses the conflicting opinions of his characters to explore controversial 
questions without providing definitive answers.  Additionally, through Lurie’s 
contemplation of including a dog in his opera, Coetzee also raises self-referent questions 
about the place of animals in fiction.  Unlike Disgrace, Life of Pi does not examine 
authorial responsibilities, but it too includes direct comments about literature.  These 
occur in the frame narrator’s remarks about writing and the purpose of fiction, which he 
says is to twist reality to bring out its essence, and of course in Pi’s emphasis on ‘the 
better story,’ by which he means imaginative storytelling that gives his experiences 
meaning.  This is the reason for Pi’s and by extension Martel’s narration of a story with 
animals, so this is also Life of Pi’s answer to the question of animals’ place in literature.  
Mr Allbones' Ferrets and The Hunter are less explicit on the subject of literature, but 
they do make certain points about it.  Farrell foregrounds the incomplete distinction 
between fiction and history, including people’s names and real events within the 
narrative, but showing how those people might have fictionalised the historical record.
The Hunter also questions the reliability of accepted history, most directly through M’s 
comment, ‘There is always new history to be made’ (37), and through Leigh’s own 
fictional ‘remaking’ of history to create a cautionary scenario.  In Oryx and Crake,
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Atwood is more overt about the same use of a fictional scenario to, as the Crakers put it, 
‘tell us about real’, and specifically to warn the present about what is already ‘real’.
 In various ways, then, the novels participate in wider explorations of issues of 
culture, environmentalism, animal studies and welfare, and about the role of literature 
within the negotiation of difference in those areas.  Indeed, sensitivity to those larger 
concerns can be seen to inform another common feature of their representation of anti-
and posthumanism: all the novels convey doubts about whether challenges to humanism 
can actually achieve the desired results.   
 Most of the novels regard the abandonment of humanist paradigms as a potential 
solution, because if maintaining the humanist subject is no longer the priority, this might 
facilitate more positive cultural and species relations.  However, the novels all convey 
doubts as to the likely success of such ideas.  In Life of Pi, this is because the humanist 
subject is still seen as valuable, so to abandon it in its entirety would not constitute 
success.  In the other novels, however, the caution about presenting anti- or 
posthumanism as solutions may be attributable to an awareness of the complexity of 
cultural and environmental problems and the responsibilities of fiction in responding to 
them: in other words, the novels seem wary of oversimplifications and complacency.   
 In his discussion of environmentalist ‘narratives of resignation’ Richard 
Kerridge suggests: 
 In part, the problem is that conventional plot structures require forms of solution 
 and closure that seem absurdly evasive when applied to ecological questions 
 with their extremes of timescale and complexities of interdependency.  And that 
 is the challenge for novelists and ecocritical theorists of narrative, if we are to 
 have environmentalist novels that do not take failure for granted.
2
    
Although they are not all concerned with environmentalist issues, if the novels that I 
have addressed were to present resistance to humanism as a straightforward solution, 
this could similarly trivialise the problems with which they are engaging.  On the other 
hand, to convey hopelessness would be to invite apathy and might thus become self-
fulfilling.  Ideally, then, catastrophe must be presented as a preventable, worst case 
2 Richard Kerridge, ‘Narratives of Resignation: Environmentalism in Recent Fiction,’ in The
Environmental Tradition in English Literature, ed. John Parham (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2002), 87, 99. 
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scenario.  This is not always the case in the novels in question here, but all five avoid 
presenting opposition to humanism as a complete solution, and all locate some degree of 
hope in animals or nature as having power to resist.  
Life of Pi and Disgrace represent some aspects of opposition to humanism as 
effective. Life of Pi is wary about challenges to human exceptionality: when in Pi’s 
second story, he performs Richard Parker’s brutal actions from the first, the threat to 
Pi’s humanity is regarded negatively and this story is not seen to fulfil the meaning-
giving purpose of fiction.  However, the repression of that narrative reinstates Richard 
Parker as the killer of the French cook (he does so twice, if this figure is represented by 
the hyena as well as the French castaway), deflecting blame which otherwise accrues to 
Pi. The meerkats in particular are also presented as remarkable in ways that defy 
rationalist explanation.  In these ways, animals are a significant factor in Pi’s victory in 
the debate about ‘the better story’, and so in Life of Pi’s overriding optimism.  However, 
its solutions can be seen as evasive in that they are arguably achieved by refusing to 
engage with problems about human-animal relations.  In Disgrace, the success of the 
species-posthumanist sharing of life that Lucy promotes is limited by the scale of the 
obstacles to it. Individual humans struggle to negotiate post-apartheid tensions, and are 
unable to solve the problems of too many unwanted animals or too much meat 
consumption.  However, the novel does show how experience of animals can affect 
someone: abandoning his default position that humans are a different order of being, 
Lurie comes to feel that animals are deserving of basic respect from humans.  He moves 
Petrus’s sheep so that they can drink and graze, and even honours the corpses of dogs.  
Additionally, rather than amounting to a criticism, his view of Lucy’s decision to submit 
to Petrus as ‘like a dog’ may facilitate his acceptance of it (205), despite the enduring 
question in the novel as to whether her choice is the right one.  The novel’s attention to 
personal ethical development, then, allows more scope for success than its engagement 
with larger problems, so that in Lurie at least, both human-animal and South African 
cultural relations are presented as works in very slow progress.
 The other novels place little faith in personal development or larger scale 
solutions, but they also avoid presenting animals as altogether helpless. All express 
reservations about the effectiveness of conservationist values in response to 
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anthropocentric science.  In Mr Allbones' Ferrets, Allbones expresses regret when 
extinction is explained to him, while Pitford, an expert on the subject, sends mustelids to 
New Zealand.  In demonstrating that neither knowledge nor concern is sufficient on its 
own, the novel gives some idea of the complexities of the contexts in which extinctions 
occur.  Moreover, this novel cannot offer solutions because it concerns a history of 
imperialism and extinction which fiction cannot undo without trivialising it.  However, 
some animals offer resistance to human mastery.  Individual animals bite, scratch and 
soil humans, while mustelids (and nightingales) defy human expectations in New 
Zealand.  Although this resulted in tragedy for the bird species affected, some optimism 
can be derived from the idea that animals do have power to hinder anthropocentric 
projects.  In The Hunter, M’s successful hunt is a triumph of human supremacy, 
international interests and anthropocentric technology over interconnections between 
species, local interests, and conservationism.  Biotechnology’s recuperative potential – 
M knows that a sperm can be made from the thylacine’s own blood (166) – is 
subordinated to the ends of biological warfare.  However, while there can be no hope for 
the thylacine, she impedes M where little else does, by accidentally or deliberately 
evading him and unknowingly influencing his feelings enough to delay his fatal shot.  In 
Oryx and Crake technology that could be used to preserve or perhaps even re-establish 
animal species is again redirected, and in this case used to make new ones to serve 
human ends.  Ecological crises appear to have led to the assimilation of Canada, while a 
global capitalism in which North America dominates has exacerbated international 
inequalities.  Resistance movements are presented as marginalised and ineffective. 
However, the novel does leave room for the possibility that its worst case scenario could 
still be avoided, and it emphasises the overall capacity of ‘nature’, in the sense of a 
nonhuman influence on living things, to persist despite anthropocentrism, 
biotechnological manipulation, and even dramatic climate change and extinctions.
 All the novels, then, include challenges to humanist discourse which can be seen 
to have a wider relevance to social and ideological concerns about the negotiation of 
differences, between cultures and between the human and the nonhuman, and about the 
role of literature in such negotiations.  Sensitivity to the scale of these larger problems or 
about the role of fiction can also be seen to inflect the novels’ avoidance of presenting 
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challenges to humanism as triumphing, although some hope is often expressed in 
relation to animals or nature. The representation of animals in Life of Pi challenges 
narrow-minded rationalism while working to maintain Pi’s human status, while in the 
other novels, animals certainly do not have enough power to effect change, but they are 
not entirely passive victims.  In these ways, the novels present animals as meriting 
attention from multiple perspectives for the challenges they pose to humanism.  More 
broadly, the treatment of animals facilitates exploration of what dispensing with 
humanism could or should mean, and what the obstacles are. Before offering a final 
evaluation of the results of the alliance between white postcolonial cultures and animals, 
I want briefly to explore how these novels use animals to explore what the abandonment 
of humanist paradigms might mean in terms of two other recurring themes: gender 
relations and religion. 
Gender and religion 
The novels are united by other several thematic commonalities besides those on which I 
have concentrated in this thesis, and two that recur with significant frequency are gender 
and religion, which each appear in four of the five texts.  Some similarities in these areas 
have already been touched on in the preceding chapters, but it is possible now that all of 
the texts have been examined to assess the nature of these overlaps and their relationship 
to the themes of species and humanism that are my focus.  
 If comparisons between women and animals are, like those between slaves and 
animals made by Marjorie Spiegel, in any sense ‘dreaded’,
3
 it is because they reinforce 
the binaries between male/female and human/nature that contribute to the definition of 
the humanist subject and the marginalisation of its perceived others.  Val Plumwood 
writes, ‘that women’s inclusion in the sphere of nature has been a major tool in their 
oppression emerges clearly from a glance at traditional sources… Feminine “closeness 
to nature” has hardly been a complement’.  The challenge for critical ecofeminism, then, 
is to find ‘a route of escape from the problematic that the traditional association between 
women and nature creates for feminists, to a position which neither accepts women’s 
3 Marjorie Spiegel, The Dreaded Comparison: Human and Animal Slavery (New York: Mirror Books, 
1996).
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exclusion from reason nor accepts the construction of nature as inferior’.
4
  As with 
postcolonial-animal connections, then, the female-nature association might be 
understood as helpful or harmful, depending on how it is represented.  The relationship 
between species and gender relations in these novels often involves parallels between 
women and animal as victims, but it also serves to question the implications of those 
parallels, for animals, women and men.  
 In Disgrace, the theme of sexual exploitation is more obviously tied to cultural 
relations than to species relations, but it is, as I noted in chapter one, framed by animal 
imagery.  Lurie’s invasion of Soraya and Melanie’s lives is suggestive of imperialism, 
and arguably, because the mature Lurie teaches the young Melanie about European 
literature, and because her retaliation forces him to resign this post, their relationship 
might be read as a parallel to the relationship between Europe and its former colony, 
South Africa.  Lurie’s diminishing sexual needs might also be read as a metaphor for 
this cultural situation.  It is not until he acknowledges the changes in both areas that he 
begins to develop respect for the white, middle-aged Bev, with whom he develops an 
eventually asexual relationship.  The role of animals in connection with these 
relationships changes too: whereas Lurie uses predation metaphors to conceptualise his 
actions towards Soraya and Melanie, his relationship with Bev is framed by the realities 
of animals’ lives and deaths in the clinic.  Indeed, in their role as carers for animals, 
Lucy and Bev both occupy traditional female positions in relation to real animals, which 
Lurie first derides and then comes to share.  In other respects, however, Lucy is not 
typically female until her rape forces her, on several levels, to become so.  At first 
independent and possibly lesbian, Lurie speculates that she is raped as a punishment for 
these points as well as for racial reasons.  Literalising the connections informing sorts of 
metaphors criticised by Carol Adams,
5
 Lucy’s rape is also associated with the 
‘butchering’ of animals as the dogs in the kennels are slaughtered as part of the attack.
Finally, defined by her biology too, Lucy finds she is pregnant from the rape, and 
chooses to assume the traditional female roles of mother and (unofficially) Petrus’s 
wife.  In Disgrace, then associations between women and animals tend to emphasise 
4 Val Plumwood, Feminism and the Mastery of Nature (London: Routledge, 1993), 19, 20. 
5 Carol J. Adams, The Sexual Politics of Meat (New York: Continuum, 2000), 4. 
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victimhood, culminating in Lurie’s simile between Lucy’s lack of property, rights or 
dignity with the position of a dog. 
 In Mr Allbones' Ferrets, the characters can in various ways be likened to those of 
Disgrace in terms of gender themes.  As I noted in chapter three, Allbones and Eugenia 
break with the traditional gendering of detachment and care in relation to animals. 
Eugenia kills insects and philosophises while Allbones, like Lurie at the end of 
Disgrace, is comfortable with expressing liking for animals and regret about their 
deaths.  Pitford, meanwhile, is more like Lurie’s earlier self.  His exploitation of a much 
younger female protégée might again be interpreted as a parallel to the empire’s 
exploitation of the colony, which in turn suggests a parallel between Eugenia and her 
grandfather’s avian victims in New Zealand.  The Pitfords’ grandparent-grandchild 
relationship might also echo that between past and present.  Whereas Coetzee 
problematises such parallels by making them explicitly and by inverting them in Lucy’s 
rape, it is not clear whether Farrell is using them self-consciously.  There is certainly a 
parallel, though, between Pitford’s various actions, and if he sees them as natural, that 
explanation would resemble Lurie’s presentation of his relationship with Melanie as the 
result of instinct. Meanwhile, for Eugenia even more than for Disgrace’s Lucy, 
pregnancy spells an end to her autonomy and she is married off to Allbones.  Thus, as 
applied to a woman, the novel’s message that humans are subject to nature somewhat 
problematically situates Eugenia in the conventional roles she has hitherto avoided, as if 
they are her inevitable fate.
 In terms of the abandonment of the humanist subject, then, Disgrace and Mr
Allbones' Ferrets can be seen to emphasise that this needs to include dispensing with the 
privileging of the masculine, so that women remain in control of what happens to their 
bodies rather than being victimised and then defined by their procreative role.  However, 
Lurie and Allbones at least do not appear much inhibited by the idea that caring for 
animals might seem unmanly.  This is more of a problem in The Hunter.
 The Hunter, like Mr Allbones' Ferrets, opposes male to female and science to 
nature.  Only Jarrah Armstrong challenges these oppositions through his work as a 
naturalist, and he is dead.  The cross-dressing of the other main male environmentalist 
character, Free, feminises his role as carer and this alienates M, so that, as I suggested in 
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chapter four, the persistent gendering of an association with nature as feminine seems to 
be criticised for impeding the development of the kind of ‘ecomasculinism’ that Jarrah 
apparently embodied.  In terms of M’s relationships with others, the traditional binaries 
are indirect, but present.  There are no instances of sexual exploitation in the novel, but 
he is dishonest with both Lucy and her daughter Sass (his manipulation of Sass could 
also be read as a parallel to the secret globalising exploitation of Australia by the 
biotechnology company).  Lucy and Sass are not directly associated with the thylacine 
or with nature, but M lies to them in order to facilitate the hunt.  Similarly, although M 
is not pursuing the thylacine because she is female, he is the male hunter of a female 
victim, and his impulse to care for the dead body (like the mother of a murder victim 
(165)) is repressed during an appropriation of her reproductive organs which clearly 
perpetuates male technology / female nature binaries.  This novel, then, emphasises the 
need to dispense with these divisions as part of the opposition to humanism so that 
caring for nature ceases to be seen as the exclusive province of women. 
Oryx and Crake presents male/female and human/nature binaries differently, in 
that they are not necessarily disadvantageous to women.  Jimmy’s mother Sharon is 
associated with nature because she condemns interference with it.  However, she moves 
in the opposite direction to Eugenia and Disgrace’s Lucy.  Indeed, she can be seen as 
something of an ecofeminist heroine, escaping her roles as wife and mother and 
liberating Jimmy’s (female) rakunk Killer, before joining a resistance movement.  
Meanwhile, female children are sexually exploited in pornography watched alongside 
violence to animals on the internet, and Oryx, who may have been one of these girls, is 
animalised as part of Jimmy’s exoticisation of her appearance.  However, when (as 
Snowman) he reinstates the human/animal binary for the Crakers, he also genders it in a 
way that deifies Oryx as a nature goddess: he says that the Crakers were made by Crake 
whereas other animals hatched from an egg laid by Oryx.  In this novel, then, the 
interaction between species and gender themes foregrounds and explores the traditional 
association between the female and the natural, but it is not seen in such negative terms, 
implying that it has been revalued to the point that it is worth retaining when other 
humanist concepts are not.  
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 The one novel that does not include any explicit treatment of gender themes is 
Life of Pi.  Indeed, with the exception of Pi’s mother and some brief appearances by his 
wife and daughter in the frame narrative, there are no significant female humans, and 
Orange Juice, the only female animal in the lifeboat, seems to be female largely so that 
she can be blurred, in Pi’s second narrative, with the character of his mother.  This is a 
surprising omission for Martel, given that the theme of gender is the driving force in his 
previous novel, Self, a narrative of repeated gender metamorphosis reminiscent of 
Virginia Woolf’s Orlando.
6
  There too, however, the masculine is arguably dominant in 
that, unlike Orlando, the protagonist goes from male to female and back again.  In the 
focus on male characters in Life of Pi, masculinity is neither threatened nor asserted to 
the same extent as human superiority, but the retention of the traditional humanist 
concentration on the male might be seen as paralleling the retention of humanist human 
superiority, in contrast to the other novels’ questioning of both. 
The second commonality that I want to address is the theme of religion, which 
again features in four of the five novels. Disgrace, Mr Allbones' Ferrets, Life of Pi and 
Oryx and Crake can all be seen to explore the question of how religious ideas apply in 
the context of their various anti- or posthumanist goals, whether they try to dispense 
with rationalism and categorisation only, or to promote a more extensive redefinition of 
what it means to be human. 
Religion features within the language and symbolism of Disgrace to an extent 
that cannot be fully evaluated here, but most importantly for my purposes, Lurie’s 
disgrace and his subsequent service to animals raise concepts of sin and atonement, even 
though he is wary of reading them in this way.  In relation to animals, the theme of 
religion can be understood as having two facets.  One of these is Lurie’s frequent use of 
religious terms.  The inferiority of animal souls, a concept that he borrows from ‘The 
Church Fathers’ (probably Aquinas, as I suggested in chapter two) is used as a 
distinction between humans and other species.  In his response to Bev’s work at the 
clinic, Lurie juxtaposes her very practical relation to animals with ‘the story of – who 
was it? St Hubert? – who gave refuge to a deer that came clattering into his chapel … 
6 Yann Martel. Self. (London: Faber, 1996).  Virginia Woolf Orlando (1928; repr., Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1998). 
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fleeing the huntsman’s dogs’(84).
7
  These sorts of references, like the animal metaphors 
and classicising imagery, contribute to the impression that Lurie conceptualises life in 
abstract terms.  However, he is obviously not religious.  When Melanie’s father speaks 
to him in religious terms, he replies, ‘I will have to translate what you call God and 
God’s wishes into my own terms.  In my own terms, I am being punished… I am sunk 
into a state of disgrace’ (172).  Derek Attridge suggests that this phrase ‘clearly evokes 
the theological notion of a “state of grace,” the name for a condition of receptiveness to 
the divine’ (182).  However, Lurie reconceptualises that idea in secular terms: ‘It is not a 
punishment I have refused.  I do not murmur against it.  On the contrary, I am living it 
out, from day to day, trying to accept disgrace as my state of being’ (172).  In doing so, 
he seems more receptive to Bev’s implication, which he initially dismisses as new-age 
nonsense, that humans might have responsibilities to animals and that neither humans 
nor animals are prepared for death without being escorted.  Lurie slowly combines his 
abstractions with this perspective to arrive at ideals that he actually lives by.  He offers 
animals love as he escorts them to their deaths and tries to accord them dignity 
afterwards, even though he continues to think about this in European religious terms, 
casting himself as a psychopomp as distinct from a saviour (146).
8
  After eating mutton, 
he even decides to ask forgiveness, of whom or what he does not specify.  Although the 
death of the sheep has overtones of religious sacrifice, it is most important as 
representing the fate of meat-animals in general.  This suggests that it might best be read 
in relation to sacrifice as Derrida uses the term, in relation to the conceptual 
subordination of animals to anthropocentric ends, and this might be why Lurie feels he 
should ask forgiveness.  In these ways, then, Disgrace uses religious concepts to frame 
the repositioning of human-animal relations that occurs as part of Lurie’s personal 
development as an ethical one. 
Mr Allbones' Ferrets also uses religious references this way, concentrating on 
Genesis.  First, in the woods at dawn, Allbones imagines that ‘this is the Eden time, and 
… he, Allbones, is the first man’ (21).  Extracts from Genesis also associate the voyage 
7 St Hubert is more commonly said to have encountered a deer with a crucifix in its horns, and devoted 
himself to God as a result.  
8 A psychopomp is a guide for the souls of the dead; for instance, Charon, in Greek mythologies, ferries 
souls into Hades. 
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with Noah’s Ark, and raise the idea that animal lives are in human hands.
9
  However, 
Allbones does not have much religious education and instead treats animals according to 
his own sense of right and wrong.  In this sense, his approach is not dissimilar to that of 
the characters in Disgrace. He does not have the same ideas about what constitutes right 
and wrong: he does not feel that he must justify or ask forgiveness for meat-eating.  
However, Allbones feels a sense of obligation to care for the mustelids and like Lurie, 
he accords their bodies a certain dignity after death, not feeding them to each other but 
dropping them into the sea like human corpses.  In these two novels, then, personal 
relations with animals are not strictly religious, but they are informed by the characters’ 
sense of morality, which in both novels works to suggest that humans might have 
obligations to animals of some kind. 
In Life of Pi, religion is presented quite differently.  Firstly, this novel is 
concerned with multiple religions.  Like Mr Allbones' Ferrets, Life of Pi includes details 
that can be connected to Eden and the ark: to Pi the zoo is ‘paradise on earth’ (14), 
which may refer to either Eden or heaven, and the voyage connects the Tsimtsum and 
the lifeboat with the ark.  However, the name Tsimtsum seems to be inspired by the 
Kabbalistic term tzimtzum, the name for the retraction of God’s light in order to create a 
space in which creation could occur.  Next, in the process called shevirat ha-kelim, God 
began to pour his light into the vessels he had created but they broke apart. The third 
step in the process, tikkun, is the process of recovering the shattered fragments of God’s 
power.
10
  Pi himself does not make much of these points: he refers to studying the 
Kabbalistic teachings of Isaac Luria later in his life, but does not comment on the name 
of the Tsimtsum (3).  However, Martel is arguably suggesting through the name of the 
ship that its sinking might be read in relation to shevirat, and therefore that Pi’s 
subsequent struggle to survive is a process of tikkun, of recovering fragments of the 
divine.  Indeed, all three of Pi’s own religions come into play during his voyage.  He 
likens the sea creatures under the raft to angels (198), he sees Richard Parker display 
‘Such a mix of ease and concentration, such a being-in-the-present’ as ‘would be the  
9 Genesis 9.1-2, in Farrell, 134 
10 See Byron L. Sherwin, Kabbalah: An Introduction to Jewish Mysticism (Lanham and Oxford: Rowman 
and Littlefield, 2006). 
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envy of the highest yogis’ (182), and praises Allah during an electrical storm, saying to 
Richard Parker, ‘This is miracle.  This is an outbreak of divinity’ (233).  These are all 
small details which seem little more than turns of phrase, yet they are consistent with a 
religious theme in which nature is constructed as evidence of divinity, which might 
again suggest that they are holy fragments which Pi is gathering together.  Pi’s faith is 
most threatened by the carnivorousness of the island, where he feels he would live a life 
of spiritual death, and by the second story, where there is no Richard Parker and Pi 
displays ‘evil’ (311).  However, this story ends with the words, ‘I turned to God.  I 
survived’ (311).  In this way, religion is seen to overcome even the threat to Pi’s human 
distinctiveness from Richard Parker.  The interviewers’ acceptance of the first, 
remarkable story over this one is also seen as promoting belief.  Although their debate is 
not explicitly about religion, the implication of the remarkable ‘better story’ (with 
animals) is that it gives meaning to human life.  This inverts the connection in Disgrace 
and Mr Allbones' Ferrets, in which religion frames ideas about how animals should be 
regarded: here, animals instead frame ideas about belief.  
 The association between the natural and the divine that appears in Life of Pi is
also made in Oryx and Crake.  This novel’s approach to religion lies somewhere 
between those of Life of Pi and Mr Allbones' Ferrets. Oryx and Crake presents nature 
and God as related or indistinguishable forces, echoing Atwood’s own ‘pessimistic 
pantheism’, according to which ‘God is everywhere, but losing’.
11
  In the novel, 
God/nature is losing to technohumanism: scientists’ power over biology has become 
such that they ‘feel like God’ (51).  Later, Crake dismisses both God and Nature ‘with a 
capital N’ (206), and arrogantly names his biosphere ‘Paradice’.  However, other 
characters in the novel appear to hold similar views to Atwood.  In particular, Sharon 
comes to regard biotechnological interference as ‘sacrilegious’ (57), and 
environmentalist activist groups go by the names of God’s Gardeners and MaddAddam.  
As I suggested in chapter five, the novel also implies that God/nature may be losing, but 
has not lost. This is apparent from the reversions and evolutions of the artificial species, 
and in particular, the Crakers’ development of reverence.  Here, then, the point that Oryx 
11 Margaret Atwood, ‘Interview with Margaret Atwood’ 
http://www.randomhouse.com/features/atwood/interview.html 
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and Crake makes using religion is very similar to the secular message of Mr Allbones' 
Ferrets that humans are not omnipotent in relation to nature.  However, the 
representation of MaddAddam and especially God’s Gardeners as compared with Crake 
and the transgenicists suggests that reverence is also important as a means of reinforcing 
this.  This means that while Crakers do not show any sign of trying to master nature, 
their religious predisposition, which Snowman directs not only towards their creator but 
towards a nature deity, may be understood in the novel as a kind of safeguard against 
what Sharon calls ‘interfering with the building blocks of life’ (75). 
 As with gender, one novel is again exceptional in relation to religion: The Hunter
pays little attention to this theme.  Perhaps the concept closest to religion is the 
environmentalist characters’ deep-ecological notion of oneness in which life is a cosmic 
whole, an idea which they interpret as offering a kind of immortality.  However, 
although M at one point reflects disdainfully on a ‘mother rainbow goddess’, there is no 
evidence that the environmentalists worship any deity.  A reference to Aboriginal beliefs 
does appear when Bike, the son in M’s host family, talks about hearing a legend at 
school of how the thylacine earns his stripes (literally) as a mark of bravery for helping a 
spirit called palanna (78).  However, none of the characters in the novel regards legends 
of the Dreaming as any more than stories. The only sense in which the novel might be 
understood to engage with Dreaming is in M’s attempts to imagine his way into a 
thylacine body.  One meaning of Dreaming, according to Max Charlesworth, is that it 
 refers to the embodiment of the spiritual power of the ancestor heroes in the 
 land, in certain sites, and in species of fauna and flora, so that this power is 
 available to people today… it is through ritual that individuals can enter the 
 spirit world and not only contact the Dreamtime presences but, more, become 
 identified with them.
12
Thus, when Greg Garrard describes the first moment in which M imagines himself as a 
thylacine as ‘a kind of shamanistic transformation’,
13
 he may be correct to read it as 
ritualistic.  M is certainly not entering the spirit world of the Dreamtime in the way that 
12 Max Charlesworth, introduction to Religion in Aboriginal Australia: An Anthology, ed. Max 
Charlesworth, Howard Morphy, Diane Bell and Kenneth Maddock (St Lucia, London and New York: 
University of Queensland Press, 1984), 10. 
13 Greg Garrard, Ecocriticism (London: Routledge 2004), 157. 
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Charlesworth describes, but there may be an analogy at work here.  What M actually 
believes, however, is that his place in life is defined by his participation in a history of 
human dominance over other species.  He shows no signs of being religious, and he 
does not believe in love or luck but rather in what he calls ‘precision’ as the best means 
of achieving his goals.  Events undermine his positions as he develops affection for the 
Armstrongs only to lose any opportunity of joining them, but reason and precision do 
eventually lead him to the thylacine. 
With the exception of Life of Pi’s avoidance of gender themes and The Hunter’s
minimal treatment of religion, the recurrence of these two concerns shows how the 
engagement with animals inflects other major themes in the selected novels. They 
foreground and often interrogate the association between women and nature, and help to 
examine how gender relations should change and how religious ideas apply in the 
context of anti- or posthumanist redefinitions of the human.  Taken together with the 
attention to imperialism or globalisation and anthropocentrism that informs each of 
these novels, these themes demonstrate the presence of a certain set of shared concerns 
across their different contexts.  The common thread running between them is their 
exploration of the enduring effects of humanist paradigms on social relations and 
human-nature relations, and about what it should or could mean for those relationships 
and human beliefs if those paradigms were effectively dismantled.  In all these novels, 
animals play a central role in the exploration of these ideas, in their capacity as the 
constitutive other of the humanist construction of the subject. 
Animals in white postcolonial literature
In this selection of contemporary literature, then, the relationship between the fictional 
representation of animals and broader concerns within and beyond the novels makes it 
clear that, as Marian Scholtmeijer finds in her analysis of animal victims in fiction, ‘the 
animal means’.
14
  I want to end by returning to the question of alliance between animals 
and postcolonialism that has been the focus here to discuss exactly what it is, based on 
14 Marian Scholtmeijer, Animal Victims in Modern Fiction: From Sanctity to Sacrifice (Toronto: 
University of Toronto Press, 1993), 92. 
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the analysis in this thesis, that animals do mean for contemporary white postcolonial 
cultures, and what in turn that means for animals. 
 The most obvious reason for any literary treatment of species relations – an 
interest in or concern for animals – certainly informs each of the novels examined here.  
This is not a culturally specific explanation. It is however one that can be inflected by 
culturally specific concerns.  At the outset of this thesis, I raised several possible 
theories that might explain the attention to animals within white postcolonial literature 
in particular.  These included a displacement of cultural guilt, awareness of connections 
between anthropocentrism and racism, identification with animals as victims, guilt about 
colonial human-animal relations, European settler desire for ‘indigeneity’, and the desire 
to break away from external forms of authority.  I now want to return to these 
explanations and offer some conclusions as to which seem most applicable here. 
 An explanation that is often given for postcolonial treatments of animals, which 
has relevance to both white and decolonizing postcolonialism, is animals’ status as 
victims.  One of the ideas raised in the introduction was that animals might function, 
whether at an acknowledged or unacknowledged level, as substitute objects of 
atonement in place of previously colonised people.  Postcolonial cultural relations tend 
to be fraught with lasting tensions: decolonising people might express a sense of 
disinheritance, while white postcolonial people may be reluctant to accept responsibility 
for their ancestors’ actions.  Ironically, because other species do not appear to make 
claims, because they are considered less important than humans, and because humans 
everywhere exploit them, to acknowledge guilt in relation to animals might be easier to 
countenance.  However, because it entails a displacement, possibly an unacknowledged 
one, the explanation of symbolic atonement remains difficult to detect or to prove either 
way.  Whether or not it is a factor in these novels, it also seems unlikely that atonement 
in relation to animals is only symbolic.  
 A more overt connection with colonised or formerly colonised peoples is an 
attention to animals as parallels to them.  This idea is explored in Disgrace, where
Coetzee addresses species relations and cultural relations alongside one another and 
appears to draw parallels between them.  Although this approach risks being seen as 
demeaning Africans by animalisation, likening their situations does not mean equating 
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people with animals.  Disgrace arguably criticises both speciesism and racism; the main 
point of the connection in the novel is that Lucy’s view that there is only one life, which 
we share (74), applies to post-apartheid race relations as well as to species relations.  
However, as is already clear, Disgrace is an exception among the novels addressed here.  
South African race relations are adjusting to the changes wrought by the end of 
apartheid, whereas in Canada, Australia and New Zealand, first peoples are 
outnumbered and current race relations are more stable.  It is probably at least partly for 
that reason that only Disgrace, of the five novels examined here, addresses race 
relations extensively.
Life of Pi’s illustration of different animals’ ability to cohabit can be seen to 
parallel Pi’s multiculturalism, but this is not made explicit; instead, Pi’s teacher suggests 
that politicians might learn from the animals.  In Canada, Pi’s cat is named Moccasin (a  
Native Canadian shoe), but Native Canadians themselves are not mentioned.  In the 
other novels, first peoples are very much on the margins.  In Mr Allbones' Ferrets,
Fowler Metcalfe is disappointed after basing his idea of New Zealand on pictures of an 
‘island girl’ undressing, but this refers to colonial misconceptions without exploring race 
relations as such.  The only reference to Maori appears in an epigraph, in which Walter 
Buller supposes that they will die out like the New Zealand robin (119-120).  The
Hunter makes a similar connection, but it is no more extensive.  When M finds an old 
aboriginal fireplace, he recalls reading that De Witt Island was proposed as a ‘sanctuary’ 
for the decreasing populations of both Tasmanian Aborigines and thylacines.  
Otherwise, neither Tasmanian nor any other Aboriginal groups appear.  Finally, in Oryx
and Crake, Atwood presents the west as exploiting other cultures through internet 
spectacle and Happicuppa’s blatant disregard for fair trade.  However, the only reference 
to native North American cultures remains implicit: the Crakers’ design appears to be 
informed by European notions of primitivism and ‘the noble savage’, which were often 
associated with Native Americans and Canadians.  As in Disgrace, then, the association 
between animals and native cultures usually seems intended to oppose speciesism by 
underscoring its similarities with racism, but the appearance of bypassing people and 
prioritising animals is problematic.  These writers may not feel that they have to address 
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race relations just because of their postcolonial status.
15
  Alternatively, as discussed in 
chapter one, avoidance could mean deliberate marginalisation or it could mean wariness 
of appropriating someone else’s story.  Race is thus a difficult subject for white writers 
to address without being accused of insensitivity of one kind or another, and perhaps 
they are less inclined to enter the territory where it is less urgent.  Although parallels 
with race relations appear in each novel, then, they do not seem to be the main reason 
for white postcolonial literature’s attention to animals. 
 Another possible explanation for that attention, which again concerns animal 
victimhood, is raised by Margaret Atwood’s suggestion that Canadians ‘feel threatened 
and nearly extinct as a nation’ and see animals as mirrors of their victimhood.
16
Mr
Allbones' Ferrets, The Hunter and Oryx and Crake all deal with animal extinctions in 
conjunction with imperialist or globalising threats to postcolonial countries.  In Farrell’s 
novel, many New Zealand bird species are about to be destroyed by the importation of 
European animals by European humans; thus, colonisation is causing animal extinctions.  
In The Hunter too, the priorities of the international biotechnology company override 
the interests of the thylacine herself, together with the value a live thylacine would have 
for local humans.  In Oryx and Crake, habitat loss and climate change have resulted in 
mass extinction, and the United States, its cities displaced by rising sea levels and 
temperature, has apparently assimilated Canadian territory and rendered Canada 
‘extinct’.  In three of the five novels, then, an association between the human threat to 
other species and the sense of an international threat to a postcolonial country does seem 
to be a factor in the representation of animals. 
 An alternative view is that the white postcolonial attention to species relations 
stems instead from a sense of regret in relation to the local treatment of animals, past or 
present.  Atwood dismisses this explanation in favour of the previous one, but it seems 
important in the novels addressed here, and the two ideas are not incompatible.  Mr
15 Atwood defends a similar position in relation to gender: ‘I write about women because they interest me, 
not because I think I ought to.  Art created from a sense of obligation is bound to be static’. Margaret 
Atwood, ‘If You Can't Say Something Nice, Don't Say Anything at All,’ in Language in Her Eye: Writing 
and Gender: Views on Writing and Gender by Canadian Women Writing in English, ed. Libby Scheier, 
Sarah Sheard and Eleanor Wachtel (Toronto: Coach House Press, 1990), 22. 
16 Margaret Atwood, Survival: A Thematic Guide to Canadian Literature (Toronto: House of Anansi 
Press, 1972), 79. 
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Allbones' Ferrets and The Hunter seem particularly motivated by a sense of regret 
regarding colonial human-animal relations.  Mr Allbones' Ferrets reminds the reader of 
the lamentable actions of colonisers, while The Hunter’s re-situation of the thylacine’s 
extinction in the present at once highlights the original tragedy and underscores that 
such things are just as likely in the present. Disgrace is more concerned with 
contemporary human-animal relations that are of international relevance, but its 
examples are the plight of unwanted animals in South Africa and Bev’s suggestion that 
the nation’s consumption of meat is excessive and unjustifiable.  The sense of 
discomfort at human treatments of animals is less localised in Life of Pi and Oryx and 
Crake. Life of Pi is critical of ‘bad zoos’ and makes a very brief reference to humans’ 
‘excessive predatoriness’ (29), while in Oryx and Crake, this point is extensively 
exemplified through human-induced climate change and the biotechnological 
domination of life.  Thus, regret about the treatment of animals seems culturally specific 
in three of the five novels.
 What is common to all the explanations explored so far, then, is that they are 
based on a view of animals as victims.  This is probably an essential ingredient in 
animals’ significance; it is certainly a central aspect of human-animal relations in 
general. In many of these novels, however, it seems equally important for humans to be 
able to identify with animals in ways that are more positive. 
 One reason why white postcolonial people might identify with specifically with 
native animals has to do with the project of establishing ‘indigeneity’.  Although the 
sense of displacement is arguably diminishing in some cases, identification with 
specifically native animals may contribute to the sense of local belonging which Pakeha 
and white South Africans, Canadians, and Australians have historically struggled to feel.
With the exception of Oryx and Crake (where few naturally occurring animals appear at 
all), each of the novels examined here includes animals native to their settings, but they 
are not always used to access indigeneity.  In Disgrace, a goat appears at the clinic and a 
duiker at the Shaws’ house, but Lurie does not particularly relate to these animals, and 
the novel complicates the notion of white South African belonging rather than 
simplifying it.  In Life of Pi, Richard Parker’s status as a Bengal tiger strengthens his 
association with Pi, but Pi’s Indian status is not in question.  The cat called Moccasin is 
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a light attempt by Pi (and Martel) to connect to the native, but is not a native animal 
himself.  In Mr Allbones Ferrets and The Hunter, native animals are of course more 
significant.  While Farrell portrays the Pitfords as destructive foreigners, the implication 
that contemporary Pakeha have a more responsible attitude to native fauna could imply 
that they have developed a closer relationship to their country.  Similarly, in The Hunter,
the Armstrongs and their friends (who are presumably Australian) try to protect the 
native flora and fauna, although other locals are hostile to them and they are 
unsuccessful.  Four of the novels, then, include native species as ways of acknowledging 
location, and two might be seen to assert some degree of local belonging based on 
responsibility and care for native animals.  
 The final explanation that I want to address is the one that seems, in these 
novels, the most frequently significant: whether or not they are victims, and whether 
they are native or introduced, animals sometimes appear to challenge the Eurocentrism 
and globalisation against which white postcolonial cultures often seek to define 
themselves.  Animals’ foundational position within humanist discourse as an essential 
other makes them uniquely placed to disrupt it.  It is this point, I am suggesting, that is 
central to their culturally specific significance in these novels, where postcolonial 
politics, in different ways, involves attempts to undermine at least certain aspects of 
humanism.  
 In Disgrace, animals contribute to the postcolonial desire for cultural 
independence from Europe through their impact on Lurie’s thinking.  His initial views 
of animals derive from Europe: his animal imagery has much in common with European 
hunting metaphors, and the theoretical grounds that he offers for human exceptionality 
come from ‘The Church Fathers’.  However, through daily contact with animals, Lurie 
begins to think and act as if humans have responsibilities to them. In his opera, he also 
breaks away from the norms of the European genre partly by considering including a 
real dog.  In The Hunter, the elusiveness of the thylacine forces M to rely on what I have 
called hunterly empathy.  When this overflows into his relationships with the Armstrong 
family, he finds that he wants to abandon what is a global and globalising existence for 
one that is rooted in the postcolonial space of Tasmania.  In Life of Pi, animals’ 
cohabitations with each other and alongside humans in cities can be seen to mirror 
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human cultural juxtapositions in India and Canada, which Pi and his families in both 
countries negotiate through cultural hybridity. Animals’ surprising qualities also help to 
invalidate narrow-minded rationality, and this could be seen as a rejection of European 
values, although Martel does not make this connection explicitly.  In Mr Allbones' 
Ferrets, the actions of the mustelids and also Eugenia’s nightingales demonstrate the 
limitations of European scientific expertise: they, like the settlers themselves, get out of 
Europe’s control.  Finally, animals in Oryx and Crake make a similar point in relation to 
the late twenty-first century.  The unexpected actions and developments of various 
transgenic creatures, especially the pigoons and the Crakers, suggest that even if the 
human world becomes dominated by a biotechnological élite, science will not achieve 
omnipotence in relation to nature.  In each novel, then, animals offer challenges to 
imperialistic or globalising as well as anthropocentric ideas or actions on the part of 
humans.   
 Overall, then, the appeal that animals seem to hold for white postcolonialism is 
twofold. They are victims not just of anthropocentrism but also of the imperialistic or 
globalising forces against which white postcolonial cultures seek to define themselves, 
yet they also display some power to resist those forces, thus becoming models for or 
allies in that project.
 However, if this is the only reason to include them, this raises questions about 
the politics of harnessing animals, if only conceptually, to these ends.  The association 
being made between postcolonial cultural issues and animals in Disgrace, Life of Pi, Mr
Allbones' Ferrets, The Hunter and Oryx and Crake can be interpreted in different ways, 
depending on whether or not one concern is subordinated to the other, a question that is 
related to the politics of literature more generally, since authors necessarily ‘use’ 
whatever they include in a text for their own purposes.  The juxtaposition of two themes 
like post-apartheid and species politics can entail a literary instance of Plumwood’s 
definition of instrumentalism, where one concern is treated as a means to the ends of 
another.
17
  In literary representations of animals, instrumentalism might be said to occur 
where they function only as similes, metaphors, or symbols, as in Lurie’s abstractions in 
the first part of Disgrace, while the realities of animals’ lives are passed over as 
17 Val Plumwood, Feminism and the Mastery of Nature, 142. 
211
irrelevant; in other words, if they become what Carol Adams calls absent referents.  
Another possibility is that the experiences of animals might serve primarily to illustrate 
human concerns; their representation as fellow victims, when they are only that, would 
also come into this category.  A non-fictional example of this is Wolfe’s somewhat 
Kantian suggestion that the discourse of speciesism be dismantled in order to neutralise 
animalising language in relation to humans.
18
  Conversely, cultural relations might be 
used as an instrument for advancing species politics, as in Derrida’s and, in The Lives of 
Animals, Elizabeth Costello’s analogies between the exploitation of animals and the 
Holocaust.
19
  However, as Coetzee emphasises via other characters’ responses to 
Costello, this inversion of the first approach also inverts the problem, and can be seen to 
prioritise other animals over the victims of racism, even though the concept is premised 
on anti-racism.
 However, most of the novels addressed here are closer to Plumwood’s definition 
of non-instrumental use, in terms of both cultural and species considerations.  Within 
fiction, any concept is, necessarily, appropriated to human ends, but this is not always 
instrumentalist.  Plumwood explains that in non-instrumental use,  
 even where the other’s agency is overridden by the user’s own in the process of 
 bringing it into use, it is acknowledged as more than a means to these ends, as an 
 independent centre of striving which places limits on the self and on the kinds of 
 use which may be made of it.
20
This definition arguably applies to cultural and human-animal relations in literature 
when, in addition to reflecting one another, these issues are each represented as 
important in themselves.  Thus, while animals serve white postcolonial cultural ends in 
the ways just described, the novels also work to promote animal interests.
Disgrace is perhaps the most obviously concerned with both cultural and species 
politics; the two connect through implicit parallels but each is a major concern of the 
novel.  In terms of animals, Coetzee questions, via a character who is initially very 
18 Cary Wolfe, Animal Rites: American Culture, the Discourse of Species, and Posthumanist Theory
(Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 2003), 7-8. 
19 Jacques Derrida, ‘The Animal That Therefore I Am (More to Follow),’ trans. David Wills. Critical 
Inquiry 28, 2 (2002): 394-95. J.M. Coetzee, The Lives of Animals, ed. Amy Gutmann (Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press, 1999), 19-22, 49-50. 
20  Plumwood, Feminism and the Mastery of Nature, 142. 
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sceptical about animal welfare, the acceptability of perhaps the two most common 
aspects of human-animal relations: the keeping and rejection of companion animals, and 
the production and consumption of meat.  These are localised issues in the novel, but 
their relevance is not.  Disgrace explicitly confronts perceptions of animals and urges its 
readers to reflect on them: Lucy says to Lurie, ‘What would you prefer… that you 
needn’t think about it?  …Wake up’ (124).  Life of Pi, as I have suggested, uses animals 
for anti-rationalist but otherwise humanist ends, yet in doing so, it fosters human 
curiosity about and liking for animals, and a desire for contact with more than just 
companion species.  It also presents the idea of sharing human spaces (like cities) with 
animals as unproblematic through Pi’s attempts to counter the unease that zoo escapes 
inspire.  Thus, although Life of Pi does not question humanist perceptions of animals, it 
does promote positive ones. Mr Allbones' Ferrets, The Hunter and Oryx and Crake all 
present colonisation or globalisation and the threat to animal species as different effects 
of the same imperialistic processes. Mr Allbones' Ferrets and The Hunter, of course, 
concentrate on promoting a conservationist ethic.  On the one hand, the interrogation of 
human-animal relations here seems less radical than that of Disgrace, because there is 
already a general consensus that endangered animals should be protected.  Yet on the 
other hand, this aspect of human-animal relations seems the most urgent.  Leigh’s 
approach arguably has most impact in this respect, because she appeals to both 
biocentric and ecocentric perspectives at once in personalising the thylacine’s extinction 
through an individual animal, whom even M mourns at the moment of her death.  In 
Oryx and Crake, the exacerbation of ethno- and anthropocentrism are both symptoms of 
widespread apocalypse. The novel touches on multiple problems in human-animal 
relations.  Like Disgrace, it addresses meat-eating, presenting it not so much as 
unethical as unsustainable, although the ChickieNobs raise questions about acceptable 
production practices.  There is also a brief engagement with the ethics of keeping 
companion animals, when Sharon decides that Killer will be happier in the wild.  
Meanwhile, like Mr Allbones' Ferrets and The Hunter, Oryx and Crake interrogates the 
scientific manipulation of animals, and highlights the threat of mass extinction. Overall, 
the novel presents human interference with nature as unethical and possibly self-
destructive.
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 In these ways, the connections between white postcolonial literary aims and 
animal interests in these novels can all be regarded as promoting animal interests as well 
as cultural ones. While humanist values cannot simply be made to disappear, the 
representation of animals in all five of the selected novels fosters positive attitudes 
towards them, including admiration, love, care and protection, reverence and perhaps 
co-operation. These attitudes are set against humanist categorising, and in four of the 
five cases, against the privileging of humans at the expense of the literal and conceptual 
sacrifice of animals.   
 This suggests that, at a discursive level, white postcolonial discourse can 
contribute to animal studies as well as the reverse.  The most significant commonality 
between the two fields, of course, is their engagement with questions of similarity and 
difference.  Animal studies is often regarded as the latest step in a series of discourses of 
liberation that has struggled (in different orders in different locations) for 
decolonization, black civil rights, women’s rights and homosexual rights.  Whether or 
not animal studies scholarship is concerned with animal rights (some is and some is 
not), questions about the negotiation of difference are central to it.  What white 
postcolonial discourse can contribute to this is its experience of trying to break away not 
just from a dominant culture but from one’s own culture.  Whereas decolonizing 
postcolonial people in South Africa, Canada, New Zealand and Australia also seek 
definition against the west, there is less confusion about what the distinctions are.  White 
postcolonial cultures, by contrast, have had to define the distinctions for themselves. To 
this extent, white postcolonial discourse could offer useful models for the attempt within 
some animal studies discourse to decentre the anthropos and to forge new 
understandings of species relations. 
 All of these novels, then, support but elaborate on Scholtmeijer’s observation 
that animals ‘mean’ within contemporary literature.  Lurie asks himself, in Disgrace,
whether he can include a dog in his opera, and the novels I have addressed all answer in 
the affirmative.  Moreover, although Scholtmeijer suggests that the fact that animals 
mean in fiction is more important than what they mean, what they mean is surely the 
next most important question, and analysis of their representation within these texts 
suggests that, whatever other concerns they reflect, animals also mean themselves.  To 
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this extent, the alliance proposed by Philip Armstrong between postcolonial and animal 
studies discourses based on humanism as a common antagonist is being made in white 
postcolonial literature, and it does work to advance both interests.  Although novels face 
obstacles in effecting it, including the dangers of ‘the dreaded comparison’ and of 
offering too much or too little hope, the fiction genre, as ever, functions as a forum in 
which to explore ways of negotiating such challenges, without, necessarily, positing 
answers.
In conclusion, perhaps the perspective offered by the project undertaken here can 
best be described as a snapshot.  On the one hand, the focus is narrow.  These particular 
texts are all representing animals as offering of resistance to aspects of humanism, and 
seem to regard animals as potential allies in a collaboration of sorts.  This might suggest 
the existence of a certain trend, but it certainly does not mean that it applies to white 
postcolonial literature in general.  Beyond the frame, however, the literature being 
addressed here connects outward to its broader cultural and historical context, and it is 
this point, I think, which explains the prevalence of species themes within the relatively 
short time period (1999-2007) under discussion here.  These novels participate in and 
reflect the increasing attention currently being paid to questions of humans’ impact upon 
other species and the environment in general.  On this level as well as for more 
culturally specific reasons, they contribute to the ongoing attempts to dismantle the 
humanist figure of Man, which remains dominant at the beginning of the twenty-first 
century.  In this way, these novels attempt to answer again, for their own time, the 
‘question’ of humans and animals’ relation to one another.
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